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ABSTRACT OR SUMMARY 
This study attempts to provide an overview of Canadian 
foreign policy during the years 1943 to 1948. Canada's aspiration 
for an influential global role proportionate to its wartime contri- 
butions, known as the functional principle, merits close attention 
in serving as the basis for Canada's approach to renewed interna- 
tional organization during this period. Hence, Canada's involve- 
ment in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 
the Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference and particularly 
in the creation of the United Nations exemplify the extent and appli- 
cation of this new philosophy, as well as its successes and failures. 
A maturation from the idealism voiced in 1943 to the more sober prag- 
matism evident by 1948 is noted. The evolving relationship with the 
United Kingdom is analyzed, the focus being on the nature and evolu- 
tion of the Commonwealth consultative process, together with the 
viability of a common foreign and defence policy. Changes in the 
Commonwealth as an association through the admission of newly inde- 
pendent members are considered. Another major theme is the signi- 
ficance of Canada's relations with the United States as approached 
from the perspectives of political influence and continental inte- 
gration. Canada's increasing awareness of other nations in the 
hemisphere, as well as the expansion of both the Department of Exter- 
nal Affairs and the Canadian presence abroad are also reviewed. By 
the final chapters, it is evident that through the advent of peace 
in Europe, the necessity of a multilateral effort for its reconstruc- 
tion, and ultimately through the creation of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, a traditional tenet of Canadian policy, the "North Atlantic 
Triangle", is maintained, but in a realigned form. Canadian policy 
in response to these issues, therefore, through a combination of its 
functional principle and a good amount of "enlightened self-interest" 
helped to elevate Canada to a position of influence within the ranks 
of the "middle" powers. Throughout this study, the emphasis is less 
on political events than on the making of Canadian policy through 
the ideas and craft of the protagonists, be they astute politicians 
such as William Lyon Mackenzie King or those individuals resident in 
his Department of External Affairs. A selected bibliography follows. 
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PROLOGUE 
Canadian historiography, we are informed by a scholar of 
rank, has exhibited a concentration on nationality and constitutional 
development, which, in the period after the Second World War, was 
broadened to encompass a "record of Canadian achievement as a model 
of, co-operative international relations. "1 Lest the reader believe 
that this author tends to pursue these traditional lines with overt 
zeal, or worse, falls prey to the temptation to write "Whig" history, 
it should be emphasized at the outset that any overview by its very 
nature suggests a progression of developments through time. 
In the study of Canadian foreign policy, the decade follow- 
ing the Second World War has acquired reverential status, largely for 
the fact that Canada played an almost disproportionately influential 
role in world councils during this period. The first five years of 
this decade, if, as in this study, one chooses to start in 1943, do 
not qualify for the "from colony to nation" approach 
but none- 
theless indicate a remarkable progression towards the realization 
1. Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, Aspects of 




of Canadian foreign policy goals. What was induced, according to 
a consummate practitioner of diplomacy during the period, came not 
as a result "of any delusions of grandeur, or of overweening ambi- 
tion" on Canada's part, but of "an intelligent understanding of her 
own enlightened self-interest .,, 
2 
What follows is an attempt to des- 
cribe, characterize and define this understanding, not so much through 
a meticulous illustration of political developments, all of which have 
already been adequately examined, but through an analysis of the 
making of policy as practised by those associated with the Department 
of External Affairs. 
The evolution and progress depicted in the ensuing pages 
is in large measure demonstrated by the rapid growth of this ministry. 
From its very formation in 1909 until the outbreak of the Second 
World War, the Department of External Affairs was frequently little 
more than a clearing bureau for the prime ministerial despatches 
which then characterized the Imperial relationship and thus more or 
less represented the totality of Canada's external relations, with 
the notable exception of Canada's symbiotic relationship with the 
United States. Indeed the Prime Minister himself served as Secretary 
of State for External Affairs until late 1946, not only because of 
the gravity of matters of state, but out of convenience, as there 
was simply not enough work to justify the appointment of another 
minister. 
Following the assumption of the role of Under-Secretary by 
historian O. D. Skelton in 1925, the Department began to attract men 
cast from a similar mould: skilled, dedicated and modest intellectuals 
with a strong but not woolly sense of nationalism. Lester Pearson, 
Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong were among the first chosen by Dr. 
Skelton. Their policy recommendations, perspectives and hopes fill 
this text, not for reasons of prosaic value, but because these men 
perhaps more than others in similar stations since managed to achieve 
a substantial amount of influence over the creation of policy. This 
authority and prominence became most perceptible with the onset of 
various plans for international organizations in 1943, the articula- 
2. Pearson Papers, vol. 20, file "Speeches - San Francisco 1945", 
speech by Lester Pearson, "Canada in World Affairs", broadcast 
over CBC radio from the San Francisco Conference, 1 July 1945. 
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tion of the "functional principle" in that same year as the raison 
d'etre of Canadian policy and continued, albeit in a constantly 
changing manner, until well after the formation of the North Atlantic 
Alliance in 1948-49 and the departure of Pearson for a public career 
as minister of the department in which he had spent his formative 
years. 
Canadian policy between the wars had been characterized 
by the "no commitments" philosophy and cautious liberalism of Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. His pervasive presence per- 
sisted well into the 1940s, and although the liberal side of the man 
recognized the need for strong international organization with col- 
lective security, the astute political facets of his complex charac- 
ter on numerous occasions assumed dominance. However by 1939 the 
world, and with it Canada, had changed immeasurably. The Statute 
of Westminster of 1931 had granted Canada and the other Dominions 
de jure responsibility to conduct their own foreign relations, the 
great depression of these years tendered new poignancy to the phrase 
"international economic cooperation", and the maelstrom refused to 
disperse over Europe. The League of Nations, which during the 
hiatus of Versailles had been foreseen as a panacea for all that was 
ill between nations, did not include the world's most powerful coun- 
try, could and would not exercise suasion to deter others from re- 
sorting to aggression to settle their differences, and did not accord 
eminence to the aspirations of smaller powers. Canada, like most 
other countries, did not wish to return to the status quo following 
the second global confrontation, and sought ways and means which 
would assure lasting peace. 
As the chapters below will endeavour to demonstrate through 
their consideration of various policy areas, Canadian efforts to have 
a voice in the new world order represented a dichotomy of idealism 
and pragmatism, with more idealism apparent at the beginning and more 
pragmatism evident at the conclusion of the five years in question. 
In the interval, Canadian policy became at once principled and influ- 
ential. Self-interest was of course extant, and was eventually 
joined 
by enlightenment through a dialectical interaction between successes 
and failures, idealistic notions and the rebuffs of reality. 
CHAPTER I 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
The Department of External Affairs officially went to war 
in 1943. The status of being a "war department" - and therefore 
able to receive additional funds - had been denied it since the 
beginning of the war, since the Department was, in the eyes of the 
Treasury Board, not completely occupied with war-related work. By 
June of 1943, however, an exemption for hiring was granted for spe- 
cial cases where it could be ascertained that the position entailed 
"substantial added responsibilities and increased duties. "1 A col- 
lective sigh of relief rose to the rafters of the East Block. 
By the beginning of the war, there were Canadian diplomatic 
missions in London, Washington, Paris, Tokyo, the Hague, Brussels 
and Geneva. By early 1943 only those in the United States and the 
lo Department of External Affairs, Personnel Records, vol. 
678, file 134, W. Ronson to the Under-Secretary, 1 June 1943; 
and Don Page, "Coping with a War: The Experience of the Cana- 
dian Department of External Affairs", paper presented at an 
international conference on "The Second World War as a National 
Experience", (Ottawa, November 14-16,1979), p. 3. 
4 
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United Kingdom were active, but by the end of the year eleven missions 
had been established. These were in addition to the High Commissions 
which Canada had established in the sister Dominions of Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa, and, at least ostensibly, Ireland, just 
before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. In 1948, Canada would 
have diplomatic or consular representation in thirty-seven different 
countries. Thirty-three diplomatic officers were employed by the 
Department in 1939; this would swell to one hundred and thirty-two 
by mid-1946.2 The Treasury Board exemption did not allow for wide 
recruitment, but did provide an opportunity for the Department to hire 
"special temporary assistants", who were usually academics well-known 
to the Robertson-Pearson-Wrong triumvirate. 
Policy was safely in the hands of Norman Robertson, who, by 
exhibiting the Skeltonian qualities of anonymity and lack of overt 
ambition, was chosen by Mackenzie King to assume the office of Under- 
Secretary of State for External Affairs following Skelton's death in 
1941. In spite of wishing to modernize and change the organization 
of the Department, Robertson did not in fact manage to alter signifi- 
cantly the "graduate seminar" system so dear to his predecessor. This 
was largely because of the insistence of the Prime Minister, who as 
Head of the Department, felt compelled to examine every detail, from 
the installation of telephones in offices to the quality of the silver 
plate for the High Commission in Canberra. Lester Pearson analyzed 
the situation clearly while on one of his frequent Ottawa forays from 
Washington in early 1943: "After lunch, Hume and I went to the Depart- 
ment, where we had a long and somewhat desultory session with the 
Under-Secretary, who is as worried and harassed as ever. It is the 
same old problem - that of organization. At present, everything is 
confusion up there, and will remain so o. 9 "3 
According to Hume Wrong, this state of affairs had not improved 
three years later when he became Canadian ambassador in Washington. 
He put the case to Robertson very frankly: 
2. DEA, General Registry File 300B(s), memorandum "Diplomatic 
Staff", August 1943; also Hume Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 24, 
"Probable Expansion of Canadian Missions Abroad and Department 
of External Affairs", 5 February 1943. 
3. Pearson Diary, 10 January 1943. 
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Among the first essentials is a firm resolution on your 
own part, which must be backed by the efforts of your personal 
staff, to prevent the accumulation in your office of papers 
which are awaiting an opportunity that often cannot arise for 
you to examine them. I should like to see the whole apparatus 
of baskets filled with waiting papers swept away and the office 
adorned with no more paper than that which you require for the 
work immediately in hand. A mere rdsolution on your part will, 
of course, not achieve this end without changes in practice, 
which must, if they re to succeed, be applied consistently 
and even ruthlessly. 
The "baskets filled with waiting papers" were Robertson's 
trademark and the manifestation of the system which functioned best 
for him: creative delay. Papers, memoranda and despatches were only 
utilized if the current outlook warranted their use; if not, they 
turned to humus in Robertson's baskets. This practice did not always 
stimulate the morale of junior men, who often toiled long hours in 
the preparation, for example, of memoranda concerned with post-hosti- 
lities planning. Ironically, Robertson's method was sometimes justi- 
fied, as the rapid flow of events rendered many papers redundant. 
Wrong also stressed in his memorandum that the Under-Secretary was 
too accessible; he should cultivate a position of aloofness by not 
always responding to telephone calls when he was in conference in his 
office. The barrier between the Under-Secretary and individual mem- 
bers of the Department should be made more formidable so as to avoid 
Robertson becoming a repository for individual claims and grievances. 
Wrong recommended that a position of personal assistant or private 
secretary to the Under-Secretary should be created - much in the 
British tradition - in order to direct cable traffic and take minutes 
of the discussions in his office. These recommendations were not 
acted upon because on 4 September 1946, Robertson was appointed High 
Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Wrong became ambassador to the 
United States, Pearson returned from Washington to become Under- 
Secretary, and of greatest significance, Louis St, Laurent was named 
Secretary of State for External Affairs. 
Pearson appeared wary of the responsibilities of the new 
position. "If I should go to the Dep[artmen]t", he wrote 
Robertson, 
"I will be in a very tough spot. After all, you and Hume 
have taken 
4. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 24, "Memorandum for the Under- 
Secretary; Organization of the Under-Secretary's Office", 8 MIay 
1946; also interview with George Ignatieff, 2 December 1980. 
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a beating, but there have, at least, been two of you -I would have 
no one like either of you to help. I would be new, and I would have 
the PM in his declining difficult months! ,5 The Under-Secretaryship 
was, however, what Pearson had always coveted, and he welcomed the 
opportunity of dealing directly with St. Laurent, the bright star in 
the Liberal galaxy. Theirs would become a partnership between poli- 
tician and civil servant which has since been unrivalled in Canada. 
But Mackenzie King was omnipresent. "I can assure you, how- 
ever, " Arnold Heeney, the Secretary to the Cabinet, wrote Robertson 
in London, "that you would find nothing strange in coming back to the 
East Block, under the new regime. St. Laurent's absence in New York 
has prevented any sense of division, so that the central problem of 
relationships with the Prime Minister continues to occupy a large 
"6 proportion of our time ... The climax in dealing with the increas- 
ingly suspicious Mackenzie King would come in January of 1948 over 
the issue of Canadian participation in the United Nations Korean Truce 
Commission, where a Cabinet schism involving St. Laurent, J. L. Ilsley, 
and Mackenzie King was only narrowly avoided. 
Coping with the foibles of the Prime Minister during the last 
five years of his tenure was expedited by the close interaction of the 
Prime Minister's Office with the Department of External Affairs. J. W. 
Pickersgill, Gordon Robertson and James A. Gibson all entered the Prime 
Minister's Office as secretaries from the Department. Pickersgill 
became Mackenzie King's leading political adviser, Gordon Robertson 
worked in the off ice at the East Block and Gibson was styled "External 
Affairs Liaison Officer" at Laurier House. Their perceptions of their 
roles in their day-to-day contact with the Prime Minister are consis- 
tent. Pickersgill learned very quickly "that Mackenzie King would use 
everybody as a doormat who would lie down"; Robertson has mentioned 
playing "the interesting little game of applied psychology"; and 
Gibson recalls the most difficult problem as "getting him to make up 
his mind". In spite of King's indecisiveness, or perhaps because of 
7 
5. Norman Robertson Papers, vol. 2, Pearson to Robertson, 
30 May 1946. 
6. Arnold Heeney Papers, vol. 1, Heeney to Robertson, 
30 November 1946. 
7. Interviews with J. W. Pickersgill, 28 May 1980; Gordon 
Robertson, 4 June 1980; and James A. Gibson, 25 June 1980. 
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it, he was an exacting taskmaster who expected nothing less than 
perfection. His voluminous diaries of the period are filled with 
statements indicating his annoyance at the "E. A. room" at Laurier 
House being locked and empty in the late evening and at the delays 
and irksome habits exhibited by his secretaries. More External 
Affairs work such as the drafting of cables and letters was accom- 
plashed on late Saturday afternoons than during the entire week, and 
the Secretaries had to be at their desks until the Prime Minister 
was content. 
8 
Procrastination likewise accounted for the fact that 
the estimates of the Department were often only brought before the 
House of Commons in the dying hours of a session, thereby making 
coordinated planning an almost impossible task. 
An additional influence on the Department of External Affairs 
was the policy-making input provided by senior officials from other 
departments. Clifford Clark, the long-serving Deputy Minister of 
Finance who had King's respect, and Graham Towers, the Governor of 
the Bank of Canada, were not only instrumental in consultation invol- 
ving economic matters but also proffered advice on the United Nations 
and the Paris Peace Conference. Arnold Heeney, the Secretary to the 
Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council, virtually assumed sole res- 
ponsibility for policy questions concerned with the American mili- 
tary presence in Northwestern Canada and also chaired the inter- 
departmental committee on atomic energy. He would inherit the mantle 
of Under-Secretary from Pearson upon the latter's elevation to the 
Cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs in the last months 
of 1948. 
Influences from other departments should not be perceived as 
being anything extraordinary. It must be realized that Ottawa's 
senior mandarins were both intellectually and socially very close 
during this period. The Privy Council Office and the Department of 
External Affairs were housed in the East Block and interdepartmental 
corridor discussions together with working luncheons in the Chateau 
Laurier cafeteria were frequent. Moreover, the informality of inter- 
departmental liaison often allowed for a system which both appealed 
to the Prime Minister - when he was in one of his better moods - and 
could induce speedier Cabinet sanction. 
8. Mackenzie King Diary, 23 March 1943; also interview with 
James A. Gibson, 25 June 1980. 
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Although the Department had been faced with a number of o- 
nizational difficulties immediately following the death of Skeltc. _ 
1941, and had seen several unsuccessful attempts on the part of Hugh 
Keenleyside, 9 the Assistant Under-Secretary, to consolidate all Cana- 
dian foreign services in one department, by 1945 the structural orga- 
nization of the Department was relatively sound. Under-Secretary 
Norman Robertson and Associate Under-Secretary Hume Wrong worked in 
concert and as a conduit directly under Mackenzie King. Wrong headed 
three political divisions which respectively included international 
organization and peace settlements; European, Commonwealth, Middle 
Eastern and African affairs; and political affairs relating to the 
United States, Latin America and the Far East. A Diplomatic Divi- 
sion was responsible for representative functions and John Read, the 
durable Legal Adviser, headed the Legal Division. 
10 
Of significance 
was the Economic Division, under H. F. Angus, who had been brought into 
the Department as a Special Assistant in late 1944 after "war status" 
had been attained. Angus was expected to return to his position at 
the University of British Columbia after the war, which he did, and 
as a result he was not included in the discussions of high policy. 
John Deutsch, another Special Assistant in his division, was lured 
away by the Department of Finance after demonstrating his negotiating 
prowess at Bretton Woods. Here was a serious lacuna in the Depart- 
ment which seemed odd, considering that Robertson himself had such 
great personal experience and interest in trade and finance. 
" 
As the Department and its role in the national fabric expan- 
ded, an Information Division was acquired by late 1944. Although the 
dissemination of information on international affairs had been ably 
conducted by the Wartime Information Board, planning 
had to be cog- 
nizant of future possibilities after the Board's 
dissolution. Some, 
including officials in the Department of Trade and Commerce and 
Vin- 
9. Page, "Coping with a War: The Experience of the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs", pp. 8-9. 
10. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 242, file 2454, memorandum, 
"Organization of the Department of External Affairs", 
2 January 
1945; cf. also, John E. Read, "Problems of an 
External Affairs 
Legal Adviser, 1928-1946", International Journal XXII, 
No. 3, 
(Summer 1967), pp. 376-394. 
11. For Robertson's great abilities as a trade negotiator, 
see J. L. Granatstein, A of 
Influence: Norman A. Robert`-oar: 
and Canadian Statecraft 1929-68, 
(Toronto, 1981), pp. 56-79. 
10 
cent Massey, Canada's High Commissioner in London, believed that an 
expansive Information Division should become a Canadian-styled British 
Council, promoting both cultural and academic exchanges. 
12 
Robertson 
and others were cool to the idea, arguing that it would be better for 
an Information Division to "frequently employ its left hand instead 
of leading with its chin. , 
13 
The division did not assume the noble 
function envisioned by Vincent Massey, but it grew in importance, and 
during the month of October 1947 alone, it handled over 1600 enquiries 
from within Canada. 
14 
Its exact function was never clearly defined, 
however, and this occasioned much fractious debate within the Depart- 
ment. 
l5 
Administration was another matter. Agnes McCloskey, who had 
been with the Department since its inception in 1909, regarded the 
offices as her personal fiefdom and often subjected pencil-seeking 
officers to stern lectures on the value of government property. She 
was effectively - and diplomatically - removed from the Department in 
1943 by being appointed to New York as Canada's first woman consul. 
When news of her appointment reached Washington, Pearson rejoiced: 
"For anyone who has had to pry expense accounts out of her the sig- 
nificance of this move will be obvious. In the Legation, it over- 
shadowed all the war news; even the advance of the 8th Army had to 
take second place. " 
16 
W. D. Matthews then entered the Department as 
Administrative Officer and quickly set to work, establishing various 
departmental committees which were to assist in coordinating adminis- 
trative policy. 
If the Department of External Affairs was to both represent 
12. DEA, File 7326-40, W. B. Herbert, Executive Secretary of the 
"Canadian Committee", to Robertson, 18 February 1945; also King 
Papers, J1 Series, vol. 366, despatch A712, Massey to King, 
18 December 1944. 
13. DEA File 7326-40; W. B. Herbert to Robertson, 18 February 1945. 
14. DEA, File 9686-40C, memorandum, "Information Division", n. d. 
(1947). 
15. "... there have been greater difficulties in regard to the 
conceptions of what an Information Division should do and how it 
should do it. We are not out of the woods in this regard yet, 
and will not be able to make any final decisions as to functions 
and personnel in the Division until we see the attitude taken 
by 
the House of Commons to our Information Estimates. 
" Pearson 
Papers, vol. 8, Pearson to Robertson, 5 April 1947. 
16. Pearson Diary, 9 April 1943. 
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Canada abroad and formulate international policies which reflected 
national interests, how would the French Canadian fact be interwoven 
into the Department, particularly at the policy-making level? Ottawa 
during the war was not the bilingual and bicultural capital of today. 
English was the lingua franca and any French Canadian who wished to 
enter the Civil Service had to be very proficient in English and wil- 
ling to live in an alien environment. Norman Robertson had often 
applied his fertile mind to this vexing question and was, at various 
times during his tenure as Under-Secretary, seriously contemplating 
having a French Canadian as his successor. There were, however, no 
qualified French Canadians available to fill the position during war- 
time. Senior representatives such as General Georges Vanier and 
Pierre Dupuy were heavily engaged in their representations to the 
Allied governments in exile in London, and Jean Desy in Brazil was 
the senior Canadian diplomat in Latin America. By 1947, Laurent 
Beaudry, who had served in the Department as long as Robertson and 
was head of the Diplomatic Division, was ailing and did not have Mac- 
kenzie King's confidence in his abilities. Dupuy and Desy in parti- 
cular were known to succumb to the blandishments of diplomatic life 
abroad, and only made short excursions to Ottawa from Montreal when 
they were in the country. 
When Desy was offered the position of Under-Secretary to 
succeed Pearson when the latter was elevated to the Cabinet in 1948, 
he indicated his views in a memorandum which asserted that the re- 
organization of the Department under a distinct minister made it 
imperative to follow the practice established by other governments, 
to have a head of mission return and serve for a time as Under- 
Secretary. "The Department would thus have the benefit of their 
experience and at the same time bring them back into contact with 
the Canadian problems as seen from a Canadian angle. 
"17 Further, 
Desy suggested that salaries should therefore be calculated on 
the 
same basis as for those abroad and a 
large house should be bought 
for the Under-Secretary where he could both live and entertain visi- 
ting dignitaries. Even a new minister such as St. 
Laurent was not 
impressed by the latter argument. The senior French Canadians were 
therefore left abroad, where it was felt that they were 
happiest and 
17. Pearson Papers, Vol. 1, 
(pre-1958 Series), Pearson to 
Robertson, 17 March 1947. 
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where they handled their representative duties with experienced exper- 
tise. 
The French-Canadian problem did not solely exist at the upper 
levels. A confidential memorandum directed to St. Laurent in January 
of 1948 indicated that of 161 officers only 33 were French Canadians 
and that of 28 heads of mission there were 9, demonstrating that there 
was a smaller proportion of French Canadians at the lower levels. Of 
those at the junior levels, there appeared to be a higher percentage 
of French Canadians in the Administration and Information Divisions 
but fewer in the Political and Economic Divisions. The recommenda- 
tions of the memorandum were emphatically stated: "S'il est desire 
que quelques Canadiens de langue franjaise puissent exercer une cer- 
taine influence au sein des divisions politiques, economiques et juri- 
diques du ministere a Ottawa, ii me semble opportun d'inviter quelques 
jeunes hommes competents a entrer au ministere. "18 The Department of 
External Affairs gradually became an example to other government de- 
partments and agencies in representing the duality of Canada both at 
home and abroad, but the significant changes transpired after 1948.19 
By far the most meaningful change in the Department during 
these years was the creation of a Cabinet portfolio for External 
Affairs which, for the first time, would be separate from that of the 
Prime Minister. It had been long in coming, and as early as 1941, 
Pearson had written to Massey of his feelings, which were undoubtedly 
shared by others: "In short, I am encouraged by the views and atti- 
tudes of the senior members of the Department - but somewhat discour- 
aged by the political difficulties in the way of translating these 
views into action. If we only had a Minister of our own! 
, 20 The war, 
however, prevented any immediate movement in this direction. Hume 
Wrong, in his memorandum regarding the organization of the Under-Secre- 
tary's office in 1946, candidly admitted that 
"The appointment of a 
separate Secretary of State for External 
Affairs is necessary before a 
18. St. Laurent Papers, vol. 18, file 100-B-1, 
"Memoire re 
Personnel Du Ministere des Affaires Exterieures", 4 janvier 1948; 
the authorship is confidential; access granted 
by permission of 
J. W. Pickersgill. 
19. Interview with John Holmes, 23 July 1980. Jules 
Leger 
became the first French Canadian Under-Secretary in 1954. 
20. Pearson Papers, vol. 1, Pearson to Massey, 
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number of the most desirable changes can be made..., 
21 
In a subsequent memorandum, Norman Robertson made a well- 
reasoned case to the Prime Minister for the necessity of having a 
separate minister. The argument used displayed both Robertson's un- 
canny knowledge of Mackenzie King's mind and his ability to tactfully 
gauge future responses. Robertson outlined the growth of the Depart- 
ment in recent years, stating that it required more ministerial res- 
ponsibility now to maintain both the ebb and flow of personnel and 
the requisite control of the departmental estimates. Although the 
Department was small when compared to other government departments, it 
was of a uniform high quality and dealt with much classified material. 
On the other hand, Robertson argued, the Prime Minister's role would 
continue to be of great consequence in relations with the United King- 
dom and the Commonwealth, since the central link was the Prime Minis- 
ter to Prime Minister consultative relationship. Similar considera- 
tions, of course, pertained to the not always harmonious relations 
with the United States. The Prime Minister had to closely supervise 
the conduct of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the coordina- 
tion of policy dealing with atomic energy. Furthermore, there was a 
peculiarly Canadian criterion, and this was that the people and Par- 
liament expected the Prime Minister to take a leading role in the con- 
duct of foreign policy, particularly following the birth of the United 
Nations. The best solution, Robertson believed, was to appoint a 
junior minister to the position: 
If one of the abler, younger men were appointed to the 
post, these very limitations upon his responsibilities would 
facilitate the gradual development of a separate Ministerial 
Department of External Affairs without interfering, in any 
way, with the continuity of the main lines of Canadian policy. 
The load taken from your shoulders should be considerable, 
but it would not, in itself, be a full load for a first 
class man. 22 
Hope within the Department rested with Brooke Claxton, the 
minister of the newly-created Department of National Health and Wel- 
fare, former Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, the genius 
21. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 24, "Organization of the Under- 
Secretary's Office", 8 May 1946. 
22. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 250, private and personal 
memorandum, Robertson to King, 13 June 1946. 
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behind recent Liberal electioneering, and an influential member of the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs in the 1930s. Indeed, the 
logic of Robertson's memorandum clearly points to Claxton as a leading 
candidate for the portfolio. Fate in the form of the Paris Peace Con- 
ference intervened, and it was there that Claxton succeeded the Prime 
Minister as leader of the Canadian delegation. To King, it appeared 
that Claxton made too many interventions, as if seeking a weighty role 
for Canada and himself in what was, in essence, a Great Power peace 
treaty. 
After King's well-chronicled23 despondent return journey from 
Europe, when the Prime Minister felt that he had been let down by all 
and sundry, he decided to approach Louis St. Laurent, which he did 
without the knowledge of his Under-Secretary. The task thus fell to 
St. Laurent, probably for the reason that he did not seem to want the 
position. He accepted with the understanding that his service would 
purely be a stopgap measure from which he could eventually retire and 
return to his law practice in Quebec. Time and events would prove 
otherwise. 
In fairness to Mackenzie King it must be emphasized that he 
was not oblivious to trends. In his mind, the key words were always 
"people and Parliament" and the stress he placed on them when approach- 
ing policy questions earned him his longevity in office and the accom- 
panying domestic and international respect. He fully realized that 
the growth of the Department of External Affairs reflected an enhanced 
attentiveness on the part of Canadians to international events and 
that more attention had to be given to this than he himself could offer. 
King scrutinized the public opinion reports of the Wartime Information 
Board quite intently, and was acutely aware, for example, that 54% of 
Canadians polled in June of 1944 desired more information about the 
government's post-war plans; 
24 
that by late 1944,78% of the people 
23. The more printable aspects of King's despondency may be found 
in J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, Tice Mackenzie King Record, 
Vol. 3,1945-1946, (Toronto, 1970), pp. 330-332; also Arnold D. P. 
Heeney, The Things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public 
Servant, pp. 89-90; L. B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right 
Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 1, (Toronto, 1972), p. 293. 
Also interview with James A. Gibson, 25 June 1980. 
24. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 427; "Privy Council Office, War 
Committee Memoranda", Document no. 728, Wartime Information Board 
Survey no. 38,3 June 1944. 
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surveyed were willing to undergo food shortages in order to give food 
to the liberated people of Europe; 
25 
and that an astonishing 82% had 
heard of the United Nations conference at San Francisco three weeks 
before it convened. 
26 
In the Cabinet War Committee, discussions pertaining to inter- 
national affairs (excluding military) increased from 10% in 1938-9 to 
26% in 1943, in terms of discussion time allotted. 
27 
Several members 
of the Cabinet War Committee, most notably C. D. Howe, the Minister of 
Munitions and Supply and later Reconstruction; J. L. Ilsley, the Minis- 
ter of Finance; and J. L. Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, 
possessed portfolios which required a maximum amount of international 
contact. Parliament had also become more sophisticated. Members of 
both opposition parties had been included in the delegation to the 
San Francisco Conference and days of yesteryear, when the House of 
Commons spent twenty-seven minutes on the Munich Crisis in 1936 and 
over eight hours on an asparagus tariff the next day, seemed gone 
forever. When King announced the appointment of St. Laurent as Secre- 
tary of State for External Affairs to the House of Commons, an oppor- 
tunity was taken by the Opposition to resoundingly criticize the Prime 
Minister's conduct of foreign policy. 
28 
It would never have happened 
several years earlier. General debates on foreign policy had never 
been a feature of the House of Commons; any discussions had been ulti- 
mately tied to debates on treaties or obligations arising from member- 
ship in the League of Nations. A general debate on foreign policy 
however took place on 4 July 1947 and eighteen members participated. 
In the April 1948 debate on foreign policy, thirty members spoke over 
a period of four days. A House of Commons Standing Committee on 
25. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 427; "Privy Council Office, 
War Committee Memoranda", Document no. 956, Wartime Information 
Board Survey no. 58,10 March 1945. 
26. Ibid., Document no. 966, Wartime Information Board Survey 
no. 59,24 March 1945. 
27. Privy Council Office Records, vol. 35, file C-10-3-G, W. E. 
Halliday to Arnold Heeney, 2 December 1943. 
28. The British felt that the Standing Committee did thorough 
work. Foreign Office, FO 371, W9002/102/68, Eleanor Emery to 
Godfrey Boyd-Shannon, 29 August 1946; for more on the parliamen- 
tary aspects of External Affairs, see R. Barry Farrell, 
"The 
Planning of Foreign Policy in Canada", WorZd Politics 1, 
(April 1949), pp. 351-380. 
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External Affairs was called into being in 1945 and by 1947 a Parlia- 
mentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External affairs had 
been appointed to relieve the beleaguered Minister of some of his par- 
liamentary work. It was a period of intense activity in a burgeon- 
ing Department. 
Venant de ce pays qu'illustre le Castor, 
Nous affectons partout de simples habitudes, 
Passant indecores sous toutes latitudes. 29 
Canadian diplomats were indeed travelling through all lati- 
tudes. At times it appeared as if the requirements of international 
representation greatly outdistanced the available resources. Repre- 
sentation abroad was of course essential, since Canada aspired to a 
legitimate position in the front ranks of the secondary states, or 
"middle powers" as they gradually became known in the jargon of 1944. 
In retrospect, the question might well be asked whether Canadian re- 
presentation in so many countries, particularly those of Latin America, 
was in fact required. There seemed to be a necessity at the time and 
representation became one method of attaining an end which was even 
then a nebulous concept: international status. 
In a Cabinet War Committee meeting of 10 November 1943, in 
which diplomatic representation was discussed, Mackenzie King sub- 
mitted a recommendation to elevate the Canadian legation in Washington 
to an embassy. This action had, according to the Prime Minister, 
been favoured by President Roosevelt, had received agreement from 
Prime Minister Churchill, and it was deemed favourable to raise the 
legations in the Soviet Union, China and Brazil to similar rank with 
Belgium and the Netherlands to follow at a later date. 
30 
Robertson 
had elucidated the position on 12 September: "When we have Haiti 
represented by Ambassadors throughout the American continents and a 
country as small as Norway represented by Ambassadors in Washington 
and London, there is not much to be said for preserving an artificial 
distinction which now serves only to create an impression of inferiority 
29. Heeney Papers, vol. 1, file "Clerk of the Privy Council, 
1947 to 1949", extract from a sonnet composed by Jean Desy, 
Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, Desy to Heeney, 10 March 1947. 
30. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, "Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee", P. C. 8699,10 November 1943. 
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which is not justified in fact. " Furthermore, the United States was 
planning on elevating all its legations which through diplomatic 
reciprocity would in turn elevate all foreign legations in Washington, 
an action which would include nations like Iraq and Liberia. "Since 
this change appears to be inevitable, I should not like to see Canada 
'promoted' in this last odd lot", Robertson concluded, "and I think we 
might better initiate some action ourselves., 
31 
Vincent Massey in turn 
informed the British Government of the basis of the Canadian proposal: 
While the present proposal with respect to raising the 
status of the Canadian minister has particular reference to 
Washington, this action will imply a willingness to extend 
the change so as to include ultimately, all Canadian minis- 
ters abroad. Among other considerations, it is felt that 
the differences between Ministers and Ambassadors is no 
longer a real one. There is a clear tendency toward the 
elimination of Legations in favour of Embassies. 32 
By 1 December 1943, in addition to the legation in the United 
States, the recently-established missions in Brazil, the Soviet Union, 
China and Belgium had been elevated to embassies. 
33 
Relatively slow 
growth followed, with embassies being established in Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and a legation in the Netherlands. Between 1946 and 1948 the 
number of missions nearly doubled to seven High Commissions, fourteen 
embassies, eight legations, eleven consulates and four missions. There 
would be comparatively little further growth during the next decade. 
One of the drawbacks of such rapid expansion was that foreign 
nations had established diplomatic missions in Ottawa before Canada 
had an opportunity to reciprocate. At the end of 1946, for example, 
31. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 242, file 2454 "Canadian Re- 
presentatives Abroad, 1940 to 1948", memorandum from Robertson 
to King, 12 September 1943. 
32. Foreign Office, F0371, W16017/2990/68, Massey to Lord 
Cranborne, 10 November 1943. 
33. Historically, since the Congress of Vienna, diplomatic 
practice has been to exchange agents of the same class, a custom 
which often indicated a supposed relative 
importance of relations 
with different foreign countries. 
A minister, for example, as 
head of a legation, though also accredited to the 
head of state, 
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than an ambas- 
sador. Exchange of ambassadors was therefore very 
important to 
Canadian aspirations of status. See 
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Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugo- 
slavia had established legations in Ottawa without any reciprocal 
courtesies on the part of Canada. This imbalance would be redressed 
during the next two years, but many countries would be actively dis- 
couraged through Canadian corridor diplomacy from establishing diplo- 
matic relations with Canada in the meantime. Evidently Canada was not 
the only country clamouring for international status. 
The British did not share Canadian enthusiasms for embassies. 
A letter from Sir Patrick Duff, the United Kingdom's Duputy High Com- 
missioner in Ottawa of 9 December 1943 which Robertson incorporated 
in a memorandum for the Prime Minister, argued that when it came to 
exchanging missions with Mexico, Peru and Cuba, these countries might 
propose an exchange of embassies rather than legations. This would 
be embarrassing for the United Kingdom since it was only represented 
by legations in these countries. Robertson believed that the attitude 
of the United Kingdom was understandable, though not quite consistent, 
since the British decision not to alter the status of its missions 
during the war was taken in the summer of 1942 just after British lega- 
tions were raised to embassies in various European countries. What 
was of greater significance in Robertson's opinion, was that the Bri- 
tish view suggested a disposition to perpetuate a formal distinction 
between embassies and legations. 
34 
The representative feature was certainly one of the key rea- 
sons for elevating the legation in Washington: 
The fact that the British Commonwealth is represented 
in Washington by one Ambassador and four Ministers, not to 
mention the Agent General for India, who is shown on the 
Diplomatic List on the staff of the British Embassy with 
the rank of Minister, tends to create an impression that 
the British Ambassador is the leader of the flock who 
speaks on occasion for them all. This impression is 
strengthened by the fact that the United Kingdom Embassy, 
under war conditions, has no less than six Ministers on 
34. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 242, file 2454, memorandum 
from Robertson to King, 15 November 1943. Leighton McCarthy, 
the Canadian Minister in Washington, had originally opposed the 
idea of elevation because it would indicate Canadian equality 
with the United Kingdom. Pearson, second-in-command at the 
legation, had not known of the proposed change. Foreign Office, 
F0371, W16692/2990/68, Stephen Holmes to Sir John Stephenson, 
12 November 1943. 
19 
its staff - all given the rank of 'Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary', ie., the same as heads of Domi- 
nions' missions. 35 
Although both the British and the Canadians would be loath 
to admit it, the question of status was in fact inextricably tangled 
with problems of titles and diplomatic precedence as evinced above. 
For example, if Lord Halifax was replaced as British Ambassador in 
the United States, what would transpire if the sovereign wished to 
convey a message to the President and the Canadian Ambassador was the 
most senior representative of His Majesty? The new Canadian global 
role had to be observed through appearance and protocol in order to 
be respectable. Alfred Rive, the Canadian High Commissioner in New 
Zealand who was often ignored by European diplomats, vented his 
frustration in a letter to Pearson in July of 1948: "Please, please 
make me an Ambassador and I promise you that the Minister for Belgium 
will be snubbed the same day, or maybe the day before, allowing for 
the difference in time.... And I won't be referred to as the Trade 
Commissioner or Mr. Commissioner any more. , 
36 
Changes in the public 
trappings of diplomacy would be exceedingly slow in coming, and, in 
the case of High Commissioners being formally designated Ambassadors, 
has still to occur. 
There was of course a different functional view to all of this. 
United Kingdom embassies, legations and consulates were still conduc- 
ting some vital Canadian business. Pearson's 1945 Washington diary 
records his feelings: "It is humiliating in the extreme that Canada, 
which now bleats so much about its status as a Middle Power, should 
continue to rely on the United Kingdom Consuls for consular services 
in this country. It is about time we grew up. " The British Consul 
in Detroit, for example, issued 50 to 100 passports monthly to Cana- 
dians. "Nobody seems to care in Ottawa about this anomaly and the 
Government is quite happy to let the British Government bear the ex- 
pense of Canadian consular work in the United States. 
"37 Pearson had 
35. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 242, file 2454, memorandum 
from Robertson to King, 12 September 1943. 
36. Pearson Papers, vol. 12, (pre-1958 Series), Alfred Rive 
to Pearson, 13 July 1948. 
37. Pearson Diary, 12 April 1945. 
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also attended a meeting of all British consular officers in the United 
States one year earlier and discovered to his humiliation, that he was 
subjected to rather elementary queries about Canada, so that British 
consuls - who were of good quality, he insisted - could deal with en- 
quiries about Canada which in some instances occupied 75% of their 
time. This was, Pearson wrote to Robertson, "... one of the worst 
examples of our reluctance to accept the full responsibilities of the 
status about which we boast, namely our continued use of British Con- 
suls in places where so much of the work done is Canadian., 
38 
Self-reliance was not evident in the transportation of Cana- 
than diplomatic bags either. As late as 1947, the British Foreign 
Office was carrying approximately one ton of Canadian diplomatic 
material per month to twenty-two Canadian missions abroad. Canada 
had offered to contribute to the cost of carriage, but the Foreign 
Office had apparently felt that the system of accounting involved 
would be too complicated. A Canadian courier service between Ottawa, 
New York and Washington was inaugurated later in the year, and this 
smaller service was offered to the United Kingdom as well as a ges- 
ture of gratitude. 
39 
The tradition of British consular representatives fulfilling 
Canadian consular duties made the Department of External Affairs 
rather complacent about engineering any changes which required both 
personnel and resource allocations, since hiring of personnel was 
frozen for most of the war. Besides, the existing system functioned 
quite satisfactorily, so why change it? Intimations by the Prime 
Minister to Parliament as early as 1938 that a consular service plan 
was receiving government attention did not hasten its 
development. 
Paradoxically, with needs for consular representation in American 
commercial centres growing, Canada's first consulates were established, 
wholly for strategic reasons, in Greenland 
in 1940 and at St. Pierre 
and Miquelon in 1941. The first conventional 
Canadian consulate in 
38. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 368, Pearson to Robertson, 
7 March 1944. 
39. It was estimated that British carriage of 
Canadian diplo- 
matic bags cost the British 
Government somewhere in the order 
of $250,000 annually. St. Laurent 
Papers, vol. 34, file 275, 
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the form of a Consulate-General was established in New York in 1943.40 
Laxness continued, however, and a coordinating conference for all Cana- 
dian consular representatives was not held until April 1949. It was 
the common belief among consuls that a loose relationship between the 
various offices and Ottawa seemed most practical at the time. The 
evidence clearly indicates that less consular attention should have 
been focussed on major questions of policy such as the North Atlantic 
Pact, the European Recovery Plan and Commonwealth relations and more 
on activities of a strict bilateral nature such as the St. Lawrence 
Seaway project and the tariff. 
41 
With the naissance of a consular service, Canada was now being 
represented abroad by what were, in effect, three government services: 
diplomatic, commercial intelligence (the Trade Commissioner Service) 
and consular. Consular matters were absorbed in a Consular Division 
which was created in the Department of External Affairs in 1946. Be- 
fore this, however, the question of amalgamating all services was re- 
viewed, and an Interdepartmental Committee to study relations between 
the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce was esta- 
blished in June 1943. The task set before the Committee was the deci- 
sion of how the work of the two Departments could be best accomplished 
without impairing the efficiency of either. The Committee studied the 
developments which had taken place in other foreign services, most nota- 
bly in the United States, where complete amalgamation had occurred in 
1939. A marked trend toward complete amalgamation of diplomatic and 
commercial services was observed, even among non-English-speaking 
countries. The options considered were the complete merger of the 
40. J. W. Pickersgill is of the view that more consulates should 
have been established instead of missions of little value in 
Latin America. Interview with J. W. Pickersgill, 28 May 1980. 
Pearson favoured combining trade commissions with Consulate- 
Generals. Pearson Papers, vol. 2, cable WA976, Pearson to 
Robertson, 22 February 1945. For preludes to consular develop- 
ment, see H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroa,: 
From Agency to Embassy, (Toronto, 1945), pp. 256-260. 
41. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2124, file "Consular 
Conference 1949", letters from Edmond Turcotte, Consul General 
in Chicago to James J. Hurley, Consul in Detroit, 4 November 
1948; T. F. M. Newton, Consul in Boston to Hume Wrong, 5 March 
19 49 . 
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existing External Affairs and Trade Commissioner Services under the 
administration of a restructured Department of External Affairs with 
appropriate staff transfers; and administrative reform leading to 
coordination and cooperation of the services, interchange of personnel, 
but without either department losing its identity. In lieu of amal- 
gamation, which was recognized as the preferred if distant goal, the 
latter option was selected, and a Standing Interdepartmental Committee 
of senior officials was established. 
42 
Robertson sent a circular to all missions in June of 194 
which referred specifically to the liaison question between diplomatic 
and trade representatives abroad. Greater sharing of despatches from 
both departments was believed to be in the general interest, as would 
closer contact between officers in drafting despatches of basic poli- 
tical and economic interest. 
43 
Unfortunately, the exigencies of the 
war and the rapid growth of representation did not allow for close 
consultations between the departments in the field. 
Clouding the issue of representation in typical Canadian 
fashion were the provincial offices abroad. The case of provincial 
representation in London merits some special attention. Since 1921, 
the Agents General, as provincial representatives came to be known, 
had endeavoured to receive greater recognition from the United Kingdom 
Government. The British had always refused, maintaining that the pro- 
per channel of communication was through the High Commissioner and 
although successive High Commissioners had tried to assist the Agents 
General with smaller matters, the federal government had always re- 
42. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2116, file AR 420/6, "Pro- 
posals for Co-ordination of External Services, External Affairs, 
and Trade and Commerce", Report of the Committee to the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Trade and Com- 
merce, 17 November 1943' also Pearson Papers, vol. 8, "Memorandum 
on the Canadian 'Foreign Service"' by George Glazebrook, n. d. 
(late 1945). The first in a series of steps toward complete 
amalgamation was undertaken in January 1982. 
43. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2116, file AR 420/6, circu- 
lar 814, Robertson to Massey, 29 June 1944; also King Papers, 
J1 Series, vol. 369, Robertson to King, 29 June 1944. 
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frained from urging Britain to grant them customs privileges and re- 
presentational recognition. British policy was applied universally 
to all Agents General, in spite of the fact that the Australian states 
possessed a better claim to recognition than the Canadian provinces 
because of their constitutional status. The official 1947 position 
was " the Commonwealth Relations Office, while anxious to be as cour- 
teous and helpful as possible, desire to avoid anything that may appear 
to give any distinctive recognition to the Agents General in London. " 
44 
There were a few tempests in the federal/provincial relation- 
ship in London. The circulation of a Government of Ontario form en- 
titled "Prospective Citizenship in Ontario" caused a furor not only 
as a result of its misleading title, but also for the sentence, 'When 
the various governments concerned announce certain post-war plans af- 
fecting the movement of people, money and trade, our own Government 
will release definite plans. " Thomas Stone, a diplomat concerned 
with Canadian representations to the exiled Allied governments in 
London, commented that "the atmosphere of the rest of the text is of 
sovereignty and independence which would make the Abbe Groulx and the 
O'Leary brothers green with envy. " He believed the entire affair "to 
be one of the worst menaces to Canadian unity. " 
45 
The federal and 
Ontario provincial elections, -which occurred in May of 1945, occasioned 
the opening of an Ontario Government office across from Ontario House 
on Charles II Street in London. Described as "Canadian Election Head- 
quarters", the windows were festooned with posters supporting the 
federal Conservative Party: "Vote with the Conservatives and Get 
Home Quickly. x, 
46 
There were four provincial offices in London by early 1947,47 
prompting Pearson to jokingly write to Robertson that he should con- 
sider having meetings of a Dominion-Provincial Council every Saturday 
morning at Canada House. As High Commissioner, Robertson's easy 
44. DEA, File 8963-40, "Status and Privileges of Agents General 
of Canadian Provinces in the United Kingdom", Frederic 
Hudd to 
Pearson, 12 August 1947. 
45. DEA, File 169(S), "Activities of Ontario Government in the 
United Kingdom", T. A. Stone to Robertson, 16 October 1944. 
46. Ibid., cypher cable, Brooke Claxton to Massey, 17 May 1945; 
cypher cable, Campbell Moodie 
(Information Officer, Canada House) 
to McCracken (Claxton's Office), 11 May 1945. 
47. Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan. 
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access to Foreign Office officials allowed for positive action on 
several of the provincial demands. These included the duty-free import 
of personal effects, liquor and tobacco, and the carrying of a dis- 
tinguishing "AG" licence plate on the official automobile. As a result 
of renewed representations of the Agents General, Robertson believed 
that the only scenario which would resolve all differences would be 
for the Agents General to be nominally attached to the High Commission, 
but he seriously doubted the acceptability of such a suggestion. Pear- 
son agreed, stating that "it would be out of the question to promise 
such artifice., 
48 
So provincial representation without diplomatic recog- 
nition continued, puzzling many, confounding at times the Canadian 
quest for international status, and confusing Norman Robertson: "They 
(Agents General) are well-disposed and most cooperative. I am some- 
times a little puzzled about the purpose they serve in the absence of 
either administrative or representative duties. "49 
As in the Department in Ottawa, and so abroad, did the French 
Canadian fact have to be demonstrated. General Georges Vanier, Jean 
Desy and Pierre Dupuy have already been mentioned as outstanding diplo- 
mats who won the admiration of their peers, and in the case of the 
latter two, some notoriety within the Department for preferring to 
work abroad and never in Ottawa. Of concern, however, was the ques- 
tion of whether French Canadian officers should be named as heads of 
specific missions as a part of policy. In a memorandum to the Prime 
Minister of January 1944, Norman Robertson emphasized the importance 
of creating a careful balance between Protestant and Catholic and 
English and French heads of missions; a balance which in Latin America 
would be seriously upset if French Canadian ministers were appointed 
48. DEA File 8963-40, Pearson to St. Laurent, 17 May 1948. 
49. DEA File 169(S), Robertson to Pearson, 5 March 1947. John 
Holmes has written: "The relations among the provinces and of 
the provinces with foreign bodies increasingly look like diplo- 
macy on other levels. The consequences of this diversity can 
be the spread of anarchy by the abandonment of rational means 
of communication or the adaptation of diplomatic rules and prac- 
tices to serve the purpose of a universe in the process at the 
same time of integration and disintegration. 
" John W. Holmes, 
"The Study of Diplomacy: A Sermon", occasional paper delivered 
at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 
June 1973 at a conference on "The Changing Role of the Diplomatic 
Function in the Making of Foreign Policy". 
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to both Mexico and Peru. 
50 
Robertson repeated the position; 
In principle, I think we should try to get away from 
the old convention which assumed that our representative 
in the United Kingdom should always be an English Canadian, 
our representative in France a French Canadian, and our man in Dublin an Irish Catholic. An extension of this conven- 
tion, which needs constant watching, is the assumption that diplomatic posts in Latin America will naturally be filled by French Canadian appointees. 51 
One of the dangers of such an attitude was the tendency of the 
public to believe that appointments were made in such a fashion and 
consequently many representations were made to the Department by citi- 
zens offering their services. For example, many applications for the 
mission at Kuibyshev, the war-time capital of the Soviet Union, were 
received from naturalized Canadians of Russian and Ukrainian origin. 
It was thought best to discourage such applications, even though many 
of the applicants possessed language and other qualifications of a 
higher order. 
In view of domestic political concerns, however, a measured 
and considered pace had to be followed in both the appearance and the 
method of the extension of any appointments policy. In April of 1943, 
a leading member of the Godbout Government in Quebec had declared it 
to be the duty of the Quebec Government to promote both cultural and 
commercial connections with Latin America and that following the war 
many agencies of the province would be established in South American 
countries. This view was peculiar to Quebec, and promulgated by Le 
Devoir, which criticized Canada's policy toward Latin America for 
ignoring the good will which had evolved over the years through cul- 
tural and especially religious connections through missionary work. 
In a despatch from Washington, Pearson suggested that this opinion 
was enhanced by the belief that Quebec's major handicaps to progress 
were commercial in nature, and that the opinion held in some respon- 
sible quarters was that provincial commercial agencies were in a better 
position to sponsor local commercial interests than federal offices. 
The two should complement each other in the field, since French Cana- 
50. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 241, file 2444, "Canadian 
Representation to Mexico, 1941-1945", memorandum from Robertson 
to King, 17 January 1944. 
51. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 241, file 2448, "Canadian 
Representation to Sweden, 1943-48", memorandum from Robertson 
to King, 29 January 1944. 
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than representation in the Trade Commissioner Service had never been 
considered satisfactory. Pearson recommended the creation of a Cul- 
tural Relations Division within External Affairs that would promote 
good will which would in turn foster commercial opportunities. Robert- 
son opined that Canada, including Quebec, was already well-served in 
Latin America since French Canadian officers had been deliberately 
placed into service there. Reports of the recent visit of Latin American 
journalists to Canada stated that there existed a favourable disposi- 
tion to Canada because Canadians relied less on high-pressure salesman- 
ship. An effective compromise was attained in the signature of Canada's 
first ever cultural agreement with Brazil in early 1944.52 
Rapid expansion of representation abroad entailed numerous 
practical difficulties, including the staffing of missions, the allo- 
cating of resources and a multifarious array of functional problems. 
Since many of the officers of the Department were considered to be 
too junior to accept a position as a Head of Mission, several eminent 
Canadians were appointed from outside the Foreign Service. They 
included General Victor Odlum, a World War I soldier who represented 
Canada in Australia, then China and later Turkey; T. C. Davis, a Sas- 
katchewan jurist who followed Odlum to both Australia and China; and 
Warwick Chipman, a lawyer and former President of the League of 
Nations Association of Canada who became the first ambassador to Chile. 
There were others, but in each of the above cases, the mission was 
established by the Minister or Ambassador and a harried Third Secre- 
tary, who was responsible for finding housing, offices, drafting and 
sending messages in code and decyphering messages as they arrived. 
Human resources were in great demand, and many missions suffered 
through prolonged growing pains, which were not abetted by the 
lack 
of experience of the head of mission, the spectre of uneven economic 
conditions which caused administrative 
difficulties and spiralling 
war-time inflation. 
53 
52. DEA, File 5175-401, "Quebec Representation in Foreign 
Countries - Latin America", despatch 1274 Pearson to 
Secretary 
of State for External Affairs 
(King), 2 June 1943; despatch 704 
King to Leighton McCarthy, 25 June 1943; King Papers, vol. 
266, 
file 2652, memorandum from Robertson to King, 22 November 
1943; 
also interview with Benjamin Rogers, 19 November 
1980. 
53. Certainly the case for the mission in Santiago. 
Interview 
with Rt. Hon. Jules Leger, 5 September 1980. 
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There was an inevitable lack of consistency; missions were 
sent on their way with a minimum of ground rules and with no umbilical 
cords; ministers were expected to establish themselves and exist by 
their wits -- then inform Ottawa. En route to Chile in January 194 3, 
Chipman passed through Washington for some basic training. Pearson 
dutifully recorded the event in his diary: "He is here to find out 
how a Legation is run. Maybe we had better not tell him too much. , 
54 
Once on the spot, the Head of Mission relied heavily on the good of- 
fices of the British and the American representatives in assisting 
during the first tenuous months and in helping to open doors in offi- 
cial circles. Even force majeure had to be reckoned with, as in the 
case of the embassy in Mexico, where altitude sickness became a prob- 
lem for all members of staff. A cottage at Cuernavaca - 3000 feet 
below Mexico City - had to be leased so that embassy officials could 
spend alternate weekends in comfort. 
55 
Officer shortages were a constant hindrance. "The greatest 
difficulty, " Norman Robertson wrote the Canadian Minister in Washing- 
ton, Leighton McCarthy, in reply to a request for more diplomatic 
personnel, "is that we have not enough experienced men to go around. 
Three new legations have recently been established and we have not 
been able to send to each of them more than one member of our perma- 
nent Service. "56 The year was 1943, this being before significant 
expansion took place. Robertson believed that it would be profitless 
to compare the relative needs in Ottawa, Washington and other posts 
abroad. Much had been accomplished by bringing the "temporary special 
assistants" into the Department, some of whom had begun to serve 
abroad, yet even they could not be spared to alleviate the chronic 
shortages at established missions. By late 1947, the shortage of 
senior men was still so acute that there were suggestions that Hume 
54. Pearson Diary, 21 January 1943. 
55. Mackenzie King however insisted that the expenses for such 
a cottage should not exceed $3,000 per annum. King Papers, J4 
Series, vol. 241, file 2444, "Canadian Representation to Mexico, 
1941-1945", memorandum from H. L. Keenleyside to King, 5 July 
19 45 . 
56. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 343, Robertson to McCarthy, 
8 March 1943. 
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Wrong should serve concurrently as Ambassador to the United States 
and as Canadian representative on the United Nations Security Council. 
Wrong's feelings were that he was too occupied to conduct the ambas- 
sadorial job properly, and "... to add to this what should be a second 
heavy full-time job in another city could only mean in practice that 
neither duty would be properly discharged, even if the New York dele- 
gation were equipped with a competent senior staff. " Furthermore, 
ambassadors in Washington of the United Kingdom, France, China and 
the Netherlands had attempted this feat and were all "... unanimous 
in condemning the infliction of this double responsibility on them. "57 
The social aspect of representational activities abroad also 
required much time and expense. Leighton McCarthy, a Toronto million- 
aire, generously kept the wine cellar at the embassy in Washington 
full without billing the Canadian Government. When Pearson, the first 
career diplomat to attain such high representational office, succeeded 
him in the latter months of 1944, he could not rely on personal wealth 
to facilitate both his family's living requirements and the social 
demands of being an ambassador. His functions as ambassador, Chairman 
of the Supply Committee of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), and Chairman of the Interim Commission on Food 
and Agriculture, did not make matters easier. Before accepting the 
position, Pearson sent his opinions to Robertson, stating, "It would, 
I think, be most unfortunate for our Service if the success of a career 
appointment to such an important post were prejudiced from the outset 
by inadequate financial provision for the work to be done. "58 
Residences for Heads of Mission, especially in Washington and 
London, had to be chosen and furnished as much for their entertainment 
potential as for their acceptability as a home. Norman Robertson was 
57. DEA, File 5475-AS-2-40C, "Appointment of Canadian Delegates 
to the United Nations Security Council", cable WA4039 Wrong to 
Pearson, 30 December 1947. 
58. Pearson received an extra $75 per month for entertainment 
purposes as Chairman of the Interim Commission on 
Food and 
Agriculture. Pearson Papers, vol. 11, file "UN Interim Commis- 
sion on Food and Agriculture, 1943-44,1947", Wrong to 
Pearson, 
5 October 1943. His salary as ambassador was $10,000, with an 
allowance of $10,450 and an automobile allowance of 
$1,900. 
Estimated expenditures totalled $30,000. Pearson Papers, vol. 
12, Pearson to Robertson, 12 December 1944. 
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embarrassed when, as High Commissioner in London, he recommended the 
purchase of the present official residence on Upper Brook Street, the 
renovation of which exceeded all estimates by $90,000.59 Protocol and 
entertainment also had to be judiciously observed in Ottawa where for- 
eign representatives would often take offence at the Canadian Govern- 
ment's inability to remember all their state holidays. Mackenzie King's 
diaries are replete with references to his fluctuating annoyance and 
delight at the responsibilities of protocol. Astute foreign represen- 
tatives, however, would find methods which would make their audiences 
with the Prime Minister most agreeable. 
60 
In 1946, Canada sent 102 accredited representatives to inter- 
national conferences. The coordination of reporting of information 
became a relatively, serious difficulty, in that various missions 
wished to be informed of behind-the-scenes activities and not receive 
all their information via the local press. 
This problem of keeping missions posted seems to be to 
increase in complexity. I used to think that if we could set 
up a division in the Department which would be responsible 
for pushing out information to Missions marked on a large wall 
map our headaches would be over. However, the difficulty of 
course, is that the only people who know what information to 
send where are the people who are dealing with the subject 
concerned. There doesn't seem to be any easy solution except 
constant alertness on the part of fatigued minds. 
61 
59. Granatstein manuscript, "Civil Servant: Norman Robertson 
and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy", Chapter 6; see 
also Granatstein, A Man of Influence, p. 210. 
60. Mackenzie King got along exceedingly well with all foreign 
representatives in Ottawa, although he sometimes showed 
impa- 
tience with the Latin American diplomats. The new Minister of 
Turkey, Sevki Alhan, won the heart of the Prime Minister by tel- 
ling him that in Turkey he was regarded with respect and affec- 
tion for his actions in preventing a war twenty-two years earlier 
at the time of the Chanak Crisis. King 
Diary, 21 March 1944. 
61. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2105, File "Meeting of the 
General Assembly, New York, 1946", John Holmes to R. G. Riddell, 
28 December 1946. Other government departments represented at 
international conferences often failed to inform External 
Affairs of their movements, confusion being the result. 
Privy 
Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 68, File 
D-12, Escott 
Reid to Heeney, 17 September 1948. Coordination of administra- 
tion and personnel at far-flung posts was assisted 
by sending 
the redoubtable Agnes McCloskey on a 
farewell investigating 
trip of the Latin American missions 
before her retirement in 
1948. Pearson Papers, Vol. 8, file "Department of 
External 
Affairs - Personnel 1946 to 
1948", Pearson to H. D. Scully, 
23 February 1948. 
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As a result of these concerns, and as an attempt to standard- 
ize reporting, a departmental Committee on Reporting from Missions 
Abroad held its first meeting on 15 October 1948. Of significance 
were the questions of the distribution and authorship of despatches, 
their revision and how they should be distributed abroad. Guidance 
had, in the past, been given in individual letters of instruction 
issued to the Heads of Mission at the time of their appointment. It 
was decided to consolidate memoranda dealing with reporting from 
abroad in order to produce guidelines which would be more attuned to 
changing patterns in representation. 
62 
The calibre and capabilities of the officers of the Department 
guaranteed its ability to survive the trials and tribulations of dyna- 
mic growth at home and abroad. They possessed impressive academic 
qualifications in many disciplines, usually acquired at either Oxford 
or Cambridge, and to a lesser degree in the United States. "No Empire 
is strong enough to withstand forever the strain that Cecil Rhodes put 
on ours", a Montreal Gazette editorial intoned. "Our whole course has 
been warped to pettiness and strutting-self assertion to compensate 
for wounds suffered in their egos by smart and bumptious youths who 
couldn't take it at Oxford and are still trying to hand it back from 
Ottawa. "63 The Rhodes Scholarship connection certainly was and per- 
haps still is what may be termed an "old-boy network". Its signif i- 
cance lay in the fact that it was a continuing trans-Atlantic matrix 
of associations and relationships. There is insufficient evidence 
in both documentary sources and the oral testimony of former officers 
to assert that Rhodes Scholars entering the Department shared a simi- 
lar Weltanschauung in either their liberal conception of Canada's in- 
ternational role or the ideal state of Canada's relations with the 
62. DEA, File 9240-40, "Minutes of Committee on Reporting from 
Missions Abroad - First Meeting", 15 October 1948. Important 
Heads of Missions often took matters into their own hands in 
changing reporting patterns. Robertson 
decided to discontinue 
the usual fortnightly summary on United Kingdom 
Affairs in 
January 1947 and instead have two weekly telegrams dealing with 
domestic and foreign aspects. King Papers, J1 Series, cable 
26, 
Robertson to Pearson, 8 January 1947. 
63. DEA, Papers from the Office of the Under-Secretary Series, 
vol. 715, file 4 "Canadian Foreign Policy, 
1932-44", editorial 
from the Montreal Gazette, 17 June 1942. 
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United Kingdom and the United States. There was, as will be demon- 
strated in later chapters, a discernible difference between those 
individuals who had received their higher education in the United 
States and those who had enjoyed academic life in Britain. Some, 
like Norman Robertson, had pursued graduate studies in both coun- 
tries. The officers who had gone to America in the 1930s were in- 
fluenced by American liberalism, which at that time espoused isola- 
tionist tendencies; whereas their colleagues who had studied in the 
United Kingdom absorbed some of the dialogues between left and right 
within the British Labour Party. Where the isolationist tinge of 
the former emphasized Canada's role in the Americas, the latter clung 
to the more popular view of the "North Atlantic Triangle. " 
The dominant historical influence on all officers was undoubt- 
edly the experience of the Great War and the failure of the League of 
Nations to bring stability to the international community. Arnold 
Toynbee's A Study of History, which appeared in 1938, was eagerly read 
by many in the Department, including Escott Reid, its most prodigious 
intellectual. The activities of the Canadian institute of Interna- 
tional Affairs in the 1930s -a golden decade for the Institute - 
assisted in formulating the evolving views of the immediate pre-war 
period and several of its more influential members - Reid, Claxton, 
Paul Martin, John Baldwin, and John Holmes - would find themselves 
working in or with the Department in the 1940s. The writings of 
John Dafoe, F. R. Scott, Frank Underhill and the League for Social 
Reconstruction were instrumental in shaping the minds of several 
of the younger officers, particularly the institution-builders. Amid 
all the social-scientific skills developed at various universities 
by the aspiring diplomats, one cannot overlook the artistic: the 
poetry of Douglas LePan and Robert Ford, and the diaries of Charles 
Ritchie. 
64 
The accessahility of senior officers such as Robertson, 
Wrong 
and Pearson to the junior staff, whether in regard to policy ques- 
tions, personal matters - it was customary for the Under-Secretary 
to 
64. Douglas LePan won the Governor General's Award 
for poetry 
in 1954 and for fiction in 1964; Robert A. D. 
Ford won the same 
award for poetry in 1956; and Charles 
Ritchie won the Governor 




approve marriages - or social occasions helped to evoke an esprýt .e 
corps which was indeed rare in other services. One has only to recall 
the baseball games between the "Hapless Heeneys" and "Pearson's Puis- 
sants" as an example. This, combined with a collective feeling of guilt 
among younger officers at not being able to enlist, led to an accep- 
tance of long hours, poor working conditions and a Prime Minister who 
gave no indication that he knew of their existence. 
65 
Inevitably, officers of the Department of External Affairs 
looked to the British Foreign Service as an example of both how to 
and how not to do things. Despatches were written in the admired 
British mode, including the ever-present "I have the honour to be 
Sir, Your obedient Servant" formal ending. Even those officers who 
were suspicious of British foreign policy motives conceded that the 
British could write much better than the Americans. The Ashton- 
Gwatkin observations on the reorganization of the British Foreign 
Service of 1944 were widely circulated within the Department and 
there was renewed discussion of amalgamation, home allowances, and 
changes in recruitment procedures. 
66 
The "country house" selection 
method of the British, where recruits were observed in a controlled 
environment, was also given some consideration before being discoun- 
ted as being too geographically impractical. 
67 
Frequent queries ema- 
nating from Canada House regarding questions of protocol, forms of 
address and the like, were found on the desks of the Foreign Office. 
68 
The openness of Commonwealth consultation at the time of the Dumbar- 
ton Oaks discussions on world organization in the autumn of 1944 gave 
Canadian officers in Washington an open window on the conduct of nego- 
tiations between the Great Powers. The British also shared many of 
their despatches and memoranda with the Canadians, but this was not a 
65. Most of the above based on interviews with Escott Reid, 
12 June 1980; Gordon Robertson, 4 June 1980; Charles Ritchie, 
20 June 1980; and James Gibson, 25 June 1980. 
66. DEA, File 2248-40, "Organization and Regulation of British 
Foreign Service", memorandum from Wrong to Robertson, 
12 March 
1945. 
67. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2116, file AR 
420/5, memo- 
randum from Holmes to Robertson, 
25 March 1947. 
68. Foreign Office, FO 371, W10265/102/68, John 
Holmes to 
A. V. Coverley-Price, 16 October 1946. 
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one-way flow since copies of valuable Canadian despatches -- the re- 
ports of Dana Wilgress, the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow, for in- 
stance - also reached London. 
but not nearly as much. 
The State Department shared as well, 
Recruitment of officers before and after the war differed 
from the British method, although both services relied on a written 
examination. "The standard required for successful competition in 
normal times is about equivalent to that of a Ph. D. examination" and 
the ratio of candidates to appointments before the war was approxi- 
mately 50 to 1.69 Questions on the examinations for the Canadian 
Foreign Service encompassed areas of domestic and international poli- 
tics, economics and the arts, and did not resemble the broad philoso- 
phical questions found on the British examinations. 
70 
Successful 
candidates would receive a starting salary as Third Secretary of 
$2,400 per annum, though women who were also recruited by competitive 
examination to ease the shortage,. received considerably less for per- 
forming similar functions. 
What characterized the new Canadian career diplomats of the 
mid-1940s were the twin dichotomies of zeal and anonymity; idealism 
and pragmatism. In Mackenzie King's opinion, anonymity was the most 
admirable quality of any government official. Policy was meant to be 
announced by Cabinet ministers and not by a plethora of civil servants 
who had no conception of the political weight of their statements. 
Speeches on the part of officers of the Department had, in the past, 
been somewhat of a rarity, especially after Walter Riddell had been 
officially rebuked for advocating oil sanctions at the time of the 
69. DEA, File 2795-, AB-40, "Canada's Foreign Office", proposed 
article by H. L. Keenleyside, n. d., 1945. 
70. DEA, File 2248-40, "Organization and Regulation of British 
Foreign Service ; DEA, Personnel Files Series, vol. 381, file 
C340/HC/39. The British Foreign Service examination, which was 
the same as the Civil Service examination contained numerous 
general essay questions: "Consider the place of the public 
house 
in the social life of Great Britain" and "Describe, with expla- 
nations and illustrative examples, the methods of seed 
dispersal 
used by plants. " Questions on the Canadian examination 
in 1940 
included "The question of Canadian unity" and "a letter to your 




Abyssinian Crisis. With Canada's global role expanding so quickly, 
it was only a matter of time before they were pulled into the public 
spotlight. The Prime Minister reacted predictably: "These matters 
are getting out of hand. Thus far External Affairs seems to have 
been fortunate in the care exercised by its officials abroad. The 
matter, however, is one which cannot be too closely watched. "71 The 
Information Division of the Department began printing some of the more 
important diplomatic speeches for public distribution in early 1947, 
as part of a programme to publicize the Department. "No Canadian, " 
Pearson declared in the first speech to be printed, "need worry today 
about the mysteries of Canadian diplomacy hovering over his head. " 
72 
Some senior officials, especially Norman Robertson, were wary of public 
utterances. "I have not made my living by public speaking, " Robertson 
told his audience at the Canada Club in London in 1946, "I have always 
felt that the so-called Trappist vows of silence and anonymity, which 
it is sometimes thought are imposed on the Civil Service from above, 
are really its principle prerequisites. I have certainly enjoyed a 
long and sheltered immunity from speech-making and this moment of 
unmuzzling gives me no feeling of relief. "73 Ironically, it was 
Robertson who had unsuccessfully tried to insist that all formal 
speeches should be submitted to the Under-Secretary in advance. Pear- 
son, who had cultivated good relations with the press since his days 
in Wasington, and whose public remarks were often laced with self- 
deprecating barbs, was more of a performer, but may already have been 
raising his sights to a political career. Wrong had pressed for a 
general but flexible directive which should be followed. 
74 
It was 
71. King had clearly not forgotten the Riddell incident. King 
Papers, J1 Series, vol. 411, King to Pearson, 21 November 1946. 
72. DEA, Statements and Speeches, 47/1, Address by Pearson to 
the Ottawa Branch of the Alumni Federation of the University of 
Toronto, 11 January 1947. 
73. DEA, File 40-AG-40, "Appointment of Robertson as Canadian 
High Commissioner to United Kingdom", speech given by Robertson 
to the Canada Club in London, 20 November 1946. The Prime 
Minister cabled his congratulations. 
74. Pearson Papers, vol. 3, Wrong to Pearson, 12 December 1947. 
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discretion, however, which became the guide; and to paraphrase John 
Holmes, transformed the necessity of public diplomacy into a virtue. 
Zeal sometimes overshadowed discretion. Individual officers 
would occasionally exhibit their own preconceptions and biases. A 
too strident nationalism at times emerged in their public speeches 
and representations; observances of protocol were not always exact; 
diplomatic language was known to have suffered from being either too 
diaphanous or too imprecise. The idealistic ends of a new interna- 
tionalism designed to change an imperfect world were pursued with 
vigour and often transcended policy to become personal crusades. 
Pragmatism appeared to be endemic to the upper echelons of the policy- 
making hierarchy within the Department. The resultant dialectic was 
both symtomatic and consistent with the adolescent growth of the 
Department of External Affairs, and the coming to the fore of a new 
generation of Canadian diplomat. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FUNCTIONALIST IDEAL 
The 'functional principle' was a singularly Canadian philo- 
sophy which formed the foundation of Canadian foreign policy during 
the 1940s. Not a Canadian invention, the principle's most lucid 
definition comes from a seminal study which asserts that the func- 
tional principle may be reduced to two fundamental positions: 
"first, that the Great Powers are entitled to take the lead in inter- 
national affairs but not to dominate them; and, secondly, that con- 
trol should be shared with such other powers as are able and willing 
to make a definite contribution to the particular object in view. "1 
One should initially note that the functional principle finds 
its origins in the theory of international relations known as 'func- 
tionalism', which postulates that a viable and pacific international 
system can best be constructed through international institutions 
concerned with economic and social questions, rather than with the 
1. Douglas G. Anglin, "Canadian Policy Towards International 
Institutions, 1939-1950" (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation, 
Corpus Christi, Oxford, 1956), p. 264. 
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web of international politics. The functional principle, in its 
Canadian incarnation, therefore represented a logical extrapolation 
of the functional theory: leading representation on international 
councils should be awarded to those states which, through their re- 
sources and international experience, found themselves closely asso- 
ciated with such economic and social concerns. 
2 
The functional prin- 
ciple, or functionalism, was given strong expression in exhorting 
Canadian participation in the Central Committee of the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA); it fueled the cam- 
paign against the great power veto in the United Nations; and it would 
eventually lead to an article in the North Atlantic Treaty which 
called for the promotion of an Atlantic community in fields other than 
defence. 
Hume Wrong was the inspirational figure in the development of 
functionalism. He presented the theory to Norman Robertson in January 
1942 as one of several policy strategies designed to maintain Canadian 
influence and status in the wake of American involvement in the war, 
and by August, the functional principle had been elevated by Wrong - 
with the consent and encouragement of his colleagues within the De- 
partment"of External Affairs - to become the preferred policy. His 
enunciation of this policy came in a lengthy and well-reasoned memo- 
randum directed to the Under-Secretary: "In principle, each of the 
United Nations should contribute to the direction of the general war 
effort in proportion to the value of its contribution to that effort. 
The principle is easy to state", Wrong conceded, "but difficult to 
apply. " The memorandum was a response to feelings that the recent 
establishment of the Combined Boards - the centralized Allied agen- 
Gies charged with control of the economic war effort - assumed that 
the United Nations, as the Allied Powers were known after 1 January 
1942, were divided into two groups - one dependent on London, the 
other on Washington, with the Soviet Union in a special position. 
"It has been obvious from the first that Canada does not fit into 
this pattern, " Wrong wrote; "... there is, however, evidence of a 
strong desire in both capitals not to 
depart from the two-power basis 
2. See John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Cüna a znii the 
Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1979), 
p. 72; also James Eayrs, In Defence of 
Canada: Peacema -nj =z a 
Deterrence (Toronto, 1972), pp. 161-2. 
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of membership on the Boards... In our contact with the organs for the 
direction of the war, should we be content merely with protecting our 
interests? "3 While on a visit to London in November 1942 to discuss 
Canadian desires for a more intimate policy-making association with 
the Combined Boards, Wrong detected that the British ministers seemed 
receptive to Canadian aspirations. As he had stated earlier, func- 
tionalism was not difficult to define but its direction and applica- 
tions were another matter: "If we wish to push these matters further, 
I am sure that it will be necessary for us to make up our minds firmly 
what we want to do and where we want to go. "4 
The functional principle had been utilized on a single-issue 
basis in ad hoc fashion during the latter part of 1942 in dealing with 
the UNRRA membership question, Canadian liaison with the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff through the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, member- 
ship of the Combined Production and Resource Board, the Pacific Coun- 
cil, and in a number of less than satisfactory contacts with the Com- 
bined Food Board which had fallen short of Canadian expectations. In 
March 1943, Wrong stated that "we have approached the questions simply 
and have improvised as successful methods as we could manage... ", but 
international post-war planning more generally had to allow for a co- 
hesive form and this would be "the principle that representation on 
international bodies should be determined on a functional basis so as 
to permit the participation of those countries which have the greatest 
stake in the particular subject under examination. "5 
Wrong had been influenced - as had others in his Department - 
by studies on international relations which had emanated from the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and by papers from 
the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD). These papers were vir- 
tually all academic in nature and included efforts by 
Arnold Toynbee, 
3. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 20, memorandum, "Canada, the 
United Nations and the Combined Boards", 8 August 1942; see also 
A. J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Rela- 
tions", International Journal XXXV, No. 2, 
(Spring 1980), p. 314. 
4. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 23 "London 1942", memorandum, 
"Combined Boards", 5 November 1942. 
5. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 338, file 3668 
"United Nations 
1942-1950", memorandum, Wrong to Robertson, 19 March 
1943. 
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T. North Whitehead, Nicholas Mansergh and David Mitrany. It was the 
latter's consolidation of some of his theories developed between the 
wars which attracted the attention of Canadian internationalist think- 
ers. Mitrany's The Progress of International Government had been pub- 
lished in 1933 and had influenced Wrong, but there was considerable 
excitement at the June 1943 publication of Mitrany's "A Working Peace 
System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization", 
6 
when the harmonization of the evolving functional 
principle to general foreign policy was nearing its apogee within the 
Department. Wrong acknowledged the debt to Mitrany's functionalist 
theory in the development of its Canadian offshoot: "There is another 
meaning given to the term, used especially by Professor Mitrany in a 
study recently issued by Chatham House... the two meanings overlap and 
are not essentially inconsistent but the variation in the use of the 
term should be borne in mind. "7 
It was left to Norman Robertson to discover how functionalism 
could capture the imagination of Mackenzie King. This was less diffi- 
cult than imagined and the UNRRA controversy during the first half of 
1943 would offer him the opportunity. In a memorandum to the Prime 
Minister, Robertson stated that the Canadian experience between the 
wars had demonstrated the practical difficulties of applying the legal 
concept of the equality of states, both to the great powers and small 
nations, to membership in international bodies and that it was now 
abundantly clear that no international system could be based upon 
great power hegemony to the exclusion of others. Moreover, what ground 
should the middle powers occupy? "It is not always the largest powers 
that have the greatest contribution to make to the work of these bodies 
6. David Mitrany's earlier work, The Progress of International 
Government (London: 1933) was most influential but the functional 
theory was expressed with more passion in "A Working Peace System. 
" 
Mitrany was not the first either, since Leonard Woolf had noted 
the functional principle in his International Government (1916) 
in connection with the success of the International Postal 
Union. 
See Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Rela- 
tions", p. 316 and Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, p. 72. 
7. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 44, file W-22-1, 
UNRRA 1942-1943", "Notes on Some Questions which may arise during 




or the greatest stake in their success... representation on such bodies 
can often be determined on a functional basis and in our view this 
principle should be applied whenever it is feasible. "8 
Mackenzie King made Canadian functionalism public in his speech 
to the House of Commons on 9 July 1943, during the customarily late 
debate on the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. 
9 
It 
was the first volley in a barrage of public statements on functionalism 
which would continue with varying degrees of intensity until the foun- 
ding of the United Nations in the summer of 1945. The purpose of this 
initial speech was two-fold: to discover if Canadian public opinion 
would find the functional principle palatable and to let other nations 
take notice of this Canadian declaration for world organization. The 
majority of the Canadian press - who were in this instance particularly 
well-briefed - expressed the view that the Prime Minister's remarks 
heralded a new age in Canadian foreign policy and made Canada a spokes- 
man for the smaller countries whose role in the world was greater than 
mere numerical size would indicate. Truly, the man who had so long 
stood for freedom for Canada from foreign commitments had apparently 
and dramatically turned over a new leaf. But Mackenzie King and his 
government were already committed to a global war, which, everyone 
was certain, would spawn new attempts at international organization. 
If Canada aspired to being more than merely at best a second player 
in such a renewal, then Canada had to display some self-interested 
approaches of its own. Indeed, Canada was already doing so in its 
determined efforts to secure greater recognition of its role in the 
Unted Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as will be 
discussed below. Nonetheless, the timing of the Prime Minister's 
speech was unfortunate, since it coincided with the Allied invasion 
of Sicily that same evening and both American and British newspapers, 
although mentioning that Mackenzie King had indicated the need for the 
establishment of a major international organization before the end of 
8. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3694, memorandum, 
Robertson to King, 18 January 1943. This memorandum was formu- 
lated into a cable which was sent to Massey in London on 22 
January and dealt directly with the UNRRA representation question. 
DEA General Registry File 2295-G-40. See below, 
9. Canada, House of Commons, ? eb tes, 9 July 1943, p. 4558. 
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the war, did not specifically mention the functional principle, con- 
centrating on reports from the battlefield instead. The inattentive- 
ness of the press of the great powers was not helped by the failure 
to send advance copies of the speech to the foreign offices of the 
Wartime Information Board. 
1° 
On the other hand, the Swedish Consul 
General cabled a full account of the speech to his Foreign Ministry; 
the Polish Minister stated that he was most impressed with this con- 
cept and was contacting his government in London; Dr. E. R. van Klef- 
fens, the Dutch Foreign Minister, indicated his support from London; 
and the Yugoslavian Minister in Ottawa telephoned Robertson to regis- 
ter his approval. 
11 
It was not coincidental that these were all 
smaller powers who would receive the greatest benefit from the appli- 
cation of the functional principle, and the Department appreciated 
their interest and support. Canada, however, already considered it- 
self to be a secondary or 'middle power' - perhaps being the only 
state who could qualify since other contenders had been overrun by 
the enemy - and a polite form of snobbery prevailed. 
*** 
Canadian membership in the United Nations Relief and Rehabi- 
litation Administration (UNRRA) was destined to become the first 
application of the Canadian functional principle. An unprecedented 
and concerted effort was made to secure membership on the Central 
Committee of UNRRA, yet this objective was thwarted, and thus ended 
the more idealistic phase of functionalism. 
UNRRA was formally established in Washington on 9 November 
1943, where the agreement was signed by representatives of 44 coun- 
tries. It represented an initial, if provisional, attempt at inter- 
national organization and its mandate was "to plan, co-ordinate, ad- 
minister or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief 
of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United 
Nations. "12 UNRRA was supposed to take over after Military Relief 
10. DEA, File 5475-40C, memorandum, "Press Comment on Canada's 
Role in International Organization as Raised in the Debate on 
External Affairs", 20 July 1943; also King Papers, J4 Series, 
vol. 426, "Privy Council Office: Cabinet War Committee Memoranda", 
Wartime Information Board Survey No. 15,17 July 1943. 
11. DEA, File 5475-40, Saul Rae to Wrong, 22 July 1943. 
12. Canada, Treaty Series, 1943, No. 16, "Agreement for United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration", 9 November 
1943, Article I, Section 2(a). 
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and since there appeared to be no clear delineation between relief 
and reconstruction before the negotiation of the agreement - at least 
in terms of planning for a post-war international economic order - 
the functions of UNRRA were carefully expressed, as the unwieldy name 
of the organization demonstrated. As John Holmes had written, Canada 
was indeed fortunate that the first practical application of function- 
alism would be in a field where Canada could make a strong claim be- 
cause of its expected role as a large provider. 
13 
Following the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union 
into the war, Allied plans for the relief of Europe slowly reached the 
formulation stage, but did not attain any form of fruition until the 
American proposals for a relief organization apart from Military Relief 
were presented to the British in May 1942. The Americans proposed a 
'Relief Council' which would consist of ranking members of the United 
Nations, and act solely as a channel of communication between the many 
members. An Executive Committee, consisting of the United Kingdom, 
China, the Soviet Union and the United States would control all of the 
yet undefined policy-making powers. 
14 
This information was received 
from London through Canada House, and in response the Canadian High 
Commission was informed that the "... preliminary draft of the proposed 
organization does not provide for Canadian representation on Executive 
Committee (sic) which is to be set up. In view of Canada's probable 
post-war position as a major supplier of needed foodstuffs, it will 
probably be found necessary to raise the question of the form of Cana- 
dian participation before proposed organization takes definite shape. "15 
13. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, p. 35; see also Grace Fox, 
"The Origins of UNRRA", Political Science Quarterly LXV, Part 4 
(1950), pp. 561-84. For an accurate assessment of Canadian 
relations with the Combined Boards, see S. D. Pierce and A. F. W. 
Plumptre, "Canada's Relations with Wartime Agencies in Washing- 
ton", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XI 
(August 1945), pp. 402-19. 
14. DEA, File 2295-G-40, cable no. 1388, Massey to King, 23 May 
1942. The American plan had been the outcome of talks between 
Dean Acheson of the State Department, Harry White of the Treasury 
and, for the British, Lord Keynes of the Treasury and 
Richard Law, 
Minister of State in the Foreign Office. 
15. Ibid., cable no. 1105, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner, 6 June 1942. 
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Seemingly, both the members of the Cabinet and of the Department of 
External Affairs, infected by a pent-up nationalism which was judged 
to be sweeping the country as the fortunes of the war turned, inex- 
orably moved toward the functional principle as a possible vehicle 
for Canadian aspirations for just international recognition. Repre- 
sentation in UNRRA at this stage was closely connected in the minds 
of Canadian officials with membership of the Combined Food Board. A 
British compromise of August 1942 which guaranteed Canada a seat on 
the Board when Canadian questions were discussed and membership of all 
subsidiary committees, was summarily rejected by the Canadian Cabinet 
War Committee. The telegraphic traffic between the East Block and 
Whitehall which followed this decision tended to concentrate more on 
the question of membership of the relief organization and in a War 
Committee meeting of 2 December 1942 it was noted with approval that 
the United Kingdom had given its support to Canadian representation 
on an expanded Executive Committee of seven. 
Canadian representations had apparently been successful, and 
the United Kingdom made good its promise by arguing with the other 
great powers that the efficiency of the Central or Policy Committee 
would be impaired by excluding from membership those countries whose 
cooperation was essential. "In particular, " the aide-memoire to the 
Americans and Russians stated, "the United Kingdom Government consider 
that Canada, as one of the major potential suppliers of relief goods, 
has a very strong claim to membership of the Committee, a claim that, 
on merits, is regarded as carrying greater weight than that of any 
other country apart from the four Great Powers.., 
16 
New Zealand and 
South Africa were in favour of such Canadian participation and 
it was 
understood to be acceptable to the Soviet 
Union as well. The Canadians 
confused this pragmatic response to their entreaties as signalling 
imminent great power recognition of their functional principle. 
Such 
was not to be the case. 
This illusory situation did not last, however, and was cer- 
tainly based upon misconceptions in the 
first place. The Soviet Union 
had no intention of allowing the 
Policy Committee to expand from four 
16. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 
3694, United Kingdom 
Aide-Memoire, 17 November 1942; also vol. 425, Minutes of the 
Cabinet War Committee, 2 December 1942. 
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to seven for the official reason that such an increase would compli- 
cate hoth the functions and the decisions of the Committee. 
17 
In 
reality, Soviet fears of Anglo-Saxon domination of the Committee and 
the spectre of Polish representation which was decidedly not pro- 
Soviet accounted for the chief Soviet concerns. Soviet resistance 
appeared to be hardening American resolve as well, since the corner- 
stone of Roosevelt's approach to relief was based upon accommodating 
the Russians. A recurring Soviet argument against Canadian function- 
alism was that acceptance would set a precedent for future interna- 
tional organizations - precisely the reason behind Canadian advocacy 
of the principle. 
A memorandum by Norman Robertson on functionalism as related 
to UNRRA of 18 January 1943 formed the basis for the discussion of 
the issue in the Cabinet War Committee three days later. The wide- 
ranging deliberations were concluded by the Prime Minister who ex- 
pressed the consensual view that on broader aspects of international 
organization, the United Nations could not be divided into a group of 
great powers who would exercise political and military responsibilities 
and another which was excluded from such responsibilities regardless 
of size and importance. The Government and the Prime Minister had 
become committed to a philosophy which echoed Mitrany's aphorism of 
"Peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it. 
J8 
The British were quite taken by the Canadian passion for func- 
tionalism, for it would be beneficial for them to have both Canada 
and another European ally on the Policy Committee. There was an inhe- 
rent fear that the European allies would reject the entire scheme for 
UNRRA otherwise. British diplomats confessed that they had missed the 
point of earlier Canadian entreaties for the acceptance of the func- 
tional principle. But functionalism was seen by them in a different 
hue; it was something which in addition to securing just and proper 
recognition for Canada, could also give Britain everything 
it wanted, 
17. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2110, file AR 405/8 Pt. 1, 
memorandum from M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to the 
United 
Kingdom, to the Foreign Office, 16 December 1942. 
18. David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System: An Argument for 
the Functional Development of International Organization", 
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 
p. 54; King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the 
Cabinet 
War Committee, 21 January 1943. 
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since it was evident that during the immediate post-war period the 
major political and strategic decisions would be in the hands of the 
great powers. The functional principle, as applied in cases such as 
UNRRA, would give a "clue to the labyrinth" of post-war international 
organization: "It gives us a principle by which we can reconcile the 
political leadership of the Great Powers with the rights of small na- 
tions. " Gladwyn Jebb, the major architect of the forthcoming British 
proposals for a general world organization, perceived functionalism 
as a sort of vehicle or "window dressing" which would attract smaller 
states to the concept of great power leadership. 
19 
It should be em- 
phasized that this was largely a Foreign Office view and that the 
Dominions Office was more sympathetic to the Canadian interpretation; 
20 
the institutional aspects of world organization, however, came under 
the purview of the Foreign Office. 
The United States did not appreciate the Canadian arguments 
for membership of the Policy Committee at all. If Canada came into 
the Committee, then the Pan-American price would have to be paid, 
which meant including Brazil. The American position was reinforced 
by a Congress still very suspicious of international commitments and 
an Administration which - if the Hot Springs Food Conference of May 
1943 was indicative - was testing the waters of international organi- 
zation in rather haphazard fashion. The American position, as expressed 
by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was that a Four Power Committee 
was favoured since it would be difficult to choose one European ally 
after Canada and Brazil had been added to the Committee. 
At a Four Power meeting on 23 January 1943, where Lord Halifax, 
the British ambassador to the United States, put the Canadian case for 
membership to Hull and senior officials from the State Department, Dean 
Acheson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, proposed 
that the difficulty of Canadian membership could be solved by Canada 
and the United Kingdom sharing a seat on the Policy Committee or by 
establishing another committee of supplying countries. Pearson com- 
mented in his diary that it was quite impossible to 
have a single 
19. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U 2329/402/70, minutes by 
Gladwyn Jebb on telegram no. 354 from British High Commission 
in Ottawa, 11 February 1943; also U 2626/402/70, Jebb to Keynes, 
28 June 1943. 
20. Interview with Lord Garner, 8 November 1979. 
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British Empire vote and that Acheson on his part demonstrated a sur- 
prising lack of knowledge of the Canadian position. Pearson approached 
Acheson three days later to again press the Canadian case; "Acheson 
thought the way out might be by abolishing the Policy Committee alto- 
gether: This is just one of the headaches that are accummulating in 
the efforts to translate the United Nations principle into United 
Nations practice. "21 London also condemned the efficacy of such a 
proposal and magnanimously offered to stand down in favour of Canada. 
This, it was felt in Ottawa, was merely a variation upon a common 
theme and as such tantamount to an Empire seat. Besides, Britain 
possessed a legitimate right to a seat on the Committee for functional 
reasons. 
The Americans offered their verbal sympathies to the Canadians, 
but gave the Russians concrete assurances of agreement. The Canadian 
strategy was to work through the British by repeating arguments to them 
supporting functionalism and its relation to UNRRA. It was stressed 
that it would be much more difficult to convince the Canadian public 
of the wisdom of assuming new responsibilities and making new contri- 
butions following the war if Canada was not given its proper share in 
the decisions involving international organizations. 
22 
The crusade 
was spearheaded by Robertson and Wrong in Ottawa, by Massey and Charles 
Ritchie in London, and by Pearson in Washington. 
These representations were perhaps over-stated, and, as ex- 
pressed by the British to the Americans, Russians and Chinese at the 
Four Power meetings, counter-productive, since they served only to 
harden the resolve of the Americans and the Soviets. Acheson launched 
the second point of his compromise proposal, that 
is, that there should 
be a committee for supplying countries and that 
Canada would be its 
chairman, sitting in on the meetings of the 
Policy Committee when 
21. Pearson Diary, 23-29 January 1943. Acheson commented 
in 
retrospect: "Ottawa raised the matter to the plane of 
high 
principle upon which the Department of 
External Affairs prefers 
(sic) to rest Canada's more mundane interests... Canadian member- 
ship on the executive committee of 
UNRRA seemed a small price to 
pay for all this and heaven too. 
" Dean Acheson, Present at 
Creation: My Years in the State Department, (London, 1969), p. 
70. 
22. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2100, file AR 
405/8 Pt. 1, 
memorandum from Charles Ritchie to 
Massey, 26 January 1943; also 
Pearson Diary, 16-27 February 1943. 
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supply questions were being discussed. Pearson had been informed in 
advance by the British that the compromise would be on the agenda of 
the Four Power meeting of 27 February, so he had an opportunity to 
telephone Ottawa so that the matter could quickly be brought before 
the War Committee. The British and the Americans had greatly under- 
estimated the functionalist passions within governing circles in 
Ottawa and Pearson at his diplomatic best had great difficulty in 
explaining the War Committee's outright rejection of the compromise 
to a distressed Acheson on 4 March. 
23 
The Cabinet was solidly united 
behind Mackenzie King, as were senior officials, especially Clifford 
Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, who in a letter to Robertson 
called for Canada's withdrawal from such an organization which would 
relegate Canada to the back row: "We are still trying to run a demo- 
cracy and there is some historical evidence to support the thesis that 
democracies cannot be taxed without representation... Any Canadian 
Government that accepts such a compromise would soon be brought to 
realities by the public - and would deserve what they would get. 
24 
Clearly, some held an exaggerated opinion of the intensity of Canadian 
public opinion. Pearson thought a visit by Acheson to Ottawa might 
have gone a long way in convincing the Americans that Canada was in- 
deed serious enough to stake its credibility on the acceptance of the 
functional principle, but within a few weeks Australian contentions 
that Australia too deserved representation on the Policy Committee 
clouded the prospect of such a visit. 
With the increasingly polarized positions, the British began 
to show discomfort. Anthony Eden and Malcolm MacDonald attended a 
War Committee meeting in Ottawa on 31 March and endeavoured to con- 
vince the Ministers of the acceptability of the American compromise. 
The compromise, Eden ventured, would come very close to meeting Cana- 
dian demands and it was absolutely essential that efforts to form this 
first international organization should be successful. It would be 
wrong to see this as any sort of precedent, Eden argued, and if the 
Canadian Government accepted the compromise, a reservation could be 
23. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2110, file AR 405/8 Pt. l, 
Cable WA-1017, Pearson to Robertson, 4 March 1943; also King 
Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War 
Committee, 3 March 1943. 
24. DEA, File 2295-G-40, Clark to Robertson, 3 March 1943. 
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made. Eden agreed with the arguments of Mackenzie King and St. Laurent 
for the recognition of the rights of smaller powers but stated empha- 
tically that the great powers should play the major role. 
25 
Pearson was the first Canadian official to become convinced 
of the need to accept the compromise. Frustrated by the anachronistic 
preference of his superior in Washington, Leighton McCarthy, for an 
Empire seat on the Committee, and gloomy over telegrams from Ottawa 
which implied that he was not pressing the functionalist cause ardently 
enough, Pearson had the opportunity to observe Acheson's smooth pro- 
fessional diplomacy in turning aside the attempts of Litvinov, the 
Soviet ambassador, to minimize the British role in the relief of 
Europe. There was more at stake in UNRRA than Canadian functionalism, 
and once the difficulties with the Soviets were temporarily resolved, 
only the 'Canadian difficulty' - as it was known - remained. Pearson 
believed that Canada had no choice but to accept the compromise and 
there was no reason whatsoever why Canada should not. The Soviets 
were apparently so sure that the Supply Committee was to become the 
vital body of UNRRA that they had already demanded membership. "With 
the right handling, " Pearson opined, "we could make a big thing out 
of this chairmanship and play a big part in the Organization., 
26 
Pearson went to Ottawa at the time of Eden's visit, and the inevitable 
opportunity arose where he had lunch with Robertson, Wrong and Clark 
but there was a failure to reach a consensus. While waiting with the 
Prime Minister and others for Eden's aircraft to land, Pearson showed 
no hesitation in telling King why he thought the compromise should be 
accepted. The Prime Minister seemed impressed and confided to Pearson 
that he had not before understood what the compromise actually en- 
tailed. King of course confided other things to Robertson. 
Although Robertson and Wrong had been against accepting the 
compromise, they had not been idle and in a memorandum of 1 April, 
which bore the stamp of Pearson's influence, they outlined the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of accepting or rejecting the compromise in a 
fashion which was weighted towards acceptance. Against accepting the 
compromise they stated that it did not represent full recognition of 
25. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee, 31 March 1943. 
26. Pearson Diary, 22-27 March 1943. 
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the functional principle, and if this principle was to be enshrined 
in the post-war organization, Canada should insist upon its accep- 
tance. Qualified participation or 'coming in by the side door' via 
the Supply Committee would not give the Canadian people sufficient 
assurances and membership of the Central Committee was therefore 
essential. Furthermore, a Central Committee composed of the Big Four 
would confirm the unfortunate impression that every United Nations 
body formed would be dominated by these same powers even though other 
nations may prove more important to the solution of a given problem 
than some of the great powers. On the other hand, chairmanship of the 
Supply Committee and hence partial membership of the Central Committee 
surely represented adequate recognition of Canada's position of being 
at least the fifth ranking country in the world in terms of relief. 
Public opinion could accept this. If this was indeed the case, then a 
precedent had been set and the functional principle was validly recog- 
nized. And finally, if the compromise was refused, it would be alleged 
that Canadian obstinacy was responsible for the failure of the entire 
programme and Canadian reasons for refusing to participate would seem 
considerably less impressive to others. 
27 
Canada would have made its 
functionalist point but would suffer as a result from a sullied inter- 
national image. This would not be good publicity for a status-con- 
scious nation. 
The compromise was accepted by the War Committee on 7 April, 
but not before J. L. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, and C. G. Power, 
the Minister of Defence for Air, indicated that they were still against 
acceptance. Within the Department of External Affairs, John Read, the 
respected Legal Adviser, starkly perceived the decision as an abandon- 
ment of Canada's "monetary honeymoon" with functionalism and in London, 
Vincent Massey registered his dismay, fearing that the decision would 
set an unfortunate precedent: "The key of (sic) the problem is of course 
representation on a 'functional basis' and I feel that we should stress 
this in and out of season. It is a time for toughness. " 
28 
27. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3694, memorandum, "The 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization", 1 April 1943. 
28. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War 
Committee, 7 April 1943. C. D. Howe and J. L. Ralston were two strong 
Cabinet members who favoured the acceptance of the compromise. 
Escott Reid Papers, vol. 6, J. E. Read, "Position of Canada in 
Relation to Post-War International Organization", 8 November 1943; 
and King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 346, Massey to Robertson, 10 April 
1943. 
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Toughness notwithstanding, the pragmatists were happy. Pearson, 
brimming with optimism, repeatedly noted that Canada had won a very 
important concession which it should not cast away: "I hope we play 
our cards right now and put a good man on the Supplies Committee. "29 
He had no idea it was to be him. A further victory was attained by 
the end of June when it became apparent that Canada was to be invited 
to become the third partner on the Combined Food Board. It should be 
noted however that the actual UNRRA Agreement did not include the much- 
desired guarantee which would assure that the form of the organization 
would not be seen to set a precedent for other international organiza- 
tions. Canadian suggestions for changes in the phraseology of the 
draft agreement, especially the preference for the Chairman of the 
Supplies Committee being "a member of" as opposed to "being invited 
to" the Central Committee were summarily ignored and rejected. 
30 
The first session of the Council of UNRRA was held at Atlantic 
City in November 1943. Pearson and Brooke Claxton were named to lead 
the Canadian delegation and Wrong had prepared an epistle for func- 
tionalism which would see them on their way. It was far from certain, 
Wrong stressed, that the compromise formula would provide Canada with 
an adequate voice in the direction of the body and the Canadian dele- 
gation should see that "influence should be proportionate to contri- 
bution, actual or expected., 
31 
It appeared that this would be realized 
and in their report on the conference prepared for the Cabinet War 
Committee, Pearson and Claxton recognized that there would be no doubt 
that the Supplies Committee would have a large part to play in UNRRA. 
Herbert Lehman, the Director General of UNRRA, had already indicated 
that he was anxious to obtain advice from the Committee as soon as 
possible since he had already received specific requests regarding 
arrangements for the future provision of relief goods. 
32 
Also, the 
29. Pearson Diary, 8 April 1943. 
30. DEA, File 2295-G-40, "Memorandum on Draft Convention for 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration", 5 July 
1943. 
31. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 24, "Notes on some questions of 
international organization which may arise during the meeting of 
the Relief Council at Atlantic City", 3 November 1943. 
32. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Privy Council Office 
Memo- 
randa, Cabinet War Committee Document no. 
668, "First Session of 
the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, Atlantic City, November 10th- December 1st, 1943". 
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Supplies Committee appeared to be functinnalist in its membership, 
since in addition to the great powers and Canada, places had been 
allotted to Australia, Belgium, Brazil, India, the Netherlands and 
New Zealand. The meeting at Atlantic City had stipulated that the 
Council of UNRRA would meet every six months. Of greatest signifi- 
cance, however, was the agreement that the member states who had not 
been invaded would contribute one per cent of their national income, 
10% of which was to be made available in convertible funds, for use 
by UNRRA for purchases outside the donor countries. Canada's total 
contribution would amount to $77 million, which would place it third 
behind the United States and the United Kingdom. 
33 
Pearson was eventually appointed Chairman of the Supplies 
Committee and his ability and verve helped to make the Committee 
efficient, in spite of the fact that he was invited to fewer than 
half of the meetings of the Central Committee. His position, coupled 
with a warm and easy rapport with the press, resulted in a very high 
profile, and although it was very unusual it seemed only natural that 
Pearson, a civil servant and not yet an ambassador, should serve as 
the President of the second meeting of the Council which was held in 
Montreal in September 1944.34 His association with UNRRA was the 
first significant step in his meteoric career in public affairs. 
The Canadian role in UNRRA was utilized by the Government to 
convince the Canadian public of the merits of functionalism and of 
the important part which Canada was playing in the organization. 
UNRRA, partly because of the organization's effective press section 
and the attention of the Wartime Information Board, was constantly in 
the news, and was depicted - to use Pearson's phrase - as an example 
of 'cooperative nationalism', the prelude to a new world order. Cana- 
dian policy-makers took advantage of this publicity and the favourable 
response to it across the nation, this being exemplified by Mackenzie 
King's opening address to the meeting of the Council in Montreal and 
33. DEA, File 2295-AZ-40, "Report to Parliament on the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration", October 1945. 
34. The British were lavish in their praise of Pearson. CAB 66, 
WP(44)589, "Second Session of the Council of UNRRA", memorandum 
by the Minister of State (Richard Law), 19 October 1944. 
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Claxton's subsequent speech, "UNRRA and Public Opinion" . 
35 
It is not the intention here to dwell upon UNRRA's obvious 
successes and the difficulties encountered in relieving a war-ravaged 
world, which have been well-documented in other sources. 
36 
What is 
of greater interest is that as UNRRA activities progressed, great 
power concern with functionalism declined proportionately. Soviet 
attacks on all aspects of the organization, especially the adminis- 
tration, became incessant, and while the war lasted, the Americans 
and the British had preferred the authority of the established Com- 
bined Boards in related areas rather than the larger and more cumber- 
some Supplies Committee. Further, the American Congress, piqued by 
the fact that the disbursement of American contributions were subject 
to multilateral control, imposed the qualification on the United 
States' second contribution that the Central Committee as opposed to 
the Council should allocate such funds. The British still succumbed 
to the "window dressing" theory and believed that UNRRA would have 
little to do near the end of the war since it would be caught between 
the relief functions of the military and the activities of nascent 
local governments. To counter these views, Pearson emphasized that 
there was a great deal of popular interest in UNRRA in North America 
and claimed that "while the Canadian Government would certainly give 
to UNRRA all the relief supplies which she had promised, - especially 
as she had some responsibility for and control over UNRRA - there 
would be no disposition whatever to hand out free military relief 
35. Claxton Papers, vol. 68, file 1 "UNRRA", speech, "UNRRA 
and Public Opinion", n. d. (October 1944). The speech contained 
a remark which could be seen as prophetic in light of Canadian 
policy in the next few years: "In the difficult times that lie 
ahead the support for international cooperation will not be 
sufficient unless it is based on the widespread understanding 
and knowledge consequent upon the recognition of enlightened 
self-interest. "; also Pearson Papers, vol. 7, proposed article 
for the New York Times, "UNRRA; Doorway to Cooperative Nation- 
alism", October 1945. 
36. The official history is George Woodbridge et a",, 
The History of the United Nations Relief an- Rehabilita--'-». 
Administration 3 vols. (New York, 1950), for Canadian perspec- 
tives see F. H. Soward, Canada In World Af fairs: From Vornar., _, ': 4 
to Paris, 1944-1946, (Toronto, 1950), pp. 82-98. 
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supplies to be dispensed by the United States and United Kingdom 
armies. "37 Perhaps the great powers, especially the United States 
and the Soviet Union, had recognized the functional principle as 
something to avoid in the future. With the accession of France to 
great power status following the formation of the United Nations 
Organization, Canada was elevated to the Central Committee of UNRRA, 
but at that point UNRRA itself was already beginning to wind down. 
Moreover, and certainly inevitably, the great powers had long since 
turned their gaze to the much larger questions of a global political 
organization, and it was imperative that the functionalists of the 
Department of External Affairs quickly adapt to consider these issues. 
It was a time for flexibility. 
*** 
As it became evident to Canadian policy-makers that in spite 
of their persistent efforts, the functional principle would not be 
enshrined in the UNRRA Agreement, Canadian functionalists began to 
turn inwards. UNRRA had served as the initial testing ground, but 
during the UNRRA issue, developments behind the scenes were far from 
static. The last half of 1943 was indicative of how quickly events 
were moving: the capitulation of Italy was imminent by mid-year; 
the British were busily at work preparing their proposals for a world 
organization and invited Canadian comments; the eventual defeat of 
Germany appeared more certain and would necessitate the international 
control of Europe; and for the first time, Canada had to seriously 
ponder the prospect of bilateral peacetime defence cooperation with 
the United States. All these issues on the international agenda 
were a tall order for a miniscule foreign service to analyze in any 
amount of detail and it was for this reason that policy planning 
committees were established in 1943. 
Like the commitment to functionalism, the creation of the Post- 
Hostilities Problems Committee was not a deliberate act, but one of 
adaptive response to changing situations. 
Escott Reid had called for 
the establishment of a planning body within the 
Department in early 
1942: "We must become a planning, thinking and creative 
body and not 
37. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 
44, file 
W-22-1, Pearson to Robertson, 27 January 1944; also 
Pearson 
Papers, vol. 21, file "FAO 1943-1945", 
Pearson to Robertson, 
13 January 1945. 
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be content merely to solve day-to-day problems as they arise. "38 His 
proposal had fallen on deaf ears, since it was for Norman Robertson 
and Mackenzie King to decide when the time was right. Pragmatism and 
not planning had been the ethos of the Department: pragmatism was at 
the core of Mackenzie King's approach to politics; pragmatic was un- 
doubtedly the best adjective to describe Robertson's preference in both 
policy-formulation and the administration of his Department. The case 
for membership in the Central Committee of UNRRA had been nationalistic, 
idealistic, ad hoc, and in the end pragmatic. It was not a product of 
long-range planning. With increasing public and press awareness, as 
evinced in the Wartime Information Board surveys and various memoranda 
within the Department of External Affairs on press reactions, 
39 
it was 
felt by virtually all the senior officials that at least a modicum of 
planning was required so that Canadian interests would not be swept 
away in the tide of international events. 
The requisite catalyst came in June 1943 in the form of a cable 
from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London which stated 
that the United Kingdom was soon going to engage in discussions with 
the United States and the Soviet Union dealing with the termination 
of hostilities. Canada was asked for comments on the included British 
proposals and whether Canada would consider participation in the pro- 
posed United Nations Commission for Europe and in an international 
European pricing system. 
40 
Here was something which called for a 
coordinated response, and it was clear, in a preliminary memorandum pre- 
pared by John Holmes and George Glazebrook, that the entire issue deman- 
ded political, military and economic considerations. Hume Wrong be- 
38. DEA, File 1415-40, Escott Reid, "The United States and 
Canada: Domination, Cooperation, Absorption", 12 January 1942. 
39. DEA, File 5475-40, "Opinion in the Press and in Parliament 
Concerning the Organization of the United Nations and the Role 
of Canada in Such Organization", 3 March 1943. 
40. DEA, File 7-AB(S), Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, circulars D364, 
D365,19 June 1943. The definitive and excellent article on 
the Post-Hostilities Problems Committees is Don Munton and Don 
Page, "Planning in the East Block; The Pos t-Hostilities Problems 
Committees in Canada, 1943-45", Internat-ol cZ Journal XXXII, 
no. 4 (Autumn 1477), pp. 687-726. 
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lieved it to be essential to have the relevant departments involved 
in such major policy decisions, and, after non-committal War Committee 
discussions on the topic during July, Robertson called an ad %O2 inter- 
departmental group into being. The group recommended that Canada 
should seek a participatory role in post-hostilities arrangements and 
the assent of the War Committee thereby set a precedent which would 
ensure Canadian involvement in Europe after the war. 
41 
The ad hoc 
group established a more junior Working Committee on Post-Hostilities 
Problems which was to analyze closely British documents and initiate 
studies of its own. On 3 November 1943 the Working Committee submitted 
a report with a strong recommendation: 
The experience of the last war indicates that uncer- 
tainty and difficulties will arise if the main lines of 
policy are not decided in advance. The Working Committee, 
therefore, strongly recommends that early consideration 
should be given to the nature and extent of the Canadian 
contribution to the tranquilization of Europe. Prepara- 
tion now will enable Canada to plan a balanced contribu- 
tion which will be advantageous not only to the people of 
Europe but also to the people of Canada. Such preparation 
will also strengthen considerably Canada's voice in inter- 
national councils at a time when Canadian interests are at 
stake. 42 
The Cabinet War Committee formalized the existence of the 
Working Committee and created an Advisory Committee to oversee its 
activities. Appropriately, Hume Wrong became the chairman of the 
Working Committee which included representatives from the Privy Coun- 
cil Office, the three Service Departments, and the Department of Ex- 
ternal Affairs. The Advisory Committee was firmly in Robertson's 
hands. The meetings and activities of these committees continued 
until July 1945, and their influence cannot be under-estimated. 
The Working Committee considered a multifarious array of sub- 
jects, most of them related to Canada's post-war role in Europe and 
questions of defence. Its chairman was well aware of the limitations 
placed upon Canada through the application of its own functional prin- 
41. DEA, File 7-AB(S), Wrong to Robertson, 5 July 1943, with 
memorandum by Holmes, "Proposals Concerning Post-Hostility 
Period"; also King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Cabinet War 
Committee Minutes, 15 July 1943. 
42. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "Post Hostilities 
Problems", "Report on Post-Hostilities Problems by the Working 
Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems", 3 November 1943. 
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ciple: "On those subjects it would be wasted effort for Canada to 
attempt to plan from the foundation upwards, since as a secondary 
country we have not great enough influence to make our views prevail. " 
Wrong acknowledged that there was much for this committee to do, con- 
sidering the quantity of Foreign Office print the Department was re- 
ceiving from the British Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee, the 
number of individual subjects being studied, and the need for the 
rapid development of Canadian policy positions. "We should, however, " 
Wrong concluded, "be in a position at least to decide what is not 
acceptable and to advocate changes or additions to fit our particular 
interests. "43 Canada's interests were again viewed in a functionalist 
light, and revolved around the concept of a just voice for the second- 
ary or middle powers in an equitable international system. "I think 
it may be put this way", Wrong wrote to Charles Ritchie in London, 
"The great powers must co-operate to create and work a world security 
organization, but unless they can carry with them at least most of 
the more important secondary states their efforts sooner or later 
"44 will fail. Ritchie for his part attended the meetings of the 
British Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee chaired by Gladwyn 
Jebb of the Foreign Office and was therefore able to observe and 
report to Ottawa on the preliminary stages of British planning. He 
also reported to Massey, his superior at Canada House, who took great 
pains to emphasize Canada's position as a middle power to Whitehall, 
frequently stating that Canada ranked next in importance to the three 
great powers in its contribution to the relief and liberation of Europe. 
"It is for these reasons", Massey wrote Lord Cranborne, Attlee's suc- 
cessor as Dominions Secretary, "because of her function in a practical 
sense... that it is hoped that full consideration will be given to 
Canada's position in the various plans for post-war international 
machinery which are now being evolved., 
45 
The British and the Canadians were familiar with each others' 
planning positions through the linkage between their respective Post- 
43. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, memorandum by Wrong, 
Canadian Planning for the International Settlement", 23 February 
1944. 
44. DEA, File 7-BY(S) vol. 1, Wrong to Ritchie, 6 March 1944. 
45. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2104, file "Post Hostilities 
Problems", Massey to Cranborne, 18 January 1944. 
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Hostilities Committees, their close liaison at official levels through 
the High Commissioners and also through the Prime Ministers' Meetings 
of 1944 and 1946 where subjects of post-hostilities planning were dis- 
cussed by the Commonwealth leaders. The link with the Americans was 
more tenuous. Pearson believed that the chances of Canada getting use- 
ful information from the Americans would increase if they were to re- 
ceive some Canadian planning papers. There was the possibility "... 
that our papers might have some influence on their own thinking be- 
fore their views had become too crystallized., 
46 
This was a pious 
hope and there is no evidence to show that Canadian Working Committee 
papers influenced the American point of view. The problem was exacer- 
bated by the fact that the Americans did not have a planning committee, 
and would not have one until General Marshall introduced his brand 
of discipline into the State Department in 1947. The Russians often 
asked for explanations of Canadian perspectives on various post-hos- 
tilities problems and Canadian diplomats at the newly-opened mission 
in Moscow readily demonstrated how well-briefed they were. This gener- 
rosity indicated Canada's willingness to participate and its right to 
belong in the front row; in retrospect, cynics may speculate that 
Molotov thus received. another impression of British plans for Europe. 
The demise of the Canadian Post-Hostilities Problems Commit- 
tees was the result of a number of factors: the absence of experienced 
personnel in the Service Departments with enough background knowledge 
of both military and political affairs; the lack of political feedback 
caused by the Prime Minister's tendency to ignore papers which could 
be controversial such as those dealing with Commonwealth Defence, and 
Norman Robertson's seeming unwillingness to commit any of Mackenzie 
King's thoughts on a given subject to paper. Added to this were the 
46. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "Post Hostili- 
ties Problems", Pearson to Wrong, 27 April 1944. Pearson 
was also of the opinion that a paper on the relationship 
between functional international organizations and the 
general international organization would be good for the 
State Department since there had been some indications of 
interest in this area. 
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rapid changes in the international agenda with the founding of the 
United Nations and the establishment of the Council of Foreign Minis- 
ters to plan the peaceful future of Europe, and the fact that most 
senior officials of the Department of External Affairs were placed in 
other positions by the autumn of 1946.7 
The findings of these committees will surface in greater detail 
in the ensuing chapters, but what is of significance in this context 
is that these committees sought to harmonize the functional principle 
with the Canadian desire for influence in the post-war world. By keep- 
ing abreast of international post-war planning, Canada hoped to exercise 
more influence on the great powers at times when they could be more 
receptive to Canadian wishes. Espousing functionalism when confronted 
with a fait accompli as in the case of the membership question of UNRRA 
could prove to be counterproductive, and although some progress had 
been achieved in the UNRRA case, there was no guarantee for the next 
time. Perhaps the committees' greatest value was that planning acti- 
vity kept minds sharp, and it was a well-informed cadre of officers 
who would represent Canada at the myriad of international meetings 
and conferences during the next few years. 
*** 
Although Canadian communications to other govenments regarding 
the functional principle repeatedly emphasized that there was "no 
thought at all of mere questions of status or prestige", 
48 
the question 
of international status was a corollary to Canadian functionalism. 
Canada was playing a role worthy of recognition in the war effort and 
wished to continue to do so in the peace to come, and public opinion 
47. Wrong favoured a continued combined planning staff but this 
was something which Pearson, the incoming Under-Secretary, would 
not have found to be conducive to his style of day to day prag- 
matic diplomacy. DEA, General Registry File 300-B(S), Holmes to 
R. G. Riddell, 3 May 1948. Also interviews with John Holmes, 23 
July 1980 and George Ignatieff, 2 December 1980. Holmes was the 
first secretary of the Working Committee and was replaced by 
Ignatieff when posted to London in 1944. For a thorough discus- 
sion see Munton and Page, "Planning in the East Block: The Post- 
Hostilities Problems Committees in Canada, 1943-1945", pp. 710- 
720. It may be of interest to note that there would not be 
another planning committee in the Department of External Affairs 
until 1969. 
48. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2104, file "Post-Hostilities 
Planning", Massey to Cranborne, 18 January 1944. 
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and parliament were acutely aware of this fact. The controversy over 
the announcement of the participation of Canadian troops in the inva- 
Lion of Sicily, coming ironically at the very moment of Mackenzie King's 
statement on the functional principle to the House of Commons on 9 July 
1943, deserves brief comment in this respect. 
The government had requested assurances through the Canadian 
Military Headquarters in London that due mention should be made of the 
fact that Canadian forces were participating in the invasion of Sicily - 
the first case of an entire Canadian division getting battle duty - 
since it appeared that originally only references to an Anglo-American 
invasion were to be made. The Prime Minister himself instructed diplo- 
mats in both capitals to insist on Canadian recognition, and Pearson 
in Washington quickly managed to receive an audience with President 
Roosevelt who agreed to include Canada in all communiques. In London, 
the difference in time zones had to be accounted for, as well as Mas- 
sey's problem in getting an appointment with Clement Attlee, then 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. It therefore appeared in 
Ottawa that the British were hesitant in according Canada its proper 
place in the communique beside the United States and Britain. The 
proper reference to Canada was made in time, Churchill issued a public 
statement which corrected Canadian impressions, but Mackenzie King was 
still furious and told Malcolm MacDonald that he was willing to dis- 
solve parliament and call an election on the entire issue of Canada 
receiving its deserved recognition. 
49 
Needless to say, the Prime 
Minister's anger did not last, but even a normally unflappable Lester 
Pearson believed that it was only Roosevelt's intervention which turned 
the tide. 50 
In a lengthy despatch to Attlee giving an analysis of the issue, 
MacDonald asserted that the controversy had acted as a sort of focal 
point for Canadian frustrations at the failure of Britain to recognize 
Canada's special status and function. This was exemplified by the 
issues of representation on the Combined Boards and UNRRA, and the 
49, King Diary, 18 July 1943. For a discussion of the military 
aspects, see C. P. Stacy, Arms, Men and Governments: 
The ;. 'ar Poli- 
cies of Canada, 1939-1945, (Ottawa: 1970), pp. 
224-228. 
50. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 348, Pearson to Robertson, 12 
July 1943. 
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tendency of the United Kingdom and the United States to issue joint 
statements on both war developments and high political policy without 
consulting other Allies. "I urge again that we should give most care- 
ful heed to this situation, " MacDonald concluded. "The Canadians are 
watching it closely... They will not, for example, remain silent if 
Canada and the other Dominions are given a less important place than 
they think is proper in the vital discussions concerning the restora- 
tion of peace. "51 
"Just as we are prepared to recognize the great difference in 
power and responsibility between Canada and the Soviet Union, " Macken- 
zie King told his fellow Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May 1944, 
"we should expect some recognition of the considerable difference bet- 
ween Canada and Panama., 
52 
In the exchange of cables with London re- 
garding the formulation of what was to become the Security Council of 
the United Nations, Canada believed it to be unrealistic to divide 
the states between the great powers and the rest in deciding which 
states, other than the great powers, should sit on the Council: "... 
in our view the same selective principle which warrants a special posi- 
tion for the great powers should be applied as far as possible to all 
rganization... "53 members of the o i tion...  
53 
Canada's preoccupation with the 
status aspect of functionalism would become more insistent after a 
conference in Chicago on International Civil Aviation in November 1944 
where all the Latin American countries had voted together as a bloc 
and had elected themselves to the Interim Council at the expense of 
other smaller nations with a greater functional claim. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on regionalism as a governing factor for non-permanent 
membership on a higher United Nations council, particularly by the 
British and the Americans, and the realization that almost half of 
51. CAB 66/40, W. P. (43)368, despatch no. 441, MacDonald to 
Attlee, 6 August 1943. 
52. DEA, File 7-BY(S) vol. 1, Cabinet War Committee Document 
no. 924, "Proposals for the Establishment of a General Inter- 
national Organization; Views Expressed on Behalf of the Govern- 
ment of Canada, May 1944 to January 1945"; "Extract from State- 
ment made by Mr. Mackenzie King to the Meeting of Prime Minis- 
ters on May 11,1444". 
53. Ibid., cable no. 130, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 2 August 
1944. 
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the members of the proposed world organization would be from Latin 
America, did nothing to inspire Canadian confidence in the prospect 
that functionalism would receive more than just a sympathetic ear. 
Mackenzie King clung to the functional principle. It was 
fair, just and Canadian and, according to him, expressed virtues which 
he had stated over twenty years earlier in his book Indust? ma and 
Humanity. To him it was a moral precept which could lend itself to 
any international situation. But more than anything it was safe, 
because it had the unqualified support of both the people and parlia- 
ment. King thought much about functionalism and in his own way sought 
to influence other leaders in his summit discussions with them, al- 
though this was not the case at the two Quebec conferences. When 
Charles deGaulle visited Ottawa in July 1944, King took a piece of 
paper, and speaking of world organization, pointed out to him "that 
there were different stages at which different nations might partici- 
pate to a greater or less degree in these matters. "54 De Gaulle, 
more concerned about French islands being disposed of as bases to 
other powers, was probably unimpressed. Earlier, during the time of 
the UNRRA negotiations, King had subjected Anthony Eden to an inter- 
esting analysis of the application of functionalism, which also indi- 
cated some of the Prime Minister's other more spiritual predilections: 
I explained our view by drawing a series of concen- 
tric circles and saying that I felt we should seek the 
present from the future, to make the beginning in the 
light of the ultimate... A still larger circle ultimately 
would be all nations of the world within this large circle 
and there would necessarily be a smaller group which would 
be the great powers, perhaps embracing the British Empire 
collectively... There was a difference of function of course. 
There would then be smaller circles for purposes 5? 
f func- 
tion, the creating of executives and the like... 
The above may appear to be confusing, but Mackenzie King simply 
believed that it would be better to plan democratically from the larger 
to the smaller, and in so doing, he labelled himself an inspired func- 
tionalist, much like the senior officials in his Department. 
At times, Canadian application of the functional principle was 
not always high-minded. As mentioned earlier, Canada was sympathetic 
to the lesser European powers since many of their concerns regarding 
54. King Diary, 11 July 1944. 
55. King Diary, 31 March 1943. 
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recognition of their status ran parallel to Canada's own. Canada did 
not wish to be too closely associated with their position, however, 
and certainly in the case of UNRRA tended to see the functional prin- 
ciple from the point of the producer rather from that of the consumer. 56 
The functional principle, it is worth noting, could also be 
discarded when direct self-interest was at stake. When United Kingdom 
Ministers were considering whether they could promise support for Indian 
aspirations for election to the Security Council in October 1946, High 
Commissioner Norman Robertson acted quickly by cabling Ottawa: 
In these circumstances, I suggest 'functional principle' 
might be given a few weeks hoist, and that our representa- 
tives abroad should be told not to encourage or promote the 
candidature of India for the Security Council until we have 
made up our minds whether India's candidature for the Secu- 
rity Council is, in fact, likely to prejudice our own 
chances of election next year. 57 
This is not an example of the unscrupulous arrogation of power. 
The functional principle was something peculiarly 
something which could be held onto as the lever of 
policy which had to endure both the rapid movement 
nization and the unilateralism which was beginning 
south of the border. It formed the basis for what 
termed the "lapidary approach" in Canadian foreign 
fitted to Canada, 
an adaptive foreign 
toward world orga- 
to emanate from 
would later be 
policy and would 
to a degree be equated with Canada's "helpful fixer" role in the 
1950s. 58 During 1943, the year of the inception of the functional 
principle, functionalism developed from an idealistic theory to a 
pragmatic strategy for Canada's role in a turbulent world. As the 
following chapters will demonstrate in greater detail, its flexible 
and variable nature formed the basis for Canada's new internationalism. 
5 6. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, p. 42, 
57. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 413, cable no. 2057, Robertson 
to St. Laurent, 14 October 1946. 
58. See John W. Holmes, "The Changing Nature of International 
Organization", Canada House Lecture Series No. 8, lecture given 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1943-44 
During 1943 and 1944 foreign policy planners in the United 
Kingdom and the United States devised their own preliminary schemes 
for a new world security organization which would replace the ill- 
fated League of Nations. In Ottawa, Hume Wrong, who had in late 1943 
been promoted to a position expressly created for him, that of Asso- 
ciate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, led a small in- 
formal group of officials in preparing Canadian views on international 
organization. Some of the efforts of Wrong and his group overlapped 
with those of the government's Post-Hostilities Problems Committees, 
but this was not unexpected, considering that Wrong was the pivotal 
figure in these committees as well. It was realized that instead of 
preparing a Canadian plan for the new organization, it would be more 
advantageous - and realistic - to prepare positions designed to meet 
the initiatives of the great powers, particularly those emanating from 
the Foreign Office in London. The United Kingdom provided Canada with 
almost continuous information on the state of British planning and en- 
couraged comment, direct consultation taking place during a Prime 
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Minister's Meeting in May 1944. During 1943, the thrust of Canadian 
planning was mainly directed to the development of specialized inter- 
national organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabili- 
tation Administration, with increasing interest being focussed on an 
authority which would control international civil aviation. The func- 
tional principle was first formulated during this year and after the 
membership issue in UNRRA, it became the guiding element of Canadian 
foreign policy, although expressions of functionalism would become 
more sophisticated during 1944. Commonwealth consultation reached an 
almost frenetic level during 1944, and the year ended with two signi- 
ficant events: the four-power Dumbarton Oaks conference which esta- 
blished a blueprint for a new world security organization and an in- 
ternational civil aviation conference at Chicago. Though not in the 
mainstream of international political organization, the latter event 
is worth study as an example of the culmination of self-interested 
Canadian efforts in a specialized field and because Canadian initia- 
tives resulted in enhanced international prestige for Canada, an argu- 
ably fleeting recognition by the rest of the world of the functional 
principle, and a unique role for Canada as a mediator. What follows 
is a record and analysis of the developments which took place before 
and during these two major conferences and how there emerged a quali- 
fied sort of Canadian optimism over the future of international orga- 
nization by the end of 1944. 
*** 
"The demands of war have telescoped into four or five years 
the growth that might normally have taken air transport a generation 
to achieve, " C. D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, told the 
Canadian House of Commons in March 1944. "[I]t is... our intention to 
make every effort to ensure that the framework within which the inter- 
national air transport of the future functions will be designed to 
1 
promote international cooperation, not international bitterness. 
" 
With the revolution in aeronautical technology came changes in pers- 
pectives; Mercator's view of the world was rapidly becoming obsolete 
and Canadians began to realize that theirs was a nation which lay 
1. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 March 1944, p. 1570; 
also King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 363, "Civil Aviation - Back- 
ground Speech Material for C. D. Howe", 24 February 1944. 
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astride the major air routes of the world, an accident of geography 
which, when combined with increases in international air traffic, 
would make some scheme of international regulation inevitable. Howe 
remained good to his word and Canadian compromise positions, designed 
to seek middle ground between divergent British and American views 
while maintaining Canadian self-interest, were instrumental in helping 
to establish an international civil aviation authority. Before and 
during the civil aviation conference at Chicago in November 1944, 
Canada acquired some functionalist recognition in becoming, along 
with the United Kingdom and the United States, one of the "Big Three" 
in the field of international aviation. The functional principle as 
such only entered Canadian civil aviation policy at a late stage, 
since the development of policy during mid-1943 paralleled the gradual 
emergence of functionalism as a policy tool during the same period. 
The successful outcome of the Chicago conference, though qualified in 
the eyes of idealists and pragmatists alike within the Department of 
External Affairs, was nevertheless perceived as both a positive and 
a negative precedent for the future world security organization. This 
result was positive in the sense that functional recognition of the 
Canadian position was achieved, a Canadian document actually becoming 
the basis for discussion at the conference; negative in that the diffi- 
culty of achieving consensual views among a large group of nations was 
underscored. 
Canadian interest in aviation had been a continuing one. 
Canada had been a signatory of the multilateral convention on the 
Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 and all of its supplementary 
protocols during the next decade. Together with the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Newfoundland, the senior Dominion participated in a 1936 
agreement for the initiation of a Trans-Atlantic air route, which was 
never quite brought into operation. With the war had come - in the 
wake of some notorious delay - the British Commonwealth Air Training 
Plan, which brought about the construction of aerodromes throughout 
the country. Meanwhile, cooperation with the Americans had resulted 
in the development of the North-West Staging Route to the Pacific. 
All told, the Royal Canadian Air Force became the fourth largest in 
the world, while as a major supplier, Canada was producing thousands 
of aeroplanes. The "national" airline, Trans-Canada Airlines, created 
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before the war, rapidly expanded during it. All this came under the 
purview of C. D. Howe, a czar-like minister with a "no nonsense" approach 
of getting things done efficiently and worrying about political con- 
sequences afterwards. A strong believer in free enterprise, but wil- 
ling to nationalize if it meant profitable efficiency, Howe paternally 
referred to Trans-Canada Airlines as "my airline" and was wary of any 
restrictions international regulation could place on his airline's 
growth and of the entrepreneurial machinations of the competitor, 
Canadian Pacific Airlines, also founded before the war. 
2 
He was also 
not content to see Trans-Canada Airlines function as a junior partner 
or appendage of some grand British Commonwealth scheme. Nor would 
Canada stand idly by were the American and British companies to ignore 
some form of international regulation and carve up the stratosphere 
for themselves at the expense of smaller powers who had a functional 
right to participate in such decisions. With his motto of efficiency 
with expediency, Howe realized that some form of international regu- 
lation and control was essential. 
The divergent and hence to Canada potentially dangerous pers- 
pectives of the Americans and the British provided an urgency to Cana- 
dian planning for civil aviation, especially since Canadian views, 
although surely self-interested and independent to a degree, would of 
necessity be conditioned and developed as a response to the preferences 
of the larger air powers. "Whatever form the future of civil aviation 
may take, " Vincent Massey wrote from London in January 1943, "one thing 
is becoming clear, that the United Kingdom Government has no intention 
of sitting back and resigning control of the air to the Americans. "3 
The British were concerned about what would transpire after the cessa- 
tion of hostilities, particularly since a greater proportion of Ameri- 
can production than their own had been devoted to transport aircraft, 
which could easily be pressed into civil service after the war. Con- 
2. For more background on Canadian involvement in civil aviation 
before the war, see Robert Bothwell and J. L. Granatstein, "Canada 
and the Wartime Negotiations over Civil Aviation: The Functional 
Principle in Operation", The International '-storyeýie 
no. 4(October 1980), pp. 586-7. For more on C. D. Howe and Trans- 
Canada Airlines see Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, --. 
D. 
Howe: A Biography (Toronto, 1979), pp. 104-119. 
3. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 346, Massey to Robertson, 20 
January 1943. 
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versely, in Washington, Adolf Berle, a New Dealer, self-confessed 
Anglophobe and politically appointed Assistant Secretary of State 
responsible for aviation matters, publicly called for "freedom of 
the air", though he privately confided to Lester Pearson that total 
"freedom" - which in Canadian and British eyes meant free rein for 
American private carriers - would probably prove impossible to achieve. 
To allay Canadian anxieties, Berle emphasized the harmonious relations 
between Canada and the United States, and reassured Canadian officials 
that there was no danger of a negotiated Anglo-American agreement 
without prior consultation with Canada. 
4 
Such psalms about the exem- 
plary nature of North American bilateral relations always made Canadian 
policy-makers nervous, especially when they wanted to press their case 
to the apparently oblivious Americans. Following the report of Pear- 
son's conversation with Berle in February 1943, the instructions from 
Ottawa were thus clear and precise: 
[Y]ou may-assure Mr. Berle that we do not take a 
narrow view of what constitutes. Canada's national interests 
in international air transport. We are conscious of the 
strength of our bargaining position because of our geogra- 
phical position. So far as we can influence the course of 
events, we are determined to pursue a policy of international 
cooperation and collaboration - Canada is, therefore, pre- 
pared to support whatever international air policy can be 
demonstrated as being the best calculated to serve not only 
the intermediate interests of Canada but also our over- 
riding interest in the establishment of an international 5 
order which will prevent the outbreak of a third world war. 
Interestingly, the controversy about Canadian representation 
on the Central Committee of UNRRA was nearing its climax at about the 
same time, and this may account for both the emphasis on functionalism 
and a feeling that what was accomplished in the establishment of spe- 
cialized international organizations would act as a precedent for the 
general world security organization which loomed so large in the back 
of the minds of the officials in the East Block. It was a time of 
determination in official circles in Ottawa. 
In London, an expatriate Canadian, Lord Beaverbrook, the Lord 
Privy Seal and Minister for Aircraft Production, steered the evolution 
4. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 343, memorandum by Pearson of a 
conversation with Adolf A. Berle Jr., 16 February 1943; also 
Pearson Diary, 16 February 1943. 
S. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 343, despatch no. 179, King to 
Canadian Minister Leighton McCarthy, 24 February 1943. 
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of British aviation policy with a firm hand. British planning was 
copious but inconclusive. A report of an interdepartmental committee, 
the Finlay Report, concluded in December 1943 that civil aviation was 
a matter of high policy which represented the choice between "inter- 
nationalisation or Americanisation" and in any event the Empire had 
to be considered in all such deliberations. Beaverbrook's personal 
preference was for an Empire and Commonwealth "red line" girdling the 
globe and Lord Amery, the Secretary of State for India, was of like 
mind, wistfully believing that the United Kingdom would be in a better 
position to catch the Americans in the development of air routes if an 
inter-Empire scheme were instituted. "All we have to do is agree 
among ourselves, " Amery wrote, "The Americans are not going to quar- 
rel with us, even if they may not enthusiastically welcome such a 
policy. We shall only be following their own example and that of the 
French and others who will certainly reserve their colonial traffic., 
6 
Amery and others appeared to have forgotten that lack of "agreement 
among ourselves" had been responsible for the stillborn North Atlantic 
Empire route involving Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom before 
the war; chances for overall agreement would surely not be improved 
by bringing even more disparate Commonwealth voices into the discus- 
sions. An exhaustive study was undertaken by a committee chaired by 
Sir Alan Barlow of the Treasury which stated in its report of March 
1943 that a scheme of full internationalization without reservation 
of internal services would be both the most satisfactory and most 
radical solution to the global problem. Since "internationalization", 
or a system of rigid regulation of all air routes and flight frequen- 
cies would probably prove unsatisfactory to a number of countries, 
particularly the United States where "freedom of the air" was the 
slogan for the development of private air enterprise anywhere in the 
6. C. D. Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 5 "Civil Aviation", copy of 
United Kingdom document R. P. (A)(43)8, "Air Transport: An Empire 
Policy", memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 3 March 
1943; also file 25, R. P. (42)5, "Shelmerdine Report", 5 January 
1942 and R. P. (42)48, "Finlay Report", 18 December 1943. Lord 
Finlay believed that the question of international regulation 
or free competition depended greatly on policies for Imperial 
development. He claimed that in his report he had tried to 
demonstrate how the two systems could be reconciled, but con- 
cluded that they were essentially irreconcilable. Covering 
letter to the report from Finlay to Jowitt, 17 December 1942. 
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world according to demand, the Barlow Committee recommended a European 
system with dependencies combined with separate Empire systems. 
7 
Una- 
nimity was not a characteristic of British planning at this stage, but 
it should be emphasized that this was not the case in the United States 
either, where the private airline companies advocating "free air" were 
confronted by statements by Vice-President Henry Wallace which advo- 
cated some form of international regulation. 
The reports of the various British committees were passed on 
to Ottawa where they were analyzed and studied with interest. Although 
no formal replies to the various recommendations were made, Massey was 
requested to warn the United Kingdom that presenting proposals for 
international regulation to the United States at this early stage would 
merely court their rejection; the likelihood of substantial agreement 
being attained would be increased by deferring the presentation of 
specific proposals. 
8 
Central to this philosophy was the fact that the 
Americans had not yet made their position clear; once this was done, 
Canadian policy could become less nebulous and more concrete. Norman 
Robertson, the driving force behind Canada's initial approach to the 
questions of civil aviation, suggested the ideal compromise: an in- 
formal meeting between officials of interested nations - meaning the 
United Kingdom, United States and the Dominions - in Ottawa. For 
Mackenzie King, this suggestion was a political blessing because he 
could thereby quell talk that he was not willing to speak to the Bri- 
tish, having turned down the idea of a Prime Ministers' Conference 
during 1943 for the official reason of lack of time and the personal 
one of indifference. A meeting of interested countries including the 
United States would avoid a separate Commonwealth conference with the 
appearance - at least in American eyes - of a uniform Empire policy. 
In his diary, the Prime Minister wrote that the Cabinet was against 
having an Imperial policy, the consensus being that "we should stand 
for a policy of our own. "9 
7. C. D. Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 5 "Civil Aviation", copy 
of United Kingdom document R. P. (A)(43)10, "Report of the Official 
Committee on Post-War Civil Aviation", 22 March 1943. See also 
Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto, 1963), p. 423. 
8. Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 25, Massey to Attlee, 24 May 1943. 
9. King Diary, 2 June 1943; also King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 
425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 2 June 1943. 
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Arnold Heeney, the Secretary to the Cabinet, reporting to the 
War Committee on 18 June 1943, stated that a meeting in Ottawa between 
Commonwealth and American representatives appeared to be likely, al- 
though there was the possibility that the United Kingdom would suggest 
pre-conference Commonwealth discussions. 10 In the meantimP_ nn AY; -- 
ting Interdepärtmental Committee on Civil Aviation was reconstituted 
as the Interdepartmental Committee on Air Transport Policy and was to 
advise on both domestic and international policies. C. P. Edwards, 
the Deputy Minister of Transport, was appointed chairman, with Norman 
Robertson as his deputy. Members included Clifford Clark; H. J. Syming- 
ton, the President of Trans-Canada Airlines; Escott Reid of the Depart- 
ment of External Affairs; and John Baldwin of the Privy Council Office, 
who served as secretary. Symington, Reid and Baldwin would later play 
very significant roles in future discussions with the British and in 
finding compromise positions at the Chicago conference on civil avia- 
tion. By July, however, the United Kingdom had let it be known that 
it wished to have a large ministerial conference in Ottawa which would 
include China and the Soviet Union and would be preceded by Common- 
wealth discussions. A political blessing had become an autonomist's 
nightmare. Canada believed that such a preliminary meeting without 
the United States as a participant would be misunderstood in Washing- 
ton and would provide new vigour for the campaign of the "free air" 
advocates. Since Canada had earlier informed the United States through 
talks with Berle of the strength of its bargaining position, a Common- 
wealth conference now could conceivably sap the strength of the Cana- 
dian position vis-a-vis the United States. A conference of Cabinet 
ministers could not be held because the requisite consultations bet- 
ween officials of the participating countries, which usually preceded 
all ministerial meetings, had not taken place, leaving the ground un- 
prepared, meaning that the results of a full-scale conference would 
at best be inconclusive. What was more, a high-profile meeting could 
give Canada much unfavourable publicity for not inviting smaller powers, 
whose rights the functional principle was supposed to defend. 
11 
The 
10. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee, 18 June 1943; also Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 25, 
Massey to Attlee, 24 June 1943. 
11. Ibid., Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 2 July 1943; 
also Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 25, Massey to Attlee, 12 July 
1943. 
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Cabinet wished Canada to have an indigenous policy of its own and one 
informal conference between the United States and the Commonwealth 
countries would be more conducive to the attainment of this goal. 
Winston Churchill and several members of his Cabinet met twice 
with the Canadian Cabinet War Committee during the Allied strategy 
meetings at Quebec in August 1943, and startled the Canadians by taking 
a more strident line on civil aviation than had previous communications 
from the Dominions Office. In response to Churchill's remark that he 
found it difficult to see how the United States could take exception 
at the propriety of holding a "family council" on aviation in advance 
of a larger conference, both Mackenzie King and Howe made strong ob- 
jections. Howe, undoubtedly thinking of his airline, explained that 
the American carriers were preparing for a large expansion of traffic 
after the war, including extensive developments northward over Canada. 
It would therefore be exceedingly unwise for Canada to embark on any 
formulation of policy with other nations before having discussions 
with the United States. The Canadian Prime Minister predictably raised 
the shibboleth of a common Imperial policy, believing that other 
countries would interpret Commonwealth discussions in such fashion and 
that subsequent conferences would thus be prejudiced. Churchill pro- 
mised to discuss this matter with President Roosevelt, who was of 
course also in Quebec, but by the time of the second meeting of the 
British and Canadian Cabinets two weeks later he had not, and repeated 
his adage that the United States was unlikely to object to "our right 
to family councils on these matters. " Canada then bowed to the inevi- 
table, agreeing to attend an informal and non-binding Commonwealth 
conference, but not before Howe stated quite unequivocally that Cana- 
dian policy would be based upon the free exchange of air traffic and 
a strong international authority with powers of control and regula- 
tion. Here the British Prime Minister revealed en passant that al- 
though he had not spoken to the President about Commonwealth discus- 
sions they had exchanged views on the nature of the international 
authority, which Roosevelt thought should have a central council of 
the great powers, whereas Churchill was enamoured of the idea of a 
stellated system of regional councils responsible to the great powers. 
Of course, Mackenzie King disagreed fundamentally with the great 
power approach, asserting that some method should be sought which 
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would give equal apportionments of rights, functions and responsibi- 
lities. Direction of the war had been in the hands of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, but that power would not be theirs in 
times of peace. 
12 
Following the Quebec conference, Churchill assured 
Pearson in Washington that Roosevelt would draw no wrong conclusions 
from a preliminary meeting, which, Churchill said, would be held in 
any case, with or without Canadian participation. Canada should not 
be worried, he intoned in histrionic fashion, there would not be as 
many stupendous developments in civil aviation as some people thought. 
13 
Churchill cabled Mackenzie King on 14 September to assure him that the 
American President harboured no objections, and also commented that he 
understood preliminary American views to be largely concerned with 
private ownership and reservation of international traffic to inter- 
national companies - theirs of course. 
14 
Wary Canadian agreement to 
attend Commonwealth discussions in London officially came one week 
later. 
The Commonwealth conversations took place in early October 
1943. C. D. Howe - who now appropriately chose to fly the Atlantic 
after experiencing a torpedo sinking in 1941 - led the Canadian dele- 
gation and was assisted by H. J. Symington, who to his consternation, 
was recognized in London as an adviser and not a delegate. Baldwin 
served as secretary and Massey joined the group for the discussions. 
There had been a considerable amount of nervousness in Ottawa before 
the meeting and a lengthy report from the Interdepartmental Committee 
outlined several of the possible questions of policy which could arise 
during the conference. In addition to declaring that the interna- 
tional organization of civil aviation was inextricably intertwined 
with any proposed international security organization, a civil aviation 
settlement should also acknowledge the principles of economic colla- 
12. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee, 11 & 13 August 1943; also King Diary, 13 August 
1943. 
13. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 22, Pearson to King, 11 Septem- 
ber 1943. See also Pearson, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 231-2. 
14. Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 25, cable no. 141, Churchill 
to King, 14 September 1943; also King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 
425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 15 & 22 September 
1943. 
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boration which had been accepted by the United Nations and which in- 
cluded "the elimination of all forms of discrimination in interna- 
tional commerce. " Canada would definitely not agree to any British 
proposals advocating a jointly-owned and controlled Commonwealth 
airlines corporation, an Empire Air Board, or regional imperial cor- 
porations. Those concepts failed to recognize Canada's role as an 
air power in its own right, its special relations with the United 
States, and involved "a rather challenging extension" of the Lnter se 
doctrine of Commonwealth relations. The view contributed by the De- 
partment of External Affairs to this memorandum was that an effective 
scheme of international regulation would ease any situations of strained 
relations between the larger air powers, would rationalize air trans- 
port leading to lower costs of carriage, and in practical Canadian 
terms, would provide a politically acceptable method of constructing 
and maintaining extensive ground facilities in the north. The requi- 
site small surrender of sovereignty would be overweighed by the bene- 
fits, but it appeared that there would be great practical difficulties 
in obtaining any agreement on proposals for international regulation, 
since nations would not be able to agree on the extent of control. 
15 
This hypothesis would be proven at the conference at Chicago one year 
later. 
In all instances, there had to be adequate recognition of 
Canada's leading role in civil aviation, and the fact that Howe headed 
the delegation was insurance enough that the interests of Trans-Canada 
Airlines would be well looked after. Paradoxically, a scheme of regu- 
lation under an international authority was regarded by Canada at this 
point as a counterweight to Imperial centralization tendencies, instead 
of as a means to counteract the more plausible and the unknown: a con- 
tinental system dominated by the United States which would have posed 
a greater threat to Canadian independence, particularly if the British 
and the Americans failed to agree. 
Fears of being confronted with grand Commonwealth schemes were 
groundless, and Beaverbrook, like Howe, gave the impression of being 
more eager to get the job finished rather than to embark on tedious 
15. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 426, Cabinet War Committee 
Memoranda, document no. 626, "Report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Air Transport Policy", 28 September 1943. 
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discussions, resulting in a greater disposition on his part to meet 
Canadian views for the creation of a strong international civil avia- 
tion authority and the free exchange of air traffic, as well as Aus- 
tralian concerns for a greater role in the Pacific. Beaverbrook 
placed somewhat more stress on the idea of an "all-red" route than 
on the establishment of an international authority, but here the 
emphasis now was on bilateral cooperation and sharing of routes, as 
opposed to centralized direction. The Canadians were pleased: the 
proposed British Commonwealth global route appeared not to dictate 
any great commitment on anyone's part, and the absence of firm Bri- 
tish opposition to a strong international authority appeared to 
indicate acceptance in principle. 
16 
In international negotiations, 
agreement in principle is often far from full agreement in practice. 
Indeed, there were enough nuances on the subject of international 
regulation to keep the London discussions going on indefinitely. 
The British introduced six "freedoms", designed to express 
the rights of the members of an international civil aviation organi- 
zation: the right of innocent passage, or the freedom of an aircraft 
to cross the airways of a member state; the right to land for non- 
traffic purposes such as repairs, refueling and emergencies; the 
freedom to land passengers and cargo from the aircraft's country of 
origin; the right to convey passengers and cargo between two countries 
neither the country of origin of the aircraft; and the right to con- 
vey between two points in one country, not the country of origin. 
These freedoms, of which the Dominions had been aware earlier, were 
products of the fertile minds of officials in the Air Ministry, many 
of whom favoured a strong international authority. "Freedoms" were 
not the sort of thing to interest either Beaverbrook or Howe, both 
of whom believed more in the realities of "give and take" than in 
idealistic platitudes. Nonetheless, the first four freedoms would 
later be incorporated into a draft Canadian convention for the inter- 
national civil aviation organization, which would be utilized in an 
16. DEA, General Registry file 3'C (s), John Baldwin to Escott 
Reid, 13 October 1943; also interview with John Baldwin, 17 
November 1980. 
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amended form as the basis for discussion at the Chicago conference. 
17 
During the London conversations, security questions, to which the 
Department of External Affairs had attached some importance since 
they would relate to a general world organization, were practically 
ignored. Instead, debate focussed on matters of definition, such as 
what exactly constituted internal and international service, and 
questions of membership in the proposed organization, especially the 
relationship between members at large and the directing body. UNRRA 
was still in the Canadian mind. 
Howe and Beaverbrook shared many private discussions, the 
former making it clear that Canadian-American trans-border flights 
were sui generis and should therefore be exempted from any interna- 
tional scheme, while the latter pressed his case for imperial air 
links. There was some concern on the part of Symington and Baldwin 
as to the frequency of these meetings, and Baldwin was charged with 
extracting the vital points from Howe over breakfast every morning 
in order to have something to send back to Ottawa. During these con- 
versations, Beaverbrook agreed that Canada should have equal rights 
on the route between the United Kingdom and Canada; that Canada should 
operate to the British West Indies and Latin America without British 
competition; and that a Pacific route should be operated jointly by 
17. There has been a certain amount of mythology surrounding 
these freedoms. John Holmes in his book, The Shaping of Peace 
vol. 1 (p. 64), and in his Canada House lecture of 8 November 
1979 (P. 7), refers to the first four freedoms as being a spe- 
cial Canadian contribution. If they were, it is only because 
they were used to preface the Canadian draft convention which 
was used as the basis for discussion at the Chicago conference. 
Professors Bothwell and Granatstein in their article "Canada 
and the Wartime Negotiations over Civil Aviation: The Func- 
tional Principle in operation", correctly identify the freedoms 
as a British invention (p. 592), but erringly state that Canada 
only learned of their existence at the British Commonwealth 
conversations in October 1943. The Dominions and India had in 
fact received a circular telegram from the Dominions Office on 
3 July 1943 outlining the six British freedoms. DEA, file 
3-C(s), copy of United Kingdom document A. T. L. (43)1, "Civil 
Air Transport; British Commonwealth Conversations; Draft Agenda 
and Relevant Documents", 9 October 1943. The creator of the 
six freedoms was William Hildred of the Air Ministry. Inter- 
view with John Baldwin, 17 November 1980. 
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Australia, New Zealand and Canada without British participation. 
18 
In a quid pro quo, a memorandum on the "All-British Air Route", 
prepared by Beaverb. rook and Howe and presented to a sub-committee 
of the High Commissioners, was sufficiently bland to warrant Canadian 
acceptance, placing the onus on individual countries for the esta- 
blishment and operation of such a route. 
19 
Of greatest significance, 
however, was agreement among the participants for an international 
air authority comprised of state actors only, and not corporations. 
In a letter to Heeney regarding British Commonwealth cooperation, 
Baldwin opined: "I do not think we have got into any difficulties 
as yet, " though he added, "but unless great care is exercised we may. "20 
The "great care" referred to Howe, who had accepted Beaver- 
brook's invitation to go with him to Washington directly for explo- 
ratory conversations with the Americans. In Ottawa, Norman Robertson 
immediately drew this to the Prime Minister's attention, believing 
that the political implications of a Canadian Cabinet Minister going 
on a journey of this kind as an apparent member of a single delega- 
tion representing the "British Commonwealth and Empire" were quite 
serious indeed. 
21 
Howe also erred at what was to be a joint press 
conference. When Beaverbrook failed to appear, Howe, not as talented 
in the art of obfuscation as Mackenzie King, was given the delicate 
task of explaining the "All-British Air Route" to a press eager for 
even an inkling of an imperial airline. Howe's remarks were miscon- 
strued, the stories appeared in Canadian newspapers, and upon the 
urgings of Baldwin and Symington - or perhaps even without them - 
Howe agreed to return to Ottawa before going to the United States. 
As it happened, and perhaps fortunately, given Howe's somewhat awk- 
ward lack of discretion, the proposed Washington talks were eventually 
18. DEA, file 3'-C(s), Baldwin to Reid, 13 October 1943. 
19. Howe Papers, vol. 101, file 25, United Kingdom document 
A. T. L. (43)4, "British Commonwealth Conversations; All British 
Air Route", 13 October 1943. 
20. DEA, file 3-C(s), Baldwin to Heeney, 19 October 1943. 
21. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2346, memorandum 
from Robertson to King, 14 October 1943. The British embassy 
in Washington had no knowledge of the planned visit. DEA, file 
3-C(s), cable WA5337, Pearson to Robertson, 27 October 1943. 
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cancelled due to alleged American unpreparedness. 
22 
In a report to the Cabinet War Committee following the Com- 
monwealth conversations, the Interdepartmental Committee noted that 
articles for a draft convention for the international authority "to 
protect Canadian interests" were being prepared for the use of Cana- 
dian participants at any future conferences, it being uncertain whe- 
ther there would be conferences among selected powers or a general 
conference, the Americans not yet having indicated their preference. 
In addition, the belief was reiterated that the views of the coun- 
tries of the British Commonwealth should remain fluid until discus- 
sions with the other leading United Nations, particularly the United 
States, had taken place. Evident also in these notions of self-inter- 
est was the functional principle: "If the voting power of the various 
member nations in the international air transport assembly is to be 
proportionate to their importance in air transport, Canada considers 
that its voting strength should be relatively high., 
23 
The Canadian draft convention, a product of the superior hand 
of Escott Reid and the technical expertise of John Baldwin, both of 
whom had worked together in the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs during its pioneering years a decade earlier, was accepted 
as a basis for Canadian policy by the Cabinet War Committee on 20 
January 1944. Stirringly appealling to the wartime imagination and 
cleverly to American emotions by being prefaced with the first four 
22. Escott Reid favoured forbidding Howe from holding any 
further press conferences: "We are being made to look very 
foolish in the eyes of members and officials of the United 
Kingdom Government, who are familiar with the long exchange 
of correspondence which we had with the United Kingdom on the 
convening of this preliminary Empire meeting. Not only have 
we gone back on what we insisted on for three months, but we 
have advertised to the world that we have agreed to a united 
front - the very thing that we said would prejudice the suc- 
cess of future international discussions. " Robertson did not 
agree with Reid's proposal. DEA, file 3-C(s), memorandum from 
Reid to Robertson, 19 October 1943; also memorandum from Bald- 
win to Heeney, 25 October 1943. Baldwin has commented in 
retrospect that his fears of Howe being trapped by Beaverbrook 
were exaggerated. Interview with John Baldwin, 17 November 1980. 
23. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 426, Cabinet War Committee 
Memoranda, document no. 650, "Report from the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Air Transport on Commonwealth Air Conversations", 
9 November 1943. 
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of the British freedoms, the convention was designed to hold middle 
ground between the United States and the United Kingdom, while at the 
same time ensuring that a strong Canadian voice would be heard, espe- 
cially on the issue of short trans-boundary flights which would not 
be subject to international control. The convention anticipated what 
was feasible in Canadian eyes and thus did not suggest complete con- 
trol by the authority over all aspects of civil aviation including 
management, since this would have alienated the United States, and 
probably C. D. Howe as well. Essentially, the convention called for 
the establishment of an international civil aviation organization 
consisting of an assembly of all members and an executive body opera- 
ting under the aegis of the anticipated general security organization. 
Such important matters as fixing rates, licensing of carriers and 
frequency of service would be among the responsibilities of the inter- 
national authority. 
24 
The draft convention was sent to Washington and London, rais- 
ing mild interest in the former capital and ire in the latter. The 
British had wished to consider the convention before its transmission 
to the United States, since at first sight it could pose difficulties 
for the United Kingdom, particularly in running services to the colo- 
nies. This request was not unreasonable, considering the way the Bri- 
tish had sent their papers to Canada earlier, but in their haste and 
eagerness to influence the Americans, Canadian officials only learned 
of British concerns when it was already too late. On the other hand, 
there was an element of self-preservation in the Canadian action, be- 
cause officials sensed that Beaverbrook was preparing for bilateral 
Anglo-American discussions which would not include Canada and the 
convention's release could therefore stay his hand. 
At Canada House, Charles Ritchie succinctly summarized the 
situation in terms which also had broader implications: 
The antithesis between the Canadian and the United 
Kingdom position is clear. The Ottawa Post-Hostilities 
Working Committee no doubt consider the London Post- 
Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee's views to be Imperial- 
istic in the narrow sense, and leading to inevitable 
24. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 426, Cabinet War Committee 
Memoranda, document no. 693, "Draft Convention, International 
Civil Aviation Authority", 8 January 1944. 
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future rivalries. The London Post-Hostilities Planning 
Sub-Committee no doubt will consider the Ottawa views 
utopian, unrealistic and dangerous to the essential 
life lines of British security. 25 
At the same time the United Kingdom was surprised to receive 
an American invitation for tripartite discussions with the United 
States and Canada, an invitation which did not include the other 
Dominion governments which had participated in the October conversa- 
tions in London. On the defensive, the British were clearly not con- 
cerned with Canadian functionalism but rather with American efforts 
to control the skies after the war, and in Washington Lord Halifax, 
the British ambassador, was instructed to press the Americans for 
immediate bilateral discussions. A despatch, circulated to the Domi- 
nion, featured language blunter than what was usual for British des- 
patches: "It will not be possible for us to sit back and watch this 
process and we shall be obliged to take immediate counter-measures to 
meet American competition. "26 Australian pride, which had peaked with 
the signing of the "ANZAC Agreement" with New Zealand in January 1944 
for mutual cooperation in foreign policy, was wounded, since it appeared 
that Canada had ignored a Commonwealth understanding for consultation 
of the past October. John Curtin, the Prime Minister of Australia, 
informed Mackenzie King that "The Governments of the British Common- 
wealth might find themselves at a serious disadvantage without a 
clearer understanding of principles between themselves than the Octo- 
ber conversations were able to achieve. " 
27 
The Canadian convention 
was leaked by the British - Beaverbrook was after all an adroit news- 
25. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "Post-Hostilities 
Planning", memorandum by Charles Ritchie, "Memorandum on Civil 
Air Transport and World Security Problems", 7 March 1944. 
26. DEA, File 3'-C(s), circular cable D245, Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs to Dominions Governments, 18 February 1944; 
also circular cable D89, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 January 1944. 
27. Ibid., cable no. 4, John Curtin to Mackenzie King, 10 March 
1944. Australia was also embarrassed by leaked plans for a 
possible Four Power conference plus Canada which was thought 
would take place later in March. 
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paperman - to an American journal and Howe was forced to make the plan 
public in the House of Commons on 17 March 1944.28 It should be added 
that the Canadians were unrepentant and took justifiable pride in 
their document, even though the timing of its public release was not 
exactly propitious. 
A more thorny problem between Canada and the United Kingdom 
was the Canadian lease of the air base at Goose Bay, Newfoundland, 
for purposes of defence. Negotiations between Canada and Newfound- 
land had taken two years but were stalled because of a British demand 
for use of the base for military purposes for the period of the 99- 
year lease. Continued Canadian refusals were centred on the notion 
that it would be difficult to refuse the United States similar con- 
cessions and could cause further difficulties if Newfoundland should 
decide to become part of Canada in the near future. This was not 
settled to Canadian advantage until November 1944.29 
With all this division there was virtually no hope of having 
constructive talks, and at any rate there still existed a great deal 
of confusion as to who was to have consultations with whom and when. 
The United States embarked on a flurry of concurrent bilateral dis- 
cussions with those nations chiefly concerned with international 
civil aviation questions. Berle and a flying entourage stopped in 
Montreal for two days while en route to London, at which time it was 
made clear to Canadian officials that the United States would only be 
prepared to accept the first two freedoms, the right of innocent pas- 
sage and the right to land for non-traffic purposes. The Canadian 
28. Mackenzie King regretted not having made the statement 
himself since he felt it was for the Prime Minister to make 
pronouncements on world policy. "The policy is as fine as 
anything the government of Canada has done at any time... Howe 
would never have made the statement he did today if I had not 
pressed the whole matter day in and day out through the Cabi- 
net. The strongest opposition to the policies enunciated 
came from Howe himself. " King Diary, 17 March 1944. See 
also Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 March 1944, pp. 
1570-1587. 
29. DEA, Papers of the Under-Secretary Series, vol. 823, memo- 
randum by R. A. MacKay, "Memorandum on Goose Bay Air Base for 
the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom", 20 March 1944; 
also Privy Council Office Files, Series 18, vol. 68, file D-12-5, 
C. J. Burchell (Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland) to 
Robertson, 2 March 1944. 
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convention was subsequently rejected in London by both Berle and Bea- 
verbrook, and it appeared as if Canadian civil aviation planning had 
all been for naught. (At a Prime Minister's Meeting held in London 
in May 1944, which chiefly addressed the issue of the proposed world 
security organization, Mackenzie King effectively laid to rest any 
vestiges of a common imperial policy in civil aviation, or in any- 
thing else for that matter. ) Meanwhile in Ottawa the draft conven- 
tion was being revised, and in Washington the American bilateral dis- 
cussions with interested countries, which had been intended to be of 
short duration, dragged on, discussions with India for example not 
finishing until mid-August. By the end of July, Berle admitted that 
his series of bilateral meetings had failed to reach a common basis 
of agreement, which really meant that the United States had failed to 
persuade other countries of the need for individual governments to 
increase flight frequencies of their own accord, something which the 
American airline companies dearly desired, so as not to have their 
expansion controlled by an international authority. This issue would 
become the major point of debate at the general conference in Chicago. 
In Washington, Pearson, ever-ready to take the initiative, 
thought "that the way is now open to Canada to embark on bilateral 
discussions itself in an effort to discover what sort of amendments 
might be made in our draft convention in order to make it a satisfac- 
tory basis of discussion at a preliminary conference of the eight 
powers or so principally concerned. , 
30 
But Howe, remembering the 
consequences of bad timing, wisely counselled restraint, and was of 
the opinion that the international situation should develop further 
before a Canadian convention in revised form could be re-affirmed. 
A week-end of debate in the wilds of New Brunswick with Beaverbrook 
and Berle did not make Howe optimistic either: "The time we spent 
together was devoted largely to fishing which was about as productive 
as our talks on civil aviation. "31 
30. DEA, File 3-C(s), Pearson to Robertson, 28 July 1944. Pear- 
son believed that the Americans were conducting these bilateral 
talks as preliminaries to traditional bilateral agreements on 
transit and landing rights and in lieu of an international 
authority. Despatch no. 1728, Pearson to King, 11 July 1944. 
31. Ibid., Howe to Robertson, 24 August 1944. 
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The United States at least ended the uncertainty of when and 
where a general conference should take place by issuing invitations 
to the countries comprising the United Nations to meet in Chicago in 
November 1944. After an exchange of messages with London which assured 
Mackenzie King that there would in no sense of the word be an imperial 
policy, renewed Commonwealth discussions were held in Montreal in Octo- 
ber just before the general conference. Not surprisingly, there had 
been little progress since the Commonwealth nations had last met a 
year earlier. Moreover, repeated Canadian efforts to convince Church- 
ill to invite Ireland on the basis of its position as an air power 
and to indicate that Ireland was welcome in Commonwealth circles had 
proved futile. The Canadian delegation, under the leadership of 
Symington, had been instructed to continue to support the principles 
established in the original draft convention and to keep a revised 
and more detailed draft version in hand as a possible basis for dis- 
cussion if the climate worsened. 
32 
The meetings were therefore fraught 
with difficulties, not the least of which was a harder attitude on the 
part of the United Kingdom which seemed to go back on the promises 
made to Canada a year earlier regarding a free hand in the Caribbean 
and half of trans-Atlantic traffic. Yet agreement was attained amongst 
the Commonwealth nations for the creation of a Commonwealth Air Trans- 
port Council which would act as an advisory body once the new organi- 
zation was in operation. 
33 
And in spite of the firmer British line, 
Lord Swinton, who had replaced Beaverbrook, had been instructed to be 
somewhat more conciliatory on other matters, so as to avoid sending 
the Canadians into the arms of the Americans. As a result, and also 
because the British anticipated American refusal, the revised Cana- 
dian draft convention was accepted as a document which could be used 
as a foundation for an international regulatory agency. The most 
32. DEA, General Registry file 72-MK-4-40C, I. C. A. T. P. Docu- 
ment no. 40, "General Instructions for Canadian Delegation to 
International Air Conference", 17 October 1944. 
33. Howe Papers, vol. 97, file 61-6, "Canada and International 
Civil Aviation", 22 March 1945. The British believed the crea- 
tion of the Commonwealth Air Transport Council to be the major 
accomplishment of this conference. United Kingdom, CAB 66, 
W. P. (44)628, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air", 
8 November 1944. 
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significant change in the revised convention was that it moved toward 
a compromise between the American and British positions, principally 
in that the right to fix rates had now been taken from the interna- 
tional authority and given to the operators. Allowance was also made 
for a transitional period following the war in which bilateral agree- 
ments between member nations could be made. The functional principle 
was also evident, as it had been in the first convention, in the form 
of an International Air Transport Board consisting of the eight states 
most concerned with international air transport, as well as four others 
elected by the proposed Assembly. At the Chicago conference on inter- 
national aviation, this convention would receive favourable publicity, 
especially in some of the American newspapers because it represented 
a compromise initiative to bring some order to the international fra- 
cas of the past two years. Before this, however, at least one British 
observer had privately commented that "the Canadian Convention is cer- 
tainly evidence of an admirable state of mind., 
34 
The stage was being 
prepared for Canadian mediation at Chicago. 
The conference commenced on 1 November, and within the first 
week the representatives of what had grown to be 52 participating na- 
tions realized that the struggle was between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union having refused to attend. The other 
participants refrained from taking sides openly, as did Canada, pre- 
ferring to spend time "revising the revisions" to the draft conven- 
tion through consultation with the Americans and the British in the 
hope of finding common ground. Canada also took pains to defend the 
functional principle, when this was assailed by some of the smaller 
powers who were lobbying for a great power council. Following a 
round of unproductive discussions between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, Berle issued a challenge to the conference by asking 
34. DEA, file 3-C(s), extract of letter from Philip Noel-Baker 
to Escott Reid in letter from Reid to Robertson, 11 October 1944. 
During the Chicago conference, the Wartime Information Board 
office in Washington monitored American newspapers. DEA, file 
72--MK-40C Part 2, Special Report no. 2, supplement no. 4, Press 
Analysis Section, Wartime Information Board, Canadian Embassy 
Washington, "The International Civil Aviation Conference, Chi- 
cago, as Reported in the United States Press, November 19-20, 
1944.11 
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whether any state cared to submit an acceptable formula for discus- 
sion. Canada did not have to be asked twice - Howe laid the Canadian 
convention before the conference, and although there was no apprecia- 
tive reaction amongst delegates for several days, the convention was 
gradually recognized as a basis for discussion. 
35 
To say that Adolf Berle and Lord Swinton did not get along 
would be an understatement. Neither man trusted the other and to a 
degree both were not allowed much manoeuvreability - Swinton only 
moved when strings were pulled in London and Berle was often at the 
mercy of the Congressional members of his delegation and the various 
interests they represented. In addition, Berle was also supposed to 
be the impartial chairman of the conference. C. D. Howe, who had the 
stature and the personality required to intervene effectively between 
the two men, could not, because the pressures of the conscription 
crisis necessitated his presence in the Cabinet in Ottawa. This left 
Symington, Baldwin and Reid to handle the corridor diplomacy at the 
over-crowded Stevens Hotel and to participate in tripartite discus- 
sions with the Americans and the British - known as the "A-B-C talks" - 
for two weeks while the other delegations idled and angered. 
It was Escott Reid who at last succeeded in having wide-ranging 
private discussions with Berle. He refuted Berle's preference for 
having two British Commonwealth seats on the directing body, stressed 
the functional principle, listened in silence to charges that the 
United Kingdom was working in collusion with Pan American Airways to 
wreck the conference, and often steered the conversation onto the 
higher level of the recently-concluded Dumbarton Oaks meetings on the 
world security organization. Reid also told Berle that he believed 
tension would arise between the United States and the Soviet Union 
within the next decade and that Canada therefore favoured a strong 
convention because it would be in the buffer zone between these two 
great powers. 
36 
There was some hope that the Soviet Union would 
adhere to the result of this conference. 
The "freedoms" caused most of the controversy during the 
conference. To the four freedoms which Canada had taken 
from the 
35. DEA, file 3-C(s), Reid to Robertson, 9 November 1944. 
36. DEA, file 72-MK-4-40C Part 2, memorandum from Reid to 
Robertson, 10 November 1944. 
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United Kingdom to place in the draft convention, now being used as 
the basis for discussion, the United States added a fifth, which 
called for the right to unload and take on traffic at intermediate 
points during the flight of the aircraft. Deemed to be essential to 
the profit of any airline and to smaller countries which did not pos- 
sess large fleets, the acceptance of this freedom would give the giant 
and well-equipped American companies free rein, something which was 
anathema to the United Kingdom. By 20 November all participants at 
the conference were tired, there still being no agreement on the fifth 
freedom. The British were prepared to recruit support for the view 
that the conference had been a success, that the first two freedoms 
were acceptable, and that bilateral discussions could now continue. 
Berle echoed this weary felling, but suggested that the work could 
not be completed because it had been too ambitious a dream, believing 
that an interim agreement was all that could be achieved at this 
point. Other participants, however, were not satisfied with suddenly 
bringing the conference to an abrupt stop over a single issue, albeit 
a difficult one. Also, many of the technical committees dealing with 
equipment and safety standards among other things, had not yet com- 
pleted their work, which had been characterized by more agreement 
between nations than at the larger political discussions. Following 
the speeches by Swinton and Berle, Symington addressed the plenary 
session, and in a terse short speech expressed his great disappoint- 
ment and, he stated, the chagrin which must be felt by the entire 
world, at the failure to reach agreement on the substantial points 
before the conference. Canada would continue to strive to bring the 
United States and the United Kingdom together on the most crucial 
points. The reaction to the speech brought some surprises, since the 
Latin Americans, who had been expected to obediently follow the Ameri- 
can lead for an interim agreement, requested a twenty-four hour study 
delay. Australia and New Zealand supported Symington. In a subsequent 
fiery speech, Fiorello LaGuardia, the energetic mayor of New York and 
member of the American delegation, threw the gauntlet at both the 
United Kingdom and the United States for failing to provide any leader- 
ship. 
37 
The conference continued, with Canada having been publicly 
37. DEA, file 3-C(s), Baldwin to Heeney, 23 November 1944. 
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recognized as the mediator. From now on, anything which fell short 
of some form of permanent document would be interpreted as failure. 
Attempting a compromise, Canada proposed something new: an 
"escalator" clause, a complicated system of ratios and percentages 
designed to allow for increases of frequency of flights through 
measured capacity. The Americans insisted that the "escalator" clause 
should apply to their fifth freedom, the right to unload and take on 
traffic at intermediate points; the British were prepared to accept 
the clause only under the third freedom: traffic picked up in the 
country of the aircraft's origin. 
38 
Again both countries realized 
excellent commercial opportunities when they saw them - the freedom 
of exploitation which the Americans would have under freedom five, 
and the protection the British would enjoy on flights from and bet- 
ween the colonies with freedom three. It was over these differences, 
which seemed irreconcilable, that the conference finally ground to a 
halt, with agreement expressed over an "agree to disagree" formula. 
Somewhat unusually, therefore, two agreements were offered 
for signature: one containing the first two freedoms of the right 
of transit and the right to land for non-traffic purposes; the other 
the full five freedoms, which quickly lapsed following the conference. 
Most countries, including Canada, signed the former which, in essence, 
stipulated a multilateral guarantee of rights and as such represented 
a creditable achievement. 
39 
Canada would not concede the rights of 
38. DEA, file 3-C(s), Baldwin to Heeney, 29 November 1944. The 
United Kingdom had been put in a difficult position as a result 
of a decoding error which had left the word "not" out of instruc- 
tions from London telling Swinton not to accept the escalator 
clause. In Ottawa, Ray Atherton, the American ambassador, sug- 
gested to Robertson that a convention should be signed without 
the United Kingdom. Robertson disagreed: "Now that the roles 
of the United Kingdom and the United States appeared to be re- 
versed, I thought we in Canada would see very much the same 
objections to setting up an international organization without 
the United Kingdom as we had earlier seen to the suggestion 
that such an organization might conceivably be set up without 
the United States. " Memorandum from Robertson to King, 29 
November 1944, 
39. See Holmes, The Shaping of Peace vol. 1, p. 65; also Canada, 
Treaty Series, 1944, No. 36, "Final Act of the International 
Civil Aviation Conference", 7 December 1944. 
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the other three freedoms - the right to land traffic from an air- 
craft's country of origin, the right to pick up traffic from an air- 
craft's country of origin, and the right to convey traffic between 
intermediate points not the country of origin - unless they were part 
of a global multilateral system for the ordered control of air trans- 
port, as originally envisioned. By far the greatest practical accom- 
plishments of the conference - and the least public - were the many 
technical agreements which would allow for consistency of operational 
standards, a convention which dealt with legal questions such as navi- 
gational rights and territoriality, and a permanent organization which 
would eventually have its headquarters in Montreal. 
40 
The Final Act of the conference, much of it containing Cana- 
than prose from its own draft convention, provided for an assembly 
to meet annually and a council of twenty-one, which was considerably 
larger than Canada had desired. Because of the clamour raised by the 
smaller powers, the criteria for representation on the council wildly 
exceeded the Canadian interpretation of the functional principle, as 
the council was not only to include the major air powers, but nations 
which provided the most substantial contributions in ground facilities 
as well. Geographic regional representation was made a tenet and was 
reluctantly accepted by the Canadians, who realized the necessity for 
geographic representation in the specialized field of air transport. 
But when it came to the elections, any functionalist precepts were 
discarded in a stampede for prestige. The results were bizarre, if 
not utterly absurd, with Canada elected only as a contributor of faci- 
lities, Mexico as a major air power and El Salvador ostensibly for 
geographic reasons. Norway offered to withdraw in favour of India 
until Berle told the Latin Americans they had over-reached themselves, 
40. It was Berle's idea to have the headquarters of the Provi- 
sional International Civil Aviation Organization, later to be- 
come the I. C. A. O., in Montreal. DEA, file 72-MK-4-40C Part 2, 
memorandum from Reid to Robertson, 10 November 1944. Berle 
resigned from the State Department shortly before the end of 
the conference, partly because of the feeling in Congress that 
he was moving too far toward "international control", but 
mainly because Cordell Hull, his political eminence grise, 
had retired from the position of Secretary of State and had 
been replaced by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 
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and so Cuba nobly withdrew instead. 
41 
It came as a rude shock to the 
Canadians that not everyone shared their moral tone when it came to 
elections to international councils, but there was also a belief among 
Canadian policy-makers that international civil aviation, because it 
was dynamic and had a propensity for rapid growth, might prove to be 
an allowable exception. The elections however led the Canadians to a 
firmer resolve to press for the recognition of functionalism in the 
charter of the world security organization which had been provisionally 
planned by the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks earlier in the autumn. 
I had never really believed before I came to this con- 
ference that there was anything very much in the idea that 
Canada could be a mediator in a matter of importance between 
the United States and the United Kingdom. At this conference, 
however, we have acted as a mediator and our mediation has 
been pretty successful... I doubt whether we would have been 
forced into the position of being mediators or honest brokers 
between the United States and the United Kingdom if it had 
not been that we had put before the conference the only com- 
plete and detailed plan. 42 
Escott Reid's words ring true: Canada had been a mediator, 
had been one of the "Big Three", had dispensed advice, had acquired 
influence, but most important, had gained experience. Although the 
results of two years of negotiations and policy developments within 
the Canadian government had fallen short of the grand scheme of inter- 
national regulation of the skies originally envisioned, Canada had 
succeeded in achieving what C. D. Howe had originally stated it would 
strive to do: promote a framework for international civil aviation 
which would foster international cooperation. In doing so Canada 
attained a sustained status at Chicago which would never again be 
achieved by any Canadian delegation at any specialized conference. 
Canada had demonstrated "enlightened self-interest"; self-interest 
in the sense that policies were advanced which would benefit Canada, 
enlightenment because when discord appeared certain, Canada could 
have withdrawn into its hemispheric shell and pursued safe bilateral 
aviation agreements. Canadian idealism would not allow this recourse. 
*** 
41. DEA, file 3'-C(s), memorandum by Baldwin, "International Civil 
Aviation Conference, November-December 1944", 13 December 1944; 
see also Treaty Series, 1944, No. 36, "Final Act of the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Conference. " 
42. Reid Papers, vol. 5, Reid to Robertson, 6 December 1944, not 
sent. Also interview with Escott Reid, 12 June 1980. 
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The Chicago conference on civil aviation had become a signi- 
ficant signpost on the road toward a general world security organiza- 
tion. International civil aviation is easily studied in isolation as 
an important test case for Canadian policies, but it must be realized 
that organization of the air served as a microcosm of a larger process 
developing during the years 1943 and 1944. In London, a "United Na- 
tions Plan" had been conceived as early as January 1943; in the State 
Department in Washington, Leo Pasvolsky, a Special Assistant charged 
with planning for international organizations, was busily engaged in 
preparing an American equivalent; and in Ottawa, Robertson, Wrong and 
others, both individually and collectively, were giving thought to 
possible policy responses to great power initiatives for a world se- 
curity organization. The Canadians would not receive a detailed plan 
from the great powers until May 1944 when the United Kingdom unveiled 
its proposals to the Dominion prime ministers in London. 
The Moscow or Four Power Declaration, discussed by the Ameri- 
cans and the British at the Quebec Conference of August 1943 and signed 
in Moscow on 30 October, represented a commitment on the part of the 
United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China for the earliest 
possible establishment of a general international organization which 
would be based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of nations. 
Canada was taken into the confidence of the United Kingdom at an early 
stage in the planning of the declaration and contributed a suitable - 
the British thought ingenious43 - amendment to the fifth clause which 
would impose an obligation on the great powers to consult not only 
each other but the other United Nations as well in matters pertaining 
to the development of the new organization. The functional principle 
was of course inherent in this amendment and was recognized as such 
by Clement Attlee, then Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs: "The 
principle is one to which Canada attaches great importance, and, quite 
apart from Canada's position, there is much to be said for bringing 
out more clearly in the document that the Great Powers are acting with 
the assent of the smaller powers and in consultation with them where 
practicable. "44 Thus there was disappointment in Ottawa when the final 
43. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U4425/402/70, minute by Glad- 
wyn Jebb on cable no. 147, King to Attlee, 17 September 1943. 
44. United Kingdom, CAB 66, W. P. (43)412, "Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs", 22 September 1943. 
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document did not in fact bring this out as lucidly as was hoped; the 
best that Wrong could do was to note that "the Moscow Declaration is 
an accurate description of the League of Nations. " In addition, he 
recommended to Robertson that an American proposal to have all the 
United Nations formally adhere to the Declaration should be rejected. 
Adherence had been appropriate in the case of the Atlantic Charter of 
1942, but now the proposal of the United States would be seen as "an 
invitation from the big boys to the little fellows to sign on the 
dotted line. "45 In Canadian minds it would have been better for the 
Americans to expand upon the Moscow Declaration, not to repeat it, 
and fortunately for Canada, the American proposal was eventually dropped. 
Further developments were necessary, it being too early for Canada to 
make any suggestions in the absence of more tangible proposals from 
the great powers. 
Before the proposals surfaced, Canada had to again assert it- 
self as an independent international actor. In October 1943, on the 
eve of the establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
in London, the Soviet Union issued a memorandum to the other great 
powers which stated that the sixteen federated republics of the Soviet 
Union should, like the British Dominions, each have the right to direct 
individual participation in the Commission. Failing that, the Soviet 
Union would simply not participate. There was consternation at this 
in both Ottawa and London, and the British submitted an analysis of 
the recently amended Soviet constitution, demonstrating how the Domi- 
nions and the Soviet Republics differed, an effort which did not fall 
upon sympathetic Soviet ears. After several meetings between Dana 
Wilgress, the Canadian Minister in the Soviet Union, and Vaycheslav 
Molotov, the Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet inter- 
pretation of international status - at least in this instance - was 
amicably resolved and certainly hastened the subsequent elevation of 
45. DEA, General Registry file 7-V(s), Wrong, "Memorandum for 
the Under-Secretary", 16 December 1943. A cable was sent to 
London which stated that it would be unfortunate to emphasize 
unnecessarily a distinction in status between the signatories 
of the Moscow Declaration and the other United Nations by having 
them merely concur in a principle agreed on by the largest 
powers. Cable no. 199, King to Attlee, 19 December 1943. 
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the Canadian legation to an embassy. 
46 
The event may have served as 
a Soviet baZZon d'essai for tactics later at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, 
and was definitely a shock to Canadian policy-makers who believed that 
the recognition Canada had achieved by this point through the war ef- 
fort had surely obviated the need for homilies on Canadian statehood. 
The lengthy membership issue of UNRRA, the Combined Boards, 
and civil aviation developments during 1943 were all supposed to have 
laid to rest prevalent feelings among Conservatives in the British 
War Cabinet that the "British Commonwealth and Empire" ought to 
comprise one of the great powers in a world security organization. 
Churchill was the chief proponent of this philosophy, using the phrase 
"British Commonwealth and Empire" continually in his references to 
UNRRA, the proposed world security organization and at Quebec in Aug- 
ust 1943 in connection with his personal view for the regional orga- 
nization of civil aviation. The only one who really shared the inten- 
sity of his vision was Lord Amery, who believed, again with an eye on 
the past, that the British Commonwealth should constitute its own 
region in all international organizations, in order "to give the world 
outside a new sense of England's power of vision and leadership. "47 
As the minister responsible, Eden would have none of this brand of 
rhetoric, but he and his advisers in the Foreign Office often expressed 
the wish that the British Commonwealth should stand together in vital 
matters of international organization. Eden had used his "four-legged 
stool" metaphor when in Ottawa during the UNRRA stand-off in March 
1943, arguing that a new world security organization should rest upon 
the four pillars of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and 
the British Commonwealth. Frank talk by Robertson, Wrong and Pearson 
at that time probably helped to change his mind, but a gradual shift 
of opinion within the Foreign Office was certainly more influential, 
as were the despatches of Malcolm MacDonald 
from Ottawa, one of which 
earlier in the year argued forcefully that recognition of the 
British 
46. DEA, General Registry file 5842/40C, memorandum from Wrong 
to King, 11 November 1943; also analytical memorandum prepared 
by Leon Malania (a special assistant in DEA), 19 February 1944. 
47. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U867/402/70, "Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for India", 25 January 1943. Eden's 
minute of 10 February: 
"Mr. Amery's paper is a foolish produc- 
tion, by a kindly but confused old man. " 
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Commonwealth as a great power would give each individual member some- 
thing less than the status of full nationhood. 
48 
The idea of a unitary British Commonwealth as a great power 
in international organizations had always been discouraged by Canada, 
since it was incompatible with functionalism and would do nothing to 
enhance Canada's burgeoning international status, but the concept did 
not readily fade away. Canadian feelings were all-pervasive, and their 
sensitivity was often not understood by the United Kingdom at all. 
For example, a preliminary agenda for a Commonwealth Relations Con- 
ference formulated by Chatham House in January 1944 was rejected by 
Canadian participants on the grounds that the agenda prejudged the 
issue of international recognition of the Dominions through the nr 
se doctrine and should have placed more emphasis on questions of con- 
cern to the entire international community. As it happened the Bri- 
tish agenda had concentrated more on what was felt were issues of 
common interest, including how the British Commonwealth could be re- 
garded as a great power, rather than on the establishment of an inter- 
national system acceptable to all nations, and in developing the agenda, 
the members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs had simply 
pot realized the depth of the Canadian point of view of the futility 
of discussing a unitary Commonwealth voice with four Dominions har- 
bouring diverse interests. Edgar Tarr, the leading member of the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs involved in both the pre- 
liminaries and the actual conference, summed up Canadian feelings in 
a letter to historian W. L. Morton: 
Their (the Dominions) thinking and policies are 
nationally based, in the same way as those of the United 
States. The long Commonwealth association is one of the 
factors which helps to shape them, in just the same way 
that our close association with the United States, as 
well as with the Commonwealth, helps to shape our thinking 
and our policy. 49 
48. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U402/402/70, cable no. 178, 
MacDonald to Attlee, 23 January 1943. Eden's minute of 10 Feb- 
ruary: "I agree that the difficulties will be great with Canada, 
other Dominions and smaller powers. We can be sure that a hege- 
mony of four powers one of which is China, will not be happily 
received. " Also Pearson Diary, 14 & 31 March 1943. 
49. Canadian Institute of International Affairs/Edgar Tarr 
Papers, vol. 1, file "1941/44", letter from E. J. Tarr to W. L. 
Morton, 4 September 1944; also memorandum by Tarr for Claxton, 
Robertson, Wrong, Keenleyside, and Louis Rasminsky, 30 December 1943. 
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The intellectual pyrotechnics at Chatham House, however, were 
relatively unimportant when compared to the storm which followed a 
speech by Lord Halifax to the Toronto Board of Trade on 24 January 
1944 which urged that the "British Commonwealth and Empire" should 
become the fourth great. power in an international organization "upon 
which, under Providence, the peace of the world will henceforth de- 
pend. ,50 Had the speech been made at any other time and place, it 
probably would have aroused little attention, but Toronto with its 
strong British traditions, had always been a most politically sensi- 
tive city in which to give a speech on Commonwealth or imperial rela- 
tions - one need only recall Arthur Meighen's politically disastrous 
"Ready, aye Ready" speech during the Chanak Crisis of 1922. With res- 
pect to timing, there had been other similar developments, disquiet- 
ing to senior Canadian officials and particularly to the Prime Minis- 
ter. Mackenzie King had always been suspicious of centralizing ten- 
dencies within the Commonwealth; amid the many despatches and memo- 
randa which crossed his desk, his blunt pencil always seemed to be 
drawn to any phrase which so much as hinted at a unified Commonwealth 
foreign policy. The month of January 1944 gave him cause for special 
concern, since John Curtin, the Prime Minister of Australia, had ap- 
pealed for the establishment of a Commonwealth Council and a speech 
by Field Marshal Smuts had identified the British Commonwealth as one 
of the great powers. The Canadian Prime Minister was also nervous 
because the British had not yet indicated the specific nature of 
their proposals for the world security organization, and Churchill's 
comments about "family discussions" at the Quebec Conference the past 
August were undoubtedly still on his mind. Smelling an imperialistic 
plot, King was worried, but even so, the Halifax speech came as a sur- 
prise. 
51 
These things taken into consideration, it is understandable 
why Mackenzie King exploded and once again made election noises. On 
a more personal level, the Prime Minister resented the "tranquil con- 
50. See Halifax, The American Speeches of the EarZ of Hali f'^- 
(London, 1947), pp. 275-283; also King Diary, 25 January 1944. 
The relevant extract from the diary is reprinted in Pickersgill, 
The Mackenzie King Record vol. 1, pp. 636-41. 
51. King Diary, 25 January 1944. 
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sciousness of effortless superiority", 
52 
exhibited by Halifax and 
others, particularly their propensity to ignore the functional prin- 
ciple, which after all he himself had made public in Parliament. The 
question of a centralized Commonwealth foreign policy will be analyzed 
in greater detail in later chapters, but it is mentioned here as an 
issue which surfaced at an unwelcome time for Canada, confusing the 
picture which Canada was endeavouring to present, that of an inde- 
pendent nation willing and able to make its functional contribution 
to international organization. 
Canada was in fact receiving indications from London of the 
state of British plans for the world organization; cables from the 
Dominions Office were regular, but as yet no complete plan had been 
received, although a seminal Foreign Office "United Nations Plan" 
had been in existence since January 1943. Also, in Ottawa, the exis- 
tence of a relaxed relationship between Malcolm MacDonald and the 
Prime Minister, and his senior officials such as Robertson and Wrong, 
allowed for many informative discussions about policy in general, 
most of which the British High Commissioner reported to London. In 
the British capital, Charles Ritchie, by means of his "observer status" 
on the Post-Hostilities Problems Sub-Committee, was able to inform 
Ottawa of trends in policy, but not of an over-all scheme. Canada may 
have had a better idea of what to expect from the United Kingdom had 
a Prime Minister's Meeting been held during 1943, but Mackenzie King 
and his fellow prime ministers had demurred for various reasons. 
As it was, Canada had not made any formal comments on future 
world organization since the question of adherence to the Moscow De- 
claration in December 1943, and although there had been some tele- 
graphic traffic between London and Ottawa regarding the relationship 
between the League and the new organization, it was not until the 
United Kingdom indicated an imminent exchange of proposed agendas 
for discussion of draft plans for the world security organization 
with the United States on 20 March 1944 that Canada expressed any 
interest in a complete plan. Even then, the Canadian message was 
52. This phrase comes from the King Diary of 30 July 1942 and 
was used at that time to describe Sir Frederick Leith-Ross of 
the Treasury. Throughout the war, King used variations of this 
phrase to describe various Englishmen, including Halifax. 
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innocuous: "We are not attempting to prepare a draft scheme of our 
own, but we should appreciate an opportunity of seeing your papers 
before they take final shape, if this is practicable., 
53 
One should 
remember that at this time the British were still absorbing the ef- 
fects of Canada's draft convention on civil aviation. The Dominions 
Office was very meticulous about consultation, and did not oppose 
sending the United States a copy of the British agenda for the dis- 
cussions but had drawn the line at sending a summary of British views 
on the world organization to the State Department before the Dominions 
had been consulted. 
54 
The Foreign Office, eager to press on, and 
realizing that its original "United Nations Plan" was already a year 
old, seemed prone to ignore this advice, terming consultation with 
the Dominions a "nuisance" which had to be endured "before we can 
formulate our own view., 
55 
However, the proposed bilateral discus- 
sions between the United Kingdom and the United States were post- 
poned until the end of February and then once again until the Dum- 
barton Oaks conference in August, allowing both countries to consult 
informally and revise their respective plans accordingly. Discus- 
sions and consultations with the Dominions could therefore commence 
from May 1944 which was the time finally agreed upon by the prime 
ministers for their meeting in London. 
Hume Wrong was correct in anticipating that at this conference 
Churchill was likely to advance to the prime ministers his notion of 
a world organization which would be directed by an executive council 
composed of the great powers representing certain regional bodies. 
53. DEA, file 7-V(s), Wrong, "Memorandum for the Prime Minis- 
ter", with draft telegram attached, 29 March 1944. 
54. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U1338/180/70, Godfrey Boyd- 
Shannon (Dominions Office) to Gladwyn Jebb (Foreign Office), 14 
February 1944. The original plan, based upon four power super- 
iority, was presented to the War Cabinet by Eden on 16 January 
1943. CAB 66/33, W. P. (43)31, "Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs", 16 January 1943. 
55. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U6615/402/70. This anony- 
mous and undated minute was written on a copy of Canadian cable 
no. 147, King to Attlee, 13 September 1943, in connection with 
the proposed Canadian amendment to the Moscow Declaration dis- 
cussed above. An interview with Lord Garner on 8 November 1979 
confirmed that similar views existed among many Foreign Office 
officials until well after the establishment of the United 
Nations organization. 
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Representation on such a council, Wrong stated in a memorandum to 
Robertson, could best be accomplished through the application of the 
functional principle: 
... It is not possible for one sovereign state to 'represent' other sovereign states on an international 
body except in rare instances by special arrangement. 
It is unrealistic and undesirable that all states without 
permanent seats should have the same chance of selection for a non-permanent seat no matter what their size or im- 
portance may be; it may prove desirable to relate frequency 
of service on the Council to the size of the contribution 
which would be based on capacity to pay and thus reflect 
the general importance of each state. It might be feasi- 
ble to group states in categories of importance rather 
than by geographical areas although obviously distribution 
of non-permanent seats must be related to geography. 56 
Robertson was advised to urge the Prime Minister to encourage 
his peers to adopt a fairer system of distributing non-permanent seats 
than had been followed in the League Council, where incidentally, many 
states had been represented in spite of their failure to pay their 
allocated amounts of the League's budget. It is worthy of note that 
Wrong was far ahead of his colleagues in recognizing the geographical 
imperative as a debilitating factor as far as the application of 
functionalism was concerned, and they would react with more surprise 
than he at the election results to the Security Council of the First 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1946. Wrong's opinion was undoubt- 
edly influenced by his own experience as Canadian representative to 
the League immediately before the war. 
The well-drafted British proposals for a world security orga- 
nization were circulated at a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
on 9 May, but were initially not discussed in any detail. Instead, 
attention focussed on a note in which Churchill outlined his idea of 
a regionally-based world organization consisting of a World Peace 
Council of the great powers, including the "British Commonwealth and 
Empire", which would in turn engender three regional councils: the 
Council of Asia, the Council of Europe, and the Council of the Ameri- 
cas, on which Canada would represent the British Commonwealth. In 
his proposals, the British Prime Minister also advocated a fraternal 
56. Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 22, memorandum from Wrong to 
Robertson, "Representation of Smaller Countries on World Secu- 
rity Council", 25 April 1944. 
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association with the United States, eventually leading to common citi- 
zenship. 
57 
Mackenzie King did not have to rely on the advice of 
Robertson - his well-honed instincts told him that a scheme of this 
nature was unacceptable and he led his fellow prime ministers in con- 
vincing Churchill to swallow his pride and quickly withdraw his note, 
which he did. This was perhaps a larger triumph for Eden and the 
Foreign Office who had consistently opposed Churchill's views; Eden 
as early as March 1943 when Churchill had first suggested a "Council 
of Europe" in a radio broadcast. 
58 
In responding to the original 
Foreign Office plan, and with a wary eye still on Churchill, it is 
interesting to see that the Canadian Prime Minister cast his response 
within the framework of the functional principle and for the first 
time referred to Canada as a "middle power": 
Canada, as a power of middle size, fully recognizes 
the necessity of ensuring that power and responsibility 
should correspond... Unless they (the smaller or middle 
powers) have the voice to which they are entitled by the 
contributions they can make to world security and pros- 
perity, they cannot be expected to discharge their appro- 
priate responsibilities. 59 
As if to demonstrate his point, Mackenzie King did not attend 
a meeting devoted to colonial questions, leaving Robertson to make 
the Canadian contribution which in itself was negligible. Unlike the 
other Dominions, Canada did not administer a mandated territory, nor 
did it wish to, and therefore possessed no functional interest in 
trusteeship. Moreover, it might prove too dangerous to support half- 
heartedly proposals which the Americans would reject. 
57. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 323, copy of PMM(44)5 (Church- 
ill's international organization plan), 8 May 1944. Churchill 
had mentioned the prospect of a regional council for Europe in 
a speech broadcast on 21 March 1943. DEA, General Registry file 
4959-40C, despatch no. 80, Massey to King, 24 March 1943. 
58. Pearson Diary, "Report of Mr. Anthony Eden to the War Com- 
mittee of the Canadian Cabinet, March 31st, 1943. " 
59. DEA, file 7-V(s), Cabinet War Committee Document no. 924, 
"Proposals for the Establishment of a General International 
Organization; Views Expressed on Behalf of the Government of 
Canada, May 1944 to January 1945", document no. 1, "Extract 
from Statement made by Mr. Mackenzie King to the Meeting of 
Prime Ministers on May 11,1944. " 
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Norman Robertson, Charles Ritchie and John Holmes feverishly 
worked at analyzing the British proposals within the time limits im- 
posed by the conference, since there was uncertainty when, or if, 
there would be another opportunity for the Prime Minister and his 
Under-Secretary to have such close direct contacts with British policy- 
makers again, either before Anglo-American bilateral discussions, or 
before a general conference. Basic general areas of Canadian policy 
had to be sketched out and informally imparted to the British - to be 
reformulated in detail through later communications from Ottawa - if 
the Canadians wished to have a chance of influencing the British plans 
before they were sent to the other great powers. The Prime Ministers' 
Meeting also included talks on Commonwealth consultation, the feasi- 
bility of Prime Minister Curtin's proposal for a Commonwealth Council, 
commercial relations, and some discussion of international civil avia- 
tion. The Canadian delegation, the smallest one at the conference, 
was certainly kept busy. For his part, Mackenzie King brought the 
gospel of functionalism and his contentment with the status quo of 
Commonwealth relations to the attention of British politicians in an 
address to both Houses of Parliament at Westminster. He appeared to 
have forgotten his singular lack of contentment occasioned by Lord 
Halifax's speech several months earlier. The Prime Minister also made 
sure to see as many of his aristocratic friends and acquaintances as 
he could, an activity in which he revelled whenever he was in London. 
With regard to the British proposals for the international 
security organization, a difficulty arose when the covering note with 
which the Foreign Office had intended to preface the proposals was 
found not to be quite emphatic enough in expressing the rejection of 
the "regional councils" approach. At a meeting of officials presided 
over by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary in the 
Foreign Office, Robertson, supported by the New Zealanders, flatly 
refused to accept the covering note, arguing that the acceptance of 
such a regional scheme would encourage isolationism 
in the United 
States. In addition, Canada's diverse interests could not be satis- 
fied by a regional system and Canada would be unwilling to represent 
the British Commonwealth in an American Council either. 
His hyperbole 
was effective, and the note was eventually amended. 
Robertson made a 
further intervention in stressing the importance of the right of a 
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state to be represented on the council of the proposed organization 
when the interests of that state were directly concerned. The original 
wording in the British plan on this point provided that "where the 
interests of any state are specially affected, it should have the 
right of representation on the Council, " but this was changed prior 
to the meeting to read "should have the right to lay its case before 
the Council. " Professor Charles Webster of the Foreign Office suggested 
that this was a mere drafting alteration, but the Canadians were not 
convinced. 
60 
It would become a major point in the evolution of Cana- 
than policy toward the new organization. 
Wrong took charge of further analysis of the United Kingdom 
proposals in the East Block following the Prime Ministers' Meeting. 
In an insightful memorandum of 19 June, he outlined selected areas 
of interest where "a Canadian view might exercise considerable in- 
fluence", but also exhibited his pragmatism by correctly realizing 
that "the main outlines of the new organization will be agreed upon 
between the Great Powers and we shall have to accept their decisions. " 
Wrong divided the subjects into two classes so as to include matters 
which were deliberately left out of the British paper for later agree- 
ment and issues arising directly from the proposals which would re- 
quire the acceptance of the smaller powers. In the first category, 
Wrong placed the composition of the World Council and how non-perma- 
nent members should be chosen; the nature and powers of the Secre- 
tariat, especially the extent of the initiating powers of the Secre- 
tary-General; and the question of financial support of the organiza- 
tion, bearing in mind the time and trouble wasted on financial issues 
in the League. The second category commenced with the emphasis placed 
in the British paper on "sovereign equality"; how should the difference 
between "equality of status" and "equality of function" be realized? 
The powers of the Assembly were not clearly defined, those of the Coun- 
cil were. For the former, it was suggested that some attention 
be de- 
voted to what should constitute its minimal powers; in the case of the 
latter a comparative study between its powers and those given to the 
League Council should be undertaken. A study of the pacific settlement 
60. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "World Organiza- 
tion", memorandum by Charles Ritchie, "Future World Organization", 
minutes of meeting in the Foreign Office on 17 May 
1944. 
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of disputes should wait, since it would prove more fruitf ul after the 
United States and the Soviet Union had indicated their preferences. 
Although the Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems had al- 
ready prepared a study on "Advantages and Disadvantages to Canada of 
the Regional Organization of Security and Defence", Wrong suggested 
that there should be some consideration given to measures to curb 
the influence of regional blocs - the elections at the Chicago civil 
aviation conference later in the year would prove him all too correct. 
Finally, he seized upon Robertson's significant intervention in London: 
The question of representation on the Council, or at 
least of access to it, for states not members of it when 
their interests are specially affected is barely touched on. 
It is, however, very important for all states other than the 
great powers. How should this problem be met (a) in the 
case of the states involved in a dispute before the Council 
and (b) in the case of states whose interests are specially 
affected in policies before the Council? 61 
At a meeting in Norman Robertson's office the next day, the 
decision was made to circulate the British proposals to the various 
divisions within the Department of External Affairs and to the embassy 
in Washington for comment and analysis. Detailed studies were not 
undertaken by the Economic Division, but its head, Henry Angus, be- 
lieved that the shortcomings of the British plan lay in the fact that 
it offered smaller nations practically no security against interfer- 
ences in their interests, commercial or strategic, by the great powers. 
62 
The other divisions did not issue complete studies either, being 
plagued by other concerns, although a few short memoranda were written. 
The Legal Division for example undertook the process of examining how 
international law would be regarded in the new organization, and whether 
the existing Permanent Court of International Justice would be revised 
or abolished, and replaced with a new court. 
As a result, it was chiefly Hume Wrong, knowing the subject 
better than anyone else, with the assistance of John Holmes and later 
George Ignatieff, who contributed the preliminary analyses. Wrong 
61. DEA, file 7-V(s), memorandum by Wrong, "Notes on Paper P1Lý1 
(44)4 of 8 May 1944, 'Future World Organisation"', 19 June 1944. 
62. Ibid., memorandum from H. F. Angus to Wrong, "Plans for 
Future World Organization", 23 June 1944; also interview with 
Charles Ritchie, 20 June 1980. 
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was in the position, as Associate Under-Secretary of State, effect- 
ively to gauge the governing political realities, and by this time 
functioned in concert with Robertson to the point where either man 
could be found in the other's office at any time. Holmes was well- 
placed as Secretary to the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities 
Problems, and although that committee was more concerned with post- 
military plans for Europe during this period, Holmes received a 
valuable overview of the opinions of other departments, and through 
Ritchie in London, of the British planners such as Gladwyn Jebb and 
Professor Charles Webster. When Holmes was posted to Canada House 
in late 1944, his position in Ottawa was filled by George Ignatieff 
who had returned from the same place. The wisdom of this shift of 
personnel for the betterment of consultation both in London and 
Ottawa is obvious. Holmes ventured an early memorandum on what 
would later in his career become one of his passions - the Assembly. 
He believed that, as in 1919, the planners had neglected the function 
of the Assembly and thought it doubtful that any Assembly would remain 
content to be a debating body unless its debates led to resolutions 
and the resolutions to action. Since Canada was one of those nations 
whose representation on the Council would probably at best be infre- 
quent, it should be interested in urging more extensive powers for the 
Assembly. 
63 
Pearson's response, written with Escott Reid, came from Wash- 
ington a month after the meeting in Robertson's office. Pearson felt 
that the Foreign Office paper would serve as a useful basis for the 
discussions between the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union 
and China. Two of the most important features of any discussion, he 
believed, would be the powers and responsibilities given to the World 
Council and the position and obligations of the lesser powers in the 
organization. Pearson emphasized that the success of any organiza- 
tion would be conditional on the ability of the three great powers 
to desire to work together for peace - he refused to acknowledge 
China's place within the inner circle. Agreeing with his colleagues 
in Ottawa that the Assembly should be "something more than a futile 
63. DEA, file 7-V(s), memorandum by John Holmes, "The Func- 
tions of a World Assembly", 13 July 1944. 
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debating society", and that it was necessary to have a relationship 
between power and responsibility in the organization, Pearson under- 
scored the prevalent Canadian opinion on what was perceived to be 
the crucial issue: "I do not see how the intermediate or smaller 
powers could ever whole-heartedly, or even half-heartedly, support 
any World Council if, when their specific interests are being dis- 
cussed by such a Council, or when specific obligations are being 
imposed on them, all they can do is lay their case before the Coun- 
cil. "64 The only way for the organization to succeed would be if 
the advantages of membership outweighed the disadvantages. This 
would be the case if nations acquired the right to participate func- 
tionally in decisions which affected their interests. 
The American proposals arrived via the Dominions Office on 
25 July. Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to study them 
in detail and to present the British with a reply to their plan be- 
fore the tripartite - China was excluded from the first round - Dum- 
barton Oaks discussions began in Washington on 21 August. The Cana- 
dian reply to the British, intended to amplify rather than criticize, 
was despatched on 2 August and expressed satisfaction that there 
seemed to be so much common ground between the United States' and 
United Kingdom's proposals. It raised all the issues which had been 
analyzed over the past month, and added that Canada also supported 
the American proposal for the creation of an Economic and Social 
Council. Predictably, most of the emphasis of the cable was on the 
powers and functions of the World Council: 
We are concerned over the very extensive powers pro- 
posed for the Council in both the United Kingdom and United 
States plans, and we feel that the requirement of unanimity 
among the permanent members should be narrowly defined... 
The greater the authority of the Council the more important 
it is that states not represented on it should have the 
right of effective participation when matters closely 
touching their interests are under discussion... We doubt 
whether many states without permanent Council seats would 
be ready to join an organization in which the Council's 
decisions on grave issues, involving action on their part, 
would be binding on them. 
65 
64. DEA, file 6-V(s), Pearson to Robertson, 18 July 1944. 
65. Ibid., Cabinet War Committee Document no. 924, 
"Views 
Expressed by the Government of Canada, May 1944 to January 
1945", cable no 130, King to Cranborne, 
2 August 1944. 
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During the Dumbarton Oaks discussions in Washington, Canada 
was probably better placed than any of the non-participating powers 
to receive information of the proceedings and to make comments through 
the British delegation. The United Kingdom was both generous and tho- 
rough in providing the Dominions' representatives with copies of the 
telegrams which Cadogan sent to London. There were daily meetings 
at the British embassy where the Dominions were briefed on events 
and encouraged to air their concerns. During the 1930s and 1940s, 
as Commonwealth consultation had matured to the point where there 
was virtually a continuous flow of information from the Dominions 
Office regarding the international activities of the United Kingdom, 
and some in return from the Dominions themselves, a tradition had 
been established for consultation, and Dumbarton Oaks was no excep- 
tion. Since there already were Dominion representatives resident in 
Washington, and with leading British policy-makers in attendance at 
the conference, it seemed only too logical to avoid the usual cum- 
bersome and time-consuming - and for the Foreign Office often frus- 
trating - process of consultation, although the Dominions Office was 
used by Ottawa during the conference as before. The discussions at 
Dumbarton Oaks were probably the last and best example of the "white 
man's Commonwealth" in consultation, and it was indeed ironic that 
the Dominions, Canada in particular, who wished to pursue an inde- 
pendent course in international relations, should give the impres- 
sion of being so dependent on the United Kingdom as to require con- 
stant information and reassurance. To external eyes, the myth of a 
uniform Commonwealth policy was reinforced at Dumbarton Oaks; it 
would be quickly shattered at the San Francisco conference the fol- 
lowing year. 
Where the Canadians had an advantage over other Dominion re- 
presentatives was in the close personal contacts enjoyed by Lester 
Pearson and Escott Reid with James 'Scotty' Reston of the New York 
Times. Reston was the recipient of several judicious leaks and was 
attuned to the mood of the American delegation, which gave the Cana- 




The meetings between the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks were 
characterized by the efforts of the Americans and the British both to 
placate and to soothe the Soviets, whether in the Soviet proposal for 
an international air force, their desire for a four power Council, 
their wish for unanimity through strong veto powers for the permanent 
members of the Council, or a restricted Assembly. The potentially 
explosive issue of separate representation for the sixteen consti- 
tuent republics of the Soviet Union was also raised, but apparently 
as a rejoinder to the American volte-face on the issue of great powers 
being able to vote on the Council when parties to a dispute. American 
interests for more seats on the Council, including a permanent seat 
for Brazil, had to be reconciled with the British preference for four 
permanent and six non-permanent members, plus a "vacant chair" for 
France. 
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Pearson availed himself of every opportunity to press the 
Canadian case to the British along familiar lines. On the issue of 
voting privileges, which Wrong had not analyzed earlier because of 
a lack of any coherent great power position, Pearson told the British 
in high moral tones that a party to a dispute should never be permitted 
to vote, either in the assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute or 
in settlement matters; that there should be defined limits to the great 
power veto in the Council; and that there should be no veto power by 
a state in the Assembly or in the Economic and Social Council. 
68 
Evi- 
66. For example, Reston told Reid that Cordell Hull had shown 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the United States propo- 
sals, went over them with the senators paragraph by paragraph, 
and still could not manage to secure the endorsement of the 
Committee. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 368, Pearson to Robert- 
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dent in the Canadian mind was the fear that with all these veto 
powers, the great powers would have too much strength, including the 
right to veto any action taken against themselves as parties to a 
dispute. Alas, the Soviet position was diametrically opposed to that 
of the Canadians; the British and the Americans were rather more in- 
terested in reaching an accommodation with the Soviets. When this 
proved impossible, the question of voting was referred for further 
discussion among the great powers and was not included in the pub- 
lished Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
At one of the last meetings between the United Kingdom and 
the Dominions at the British embassy, Cadogan expressed obvious sa- 
tisfaction at what the British delegation had been able to accomplish 
during the discussions, including among other things, a statement by 
principles which would restrain arbitrary action by the Council, 
thereby protecting the smaller nations; the expansion of membership 
on the Council; and the securing of participation on the Council for 
states parties to a dispute whose interests at been specially affec- 
ted. 
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It was a considerable diplomatic triumph for the United King- 
dom, and by association for Canada as well. Pearson, who had become 
something of a zealot in voicing his concern over the recognition of 
the rights of the secondary or middle powers, was sorely disappointed 
by the British failure to secure acceptance of the "due regard" clause, 
which stipulated that there should be acknowledgement of powers accor- 
ding to past and potential contribution, the inclusion of which in 
the final document would have been a visible manifestation of func- 
tionalism. 
Although Wrong and Robertson were not at the conference, they 
had more realistic notions about what was politically feasible, in- 
cluding the danger of expressing Canadian concerns too vocally so as 
to appear to interfere in American affairs at a time when the Repub- 
lican presidential nominee, Thomas Dewey, was assailing the concept 
69. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 364, cable WA5614, McCarthy 
to King, 28 September 1944; also FO 371 Series, U7353/180/70, 
Cadogan to Foreign Office, 12 September 1944; and U7794/180/70, 
note regarding meeting at Washington embassy between the United 
Kingdom and the Dominions, 12 September 1944. 
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of four power leadership. 
70 
For instance, Wrong and Robertson were 
prepared to change their views regarding the desirability of an in- 
ternational police force under the control of the world organization. 
By the middle of the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, when there was much 
disagreement between the English-speaking great powers and the Soviet 
Union on several issues, only Pearson clung convincingly to this 
belief and used it as a vehicle to further the concept that states 
providing military forces should have the right to participate in 
Council decisions regarding their deployment. In Ottawa, Wrong and 
Robertson were more practical, dropping the police force concept, 
but retaining the notion that states should participate in Council 
decisions if their forces were required. They knew that there was 
a price to be paid for Soviet agreement and that parliament, public 
opinion and Mackenzie King, in spite of his conversion from isola- 
tionism to functionalism, would never accept decisions made regarding 
Canadian forces without an appropriate Canadian contribution to the 
decision-making process. In the United States, there would be similar 
difficulties with Congressional sanction, although it was felt by the 
Canadians that as far as the Americans were concerned, it would be a 
case of "straining at a gnat when the chief secondary states may be 
"7l asked to swallow a camel. 
The above remark is symptomatic of an overly glib attitude 
which Canadian officials had about American difficulties, tete-ä- 
te tes with Scotty Reston notwithstanding. The Canadians had relied 
on the British as informants and interlocutors to the point of ex- 
clusivity, not that the State Department, with its senatorial and 
Pan-American concerns, would have had the time or the patience to be 
to be as forthcoming as a busy Foreign Office. Pearson and Reid did 
engage in conversation with several State Department officials, most 
70. King Papers, J1 Series, vo. 369, Norman Robertson to Mer- 
chant Mahoney (of the Canadian Embassy, Washington), 
18 August 
1944. 
71. Ibid,, cable EX3733, Robertson and Wrong to Pearson, 6 
September 1944. The dialogue in Ottawa had also been influenced 
by important voices urging moderation. Graham Towers, the 
Governor of the Bank of Canada, wrote: 
"It seems to me that 
iron-ribbed commitments to participate in a war might produce 
less satisfactory results than a looser 
form of arrangement. " 
DEA, file 7-V(s), Towers to Wrong, 3 November 1944. 
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notably John Hickerson, the head of the British Commonwealth Division, 
but their views were perceived as individual opinions and not those of 
the Canadian Government. After the Dumbarton Oaks conference, Pearson 
believed that Canada had a chance to influence American outlooks and 
that this should be accomplished before the general conference which 
would include all allied nations. Predictably, Pearson recommended 
that any representations to the United States should emphasize "the 
necessity of narrowing the gap between the rights and obligations of 
the great and lesser powers. "72 As it happened, Mackenzie King and 
Roosevelt did have a summit meeting during the autumn, but this was 
not the place to bring forward detailed minutiae on the plans for 
the world organization. Consultation at the official level was not 
established until January 1945, and then there were disappointments. 
Instead, the Canadians continued to consult very directly with 
the British. In Ottawa, an informal October conversation between Mal- 
colm MacDonald and Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong and Arnold Heeney, ex- 
panded on an earlier cable from Mackenzie King to Churchill which had 
stressed the need to secure the association of the secondary states to 
the organization through the application of the functional principle. 
A military alliance between the "Big Three" should be required during a 
"transitional period", and the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks pro- 
posals, which appeared immiment, should be delayed, if not suppressed. 
This latter suggestion was ostensibly to allow more time for consulta- 
tion, but the Canadian Prime Minister's own personal view - that the 
proposals would not be well received by French Canada and the CCF - 
crept through. 
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Escott Reid received information on Soviet views from conversa- 
tions with Charles Bohlen. "Memorandum by Mr. Reid of a Conver- 
sation with Mr. Bohlen, Chief of the Eastern European Division 
of the State Department", 20 October 1944. 
73. Dominions Office, DO 35/1870, J. S. S. Garner (High Commission, 
Ottawa) to Godfrey Boyd-Shannon (Dominions Office), 7 October 1944. 
An unsigned minute on this letter exclaimed: 
"This is one of the 
most remarkable examples of muddled thinking I ever came across. 
At one moment, Messrs. N. Robertson and Hume Wrong are complaining 
of the inadequate considerations given to secondary states; at 
the 
next they are advocating a military alliance of the 
4 Great Powers; 
at a third they say they are not perturbed about 
the Russian veto; 
and they then end up by declaring that they are gravely preoccu- 
pied about the prospects of setting up a successful world 
organi- 
zation. Finally they are proved wrong about 
the attitude of Cana- 
dian public opinion to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
No wonder 
we get some very odd communications 
from Canada: " 
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His fears were unfounded. The polls of the Wartime Informa- 
tion Board consistently showed strong support across the nation for 
the international policies of the government, although there was 
less enthusiasm in Quebec, and by March 1945,72% of Canadians de- 
sired their country to take an active role in maintaining world 
peace, even at the cost of sending Canadian forces overseas to en- 
force international decisions. 
74 
There had been talk during the 
Dumbarton Oaks discussions of locating the headquarters of the new 
organization in Quebec, and the city of Levis formally went on record 
in support. This idea was not new - there had been remarks in this 
vein during the first Quebec conference in August 1943 and Professor 
Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office Research Department had suggested 
southern Ontario as a location earlier in the year. 
75 
Activity within the Department of External Affairs during 
December 1944 was centred on producing an adequate reply to the Dum- 
barton Oaks proposals for transmission to the "Big Four" and the 
provisional French Government, which would get Canadian recommenda- 
tions across and still allow Parliament to ratify the proposed Charter 
without appearing to make the government look inconsistent if its 
suggestions were not accepted. In addition to stressing the expected 
argument for due recognition of secondary states, mentioning that 
Canada had demonstrated its military and industrial capacity and 
readiness to join in concerted action against aggression in two world 
wars, the Canadian reply also launched a new proposal. A suggestion 
was made that decisions of the Council under Chapter VIIIB - military 
enforcement - should only bind states represented on the Council; 
those that were not represented would participate in military action 
following endorsement by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, or if 
the nations concerned had been invited to share in the deliberations 
74. There was however less enthusiasm in Quebec, although this 
particular record does not indicate how much 
less. King Papers, 
J4 Series, vol. 427, Cabinet War Committee Memoranda, document 
no. 966, Wartime Information Board Survey no. 
59,24 March 1945. 
75. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, memorandum from James A. 
Gibson to King, 28 November 1944. Toynbee's preference is indi- 
cated in Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, 
U2207/402/70, minute on 
draft of "United Nations Plan", n. d. 
(Spring 1943). 
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of the Council. 76 After dealing at such length with the platitudi- 
nous generalities of representation of lesser powers without pre- 
senting workable proposals in this regard, Canada had made an ini- 
tiative which seemed practicable, at least to Canada. 
At the end of 1944, there was every reason for optimism over 
the impending developments toward an effective world organization. 
Escott Reid, the utopian of the Department of External Affairs, pre- 
ferred a complete Canadian draft Charter as an alternative to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Fresh from the tribulations of civil avia- 
tion at Chicago, he expressed his enthusiasm for the coming year in 
a telegram to Norman Robertson: 
In Chicago I got into the habit of drafting dozens 
of Convention Articles overnight. I have not yet been 
able wholly to break myself out of that bad habit, to 
which I have lately been succumbing between the hours 
of eight in the evening and midnight. Consequently I 
am sending you by bag on Saturday, as a Christmas present, 
a redraft of the Charter and in my redraft have incor- 
porated 75 per cent to 90 per cent of the Constitutional 
Articles of the Permanent Aviation Convention. 77 
Although the vigour of Reid's sense of mission was not always 
shared within the Department, there did exist a quiet sort of opti- 
mism. Canada had acquired a favourable amount of prestige as a result 
of wise mediation at the Chicago conference on international civil 
aviation, and an international aviation authority had been established 
which would meet Canadian requirements. On a broader level, there had 
been success on basic Canadian tenets of international organization: 
representation according to regional councils had been effectively 
discouraged, as had the idea of a unitary Commonwealth policy. Com- 
monwealth consultation had been more than adequate, and had resulted 
in a greater Canadian input into the Dumbarton Oaks proposals than 
might otherwise have been possible. Functionalism had matured, and 
its application had become more sophisticated; which is to say, it 
was realized that not everyone viewed it as a panacea, and that it 
could not be applied equally to every situation. 
76. DEA, file 7-V(s), Wrong, "Draft Memorandum on Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals for communication to United States, United King- 
dom, Soviet, Chinese and French Governments", 30 December 1944. 
The message was sent on 12 January 1945. 
77. Ibid., cable WA7095, Reid to Robertson, 21 December 1944. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE UNITED NATIONS 
You've come from nations far and near 
To meet each other in person here 
To discuss worldly problems pro and con, l 
Have a better understanding from now on. 
The founding conference of the United Nations at San Francisco 
in 1945 was an event unparalleled before its time. Attracting over 
2000 delegates, advisers and staff from 46 nations, and through radio 
people in all parts of the globe, it symbolized the hopes of all for 
order in an imperfect world. To Canada, the resultant Charter of the 
United Nations represented "a beginning and not an end. It has in it 
the seeds of progress and development, and it can be changed as the 
changes are required., 
2 
Canada played a quiet and effective role at 
the conference in advancing its own particular concerns while realizing 
1. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 339, file 3672, included in 
letter from William Christians, a citizen of San Francisco, to 
King, 25 April 1945. 
2. Pearson Papers, vol. 20, file "Speeches - San Francisco 1945", 
speech broadcast in the United States, 1 July 1945. 
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that success could only be achieved without major disagreements bet- 
ween the great powers. The Canadian attitude was characterized by a 
greater sense of realism, acquired through frustrating discussions 
with the United States earlier in the year concerning the world secu- 
rity organization, and through continued consultations with the Bri- 
tish which led to pre-conference Commonwealth talks in London in 
April. Although the functional principle was enshrined in the Charter 
at San Francisco, there was uncertainty whether it would be accepted 
by all members in practice, though universal acceptability was not, it 
is true, an overriding concern at the time. In a broadcast to the 
nation on Dominion Day 1945 from San Francisco, it was an exuberant 
Lester Pearson who declared: "If the Canada of 1945 is eager and anxious 
to play an important role in world affairs, it is not I hope, because 
of any delusions of grandeur, or of overweening ambition. It is be- 
cause she has acquired an intelligent understanding of her own en- 
lightened self-interest. "3 Canadian optimism became more hesitant 
following the conference, as it became clear that nations were indeed 
prone to "overweening ambitions" in the new organization. In spite 
of several setbacks to Canadian prestige in the early stages of the 
United Nations and the spectre of dangerous disunity among the great 
powers, there proved to be a resolve to stand by the troubled orga- 
nization, come what may. It was during and following the initiating 
conference of the United Nations that a greater sense of realism 
began to pervade Canadian foreign policy, and it was also then that 
Canada began to act like the middle power it was becoming. 
The United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, China and 
the Provisional French Government were sent the official Canadian 
response to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the world security 
organization on 12 January 1945. As indicated in the last chapter, 
this memorandum endorsed the functional principle, which probably 
came as no surprise to the great powers, and also embodied an ini- 
tiative under the enforcement chapter of the Dumbarton Oaks propo- 
sals, suggesting Assembly approval for military commitments on the 
3. Pearson Papers, vol. 20, file "Speeches - San Francisco 
1945", speech, "Canada in World Affairs", broadcast over the 
CBC from San Francisco to Canada, 1 July 1945. 
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part of states not represented on the Council. But the memorandum 
reflected no real sense of urgency, the prevalent impression in the 
East Block being "that the desired changes can most effectively be 
introduced before the proposals are formally submitted as the basis 
for an international conference., 
4 
Similarly, instructions to the 
Canadian heads of mission in the five capitals stated that "the 
memorandum deliberately avoids proposing specific amendments because 
there are alternative means of meeting most of the points., 
5 
The 
representatives however were reminded to stress what lay behind the 
sole initiative of the memorandum: the right of all states to par- 
ticipate in decisions involving the deployment of their own military 
forces. For the rest, there appeared to be justifiable confidence in 
the ability of Canadian diplomacy to get the job done quietly. 
The publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals raised the 
important question of publicity in Canada. Mackenzie King and his 
Liberals were planning an election in 1945, and public interest in the 
international policies of the government was a concern. Following a 
statement by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on the Dum- 
barton Oaks proposals of 9 October 1944, the Wartime Information Board 
produced a descriptive pamphlet of which more than 40,000 copies were 
distributed. Educational aid kits were sent to schools and church 
groups across the country. In January 1945, Norman Robertson, him- 
self not usually associated with questions of publicity, went so far 
as to suggest to the Prime Minister that John Grierson, the talented 
director of the National Film Board, should offer his services to the 
State Department in order to make a popular film of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals. 
6 
Speeches were also made by Cabinet ministers and 
4. DEA, file 7-V(s), Cabinet War Committee Document No. 924, 
"Proposals for the Establishment of a General International 
Organization; Views Expressed on Behalf of the Government of 
Canada, May 1944 to January 1945", "Memorandum to the Govern- 
ments of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and 
China and the Provisional Government of the French Republic", 
12 January 1945. 
5. Ibid., cable from the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
to the High Commissioner, London, the Ambassadors in Washington, 
Moscow and Paris and the Charge d'Affaires, Chungking, 12 Jan- 
uary 1945. 
6. DEA, file 5475-40, memorandum from Robertson to King, 26 
January 1945. 
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senior Canadian diplomats, extolling the virtues of the proposals, 
while also mentioning Canada's special interests. 
7 
In response it 
could not be said that Canadians were unenthusiastic. A Gallup poll 
of January 1945 demonstrated that 90% of Canadians surveyed approved 
of membership in a world security organization and 76% believed in 
the use of military sanctions, although in the province of Quebec 
this figure dropped to 51%. 
8 
This poll result appeared to obviate 
repeatedly voiced fears of Canadian officials during the previous 
year and in the months that would come about harsh public verdicts 
on commitments for Canada. 
In the diplomatic corridors, Escott Reid pursued publicity 
on a different level. When his masters within the Department of 
External Affairs refused to get excited about publishing a Canadian 
draft charter as an alternative to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals just 
before the general conference, Reid decided to take matters into his 
own hands. His version was published under a pseudonym in an American 
journal just before the San Francisco Conference, his assumption being 
that if this approach worked once for civil aviation, it might be 
worth a chance in the case of the general organization. 
9 
7. A speech which had been delivered by Pearson in Winnipeg 
surprisingly appeared in Paris in the February 1945 issue of 
"Bulletin de Documentation", published by the Agence France- 
Presse under the title of "Le point du vue d'un Canadien sur 
les projets du Dumbarton Oaks", DEA, file 5475-40, Wrong to 
Pearson, 22 February 1945. 
8. DEA, file 5475-40, memorandum from Robertson to King, 
26 January 1945. 
9. DEA, file 7-V(s), Reid to Robertson, 24 January 1945. 
Reid's charter was eventually published without departmental 
approval in the magazine Free World. Reid believed that because 
his charter contained clear, stirring language and contained 
numerous references to American history, people would not guess 
who had written it. They did. DEA, Papers of the Under-Secre- 
tary Series, vol. 827, file 732, Reid to Robertson, 21 March 1945. 
Reid had earlier apologized to Robertson: "So far as I know 
there is nothing in it which is contrary to the views of the 
Canadian Government, though not everything in it, of course, 
represents Canadian Government views. As I have said to you, 
what I have tried to do is write the best possible treaty which 
could be written on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
I wish it were possible to do more because, as you said, there 
isn't much straw in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals out of which 
to build bricks. " Reid to Robertson, 13 March 1945. 
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Optimism at Canadian abilities to influence the great power 
proposals became more guarded once direct consultation was taken up 
with the United States State Department in January 1945. Ray Ather- 
ton, the American ambassador in Ottawa, informed Hume Wrong on 4 
January that Canada would be furnished with complete information 
about a forthcoming meeting of the American republics at Chapultepec, 
Mexico, called to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He took 
pains to emphasize to Wrong that Canada possessed a marked advantage 
over other countries in its close liaison with the United Kingdom. 
Wrong in turn stated that in spite of Canadian difficulties with the 
proposals, nothing was being said in Canada which would make accep- 
tance more difficult in the United States. The United States was not 
taking Canadian views seriously enough, Wrong observed, and offered 
a scenario which even he must have found difficult to believe: "I 
pointed out that criticism in Canada of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
would be picked up by the isolationists in the United States and 
might become - especially if injected into the Canadian election -a 
factor of some account in the consideration by the Senate of the Char- 
ter of the new organization. "10 Atherton admitted his government's 
guilt, but Wrong did not reciprocate by admitting that his government 
benefitted from the informative British connection. 
In Washington, while listening to Edward Stettinius, Cordell 
Hull's successor as Secretary of State, wax eloquent about the exem- 
plary nature of Canadian-American relations, Pearson took the oppor- 
tunity to remind the Secretary that the Canadian approach to the in- 
ternational organization could naturally be not quite the same as 
that of a great power. Not wishing to go too far since on this occa- 
sion he was presenting his newly-acquired ambassadorial credentials, 
Pearson nevertheless told Stettinius that the Dumbarton Oaks Charter 
"... should recognize the place of the Middle Powers and make it possi- 
ble for public opinion in those powers whole-heartedly to support the 
United Nations Organization. "11 Privately, some American officials 
10. King Papers-, J4 Series, vol. 342, file 3679, memorandum 
from Wrong to King, 4 January 1945. 
11. Stettinius responded by saying: "You people in Canada really 
have nothing to worry about in these things; you are in a sense 
part of us and you are also part of the British Empire. You are 
really fortunate because you have such good and strong friends. 
" 
Since this was his first formal meeting with the Secretary, 
Pearson did not put up his usual fight. DEA file 7-V(s), Pearson 
to Robertson, 9 January 1945. 
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admitted that they did not think that the Charter as drafted would 
have much of a chance of getting through the Canadian parliament, to 
say nothing of the American Senate. 
12 
No one seemed to place much 
faith in public opinion polls. 
The State Department took the Canadians by surprise by re- 
questing their views before the Canadian memorandum of 12 January 
arrived. On the day before, Pearson met with Theodore Achilles, the 
new head of the British Commonwealth Division, who handled him a list 
of specific points on which the State Department wished to solicit 
Canadian views. The Americans invited Canadian comment on the ques- 
tions of initial membership in the organization, the role of the pro- 
posed Economic and Social Council, the procedure for preparing the 
statute of an international court, and the character of provisions 
relating to "peaceful change", or the power of the organization to 
revise treaties, boundaries and the like. "Peaceful change" had been 
embodied in Article XIX of the League Covenant, but had never been 
used and it was felt by Canada that this provision would lead some 
of the smaller powers to demand the inclusion of a territorial gua- 
rantee along the lines of Article X of the League Covenant, which Canada 
had consistently opposed. 
13 
As it was, Canada did not really have 
to take a stand on the question of a territorial guarantee since the 
United States opposed it when raised at the San Francisco coverence, 
opting instead for a statement of general acceptance of the sovereign 
integrity of states. For the moment, Pearson gave perfunctory replies 
to the American queries, which would be studied in detail by Wrong and 
his small but potent task force in Ottawa. 
Pearson, apprehensive at tendencies of the isolationists in 
the American Senate to defend the rights of the smaller powers, sug- 
gested to Ottawa that the Canadian memorandum be circulated to a wider 
group of smaller powers in order to secure some more support. This 
request was rejected by Wrong, who believed that the great powers 
12. Reid Papers, vol. 5, file 7, "Dumbarton Oaks Draft Charter", 
memorandum by Reid following dinner with John Hickerson of the 
State Department, 10 January 1945. 
13. DEA, file 7-V(s), Pearson to Robertson, 11 January 1945; 
also draft memorandum by Charles Ritchie and Hume Wrong, 
"Points 
Raised by the State Department Concerning the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals", 29 January 1945. 
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should make the desired changes in the proposals, and if they did not, 
it would be best if the exact nature of the Canadian representations 
were known only to a narrow circle. 
14 
The Foreign Minister of Bel- 
gium, Paul-Henri Spaak, and E. R. Van Kleffens, the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, were given the memorandum but at a later date. Van Kleffens 
in particular could have been taken more into Canadian confidence, 
since in his speeches he repeatedly emphasized that distinctions had 
to be drawn between middle and smaller powers, continuously using 
Canada as an example. 
15 
In retrospect the Canadian proclivity not to 
cultivate allies for the middle power cause was perhaps comfortably 
unwise, and reflected Canadian uncertainties with public opinion. It 
should be said, however, that there were few powers which would fit 
the "middle power" category. 
The fateful meeting with American officials took place in 
Washington on 12 February. Wrong was accompanied by Pearson, Heeney, 
Reid, and Davidson Dunton, the Manager of the Wartime Information 
Board, who also managed to have some talks with leading American jour- 
nalist Walter Lippmann. The meeting itself was principally a dialogue 
between Hume Wrong and Leo Pasvolsky, the architect of the American 
plans for the world organization. The Canadians did not perceive the 
American attitude as encouraging: 
The United States representatives gave the impression 
that, while they were glad to listen to our comments, they 
were so engrossed with their own particular difficulties 
and with the difficulties of reaching agreement with the 
Soviet Union that they were unwilling and unable to attach 
much importance to our difficulties or our views. 16 
The most significant outcome of the talks, Wrong informed the 
Prime Minister, was the knowledge that the State Department had decided, 
chiefly at the public urgings of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, to sepa- 
rate the machinery for the enforcement of peace treaties with Germany 
and Japan from the proposed general security organization. Wrong be- 
14. DEA, file 7-V(s), Pearson to Wrong, 16 January 1945; also 
cable EX229, Wrong to Pearson, 19 January 1945. 
15. n)id., Holmes to Wrong, 24 January 1945. 
16. Ibis, '., memorandum by Reid, "General International Organi- 
zation; Memorandum of a discussion held in `Ir. Pasvolskv's 
Office in the State Department, Washington", 12 February 1945. 
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lieved that if this were the case, emphasis on the Security Council 
within the organization would be reduced and the importance of the 
Assembly and the proposed Economic and Social Council enhanced. The 
Council would become less important and this would be good for public 
opinion in Canada. On the other hand, the Canadian memorandum of 
12 January had not been considered very seriously, and Pasvolsky 
balked at accepting the Canadian proposal that Council decisions re- 
garding military enforcement should only bind states represented on 
the Council unless there was an endorsement by two-thirds of the 
Assembly. The Americans preferred a scheme where a state not a mem- 
ber of the Council would not be bound until its government had con- 
curred in the decision, Pasvolsky arguing that such a scheme would 
be more sensible. With regard to Canadian insistence on the recog- 
nition of the functional principle in the election of states to the 
Council, "the Americans produced the obvious and formidable objec- 
tions to any effort to classify all the states of the world in accor- 
dance with their international significance. "17 Pasvolsky stated 
that if criteria for election were required, they would have to in- 
elude the contribution of armed forces, the necessity of proper 
regional representation and the "moral leadership" of states. 
18 
Func- 
tionalism was a dead issue as far as the Americans were concerned, 
and Canadian officials were so blinded by the logic of the functional 
principle that they actually believed that the United States could be 
swayed from the anti-functionalist stand it had taken in the member- 
ship issue of UNRRA and at Dumbarton Oaks. 
The Canadian memorandum was not better received in London, 
where the Foreign Office view appeared to be that greater success 
for modifications of the Charter could only be achieved if the great 
powers reached a decision among themselves and then presented this 
to the general conference. John Holmes, who had by this time succeeded 
17. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "World Organiza- 
tion; Wrong, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister", 15 February 
1945; also DEA, General Registry file 5475-40, despatch no. 415, 
Pearson to King, 16 February 1945. 
18. DEA, file 7-V(s), Reid, "General International Organiza- 
tion: Memorandum of a discussion at Blair House, Washington, 
10 February 1945. " 
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Charles Ritchie at Canada House, had frequent occasion to meet with 
Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office, and although the latter expressed 
sympathy for Canadian feelings, especially the issue of more proper 
representation for the middle powers, his attitude hardened when it 
came to the specific Canadian proposal: "He appreciated our problems 
and realized the difficulties we faced, but he was frankly worried 
about any provisions which would cause delay in the enforcement of 
sanctions. "19 The Canadian initiative had been quickly dismissed by 
the two great powers it was supposed to influence. 
of the great powers to the Canadian recommendation 
expected, but disappointment in the East Block was 
retrospect seemed an unrealistic notion that there 
cient time to offer some acceptable alternatives t 
before the general conference. 
The cool attitude 
had not been un- 
eased by what in 
would be suffi- 
o the great powers 
In the Department of External Affairs, an indefatigable Hume 
Wrong was undeterred. In spite of American wishes to stage the gene- 
ral conference at San Francisco in March 1945, Wrong sensed that it 
would be at least late April or May before it would convene. Analysis 
of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals continued, and papers dealing with 
the role of the great powers, the Economic and Social Council, legal 
questions, and military aspects were produced and discussed among 
officials. Insofar as military questions were concerned, Wrong's 
view that the use of force should be determined by circumstances and 
not by any rigid scheme, was closer to the temper of the Prime Minis- 
ter than the opinions expressed by several other members of the De- 
partment of External Affairs. Wrong noted that under the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals, no general obligation to furnish forces at the behest 
of the Security Council was contemplated and members of the organiza- 
tion would only be obligated by being direct parties to special agree- 
ments. In contrast to the League Covenant, disarmament received only 
a passing glance in the proposals where it was referred to as "regu- 
lation". 
20 
The issue would not attract more attention at San Fran- 
19. King Papers, J1 Series, vo. 387, copy of memorandum from 
Holmes to Massey, 27 January 1945; interview with John Holmes, 
23 July 1980. 
20. DEA, file 7-V(s), memorandum by Wrong, "Military Aspects 
of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals", 19 February 1945; see also 
John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace vol. 1, p. 243. 
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cisco, planners in all countries being unaware that the birth of the 
atomic age was only a few months away. 
In light of the voting agreement reached by the "Big Three" 
at their conference at Yalta from 4 to 11 February 1945, which en- 
sured the great power veto on almost everything, and on which there 
had been no British consultation with the Dominions, it appeared that 
no system could be devised which would have sufficient strength to 
coerce nations as powerful as the United States, the United Kingdom 
or the Soviet Union. Wrong was of this opinion, but in Washington, 
Pearson and Reid, stronger believers in collective security than 
Wrong, were not, as Pearson readily informed Robertson: 
I can recognize that certain immediate political consi- 
derations in certain countries make it necessary to take this 
line, but I see no reason why we should encourage it in Canada; 
especially as it is a completely defeatist line and represents 
a considerable retrogression from the League Covenant. Not- 
withstanding the State Department here goes merrily along try- 
ing to convince people that the Dumbarton Charter is much bet- 
ter than the old League Covenant because it has teeth in it. 
What is the use of having teeth if you cannot use them? What 21 the Dumbarton Oaks Charter needs in fact is a little dentistry. 
21. DEA, file 7-V(s), Pearson to Robertson, 14 March 1945. Reid 
offered the historical argument: "Surely, indeed, the lesson to 
be drawn from the history of the Thirties is that if a great 
power should, in future, act in such a way as to convince the 
other great powers that it is determined to dominate the world 
by force, the only way to prevent a world war from breaking out 
will be for the other great powers to form immediately an alli- 
ance against it and to declare that the moment it commences 
aggression they will in combination wage total war against it 
until it surrenders unconditionally. " Reid would become one of 
the key figures in the discussions leading up to NATO in a few 
years' time. Reid, "Comments on memorandum of March 6 to the 
Prime Minister outlining material which might be included in 
his speech moving the resolution on international organization 
in the House of Commons", 14 March 1945. Walter Riddell, who 
had achieved notoriety for being publicly repudiated by Mackenzie 
King when the former proposed oil sanctions against Italy under 
the League in 1935, and who had since been exiled as High Com- 
missioner to New Zealand, offered his advice from Wellington: 
"Canada, at the present time, is in a strong position to claim 
preferential representation on the Security Council because of 
her contribution to the war effort. Her claim, therefore, should 
be based on her power and readiness to collaborate in combatting 
aggression. I do not believe anything will be gained by going 
to the San Francisco Conference with pistol or with cap in hand. " 
DEA, file 7-V(s), despatch no. 28, Riddell to King, 12 March 1945. 
One must admire Riddell's tenacity in trying to influence a Prime 
Minister who never forgave past transgressions, and would there- 
fore ignore anything Riddell said. 
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In Ottawa there was less daring and more pragmatism. Robert- 
son and Wrong laboured under a political master whose conversation to 
collective security had come grudgingly, the League being perceived 
by the Prime Minister as more of a conciliatory body than a coercive 
one. Old habits were hard to break, especially for Mackenzie King, 
but the experience of the war, and Robertson and Wrong's moderating 
influence, eventually brought him to see military coercion as "an 
22 
ultimate means of maintaining peace". He could not be expected to 
take the great powers to task over the sweeping voting powers they 
had given themselves at Yalta, especially the unanimity provision in 
the Security Council. The Prime Minister stated that the Yalta voting 
formula represented an achievement of substantial unity among the 
great powers which should not be unwisely rejected outright, but viewed 
with an open mind. "It would not be realistic, " King told the members 
of the House of Commons on 20 March, "to expect to establish imme- 
diately any international system strong enough to coerce any great 
military power bent on attaining its aims by force., 
23 
When it came to the proposed Economic and Social Council, 
there was a greater amount of consensus among Canadial officials. A 
meeting with several key members of the Department of Finance, inclu- 
ding W. A. Mackintosh and R. B. Bryce, as well as Louis Rasminsky of the 
Bank of Canada, helped to establish Canadian policy as being generally 
in favour of the scheme as set out in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
Concern was expressed, however, over the relationship of the various 
functional agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
and the International Monetary Fund, to the Economic and Social Council 
and the General Assembly. The International Labour Organization, for 
example, had indicated that it would be opposed to having its budget 
screened by the Economic and Social Council, since the League Assembly 
had always done this in the past. 
24 
The Canadians would be very active 
in discussions concerning this Council at San Francisco. 
22. King's remark had come at the height of the conscription 
crisis. King Diary, 25 October 1944. For an informative dis- 
cussion of Mackenzie King's views on international organization, 
see Eayrs, In Defence of Canada; Peacema-; n^ and Deterr--n 
pp. 139-142. 
23. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 20 March 1945, p. 28. 
24. DEA, file 7-V(s), memorandum by Wrong, "Social and Econo- 
mic Aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals", 
2 March 1945; 
also memorandum by F. H. Soward to Wrong, 9 March 
1945. 
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Mackenzie King visited Franklin Roosevelt in early March for 
discussions on a variety of topics, including the forthcoming con- 
ference at San Francisco. Wrong advised the Prime Minister of his 
growing concern about the failure of the United States to recognize 
the desire of secondary powers to participate in decisions involving 
their own interests: 
One does not wish to be plaintive or to ask for com- 
pliments. Few things, however, seem harder to achieve 
than to persuade the great powers to look at the position 
fairly from the point of view of the smaller responsible 
countries among the Allies. Once the concentration on the 
single objective of victory has ended with its attainment, 
this tendency of the great powers will become more disrup- 
tive and dangerous than it is at present. 25 
The question of recognition of the part of the smaller powers 
was discussed by the two leaders, but with no discernible change on 
anyone's part. The President, recognizing an opportunity for publi- 
city when he saw it, called for the issue of a communique and asked 
the Canadians to draft one. Finding it too colourless, Roosevelt and 
his officials suggested a phrase referring to the elimination of "all 
trade discrimination", which Mackenzie King alertly recognized as an 
attack on imperial preference. The Canadian Prime Minister would not 
accept this and countered with a sentence which stated that Canada 
and the other middle powers would be asked to play a part in the world 
organization which would match their wartime contributions. Now it 
was the President who demurred, the resultant colourless communique 
proving once again that questions of international organization did 
not lend themselves well to Canadian-American summit diplomacy. 
26 
Mackenzie King, however, played up the visit for maximum political 
impact, blending statesmanship with political savvy, and did nothing 
to silence flattering rumours that he was to be the chairman of the 
forthcoming general conference. 
27 
25. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 339, file 3672, memorandum 
from Wrong to King, 5 March 1945. 
26. Pearson Diary, 13 March 1945. Lord Halifax informed the 
Foreign Office that "He (Pearson) did not believe for a moment 
that official American attitude would be changed in the least as 
a result of Mackenzie King's visit. " Foreign Office, FO 
371 
Series, U2009/12/70, cable from Halifax to Eden, 21 March 1945. 
27. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U1860/12/70, cable from Hali- 
fax to Eden, 15 March 1945. 
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On 30 March, the news that the United States and the Soviet 
Union had secretly agreed at Yalta to give each other three votes in 
the Assembly of the new organization broke upon the unsuspecting 
Canadians and even several surprised members of the State Department. 
Pearson recorded in his diary that it was "the most ridiculously stu- 
pid thing for the Americans to have done... of course the old argument 
of six British votes had cropped up. "28 In Ottawa there was anger 
but more resignation, the inclusion of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian 
republics being perceived as the price to be paid for Soviet member- 
ship in the United Nations. Norman Robertson however met with both 
Ray Atherton, the American ambassador, and Malcolm MacDonald to in- 
dicate the displeasure of the Canadian government and to express the 
view that American press comment, in comparing the proposed three 
votes for the United States with the British Commonwealth votes, was 
only diverting criticism from the questionable Soviet plan for three 
votes. 
29 
The British had not anticipated much adverse publicity when 
28. Pearson Diary, 30 March 1945. 
29. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U2595/12/70, cable from 
Malcolm MacDonald to Lord Cranborne, 31 March 1945. Gladwyn 
Jebb's minute of 2 April on this cable: "This is really a 
very sad business. " Jebb had earlier told John Holmes that 
although he objected to the principle of the representation of 
the two Soviet republics, the British would draw the line at 
including the Lithuanian SSR, and in practice the representa- 
tion would do no harm, helping to counter the Latin American 
bloc. DEA, file 7-V(s), Holmes to Wrong, 23 February 1945. 
The British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Archibald Clark 
Kerr, had assured Dana Wilgress, the Canadian ambassador, that 
Canadian interests had been upheld at the Yalta meeting, but 
the Soviets had centred on the United Kingdom's weak point - 
India - in their arguments. Averell Harriman, the American 
ambassador, had remarked that Soviet conference tactics had been 
superb. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "World Orga- 
nization", copy of despatch no. 145, Wilgress to King, 22 March 
1945. The issue was raised again a decade later when the United 
States released its documents on the Yalta Conference as part of 
its cold war strategy. An unsigned Canadian report at that time 
indicated that "The Soviet Union, as near as one can make out, 
obtained the agreement of the United States and the United King- 
dom for its multiple membership on the sole basis of the Common- 
wealth analogy. It might easily be that Churchill, having no 
interest in whether the Soviet Union had multiple membership or 
not, was not disposed to argue. The Americans appear to have 
accepted the analogy as accurate and even sought to use it to 
support their own case for multiple membership... " DEA, file 
7-CS(s), unsigned report, n. d. (1955). 
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they had originally agreed to the American-Soviet compromise at Yalta, 
but now they were embarrassed. Ironically, it was now none other 
than Lord Halifax in Washington who suggested that as much publicity 
as possible should be given to past occasions such as the Chicago 
civil aviation conference where the Dominions had taken different 
positions from the United Kingdom. 
30 
If Mackenzie King knew or the 
efforts of Halifax in this regard, he surely must have taken quiet 
satisfaction. Fortunately for all concerned, the American side of 
the bargain was hurriedly dropped. 
Shortly after all the hue and cry over the extra seats, a 
pre- San Francisco conference Commonwealth meeting was held in London. 
Having the meeting had been the suggestion of Field Marshal Smuts and 
Herbert Evatt, the vocal Australian Minister of External Affairs, and 
the United Kingdom had agreed to it, not for purposes of necessarily 
establishing a common policy, but to further a broad understanding of 
the positions Commonwealth members would take at the general confer- 
ence. Lord Cranborne, now Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
was aware of nationalistic feelings within the Dominions, especially 
in the wake of the recent voting issue, and in a peculiar message to 
Churchill, urged that a cautious approach be taken at the Commonwealth 
meeting: "As you know, the Dominions are extremely - to my mind ab- 
surdly - sensitive about being regarded as a sectional bloc... Any 
suggestion that we endorse the idea that the Commonwealth constitutes 
a bloc of six votes would certainly have an unfavourable reaction 
from Dominion Governments and might make it most difficult to bring 
them into line. "31 If the meeting proved anything, it was that there 
was no question of a "one voice" Commonwealth policy, or of bringing 
anyone "into line", although the Dominions tried to do just that with 
the United Kingdom. In Vincent Massey's words, "If the delegations 
had cast votes on each issue, the United Kingdom would have found it- 
30. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U2373/12/70, cable from 
Halifax to Eden, 2 April 1945. 
31. Dominions Office, DO 121/10A, No. 111, minute from Cran- 
borne to Churchill, 2 April 1945. 
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self out-voted on several matters..., 
32 
At the meeting, New Zealand and South Africa were represented 
by their prime ministers, Australia by Evatt, and Canada by Wrong and 
Massey, Mackenzie King having decided not to forsake his parliamentary 
and political duties since a general election was only a few months 
away. Smuts was undoubtedly the outstanding figure at the meeting, 
appearing to take the role of a "member-at-large" through his broad 
philosophic approaches based upon years of experience in international 
affairs. He did not support the Canadian position regarding the rights 
of the secondary powers, clung closely to the great power view and 
repeatedly stated that while he disliked the rigid Yalta formula on 
the veto, the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States 
was worth a great price. The Australians and New Zealanders were 
vehement in their attacks on British plans for trusteeship as an ex- 
tension of the League's mandate system, favouring the establishment 
of an international body attached to the world organization to which 
colonial powers would have to submit regular reports. Canada did not 
have much to contribute on this matter, but Wrong did inject a note 
of realism, stating that liberal opinion in the United States should 
not be isolated through any rigid schemes for trusteeship, and that 
assurance should be given at this meeting that such questions would 
later be examined on their merits. 
33 
He knew better than most that 
liberal opinion in the United States, which had always been suspi- 
cious of British imperialism, was also isolationist in its character. 
The delegations concluded that the veto power by the great powers on 
the application of sanctions would have to be accepted, but there was 
room to express opinions regarding the other powers of the veto. Wrong 
therefore optimistically concluded that issues such as the removal of 
32, DEA, file 7-V(s), Massey to Robertson, 23 April 1945. Charles 
Ritchie had prepared a detailed memorandum a few months earlier 
on Dominion views which had indicated many areas where opinions 
differed. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2103, file "World 
Organization "Memorandum on the Views of the Governments of 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa concerning the Dumbar- 
ton Oaks Proposals on International Organizations", 7 February 
1945. 
33. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 387, cable no. 960, Wrong to 
King, 5 April 1945; also Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U2483/ 
12/70, B. C. M. (45)4, "British Commonwealth Meeting", 29 March 
1945. 
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the veto on consideration of disputes to which the great powers were 
not a party could be examined in detail at San Francisco. 
34 
There was a wide divergence of views on the question of 
limiting the power of the Security Council to require all members 
of the organization to take enforcement action. Australia and India 
made a strong case for collective security, and maintained that a 
universal obligation to enforce sanctions at the call of the Security 
Council was an essential principle. In return, Wrong offered the 
familiar Canadian approach: public and parliamentary support would 
be exceedingly difficult to obtain, and consultation with the states 
needing to take serious action would almost certainly occur. If con- 
sultation were written into the Charter, ratification in several coun- 
tries including Canada would be made much easier. Prime Minister 
Peter Fraser of New Zealand, in Massey's eyes the only "Wilsonian" 
present, went much further, arguing that all enforcement decisions 
made by the Council should be confirmed by a simple majority in the 
Assembly. 
35 
Clearly, no consensus among Commonwealth members on this 
issue was possible, and the Canadian position did not receive much 
sympathy. 
Canadian concerns which had only developed recently were dis- 
cussed on the last day of the conference. All delegations agreed with 
the Canadian view that provision should be made for a general review 
of the Charter after five or ten years but were lukewarm in supporting 
Wrong's proposal that an opportunity for withdrawal might be afforded 
at this review. All agreed that a preamble setting forth the high 
principles and purposes of the Charter should be added - Smuts had 
already drafted a stirring one - but there was little discussion of 
34. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 387, cable no. 1020, Wrong 
to King, 10 April 1945; also J4 Series, vol. 238, file 2353, 
copy of United Kingdom document B. C. M. (45)9, "Questions 
Arising from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Put Forward for 
Discussion by the Canadian Delegation", 5 April 1945. 
35. Ibid., cable no. 1021, Wrong to King, 10 April 1945; 
also DEA, file 7-V(s), Massey to Robertson, 23 April 1945. 
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economic and social aspects. 
36 
The question which most preoccupied Canadian minds, however, 
was how the middle powers could effectively and fairly be represented 
on the Security Council, or in other words, the ultimate recognition 
in the Charter of the functional principle. The Foreign Office, quite 
unlike the State Department, had in the past months assured Canadian 
officials that work was progressing on proposals addressing this pro- 
blem, but there was no certainty as to what criteria would be neces- 
sary for classification, especially since both the United States and 
the Soviet Union wished a Security Council with a small membership. 
A scheme was eventually developed by the British which consisted of 
representation for states of three categories: firstly, middle powers 
such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, the Nether- 
lands, and Poland; secondly, those Latin American countries not men- 
tioned in the first group; and thirdly, the rest of the world. Two 
seats were to be alloted to each category. 
37 
Dominions Office offi- 
cials were certain that Canada would find the scheme unacceptable, 
and in any event it was rejected by the British War Cabinet on 3 April, 
which recommended that one member should be elected from each of the 
six main territorial groups. Sir Alexander Cadogan sought to calm his 
officials who still sensed a Churchillian plot to organize the world 
by regions, by explaning that it was only a suggestion thrown out at 
the end of a discussion by a rather jaded Cabinet. " He wisely added: 
36. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 387, cable no. 1053, Wrong to 
King, 13 April 1945; also J4 Series, vol. 342, file 3679, memo- 
randum by Wrong, "Questions arising from Dumbarton Oaks Propo- 
sals on which further guidance seems desirable Before the Com- 
monwealth discussions in London", 15 March 1945. This memoran- 
dum was closely studied by Mackenzie King and the marginal 
minutes indicated that he entirely approved of the course being 
taken by Wrong. 
37. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U1958/12/70, "Meeting held 
at Foreign Office", March 1945. Ernest Bevin strongly believed 
that the size of the Council should be increased from 11 to 14 
and suggested to Eden that although it may appear easier to get 
a decision when there are no more than 11 members, this apparent 
advantage would be nullified by the hostility created by the in- 
sufficient representation of countries generally. Eden was in 
accord but stated that no one had yet devised an acceptable 
formula. U1816/12/70 Bevin to Eden, 6 March 1945; Eden to Bevin, 
17 March 1945. 
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"But I must say 'our' proposal, for a list of 'middle states' is I 
think, probably not practical politics. "38 The list never emerged, 
and instead there was general agreement among the Dominions at the 
London meeting that in electing non-permanent members of the Security 
Council, the Assembly "should pay due regard to the contribution of 
the members of the Organisation towards the maintenance of interna- 
tional peace and security and towards the other purposes of the Orga- 
nisation. " "This is, in fact, " Wrong cabled Ottawa, "as good a pro- 
posal as I expected we could get. "39 Canadian expectations had cer- 
tainly fallen since Mackenzie King had enunciated the functional 
principle in July 1943. 
General agreement had been achieved among Commonwealth mem- 
bers on several matters, but on none of the vital issues. Perhaps 
the greatest value of these discussions was that a significant pre- 
cedent for discussion amongst Commonwealth members was set which would 
continue in the established United Nations. The talks were construc- 
tive, and as Massey wrote Robertson, "It was satisfying also to attend 
a Commonwealth meeting at which practically no time was given up to 
introspective examination of the nature of the Commonwealth, and there 
was, therefore, full time for the real purposes of consultation. " 
40 
Commonwealth members had convinced themselves that the idea of a com- 
mon policy was a myth; they would prove this to the world at San Fran- 
Cisco. 
There was yet another meeting of international significance 
before the nations gathered at San Francisco. Although the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals had provided for an international court, there had 
38. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U2514/12/70, minute by 
Cadogan, 4 April 1945. Gladwyn Jebb was annoyed by the Cabinet 
recommendation; "Surely the Cabinet could not have agreed to 
this proposal? For, if it were put into operation, it would 
seem that Canada would have a one in ten chance of being elected 
to the Council, India a one in nine chance, South Africa a one 
in four chance and Australia and New Zealand a one in two chance. 
Difficult though our proposal may have been it is logic itself 
compared to any system based on the principle now apparently 
decided on by the Cabinet... "; minute by Jebb, 4 April 1945. 
39. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 387, cable no. 1020, Wrong to 
King, 10 April 1945. 
40. DEA, file 7-V(s), Massey to Robertson, 23 April 1945. 
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been no details, and it was left to a meeting of an International 
Committee of Jurists in Washington in early April to produce a draft 
chapter for the United Nations Charter and a draft statute. The 
Canadian Bar Association, meeting during the summer of 1944, had 
formed a committee to examine questions of international organization 
which was chaired by Chief Justice Farris of British Columbia. It 
made recommendations to the federal government which were studied 
with interest by the Legal Adviser in the Department of External 
Affairs, John Read. Read and Farris attended the meeting in Washington 
along with other representatives of the allied nations and generally 
pursued a cautious line. The Canadians however did not support United 
Kingdom proposals to reduce the number of judges on the proposed in- 
ternational court from fifteen to nine, and worked successfully with 
representatives of smaller nations to ensure the elimination of the 
great power veto over the election of judges. 
41 
Read himself would 
be among the first group of judges to be elected to the International 
Court of Justice in 1946. 
Canada was interested in having the old statute of the Perma- 
nent Court of International Justice amended, so as to ensure continuity 
in the development of international law, but both the Soviet Union and 
the United States favoured a new court. The central issue, and one 
which had perennially occupied international law during the time of 
the League, was the question of the "optional clause", a declaration 
to which states adhered to express their acceptance of the jurisdic- 
tion of the court with reservations. Canada had adhered to the op- 
tional clause in 1929, having expressed reservations, like many other 
countries, to the court's jurisdiction on matters which fell under 
domestic purview, and, in addition, on Commonwealth disputes inter se. 
Compulsory jurisdiction was recognized by Canada as being an ultimate 
goal, but Read, like some of the other senior members of his depart- 
ment, realized the limitations to such idealism: "I should be some- 
what concerned about the possibility of breaking the whole San Fran- 
cisco conference on this issue, or of reviving the isolationist move- 
41. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 339, file 3672, confidential 
print, "Establishment of International Court of Justice and 
other Legal Questions; Washington, 9 April 1945 - San Francisco, 
25 April 1945", p. 8. 
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ment on this continent, in the event of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction followed by a fight in the Senate of Washington on rati- 
fication. , 42 Points upon which Canada had placed a large amount of 
emphasis were on securing a scheme acceptable to both Washington and 
Moscow, maintaining continuity in international law, and preserving 
both existing jurisdiction under the optional clause and particular 
treaties. All these issues had been well studied by the International 
Commission of Jurists, and its draft recommendations were in turn 
quickly dispensed with at San Francisco, unlike other matters. In a 
related area of international law, and consistent with its support of 
the powers and functions of the General Assembly, Canada avidly sup- 
ported Chinese proposals for the Assembly to have the power to both 
enact new general rules and codify international law, 
43 
a measure 
which was diluted by the great powers at San Francisco, but was even- 
tually included in the United Nations Charter in Article 13: 1(a). 
Although it could not be said that Canadian policy-makers 
were pessimistic about the forthcoming conference at San Francisco, 
they were not optimistic either. Wrong was convinced that the success 
of the conference would hinge on whether the Soviet delegation would 
be able to be flexible in negotiation. Molotov's presence as head of 
the delegation was therefore essential, since he would be able to 
exercise greater discretion on a daily basis than other Soviet repre- 
sentatives. Should he not attend, "... there will be a long, quarrel- 
some and unproductive conference. "44 Pearson, certainly the most op- 
timistic among the Canadian officials, also had his moments of des- 
pair which he confided to his diary. His position as Canadian "Minis- 
ter-Counsellor" and then ambassador in Washington had been frustrating, 
since the Americans seemed to be too preoccupied with their own vital 
interests in the international organization; Canadian problems paled 
by comparison. When it came to contacts with the Americans, Pearson 
had a sharp eye for the ironic: Senator Vandenberg, a long-standing 
42. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 389, cable no. WA2055, Read 
to Robertson, 17 April 1945. 
43. DEA, file 7-V(s), memorandum by John Read, "The Procedure 
for preparing the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
and for establishing the Court", 25 January 1945. 
44. Ibid., Wrong to Wilgress, 10 March 1945. 
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member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confessed to Pearson 
that he had never been to an international conference in his life and 
was looking forward to going to San Francisco "to see how one worked., 
45 
Yet sometimes the obvious did not register as clearly. For example, 
Pearson had told John Hickerson of the State Department that it would 
have been in the United States' greater interest to have shown more 
desire to secure Canadian views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals than 
it had, given the closeness of the Canadian-American relationship. 
As a result, Canada would have been freed from being totally dependent 
on the United Kingdom. Hickerson brusquely replied that Canada had 
no cause whatsoever to complain, since it had been in a privileged 
position compared to other countries. Pearson concluded that Hicker- 
son needed to get away for a good long rest. 
46 
In retrospect, the Canadians can be accused of having suf- 
fered at least a little myopia in presenting their views in the months 
before the San Francisco conference. The policy-makers and diplomatic 
representatives laboured mightily to convince the great powers of the 
righteousness of the Canadian cause, but overlooked the utility of 
securing allies in the form of the smaller nations. It is doubtful, 
however, whether such actions would have made any difference, other 
than increasing Canadian prestige and securing numerical support for 
later elections to the councils. The relationship which Canada had 
cultivated with both the United Kingdom and the United States would 
not have allowed this either. The positions expressed by Latin Ameri- 
can countries to Canadian representatives were never taken seriously 
in Ottawa, 
47 
mainly because of the close consultative relationship 
45. Pearson Diary, 5 March 1945. 
46. Pearson Papers, vol. 2, Pearson to Robertson, 3 November 1944. 
47. Hugh Keenleyside, the Canadian ambassador to Mexico, had sent 
a lengthy and enthusiastic despatch dealing with Mexican views of 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. There were similarities between 
the Mexican and Canadian positions regarding the General Assembly 
and voting in the Security Council by nations party to a dispute. 
The Mexicans favoured including a statement on principles of con- 
duct in the Charter. DEA, file 7-V(s), despatch no. 43, Keenley- 
side to King, 22 February 1945. The Mexican views attracted some 
attention within the Department by April and were mentioned in 
the commentary prepared for delegates to the San Francisco con- 
ference, but by that time it was too late to consult with the 
Mexicans. DEA, Policy Documents Series, vol. 2358, file S/148/1, 
"Commentary on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for Preparation for San 
Francisco Conference", 14 April 1945. 
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existent between Canada and the United Kingdom and the lesser one 
with the United States, which tended to inflate an already existent - 
though perhaps unconscious - elitism. Canada eschewed the enthusiastic 
boosterism of the Australians and the New Zealanders both at the London 
meeting and in public pronouncements afterwards, preferring to appear 
willing to work quietly, thereby giving the great powers the manoeuv- 
reability they sorely required to reach agreement among themselves. 
It was hoped that the value of having taken the high road would not 
be completely lost on the great powers when the time came to consider 
Canadian points of view at the forthcoming general conference. 
But there was another reason for caution. In spite of favour- 
able opinion polls, wide circulation of Canadian views could lead to 
public disclosures, which could prove embarrassing to a government 
recovering from a conscription crisis. Furthermore, if efforts to 
secure Canadian amendments should prove unsuccessful, the opposition 
parties could inject these "failures" into the forthcoming election 
campaign. To an extent the cautious attitude also reflected the per- 
sonality of the Prime Minister and his control of the Department of 
External Affairs. It was for this reason that, when the United States 
offered to circulate in advance any observations of countries atten- 
ding the San Francisco conference to other nations, Wrong and Robert- 
son recommended to the Prime Minister that a memorandum should be 
prepared which would only be distributed to other countries at the 
beginning of the conference if circumstances made this desirable. 
48 
The Latin American countries and France had circulated their recom- 
mendations before the conference, and it is of interest to note that 
the French went so far as to refer to some countries in the category 
of Z'etat moyen. 
49 
It would have seemed only too logical that Canada, 
as the originator of the term "middle power", and the only nation to 
refer to itself as such, could have exhibited a little more daring 
at this time. 
48. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 339, file 3672, memorandum 
from Wrong to King, 15 March 1945, with notes by Robertson. 
49. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 339, file 3673, confidential 
print, "Selected Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals for 
the Establishment of a General International Organization", 
25 April 1945, pp. 2-6. 
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Mackenzie King led an extraordinary delegation to San Fran- 
cisco in late April 1945. The delegates included Louis St. Laurent, 
the Minister of Justice; J. H. King, the leader of the Government in 
the Senate; Gordon Graydon, the Conservative House Leader; M. J. 
Coldwell, the leader of the CCF; Lucien Moraud, a Conservative sena- 
tor; and to represent women, Mrs. Cora Casselman, a member of parlia- 
ment. The "senior advisers" included Robertson, Wrong, Pearson and 
Major-General Maurice Pope, the Prime Minister's military staff offi- 
cer. That group was completed by three Canadian ambassadors from 
far-flung missions: Warwick Chipman from Chile, Jean Desy from Bra- 
zil, and Dana Wilgress from the Soviet Union. Among the "special ad- 
visers" were Escott Reid, Charles Ritchie and Louis Rasminsky. 
50 
As 
Pearson recorded in his diary, "For a few weeks at least, Canada will 
probably have a national government - at San Francisco :,, 
51 
The idea 
of an all party delegation was a good one, since it would be a new 
parliament which would have to debate the acceptance of the Charter 
following the June election. On the other hand, the politicians would 
be absent for a crucial six weeks of the conference, and even while 
at the conference Mackenzie King was almost exclusively preoccupied 
with the election and with making a rousing broadcast to Canada on 
8 May, V-E Day. 
52 
All delegates however conducted their conference 
50. Among the others present were the Prime Minister's staff, 
including J. W. Pickersgill and James Gibson; Davidson Dunton 
of the Wartime Information Board, and Gordon Robertson as head 
of the secretariat. Keenleyside, the ambassador in Mexico, 
had wished to attend, but Desy had to supply some French Cana- 
dian weight to the delegation, and Chipman, a lawyer, was needed 
to handle legal questions since John Read had remained in Ottawa 
as Acting Under-Secretary. DEA, General Registry file 7391-D-40, 
cable from Robertson to Keenleyside, 7 April 1945. John Diefen- 
baker, a Conservative member of parliament who would become 
Prime Minister in 1957, wished to attend in an advisory capacity 
to Graydon, but his request was declined. Robertson to Diefen- 
baker, 18 April 1945. Undeterred, Diefenbaker went to San Fran- 
cisco as a tourist and managed to attend some public sessions 
with a "borrowed" pass. Interview with J. W. 
Pickersgill, 28 
May 19 80 . 
51. Pearson Diary, 20 April 1945. Also quoted in Pearson, 
ÄVer o 1's, vol. 1, p. 274. 
52. The Prime Minister's preoccupation with the election and 
his speech is substantiated by interviews with 
Gordon Robertson, 
4 June 1980; James Gibson, 25 June 1980; and J. W. Pickersgill, 
28 May 19 80 . 
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work responsibly, and there was no evidence of political differences 
being brought to the fore. 
One minor case construed to constitute political differences 
arose over a preliminary controversy regarding the admission to the 
conference of Argentina, which had not been invited to this confer- 
ence nor to the earlier meeting of American countries at Chapultepec 
because of its contacts with the Axis powers and its repressive domes- 
tic policies. After an appeal from the Latin Americans, it was re- 
luctantly agreed to invite Argentina to San Francisco. At a press 
conference, Coldwell expressed the opinion that Canada had made a 
mistake in supporting the admission of Argentina, arguing that before 
being admitted, Argentina should have eased internal repression. 
"This would have shown there was a possibility of the Argentine Re- 
public coming into the organisation as one of the peace-loving and 
democratic countries. "53 Coldwell had merely given voice to what 
many were feeling. The Prime Minister believed that the correct 
decision had been made, and that Canada as a country of the Western 
Hemisphere, had done well to support the hemispheric consensus: 
"One, in these matters, has to use one's own judgment. I find there 
is a terrible tendency to make sensations out of everything. The 
whole atmosphere of the conference is that of a seething pot, especially 
with the press as well as delegates ready to create sensations, and 
to arouse and foster suspicions. "54 Here, as in everything else, King 
favoured a conciliatory approach. 
In his opening speech to the conference, Mackenzie King des- 
cribed in the high moral tones which echoed those of his 
favourite 
book, Industry and Humanity, the Canadian goal of helping "to bring 
into being a world community in which social security and human wel- 
, 55 The speech fare will become a part of the inheritance of mankind. 
" 
53. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 338, file 3668, transcript of 
Coldwell press conference, 1 May 1945. 
54. King Diary, 30 April 1945. 
55. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Confer : ce : 
series 
1945, no. 2, "Report on the United Nations Conference on 
Inter- 
national Organization held at San Francisco, 
25 April-26 June, 
1945", p. 10. In drafting the speech, Pickersgill 
had in fact 
adapted a few passages from Industry and 
Hzßnanzty. King Papers, 
J4 Series, vol. 340, file 3676, note by J. W. Pickersgill on 
draft of speech, n. d. 
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represented a combination of the Prime Minister's wish to capture 
an historic moment, and his desire to capture the electorate in June. 
His influence at San Francisco was probably greater than he or his 
advisers thought at the time. He attended a few of the infrequent 
meetings of Commonwealth delegations but did not contribute much, 
largely because of his exasperation at the tirades of Herbert Evatt 
of Australia and Peter Fraser of New Zealand, whom he characterized 
as "these constitution makers who are trying to change the world at 
once. "56 A meeting in Smuts' apartment between the Dominions without 
the presence of the United Kingdom, followed by a late session with 
Eden shortly before the Foreign Secretary's departure, addressed the 
Canadian concern over the participation of non-permanent members of 
the Security Council in enforcement decisions when asked to assist 
in providing military sanctions. The Antipodean-British row over 
trusteeship, in which Canada had little interest, made it difficult 
to ascertain how much progress had been made. Three days later, on 
the day he left San Francisco, King met with Stettinius and again 
lucidly presented the familiar Canadian case: "In the first place, 
we did not want to get out of doing our just share. All that we 
wanted to do was to be able to assure our people of the fairness of 
what we were being asked to do. "57 
The negotiations were left to Norman Robertson and his offi- 
cials, who, although by now well-acquainted with the committee-work 
of international discussions, but unable to exercise the suasion of 
their political masters, had to rely on their wits to promote the 
Canadian causes. 
58 
This was just as well, because Evatt had taken 
an obstreperous role in defending the rights of the smaller powers 
himself. The calibre of Canadian officials had been recognized be- 
fore the conference, especially by the British who saw them as "ex- 
perienced in the ways of international conferences, and adept at 
getting along with Americans. " The Foreign Office believed that if 
Canadian views could be supported in some instances, then the Cana- 
dians could be useful in return. If not, "the U. K. delegation might 
56. King Diary, 3 May 1945. 
57. King Diary, 14 May 1945. 
58. See John W. Holmes, she Shaping of Peace, vol. 1, p. 246; 
also interview with Charles Ritchie, 20 June 1980. 
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be well-adyised to be very wary of the manoeuvres of the Canadian 
delegation, which will use every expedient, including the good will 
to Canada of the Latin American delegations and the Canadian link 
with France to put their wishes across at the conference. ,59 These 
preliminary British fears were not realized, as indicated in a sum- 
mary prepared during the closing days of the conference for the For- 
eign Office: "The Canadians have been one of the strongest and ablest 
teams at the conference. They have displayed a real solicitude for 
the welfare of the organisation and have worked closely with us. ""60 
Canada managed to "work with" the United Kingdom while taking stands 
against it and the other great powers on various issues, and with its 
seasoned skill at drafting compromises, was able to get some portions 
of the Charter revised. 
Before much in the way of compromises could be accomplished, 
however, the Canadian delegation had to contend with divergent feel- 
ings within it, bearing in mind the instructions the Prime Minister 
had left that nothing should be attempted which would try to change 
the great power consensus established at Yalta. Robertson and Wrong 
were cautious and aware of Canadian political realities, Pearson 
somewhat bolder in advancing Canadian positions, and Reid extremely 
idealistic and willing to take chances. General Maurice Pope pre- 
ferred a middle course: "We should have enough confidence in our- 
selves to make up our own minds on a great range of questions that 
will arise, or have arisen, without taking a British or American 
line... I firmly believe that we are right in taking a back seat at 
this Conference, but I do not go so far as to believe that we should 
59. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U2179/12/70, Ben Cockram 
(U. K. Embassy, Washington) to Gladwyn Jebb, 20 March 1945. 
During the conference, a Canadian columnist described Canada's 
leading three officials in the following manner: Norman Robert- 
son "has a massive head, great brown eyes, and a mouth that al- 
ways seems reluctant to talk too lunch. 
" Hume Wrong is "the 
fellow who lets the other guy get out on the end of the limb... 
he has a Macchiavellian eye, and knows his way around. 
" Pear- 
son "... is as useful a man as there is at the entire conference. 
" 
Pearson Diary, 23 May 1945. 
60. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U4957/12/70, Summary from 
United Kingdom delegation, San Francisco (prepared by Philip 
Noel-Baker) to Foreign Office, 23 June 1945. 
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sit outside in the hall and not in the Committee Room- 1,61 From Mexico, 
Ambassador Hugh Keenleyside indicated his disappointment at what he 
thought was a lack of Canadian idealism: "I feel some personal re- 
gret that the Canadian position on the problems discussed at London 
and San Francisco has been so strictly conditioned by what seems to 
me to be an excessively cautious interpretation of what is immediately 
'practical' . "62' Delegation control was however securely in the hands 
of the pragmatists. 
Considering the activities of the Canadian delegation, differ- 
ences in approach or stress among officials should not be regarded as 
having been overly serious. Canada was represented on three control- 
ling committees: the Steering Committee, the Executive Committee, 
and the Coordination Committee, all of which also had sub-committees. 
In addition, ten of the twelve Technical Committees met each day, 
the last three, as someone said, meeting "from 8: 30 p. m. until un- 
conditional surrender. " Wrong informed John Read, the Acting Under- 
Secretary in Ottawa, of the situation: "What time one has between 
attending meetings and preparing for them is given up to ensuring 
reasonable liaison inside the delegation and a good deal of inter- 
delegation contact. "63 Commonwealth meetings were rare, and there 
were fewer meetings with the Americans. The Canadians shared several 
dinner meetings with a few of the Latin American delegations, leading 
Pearson to observe that Canada appeared to be gaining admission into 
the Pan-American Union via the culinary route. 
64 
Lack of consulta- 
tion with the great powers was not something which bothered the Cana- 
dians: they realized the "Big Three" were scrambling to resolve their 
own differences. 
61. Maurice Pope Diary, volume 1,10 May 1945. 
62. DEA, file 5475-40 Part 3, despatch no. 174, Keenleyside 
to King, 31 May 1945. 
63. DEA, file 7-V(s), Wrong to Read, 13 May 1945. 
64. Pearson Diary, 16 May 1945. 
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The issue which would either ensure the success of the con- 
ference or its failure was the great power veto. The Canadian atti- 
tude to this problem at San Francisco could be best described as 
being pragmatic yet principled. The Yalta compromise on the veto, 
which in essence stipulated that the five permanent members of the 
Security Council - France had now joined the group - would have the 
right to veto any punitive action proposed by the organization, was 
viewed by Canada as being irreversible, but more progressive than 
past Soviet entreaties for individual veto powers on discussions 
themselves. Where there was room for compromise was on the veto 
powers over amendments to the Charter and over the consideration of 
disputes to which the great powers were not a party. 
65 
Pearson's 
opinion, ventured during the early stages of the conference, and 
agreed to by the Prime Minister, was "I think we should support any 
reasonable move to limit the veto strictly to the actual application 
of sanctions, but that we should not press this position to a vote 
in the face of strong Big Four opposition., 
66 
In this fashion, Canada 
supported a Netherlands proposal which suggested that a great power 
party to a dispute should not be able to veto the determination by 
the Security Council of the existence of a threat to the peace or an 
act of aggression. A similarly unsuccessful effort was made to ensure 
that decisions taken by the Security Council on the peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes should not require great power unanimity but a two- 
thirds vote by Council members not party to the dispute. 
67 
Acceptance of these provisions appeared hopeful, at least 
until the second week in June when the "Battle of the Veto" took place. 
The Soviet Union had changed its mind, and now believed that the veto 
should apply to placing a subject for discussion on an agenda. The 
inevitable compromise, the result of some negotiation in Moscow, was 
65. DEA, Policy Documents Series, vol. 2358, file S/148/1, con- 
fidential print, "Commentary on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for 
Preparation for San Francisco Conference", 14 April 1945, pp. 
81-83. 
66. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3695, Pearson, "Memo- 
randum for the Prime Minister, Questions of Policy Coming Before 
Commission III, Committee 1; The Security Council: Composition, 
Powers and Procedures", 13 May 1945. 
67. Ibid., Reid to Robertson, 12 May 1945. 
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that a full discussion of a dispute could be held in the Security 
Council, but when discussion reached the point of investigation of 
facts, the veto would become operative. The Soviets clearly cast 
this new proposal in the light of a great concession, the other great 
powers really having no choice but to present a united front, and this 
angered the smaller nations. A meeting of the committee dealing with 
the veto ended in a shouting match between Professor Webster and 
Senator Conally of the British and American delegations on the one 
side, and Messrs. Evatt and Fraser of Australia and New Zealand on 
the other, Fraser going so far as to accuse the British of going back 
on promises made during the London Commonwealth meeting two months 
earlier, and to call Webster's argument "dishonest" and Webster him- 
self "contemptible". It was here that Pearson was "volunteered" by 
Robertson to pour oil on troubled waters, and Pearson interrupted to 
say that the meeting would surely not wish to hear "a speech from 
another member of that well-known British Empire bloc, a few chips 
from which seem to have fallen this evening and the members of which 
can argue against each other as violently in the Committee rooms as 
they can fight together enthusiastically, side by side, on the battle- 
field. , 
68 
The tension had been relived, but not diffused. 
Now it was Robertson's turn to act. He cabled John Read in 
Ottawa, and requested an instruction of approval from the Prime Minis- 
ter for the proposed Canadian course of action following the Common- 
wealth debacle: 
Our view is that it is better to take the Organization 
we can get and, having come to that decision, to refrain from 
further efforts to pry apart the difficult unity which the 
Great Powers have attained. This means foregoing the luxury 
of making any more perfectionist speeches either on the 
voting procedure itself or on the general amendment procedure 
which is very closely linked with it... we should not insist 
on forcing decisions on such central questions as veto and 
amendment to a vote in which our association with the other 
middle and smaller powers might well result in the rejection 
of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
69 
68. Pearson Diary, 5 to 9 June 1945. 
69. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 340, file 3675, cable from 
Robertson to Read, 10 June 1945; also note from Read to King, 
11 June 1945. 
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Mackenzie King agreed that the strategy proposed by Robertson 
and his colleagues was the most sensible one. Following Evatt's Jiu'". ' 
und Drang approach could be risky at best, especially if it meant the 
difference between an imperfect organization or no organization at all, 
which could happen if the Australians were avidly supported to the 
point where the great powers were defeated in committee. 
70 
Would the 
citizens of Canada approve if their representatives tipped the balance 
against the great powers? There was, however, another aspect of self- 
interest in the Canadian strategy. Robertson and Wrong had negotiated 
an arrangement with Cadogan and Jebb of the British delegation, which 
subsequently received great power approval, where Canada would agree 
to drop its amendments to Chapter VI, which dealt with the right of 
any member to vote on the Security Council when its interests were 
particularly affected. The Canadians had been told there was little 
chance of their proposal being accepted. In return, the Canadian 
amendment to Chapter VIII, regarding the right of a member to parti- 
cipate on the Security Council in enforcement questions involving its 
own forces, would be accepted. A scheme allowing the Canadian amend- 
ments to be withdrawn gracefully from the technical committees had 
already been agreed upon. 
71 
Self-interest was important, and with 
increasing polarization between the great powers on the one hand, and 
Evatt and his disciples who now included the Latin Americans on the 
other, priorities had to be chosen. Canada therefore abstained from 
voting on an Australian amendment to limit the veto and the great 
powers had their way. A similar position was taken on the question 
of the great power veto on amendments, where Canada abstained once 
again, with the impeccable logic that if the veto had been accepted 
70. DEA, file 7rV(s), "Report of Meeting of Canadian Delega- 
tion", 11 June 1945. Mackenzie King had won a majority govern- 
ment on that day but had lost his own seat in Prince Albert. 
71. United Kingdom, CAB 21/1613, file 60/17/4, Record of Meeting 
of Officials Committee of the Five Powers, 28 May 1945. There 
are very few records of the San Francisco conference in the 
Public Record Office and fewer of British delegation meetings. 
A plausible explanation is the disappearance on the return jour- 
ney of an aeroplane with the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office, 
Sir William Malkin, and the Military Adviser, Colonel Denis 
Capel-Dunn on board. Many records and delegation papers were 
also on the aircraft. 
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previously, the great powers could not be asked to relinquish it on 
amendments, because they might lose their veto - by amendment - on 
everything else. 
72 
What had Canada accomplished at San Francisco? Article 44 
of the United Nations Charter, calling for participation in any en- 
forcement decisions of the Security Council when the use of a mem- 
ber's forces is being considered, was enshrined and represented the 
success of Canadian efforts since May 1944, when the issue was first 
raised at the Prime Ministers' Meeting. Ironically, this article has 
never been used, and international peacekeeping has always been 
arranged by other means, since the special arrangements envisioned 
in Article 43 have never been attained. Nevertheless, the article 
was in the Charter, and public opinion, which had been such a great 
concern of Canadian policy-makers on this issue, would be satisfied. 
Interestingly, a Canadian public opinion poll published during the 
San Francisco conference demonstrated that 39% of the respondents 
favoured decisions on enforcement action by all nations equally, 29% 
by the great powers only, and 27% by the great powers with certain 
"middle powers". In Quebec, only 12% favoured decisions by the great 
powers, 30% for the great powers with some middle powers, and 50% for 
decisions by all. 
73 
Article 32, providing for the invitation of a 
state party to a dispute but a non-member of the Security Council to 
participate in its discussions, has had greater historical impact, 
although a joint effort on the part of Canada and the Netherlands to 
give such states an equal vote, along with the other party to the 
dispute, was opposed by the great powers. 
74 
72. Pearson Diary, 16 June 1945. Evatt led this fight as well 
and seemed to be everywhere at once. Pearson recognized Evatt's 
outstanding abilities, but like most, did not like his confron- 
tationist and boisterous style. For example, after a speech by 
Senator Tom Connally of Texas, the Chairman of the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee, and an old-style Southern orator, 
Evatt assured the Senator publicly that if he were ever to lose 
his seat, he would easily find employment with the Ringling 
Brothers Circus. Pearson Diary, 17 June 1945. 
73. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 427, Cabinet War Committee 
Memoranda, Document no. 984, Wartime Information Board Survey 
no. 63,19 May 1945. 
74. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3695, Wrong, 
"Memo- 
randum for the Prime Minister: Questions Arising in the Committee 
on Enforcement Arrangements", 13 May 1945. 
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Canada had been particularly active on economic and social 
questions, which had only begun to interest Canadian policy-makers 
following the discussions with the Americans earlier in the year. 
A revised draft of Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals con- 
cerning arrangements for economic and social cooperation was circu- 
lated by the Canadian delegation at San Francisco. The suggested 
proposals were ambitious and idealistic, but unlike the Canadian draft 
convention on civil aviation of a year earlier, perhaps overly so. 
The Economic and Social Council was to help attain higher standards 
of living, full employment, foster economic and social progress, as 
well as promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
75 
The Canadian amendments which were accepted were sensible and con- 
structive, expanding the role of the Economic and Social Council to 
empower it to cooperate with the specialized agencies (Article 70), 
to obtain their reports of the Council's own recommendations for 
communication to the General Assembly (Article 64: 2), and through 
consultation to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies 
through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the individual 
members of the organization (Article 63: 2). The predictable Canadian 
amendment calling for "due regard" to be shown "for the adequate re- 
presentation of states of major economic importance", was withdrawn 
after other countries made a convincing case for flexibility of re- 
presentation, in view of more expanded social responsibilities for 
the Council than had been originally envisioned. "This action was 
warmly applauded by the Committee and many congratulatory statements 
were made regarding the spirit of comprehension and conciliation 
shown by the Canadian delegation. "76 
During the last days of the conference, Canada sought to cir- 
cumvent the agreed great power veto on amendments by securing provi- 
sion for a review, a concept which had been advanced by Wrong at the 
London meeting. Wrong recommended that the delegation should not 
75. DEA, file 7391-R-40C, draft "Arrangements for International 
Economic and Social Cooperation", n. d. (May 1945). 
76. DEA, file 5475-40, report by Louis Rasminsky, "Report of 
Work of Commission II, Committee 3; Economic and Social Coopera- 
tion", 7 June 1945. 
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support a right of withdrawal clause in the Charter, but Canada would 
be inclined to support this right after a general revision of the 
Charter had taken place. 
77 
The result was the inclusion of Article 
109, which appears in the Charter more as window dressing, since the 
great powers can veto any recommendations or amendments of a review 
conference. A minor triumph also occurred during the waning days of 
the conference when the smaller powers, led by Canada and Australia, 
conspired to defeat a Soviet proposal for the creation of the posi- 
tions of five Deputy Secretaries-General who would represent the 
great powers in the secretariat. The Canadian maxim had been "the 
establishment of a truly international civil service with the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity . 
"78 Politics should 
be left out of at least the administration of the United Nations. 
Canada had favoured widening the scope and the powers of the 
General Assembly, and had again worked in concert with other smaller 
countries to bring this about. An eleventh-hour desire of the Soviet 
Union to return to the restrictive wording regarding the General Assem- 
bly contained in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was overcome, mainly 
because Senator Vandenberg and Lord Halifax had asked Pearson to in- 
tervene with Evatt, who was again girding on his armour to battle 
for the small power cause. The differences were therefore settled 
quietly. 
79 
With regard to membership in the General Assembly and of 
the organization, the basic preference among the Canadians, from the 
Prime Minister downwards, was eventual universality with more repre- 
sentation from Europe as soon as possible. The Canadian delegation 
worked hard behind the scenes in advance and in vain to secure the 
admission of neutral states such as Ireland. Canada had also sugges- 
ted at the beginning of the conference that great power status should 
be given to France without delay. During the latter part of the con- 
ference, the Canadian delegation was sympathetic, as were the Americans, 
77. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 340, file 3676, cable H-300, 
Robertson to Read, 10 June 1945; also vol. 343, file 3695, 
Wrong, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister; Amendment and Revi- 
sion of the Charter", 13 May 1945. 
78. Reid Papers, vol. 5, file 7, memorandum from Reid to 
Pearson, 16 May 1945. 
79. Pearson Diary, 19 June 1945. 
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to the inclusion of Italy in the final deliberations, but John Read, 
the Acting Under-Secretary in Ottawa, corrected Canadian feelings at 
San Francisco by arguing that acceptance of Italy "would mean an im- 
mediate recognition of peace without a peace conference, peace treaty, 
or the necessary negotiation for territorial or other changes. "80 
Canada was not very vocal on the issue of intervention by the 
United Nations in matters coming within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states, but did support the great power amendment calling for the 
"promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, 
religion or sex. " Canada, like other nations, was not anxious to 
have its immigration policies examined by the organization; had to 
consider the position of the provinces; and, as in the case of the 
League, had once again been embarrassed by the efforts of its native 
peoples to bring their grievances to the attention of the conference. 
81 
Freedom from United Nations intervention in matters of domestic juris- 
diction was eventually assured in Article 2: 7. 
The long-sought recognition of the functional principle was 
achieved with surprisingly little effort. Article 23, "the Canadian 
article" stipulated that in the election of members to the Security 
Council, due regard should be paid, "in the first instance to the 
contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of 
international peace and the other purposes of the Organization. " The 
acceptance of functionalism was very much a Pyrrhic victory, because 
at San Francisco, as at the civil aviation conference at Chicago, 
several states suggested varying criteria, including population and 
region. A British proposal to add "equitable geographic distribution" 
was accepted, and has subsequently become the determining factor. The 
Canadian amendment, which was quickly accepted, was just as rapidly 
ignored. There is a great deal of truth to the assertion made by John 
Holmes that "the Canadian attachment to a logical case, based on an 
impeccable principle of functionalism, obscured from them the political 
80. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 340, file 3676, cable D-322, 
Read to Robertson, 11 June 1945. 
81. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3695, memorandum 
by Charles Ritchie, 13 May 1945. 
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unreality of what they sought. 
J2 
In practice, conciliation and not 
military preparedness has become the watchword of the Security Council, 
and in theory and often in practice, a small power can be just as good 
at that as a larger one. The exclusive election of middle powers, 
which would have made the Security Council excessively rigid for con- 
ciliation purposes, was therefore avoided. 
Although the Canadian delegation was not pleased with the 
final product of the conference, they realized that given the cir- 
cumstances, the best possible Charter had been achieved. Robertson 
and Reid worked solidly during the last few days on the Coordination 
Committee, which polished the language and reconciled the paragraphs 
of various committee drafts for the final Charter. They did this 
with gusto, and believed that with a few more days work the document 
would be unrecognizable. "That is the trouble, " Pearson confided to 
his diary; "I am afraid that the Coordination Committee are anxious 
to improve the document as well as the English, but the time for that 
has long since gone by. "83 
The United Nations Charter was unanimously approved by the 
new Canadian Parliament in October 1945 in an atmosphere of interna- 
tional uncertainty. The war was over, but a fearsome new weapon had 
come into existence. In London, the breakdown in September of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, established at the Potsdam Conference 
earlier in the summer amongst the great powers to prepare for the 
eventual peace settlement in Europe, increased anxieties over the 
prospect of effective cooperation among the great powers. Louis St. 
Laurent, the able "Quebec lieutenant" in a larger Liberal majority 
government and Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs in the 
absence of the Prime Minister, who was in London, summed up the serious 
thoughts of all members of parliament: 
The conditions... under which the new organization will 
function will depend on the nature of the peace settlement 
in Europe and Asia. I use the term 'peace settlement' in 
the widest sense to include not only the treatment to be 
accorded the defeated enemy but the relations between the 
victorious allies... to build a solid and enduring structure 
82. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, vol. 1, p. 252. 
83. Pearson Diary, 19 June 1945. 
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of international security will be no easy task, but the 
risks of failure are beyond calculation. The coming of 
the atomic bomb has opened our eyes to the appalling possi- 
bilities which may face the world if the United Nations 
should fail to achieve international cooperation. 84 
In the United Nations Preparatory Commission which met in 
London during the summer and autumn of 1945, Canada demonstrated 
unwavering devotion to the success of the new organization by work- 
ing quietly and effectively to develop rules and procedures which 
would ensure the smooth function of the various bodies comprising 
the United Nations. Canadian efforts here were probably more valua- 
ble in the long run than any of the amendments which had been fought 
for at the general conference. At San Francisco, Canada had been a 
member of the Executive Committee along with thirteen other states, 
and as a result, became a member of the Executive Committee for the 
Preparatory Commission, the planning body for the first Assembly of 
the United Nations. In addition to convoking the first session of 
the General Assembly, the Commission was charged with preparing pro- 
visional agendas for the first sessions of all the organs of the 
organization; formulating recommendations concerning the transfer of 
activities and assets from the old League of Nations to the United 
Nations; investigating the problems between existing specialized 
agencies and the organization; issuing invitations for nominations 
to the International Court of Justice; preparing recommendations 
concerning arrangements for the Secretariat; and lastly, suggesting 
a site for the permanent headquarters of the United Nations. 
85 
It was Escott Reid's show. Although classified as an alter- 
nate delegate, Reid was in fact the cornerstone of the Canadian dele- 
gation, and with his tireless energy, deftness at procedural drafting, 
and idealistic zeal for the success of the United Nations, he was 
responsible for many of the measures introduced. Canadian insistence 
upon simple and clear language in the rules of procedure and staff 
84. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 16 October 1945, p. 1202. 
85. DEA, file 5475-E-40C, Reid, "Draft Memorandum on the Nature 
of the Instructions which might be given to the Canadian Dele- 
gation to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations which 
is to meet in London on November 23,1945", 2 November 1945. 
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regulations was peculiarly Reid's, who was determined to bring Senator 
Vandenberg's characterization of the General Assembly as "the town 
meeting of the world" into reality. In concert with Australia, Canada 
stressed the importance of agreement in advance on procedure in order 
to avoid wasting time on such questions at the initial sessions of 
the various organs. A Canadian compromise suggesting the creation 
of a Department of Security Council Affairs within the Secretariat 
neutralized Soviet demands for a separate secretariat for the Secu- 
rity Council. Tampering with the Security Council, however, was not 
always appreciated by the great powers, as in the case where proce- 
dural amendments for the Security Council were rejected in committee, 
while exactly the same regulations were accepted for the Economic and 
Social Council. 
86 
Surprisingly, Canada sided with the United Kingdom 
and France in preferring a European site for the United Nations, even 
among the ghosts of Geneva, while most other states appeared to sup- 
port a site in the United States. The Canadians believed the organi- 
zation would be best located where most of its work would be. The 
question of a location was left unresolved until the first session 
of the General Assembly in London in 1946, where parliamentary dele- 
gates Stanley Knowles (CCF) and Gordon Graydon (Conservative) embar- 
rassed the government by expressing their enthusiasm for a site in 
Canada. From Ottawa, Mackenzie King quickly informed the delegation 
of his view, stating that no Canadian city was at present equipped 
to house the organization. One would have thought that the Prime 
Minister could have come up with a less parochial excuse; Montreal 
had after all housed the International Labour Organization during the 
war, and would become the home of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. When the United States was eventually selected to be- 
come the headquarters of the United Nations, Canada expressed a pre- 
ference for New York as opposed to San Francisco, which had been 
favoured by the Pacific states. 
87 
86. Reid Papers, vol. 5, file 5, "Draft Report by the Canadian 
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In spite of many Canadian sermons during the preceding two 
years against self-aggrandizement on the part of any nation, Canada 
appeared to be a candidate for everything at the first Assembly of 
the United Nations in London in January 1946, but did not - at least 
not directly - lobby other countries for support in the various elec- 
tions. Canada expected to be elected to the Security Council, to the 
Economic and Social Council, while a place on the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission was virtually assured because of Canada's role in the develop- 
ment of the atomic bomb. John Read was a candidate for the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice; Norman Robertson and Lester Pearson were both 
being mentioned as possible choices for the position of Secretary- 
General. High Canadian expectations were a result of believing that 
the functional principle would be recognized by other nations; in the 
case of the individuals, their prowess at international negotiation 
had stood them in good stead. 
Canada lost to Australia in a run-off vote in its bid for a 
seat on the Security Council. The second part of Article 23 of the 
Charter, "the Canadian article", which had dealt with regional dis- 
tribution of seats, took precedence over the first part, which em- 
bodied the functional principle, as the regional candidates - Brazil, 
Egypt, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands - were elected to the Security 
Council first. With thirty-four votes necessary for election, Canada 
secured thirty-three and Australia twenty-eight. A Nicaraguan dele- 
gate who had marked his ballot for Canada had disqualified himself 
by signing his name. In the two run-off votes which followed, Canada 
led Australia and then fell behind, and St. Laurent, who led the Cana- 
dian delegation, graciously accepted defeat, rather than allowing the 
struggle between the two Dominions to continue. There were several 
factors which contributed to Canada's misfortune, not the least of 
which was the tendency of all members to ignore the functional prin- 
ciple and follow the regional imperative in the election. Canada al- 
ready seemed to be getting too much, and had not supported the Soviet 
Union in its bid to have open nominations. The resultant "secret 
diplomacy" worked against Canada, mainly because the Canadians were 
too high-minded to engage in conventional politicking like most other 
countries, and firmly declined deals which were offered by the Latin 
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Americans and Arabs. Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State 
and a delegate, believed that Canada should have been more vocal: 
"The value of a well-placed piece of oratory on waiverers cannot be 
doubted. "88 Perhaps Evatt's style at San Francisco had finally paid 
off, and there is also the possibility that some countries, reminded 
of the practice followed in the League, saw Australia as the Common- 
wealth candidate. Canada was however decisively elected to the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council. The news of the Security Council elections 
did not please Pearson in Washington, and he sent a pessimistic 
appraisal to Robertson in Ottawa: 
Our functional principle seems to have been thrown out 
of the window in London. In elections to the Security Council 
it has been subordinated to the geographical principle, while 
the acceptance of the view that election to the Security Coun- 
cil disqualifies a state for membership in the Economic and 
Social Council prevents, in large measure, its application to 
that latter body. In this connection it is interesting to 
note that in London these two ideas clashed... I am afraid 
that the election pattern which is developing in UNO, in 
spite of our efforts at San Francisco, and all our speeches 
on functional representation, will not be any better than 
that which prevailed in Geneva in the old days. 89 
Pearson almost became the first Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. The British had originally wanted General Eisenhower, the 
Americans believed that Robertson would have made a good choice, but 
both were unavailable and were probably not the ideal men for the job. 
Pearson's candidature was enthusiastically supported by the British, 
the Americans and the Latin American bloc - perhaps overly so in terms 
of tactics, since the Soviets were adamantly against someone from the 
"Anglo-Saxon bloc", and preferred a Slav if the organization was going 
to be located in the United States. Had the United States and the 
United Kingdom proposed a candidate more closely associated with the 
Anglo-Saxon great powers, such as Cadogan for example, and had they 
not supported Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium against Trygve Lie of Norway 
so avidly for the presidency of the General Assembly, Pearson could 
88. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 342, file 3684, commentary 
by Paul Martin on the First Session of the General Assembly 
sent to Mackenzie King, 8 April 1946. 
89. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 411, Pearson to Robertson, 
23 January 1946. 
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have emerged as a possible compromise choice instead of Lie. 
90 
Pear- 
son had been interested in the job, but mention of his availability 
was so typically low-key that the American delegation in London doubted 
whether he would actually allow his name to stand. This was partially 
due to Pearson's own concerns about the details of the position: the 
terms of employment, salary, and pension rights. More important in 
Pearson's view were guarantees of freedom from outside pressure, the 
independence of action of the Secretary-General, as well as whether 
acceptance of the position would mean disqualification from subsequent 
national official employment. Since these matters had dragged on from 
the Preparatory Commission to the General Assembly in London and were 
still under consideration, Pearson could not receive detailed answers. 
91 
He was gracious about not getting the job, and thought that the selec- 
tion of a European was inevitable and that Lie was a good choice. "I 
do not mind backbreaking jobs, " Pearson wrote, "but heartbreaking ones 
are in a different category... If Lie can cut through the tangle of 
Russian suspicion of and United States inexperience in international 
administration, he will be a very great man. "92 Pearson would be 
again considered for this high office in 1950 and 1953. 
Hume Wrong, the architect of most of Canada's policy toward 
international organization, returned from London where he had been 
chief adviser to the Canadian delegation a disillusioned man. The 
constructive side of the work of the Assembly, and especially the 
Economic and Social Council, had in his opinion been obscured by 
90. Pearson Papers, vol. 11, file "UN: Secretary-Generalship", 
Rasminsky to Pearson, 30 January 1946; also Wrong to Robertson, 
30 January 1946. Also interview with Escott Reid, 12 June 1980. 
91. Ibid., cable WA258, Pearson to Robertson, 15 January 1946. 
92. Ibid., Pearson to Rasminsky, 8 February 1946. The Times 
had the last word on 29 January: "When last the 
'Big Five' dis- 
cussed this matter the Russians did not wish to accept the 
nomination of Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Ambassador 
in 
Washington. They thought, quite wrongly, that a Canadian would 
tend to look at problems through British or American spectacles. 
The suggestion is especially wide of the mark when applied to 
Mr. Pearson, who is a man of independent mind and great moral 
courage. On the other side, the British representatives 
did 
not want an East European appointed. They thought that 
he 
would not have the necessary freedom of action. 
" 
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"protracted public battles which were fought over political issues 
regarded as having propaganda value. " He deplored the tactics of 
the Soviet Union which depicted itself as the defender of dependent 
peoples, small nations, and organized labour, and was critical of 
the fact that the proceedings had encouraged the existence of blocs 
for voting purposes. Wrong was gloomiest, however, when it came to 
the Security Council: 
The Security Council... was not meant to be an agency for 
the prosecution of psychological warfare or an arena for 
gladitorial contests between national champions. Without a 
great alteration, therefore, in the attitude toward each 
other of the great powers - and it should be emphasized 
that this alteration is required not only on the part of 
the Soviet Government - the first meetings of the Security 
Council and the Assembly leave open the question whether the 
establishment of the United Nations has in fact furthered 
its primary purpose - the maintenance of international 
peace and security-93 
The next few years did not witness a decline in the insecuri- 
ties prevalent among all nations for the future prospects of the 
United Nations. Procedural wranglings continued in the Security 
Council, where the once vaunted phrase "unanimity among the great 
"94 powers" was now, in Wrong's words, "that priceless euphemism. 
Canada, although uneasy about the spectre of a "Commonwealth seat" 
on the Security Council, but realistic enough to concede that a new 
roster of states was again being elected according to region, re- 
placed Australia on the Security Council in September 1947. Canada 
would grow more comfortable taking its turn in the seat as the Com- 
monwealth expanded and changed. Even so, there was still pessimism 
within the Department of External Affairs, as evidenced in a state- 
93. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2105, secret and personal 
memorandum by Hume Wrong, 27 February 1946; also Heeney Papers, 
vol. 1, file "Clerk of the Privy Council; Correspondence, 
Memoranda". Wrong had written to Heeney on 7 February: "We 
hope to wind up the Assembly within four or five days. Not an 
experience which hails to optimism. The Security Council has 
been a sort of verbal prize fight... To keep your illusions, 
keep away from conferences and don't look at our masters at 
close quarters. " 
94. DEA, Statements and Speeches Series, no. 47/14, "Canada, 
the United Nations, and the United States", address by Hume 
Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, at Tarrytown, 
New York, 15 September 1947. 
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ment approved by the Cabinet on 11 September 1947 for the guidance 
of the delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly 
which noted that the Government was "aware that there is a possibi- 
lity that issues will emerge... which may destroy the United Nations 
in the form in which it was conceived and established. "95 Neverthe- 
less, failure to stand for the Security Council would have been a 
repudiation of functionalism, which although generally acknowledged 
within the Department as now being moribund as a policy, never did 
leave the minds of the policy-makers. As the thrust of their think- 
ing on questions of security shifted from an emphasis on the United 
Nations to new avenues which served as preludes to the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty, what was left of the functionalist ideal underwent yet 
another metamorphosis. 
Canadian United Nations policies will occasionally surface in 
later chapters, but at this point it may be of value to examine the 
Prime Minister's attitude toward the organization. Although Macken- 
zie King was hopeful for the success of the United Nations before 
the San Francisco conference, his attitude quickly reverted to one 
of suspicion when he discovered that the organization was not the 
conciliatory body he had envisioned. While St. Laurent was making 
his speech on the Charter in the House of Commons in October 1945, 
and the Canadian delegation to the Preparatory Commission was pre- 
paring its strategy on procedural questions, the Prime Minister was 
engaged in highly secret discussions in London with Prime Minister 
Attlee about a recently discovered Soviet espionage ring in Ottawa. 
This revelation increased doubts he had always entertained about the 
value of coercion in international organizations, and he expressed 
his thoughts in his diary while aboard the Queen Mary: 
95. DEA, file 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "A Survey of Canadian 
External Policy", Chapter 6, "Canada and the United Nations", 
p. 3. During the summer months of 1951 and 1952, Professor 
F. H. Soward of the University of British Columbia, a former 
special assistant within the Department of External Affairs 
during the war, was asked by the Department to examine files 
on Canadian foreign policy since 1946, for the purpose of 
providing a series of documents which would be useful to the 
Minister and the officers. 
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[I]t is... a great mistake to develop organizations 
or agreements which help to relieve the anxieties and 
consciences of large numbers of people but which in 
reality are first a delusion and a snare in that they 
give a positive advantage to a country that does not 
care a rap about the sanctity of contracts. A change 
of heart is the only real security in a matter of the 
maintenance of peace. 96 
King's belief in peaceful conciliation and progress did not 
commend itself to some of the specialized agencies, most notably the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) which the Prime Minister believed to be both a waste of 
time and money. In October 1947, Victor Dore, Canadian ambassador 
to Belgium and representative on UNESCO, requested an opportunity to 
speak to the Prime Minister to convince him that UNESCO was in fact 
an agency which would further peace: "De toutes les filiales de 
1'ONU, eile a le r6le he plus ingrat parce que'elle evolue dans 
l'intangible. Sa täche n'a rien de concret qui frappe et retienne 
l'attention de grand public"97 Perhaps King felt that too generous 
financial and political support for an agency with a negative public 
image could become a political liability, and objects of peaceful 
change and conciliation were therefore not as important. 
It was the issue of Canadian participation on the United 
Nations Korean Truce Commission during the early weeks of 1948, which 
occasioned the Prime Minister to reach back in time to his out-dated 
"no commitments" philosophy. Following the failure of the United 
States and the Soviet Union to end their occupation through a Korean 
election scheme, the Americans suggested that the General Assembly 
should appoint a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) 
to supervise an election throughout the Korean peninsula, and the pro- 
posal was passed with Soviet bloc abstentions. John Foster Dulles, 
the American delegate, had been instructed by Secretary of State George 
Marshall to offer a list of nations which would participate on the 
96. King Diary, 4 October 1945. 
97. St. Laurent Papers, vol. 33, file 267 "UNESCO", Dore to 
St. Laurent, 25 October 1947. King's view was also shared by 
Vincent Massey, who had been offered the Director-Generalship 
of UNESCO. Canada House Series, vol. 2104, file : aR 405/1/4/9 
Part 2, Massey to Robertson, 6 July 1948. 
153 
commission and Canada was among the nations put forward. 
98 
The Cana- 
dian delegate, J. L. Ilsley, now Minister of Justice, agreed, after 
he had heard the advice of Pearson, who was now Under-Secretary, and 
with the approval of Secretary of State for External Affairs and 
Acting Prime Minister St. Laurent, King once again being in London. 
The stern opposition of the Prime Minister to Canadian involvement 
upon his return confounded everyone, and sparked a Cabinet crisis - 
with St. Laurent and Ilsley threatening resignation - unprecedented 
since the conscription crisis of November 1944. 
Pearson, charged with defending a stand against Canadian 
participation in the Commission which he himself did not believe in, 
was sent to Washington to inform President Truman that Prime Minister 
King would not yield, and that no Canadian would serve on the Korean 
Commission. Pearson was convinced that King's visit to London had 
made him fearful of imminent war and that his view of international 
relations had therefore regressed to its pre-1939 state with the 
United States as the villain of this piece, instead of the United 
Kingdom. The Prime Minister, Pearson ventured, may also have been 
attempting to consolidate his supremacy in the Cabinet as the day 
of his retirement drew nearer. 
99 
Truman's subsequent message to King 
did nothing to change the Prime Minister's mind, in spite of the 
fact that both Pearson and Wrong, now ambassador in Washington, had 
a hand in assisting perplexed State Department officials in drafting 
the response. St. Laurent eventually convinced the recalcitrant 
Prime Minister that there was no reasonable excuse for Canada not to 
participate, there being no danger of having to take sides since the 
98. The others were Australia, China, El Salvador, France, 
India, the Philippines, Syria and the Ukrainian SSR. For a 
detailed study of Canadian policy towards Korea, see Denis 
Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean 
and the United States, (Toronto, 1974). 
99. Pearson Papers, vol. 8, file "Korea, Canadian Membership 
in UNTCOK, 1947-1948", memorandum by Pearson, "Mission to 
Washington on the Korean Commission, January 1-6,1948", 10 
January 1948. Pearson threw eager journalists off the trail 
by saying that he had come to talk to the President about 
Korea - they refused to believe him. Stairs suggests that 
King's encounter with a London spiritualist, who claimed that 
Franklin Roosevelt spoke through her, predicting a war in Asia, 
may have also influenced the Prime Minister. See Stairs, , -; ie 
Dip'omacy o. ' Con. ±r 'nt, p. 10. 
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Commission required both American and Soviet agreement to function 
at all. A compromise was struck, with Canada reserving the right 
to withdraw. 
For his part, Mackenzie King believed that Canada had no 
business whatsoever to be in Korea since it had no interests there, 
and he was also wary of what he saw as a tendency of the United 
States to view the United Nations as an extension of the State De- 
partment. He thought the appointment of the Commission had been a 
mistake: "I believe, that if many more Commissions of this kind are 
appointed, the United Nations will not only speedily lose what measure 
of influence it possesses, but that it will be impossible for some of 
its member nations to avoid being drawn into positions of great future 
embarrassment to themselves. "100 Surely this was a voice of isola- 
tionism and not one advocating peaceful conciliation through all 
possible means. Ironically, Mackenzie King's fears about the Com- 
mission contained many truths, but it was too late for Canada to turn 
back the clock of its own development in international organizations, 
especially since the time was now being set by the team of St. Laurent 
and Pearson which believed in a more assertive foreign policy for 
Canada. The "no commitments" philosophy was officially dead. 
The quest for an international organization which would suit 
Canada's needs and aspirations had taken Canada down a long road. 
Although it was not readily apparent in the Charter that Canada was 
in fact a middle power, it certainly behaved as one at the San Fran- 
cisco conference and after. The idealism which had been associated 
with the functional principle in early 1943 had given way to a more 
sober and practical realism, essential for the challenges of the 
post-war world. Some disillusionment had set in, but Canada was 
committed and would not abstain or abscond from the responsibilities 
taken so very seriously when the Charter of the United Nations was 
signed and ratified. Hume Wrong crystallized Canadian feelings phi- 
losophically when he addressed the last meeting of the League of 
Nations in April 1946; 
100. Pearson Papers, vol. 8, 
ship in UNTCOK, 1947-1948", 
Truman, sent as cable EX61, 
1948. 
file "Korea, Canadian Member- 
copy of a letter from King to 
St. Laurent to Wrong, 8 January 
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Now in 1946 we have less confidence that the Charter 
will succeed than we had in 1919 that the Covenant would 
succeed. Those who have lived through the terror and 
glories of two great wars are bound to be disillusioned. 
Disillusionment, in its literal sense of the absence of 
illusions, is a good thing. It should mean that we see 
more clearly, not that we have lost hope... We must never- 
theless, keep the hope and faith of the founders of the 
League of Nations that we can, by concerted effort, banish 
from the earth the most irrational of human pursuits, the 
waging of war. 
101 
101. Wrong Papers, vol. 3, file 19 
"`'1st and 22nd League 
Assemblies, 1939 and 1946", speech to the 
last meeting of 
the League Assembly, 10 April 
1946. 
CHAPTER V 
THE COMMONWEALTH: A COMMON POLICY AND CONSULTATION 
One of the tasks facing Canadian internationalists in the 
1940s was to separate reality from rhetoric in redefining the Common- 
wealth relationship in a fashion which would suit Canada's growing 
international presence. Feelings and expressions about the Common- 
wealth had too often been laced with imprecisions and an overabundance 
of sentimentality, reflecting perhaps the association these inadequate 
terms were attempting to define. As late as 1947, many Britons, par- 
ticularly those among the business community, still beheld the image 
of the Empire evoked by the "King's Christmas Dinner", which began 
with a South African grapefruit and ended with a Jamaican cigar. 
I 
Canada of course supplied the staples. The group photographs depic- 
ting the prime ministers of the Dominions in close consultation with 
the mother country conjured up a sentimental attachment to an Empire 
which had reached its zenith at the time of the outbreak of the Great 
1. DEA, file 6133-40, vol. 3, Robertson to Pearson, 6 May 1947. 
Robertson had attended a luncheon in London where several business- 




War, but which had evolved along different lines following it. During 
the period between the wars, "the Commonwealth", "British Commonwealth", 
or, to use Churchill's phrase, "the British Commonwealth and Empire", 
changed to become a more flexible organism, accommodating by means of 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931 the growing nationhood of the four 
Dominions. Although the Statute conferred on them the right to adopt 
their own foreign policies, the Dominions were still immature and 
untried players on the international stage, and the relationship bet- 
ween the component parts of the British Commonwealth - often referred 
to as the inter se doctrine - was perceived by all as unique, if not 
in fact interdependent in its nature. There was, for some, a tendency 
to wish to formalize what in fact the inter se relationship and con- 
sultative practice between governments approximated: a common foreign 
policy for all. Efforts to achieve this goal persisted well into the 
1940s. 
As already demonstrated in earlier chapters, the continued 
promulgation in various forms by the United Kingdom of a Commonwealth 
"single voice" foreign policy, and its tacit acceptance by the other 
great powers, caused acute worries for Canada in its bid to have its 
own functional principle recognized in the new international organi- 
zations. British policy-makers, aware that their country was gradually 
approaching the status of a "once great" power, sought to arrest this 
trend by emphasizing the function of the British Commonwealth as a 
great power unit in international organization. Not until the emer- 
gence of new Commonwealth members later in the decade did such notions 
formally come to an end. 
During the interim period, it was Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King who played a predominant and for him instinctive role in con- 
tinuing to oppose all plans for a single foreign policy. The reti- 
cence which King at times displayed at large international gatherings 
was not evident at Commonwealth meetings, where, once lured to the 
conference table, he appeared, as longtime leader of the senior Domi- 
nion and through the predictability of his attitude, to be very much 
in control of the proceedings and used to getting his own way. The 
Canadian Prime Minister was firmly supported and advised in his role 
before and during Commonwealth meetings by his officials in the De- 
partment of External Affairs, who, while not all sharing the inten- 
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sity of King's emotive responses to numerous approaches for a common 
foreign policy and not all as isolationist as their erstwhile tutor 
O. D. Skelton, nonetheless regarded policy centralization in Whitehall 
as anathema to Canadian foreign policy aspirations. 
In mid-August 1943, following the protracted resolution of 
the "Canadian problem" in the effort for membership of the Central 
Committee of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis- 
tration (UNRRA), Hume Wrong wrote that "It is by no means wholly 
a paradox to maintain that the most important current problem in 
intra-Commonwealth relations is to make countries outside the Common- 
wealth understand what these relations actually are. "2 Perfunctory 
and facile explanations of the relationship would suffice for inqui- 
sitive nations of minor rank, as in the instance when a visiting 
Mexican foreign minister was told by Mackenzie King that the status 
of the Governor General was akin to that of a guest of honour at a 
banquet. 
3 
The great powers, however, particularly the United States, 
had to be made to understand that the British Commonwealth had devel- 
oped into a permanent entente cordiale, where a group of independent 
states with a common sovereign pursued generally similar but indepen- 
dent objectives through traditionally close consultation. Convincing 
the Americans of this became one of the major challenges of wartime 
Canadian diplomacy. "Whatever may be the vestigial traces of legal 
dependence that remain to arouse argument among the constitutional 
pundits, " Wrong continued in his memorandum of 17 August 1943, "they 
are of no more practical importance in the operation of the Common- 
wealth than is the vermiform appendix in the operation of the human 
body. " Greater cooperation on the part of all Commonwealth govern- 
ments, particularly the United Kingdom, was necessary to educate the 
world about the nature of current Commonwealth realities. Prime 
Minister Churchill would therefore have to abandon his view that if 
one Commonwealth member was associated with the United Kingdom in a 
policy statement, then all Dominions would automatically be associated 
2. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 1, memorandum by Wrong, "Some Com- 
ments on Intra-Commonwealth Relations", 17 August 1943. 
3, Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 68, file D-12-5, 
S. D. Pierce (Canadian ambassador to Mexico) to L. B. Pearson, 
31 July 1947. 
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as well. "If the functional principle has merit in problems of in- 
ternational organization, " Wrong concluded, "it also has merit inside 
the Commonwealth. ,4 
Yet there was more that Canada had to do to illustrate the 
difference between what really was and what others perceived to be 
the trappings of Empire. Canadians abroad were technically still 
under the mantle of British protection, since the United Kingdom 
fulfilled consular duties for Canada; Canadian citizens did not enjoy 
true "national status", and a Canadian nationality act would not be 
passed until 1946; nor did the Canadian Government grant passports 
to its citizens. Furthermore, all treaties entered into by Canada, 
as well as full powers for plenipotentiaries from the Department of 
External Affairs, were still issued under the Great Seal of the Realm 
and not under the Great Seal of Canada. By the end of the decade, 
these difficulties would have been removed, but there were still 
other matters to consider. The Canadian Government did not have its 
own system of honours and awards, and it was a rueful Lester Pearson 
who noted in June 1943 that the president of the University of Toronto 
had been made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George 
(C. M. G. ) in the King's Honour List, a decoration given to virtually 
every senior official in British government departments. 
5 
Probably 
most striking to nations outside the Commonwealth was the fact that 
Canada possessed no flag of its own either. The Red Ensign had come 
into use during the war, but would not be affirmed by Parliament as 
the flag of Canada until well after hostilities had ceased. A poignant 
example of the importance often attached to flags occurred at the 
first Quebec Conference in August 1943, when Robertson, Heeney and 
General Pope pressed to have the Red Ensign unveiled on a pole of 
its own beside the Union Jack. Workmen made the inevitable mistake 
which resulted in both flags being flown on the same mast, the Union 
4. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 1, memorandum by Wrong, "Some Com- 
ments on Intra-Commonwealth Relations", 17 August 1943. 
5, Pearson Diary, 2 June 1943. Pearson would institute the 
Order of Canada awards when Prime Minister in 1967. Also, 
Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 24, memorandum by John Read, 
"Tentative Observations on Wrong Comments; Intra-Commonwealth 
Relations", 21 August 1943. 
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Jack above. Fortunately, the situation was remedied before the 
arrival of the train carrying the American officials, thus avoiding 
embarrassment. 
6 
If these examples of Canadian dependence on the 
United Kingdom were what was often seen by other nations, to a degree 
they were also observed by the Canadian public who did not seem overly 
anxious for rapid change. The longevity of the King Government could 
well be attributed to the watchful eye it kept on Canadian public 
opinion. 
Most perceptible was the Canadian war effort. In spite of 
the photographs of Mackenzie King with Roosevelt and Churchill at 
Quebec, Canada was not taking part in the higher strategic direction 
of the war. Canadian troops did not see any great action across a 
broad front until the invasion of Sicily in August 1943, and then 
the Prime Minister had to intercede to ensure public recognition of 
their effort. Recognition of Canada's great wartime economic role was 
somewhat more easily achieved, and resulted in copious outpourings of 
gratitude from the United Kingdom, which led Escott Reid to observe 
that British thanks were usually publicly expressed in the old-fash- 
ioned 'Anglo-centric' way: "those great Dominions which have worked 
for us so devotedly in this war. "7 Such statements, which undermined 
the functional principle, were largely accepted without question in 
the United States, lent truth to views of the Commonwealth as a "bloc" 
or "Empire", and fueled traditional American suspicions of British 
intentions, often expressed in American newspapers in the language of 
the frontier: "The city slicker John Bull will hornswoggle hayseed 
Uncle Sam. "8 At least one British official believed that the people 
of the United Kingdom felt very keenly the inferiority of their re- 
sources when compared to those of the United States and the Soviet 
6. Pope Diary, vol. 1,10 August 1943. 
7. Reid Papers, vol. 5, file 5, memorandum by Escott Reid, 
"Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Public Opinion in Great Britain 
about Canada", 7 July 1943. Reid had quoted Group Captain 
Helmore in the British House of Commons on 1 June 1943. 
8. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 2, copy of U. K. paper, Foreign Office 
Research Department, United States Memoranda Series, No. 226, 
"Comment on the Commonwealth", 11 September 1944. The reference 
is from the Lbicago Sun of 26 April 1944. 
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Union and that a united Empire was therefore essential in maintaining 
the position of Britain as a great power. Behind this argument Hume 
Wrong detected a feeling that because the British people had suffered 
most in the war, they had a moral right to expect a similar sacrifice 
from other Commonwealth members. "They had in short a sort of credit 
balance, " Wrong wrote, "... and however illogical this seems on the 
surface, it is not psychologically inconsistent with the rather em- 
barrassing expressions of thanks for Canadian 'generosity' which have 
come from United Kingdom leaders. "9 
To public opinion as derived from public statements in both 
the United Kingdom and the United States, therefore, the general 
tenor of the Canadian relationship with the United Kingdom at the 
most superficial level appeared to be dependent, if not still colo- 
nial. The Soviet Union, as indicated in previous chapters, had its 
own reasons for adhering to an interpretation along common lines. 
When these prevalent views are pitted against Wrong's assertion that 
the most important problem concerning intra-Commonwealth relations 
was outside perception of the relationship, then the public speeches 
by various Commonwealth statesmen in late 1943 and early 1944 assume 
a special significance. 
In stark contrast to the excitement which followed the speech 
by Lord Halifax in Toronto on 24 January 1944, a more strident speech 
calling for a unitary Commonwealth policy by Lord Cranborne at the 
Guildhall in London on 23 November 1943 had raised few Canadian eye- 
brows. One would have thought that the words of Cranborne, who had 
been Dominions Secretary earlier in the war and who would succeed 
Attlee in that office from 1944 to the fall of the Churchill govern- 
ment in 1945, would have occasioned more Canadian attention. Cran- 
borne of course did not speak on Canadian soil. Whereas Halifax had 
perceived the British Commonwealth acting as a great power in world 
councils, Cranborne had been less sentimental and more emphatic: 
"The nations of the Commonwealth must have one single foreign policy. 
That is essential. A British Commonwealth of Nations with divided 
9. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 2, memorandum by Wrong of a conver- 
sation he had with Boyd-Shannon of the Dominions Office when the 
latter passed through Ottawa while en route to the civil avia- 
tion conference in Chicago, 30 October 1944. 
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councils on international affairs would lose all its influence. It 
would be a broken and futile instrument... "10 
Cranborne had elucidated a view which had become prevalent 
among politicians at Westminster as plans for the United Nations or- 
ganization developed, the focal point of which was the notion that 
the United Kingdom could not on its own constitute a great power in 
foreign affairs without the Dominions. The British Commonwealth as 
a great power had formed the basis for Churchill's vision of "regional 
councils" for international organization and was also the cornerstone 
for Beaverbrook's hopes for international civil aviation. Nor did 
feelings of centralization terminate among high-profile ministers. 
Paul Emrys-Evans, Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Dominions Office, 
believed a common policy to be a necessity, but one which would have 
to wait until after the war, when the Dominions could be more easily 
convinced to rally for the common cause. 
11 
One finds it difficult to 
believe that these men were unaware of the "no commitments" philosophy 
of Mackenzie King, which the Canadian Prime Minister had stressed at 
Imperial Conferences in 1923,1926 and 1937. 
Foreign Office opinion, which had really only become aware of 
the extent of Canadian determination for a separate functionalist 
voice in the wake of the UNRRA representation issue in the spring of 
1943, had by the autumn become reconciled to the general conclusion 
that the Commonwealth was becoming more decentralized, as the Domi- 
nions gained strength and status and pursued more individualistic 
policies. A change of tactics was required, and at a meeting at the 
Dominions Office which included some Foreign Office officials on 1 
April, it was decided that Britain must refrain from confronting the 
Dominions with "cut and dried over-ambitious plans" but should work 
"toward our end according to a preconceived but unexpressed plan by 
a series of apparently ad hoc decisions. "12 Mackenzie King's disquiet 
was not completely unfounded. 
10. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 1, copy of speech delivered by 
Cranborne at the Guildhall in London, 23 November 1943. 
11. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U4567/4084/68, Paul Emrys- 
Evans (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Dominions 
Office) to Richard Law (Minister of State in the Foreign Office), 
16 March 1943. 
12. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U1567/310/70, unsigned minute 
regarding meeting held at Dominions Office on 1 April 1943. 
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More liberal opinion at Whitehall recognized that "cooperat 
one assumes policy coordination - could best be achieved not throu&.. _ 
centralized type of machinery designed to formulate a common policy, 
but through more frequent and informal contacts between the consti- 
tuent parts of the Commonwealth on a personal level and through clo- 
ser collaboration in the field as the Dominion foreign services ex- 
panded. As an insightful Foreign Office report concluded, quite dif- 
ferently from Lord Cranborne: 
We must in future regard the Dominions not so much as 
offspring of the Mother Country as fellow members of the 
United Nations, whose goodwill we already have in large 
measure and wish to retain on the basis that the more 
friends we have the better. We must do this because a 
clear-eyed approach to the question of Commonwealth rela- 
tions, as opposed to a sentimental one, is necessary if we 
are not to endanger our relations with English-speaking 
peoples by becoming resentful either of the behaviour of 
the Dominions, who are naturally determined to have the 
best of both worlds, or of the intervention of the United 
States in Commonwealth affairs. It will help us to do this 
if we realise that, although the Dominions are very useful 
to us and we to them, we could still be a Great Power with- 
out them-this insistence on flexibility and informality 
does mean, however, that the family bond which undoubtedly 
exists and which we should continue to make use of as a 
fund of goodwill and assistance in international relations 
cannot be presumed upon and must not be exclusive. 13 
Evidently there were clear differences of opinion among British 
officials, but the gulf between them was not as large as that sepa- 
rating them from the politicians, who seemed ready to test Dominion 
waters with bold plans, which could do no political harm at home 
when publicized. 
But the Canadians were guilty of over-reaction as well. 
Charles Ritchie had managed to secure a copy of the report cited 
above from the Foreign Office in early February 1944, with the strict 
assurance that it should only get a very narrow circulation, consi- 
dering the sensitive climate which followed the Halifax speech. Sym- 
pathetic to the Canadian view as the memorandum was, in Ottawa Hume 
Wrong detected an irksome tendency in it to treat "the Dominions" as 
an entity and not as four separate countries, each with their own 
13. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W12262/5467/68, memorandum 
by J. L. Campbell, "Intra-Imperial Relations: The British Common- 
wealth", 30 November 1943. 
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interests and aspirations. Canada, having had a colonial past, for 
example, did not necessarily mean that it would have vital interests 
in the colonial questions confronting the Empire. 
14 
For Lester Pear- 
son, who also read the British report, the idea of closer informal 
consultation towards common ends could be a debilitating influence 
on both the British and Dominion governments, and "the fact that it 
never does occur to them (the British) is one of the best reasons 
for the rejection of it, because it indicates that the limitation is 
meant to be pretty one-sided. "15 One should remember, however, that 
the report was written before Lord Halifax delivered his speech in 
Toronto, while the Canadian responses came after. 
Much like Alfred Deakin, one of his earlier predecessors who 
in 1907 had proposed an Imperial secretariat, John Curtin, the Labour 
Prime Minister of Australia, suggested the creation of a standing 
sub-committee of the Imperial Conference and a secretariat which 
would formulate agendas for meetings of the prime ministers. Curtin's 
proposals were ventured in November and December 1943, and were pro- 
phetic to a degree in that they called for the meetings of prime min- 
isters, preferably to be held in different Commonwealth capitals, to 
be the major mode of consultation. In addition, meetings of other 
miniters with specific portfolios such as finance, trade and commu- 
nications could be organized. Curtin took great care to emphasize 
the convergent interests of the Commonwealth with those of the allied 
nations, did not openly mention Australia's usual concern for a com- 
mon defence policy, and referred to "Britain" and not to the "British 
Commonwealth" as one of the great powers. 
16 
Nevertheless, the Aus- 
tralian prime minister had in fact included a proposal for a secre- 
tariat, something which was not likely to court favour with his Cana- 
dian peer. Mackenzie King was instinctively opposed to Curtin's pro- 
posals and would address himself to them at the Prime Ministers' 
Meeting in May 1944. 
14. Pearson Papers, Pre 1958 Series, vol. 9, file "Commonwealth 
Relations 1945-48", memorandum from Wrong to Robertson, 7 Febru- 
ary 1944. 
15. Ibid., Pearson to Wrong, 21 March 1944. 
16. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2362, memorandum 
from Robertson to King, 30 November 1943; also summary of 
Curtin proposals prepared by John Holmes, 14 December 1943. 
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On 25 November 1943, Field Marshal Smuts delivered a speech 
in London entitled "Thoughts on the New World", and in the press, his 
thoughts, which had been expressed with usual histrionic flair, quickly 
became proposals. Smuts too, like Curtin, repeatedly stressed the 
sovereign nature of the Dominions, and his remarks dealing with "the 
trinity of nations" referred to the United States, Soviet Union and 
the United Kingdom as the great powers. Again, there was no mention 
of the British Commonwealth as a great power. Where the South Afri- 
can Prime Minister actually made what amounted to a vague proposal 
was in his desire to "tidy up" the administration of the Colonial 
Empire by associating interested Dominions with regional colonial 
groupings. "In this way, " Smuts stated, "you will tighten up your 
own system, and instead of being two separate systems, the one de- 
centralized and looking after its own affairs, and the other central- 
ized and centered in London, you will have a much more logical and 
statesmanlike arrangement . 
"l7 Smuts had spoken from jotted general 
notes and had been then asked to supply a vetted version. His ex- 
pression "tighten up" confused journalists, or perhaps presented 
them with the opportunity they required, especially H. V. Hodson of 
The Sunday Times and Geoffrey Crowther of The Economist, to publicize 
their cherished one-voice Commonwealth theory. Smuts had been merely 
thinking and speaking constructively, and like any good leader, with 
his country's interests uppermost in his mind. John Holmes, refer- 
ring perhaps both to his cautious superiors and the rabid British 
press, thought Smuts had been misinterpreted, and so wrote Hume 
Wrong: "... at a time when a good deal of serious thinking needs to 
be done on Commonwealth relations, it seems unfortunate that there 
is a tendency to lump all reformers into one basket. "18 
Smuts and Curtin, though not extremely vocal, were at least 
sympathetic to the Canadian functionalist ethos, and at any rate the 
Canadians, for their own part, were more anxious to receive great 
power recognition of their newly and firmly articulated policy. For 
this reason the speech by the United Kingdom ambassador to the United 
States in Toronto appeared to subvert the functional principle and as 
17. The Times, 3 December 1943. 
18. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 1, note from Holmes to Wrong, 
8 January 1944. 
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such struck Canadian policy-makers - thought not all as strongly as 
the prime minister - as an ominous development. Halifax had been 
invited to speak in Toronto by Leighton McCarthy, who, in spite of 
being one of the leading members of the old Canadian school of im- 
perialists, served as Canada's Minister to the United States by vir- 
tue of his close friendship with President Roosevelt and his contri- 
butions to the coffers of the Liberal Party of Canada. Whether Mc- 
Carthy influenced the President's conceptions of the Commonwealth, 
or reinforced his preconceptions, is open to debate. 
Unlike Cranborne two months earlier, Halifax was not stri- 
dent at all; the speech was filled with complimentary references to 
Mackenzie King and Canada's autonomous status, his strongest remark - 
in addition to a requisite Imperial rallying cry at the end of the 
speech - being: "It is an immeasurable gain if on vital issues we 
can achieve a common foreign policy expressed not by a single voice 
but by the unison of many. "19 If the many speeches he made during 
the war are scrutinized, Halifax had only been repeating precisely 
what he had often said before. 
However it was the effect of his speech which mattered most. 
Although it subsided after a few days, Mackenzie King's anger proved 
difficult to mollify initially, this being a task which had fallen 
upon Norman Robertson and Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Com- 
missioner. MacDonald reported to London that to the Canadian prime 
minister the speech looked like a deliberate design by the United 
Kingdom to revive imperialism, and also represented a personal attack 
on King, since Halifax knew full well the prime minister's political 
position vis-a-vis his opponents and his love for the functional 
principle. On the other hand, Canadian Conservatives were concerned 
about the potentialities of the speech as an electoral weapon in 
Mackenzie King's hands. "All this is very disappointing, " MacDonald 
concluded. "It indicates that Canadian politicians are still capable 
of moods in which they do not do themselves justice as leaders of a 
20 
mature democratic nation. " 
19. Halifax, The American Speeches of the EarZ of Ha'ig' zx 
(London, 1947). Address to the Toronto Board of Trade, "The 
Dominions and the United Kingdom: Independence and Interdepen- 
dence", 24 January 1944, pp. 275-283. 
20. Dominions Office, DO 35/1204, WC 75/9, MacDonald to Cran- 
borne, 27 January 1944. 
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Mackenzie King's feelings were quickly appreciated though 
not entirely understood in London, where ironically, there was also 
a corresponding over-reaction to the speech. At a meeting of the 
War Cabinet on 31 January 1944, Churchill suggested that the Foreign 
Secretary should be consulted before public statements were made 
which were likely to be perceived as pronouncements on important 
issues of policy. Although the British prime minister did not con- 
demn Halifax, or say that he disagreed with the content of his re- 
marks, he did note that "It seems to me that Lord Halifax ought not 
to have made this very important speech at Toronto without reference 
here beforehand. It is in effect an interference in Canadian poli- 
tics turned markedly against Mackenzie King. "21 Questions of high 
policy, Churchill stated, would be studied with all prime ministers 
at the forthcoming meeting in May. Brendan Bracken, the British 
Minister of Information, had commented at a press conference a few 
days earlier that the speech solely represented the views of Halifax 
and "Everything he said, as a matter of fact, was largely hallowed 
by antiquity, but whether it is the wisest possible thing at the mo- 
ment to talk in Canada of some form of Imperial Federation is, I 
think, very much open to question-It is a matter of party politics 
in Canada. "22 According to British leaders, therefore, the furore 
occasioned by the speech was primarily political, and not really a 
question of fundamental disagreement in principle. Even Malcolm 
MacDonald, a stalwart supporter and confidant of the Canadian prime 
minister, who himself deplored the use of the phrase "British Com- 
monwealth and Empire", and who in a speech in Montreal a few months 
later endorsed Mackenzie King's view of separate and indigenous 
foreign policies, wrote to Lord Cranborne that Canadian cooperation 
in the Commonwealth - whatever that meant - would be assured if the 
United Kingdom would not issue statements which would alienate res- 
ponsible French Canadian opinion or give the impression that the 
Commonwealth was "ganging up" on the United States. "That was the 
principal mistake that Edward made in his speech and the only bit of 
21. Dominions Office, DO 35/1204, WC 75/9, Prime Minister's 
Personal Minute, 31 January 1944. 
22. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 366, cable no. 270, Massey 
to King, 28 January 1944. 
168 
the speech that I personally disagreed with., 
23 
There still evidently 
existed some hope in British circles that Canada would "come round". 
Once his anger had been replaced by resentment, Mackenzie King 
was cleverly conciliatory. In a speech to the House of Commons on 
31 January, which the Irish High Commissioner in Ottawa claimed had 
saved the Commonwealth - but did not save Ireland's place in it later - 
the Prime Minister stated: "We have reached today an effective method 
of consultation and cooperation that has not been surpassed at any 
time in the history of the British Empire. " He then reflected upon 
the communiques of various Imperial Conferences which he had attended 
over the years and focussed upon a very clear sentence in the Balfour 
Declaration of 1926: "Every self-governing member of the Empire is 
now the master of its destiny. " True world security and freedom from 
war could not be achieved through great power rivalry, and in addi- 
tion to collaboration with "a special degree of intimacy" within the 
Commonwealth, Canada could of necessity not lean towards exclusivity 
when confronting the issues which would determine peace and war. 
Halifax, according to King, was an eminent statesman and political 
philosopher who had merely allowed his mind to review the developments 
of the past century and projected his thoughts into the future. Unfor- 
tunately his speech had come at an inconvenient time and had raised 
certain issues which should be clarified. 
24 
In Washington, Pearson gave his political master full credit 
for a great speech and added a few thoughts of his own: 
If we act as a unit, I do not see how we can also act 
separately and maintain the national and international 
position we have gained. We can't have it both ways. 
Therefore, there is only one way. It is, I think, quite 
impossible for us, even if we so desired, to reverse the 
history of the last twenty years. The Prime Minister was, 
23. Dominions Office, DO 35/1204, WC 75/9, MacDonald to 
Cranborne, 12 February 1944. 
24. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 31 January 1944, pp. 
36- 
42. In a note which he sent to MacDonald, Halifax stated that 
he 
had in mind Cranborne's speech of 23 November 1943 and a speech 
by Brooke Claxton on 9 July 1943, the day the functional principle 
was formally announced. 
"I deliberately rejected the idea of a 
'single voice' to which Claxton referred ... 
I do not readily appre- 
ciate in what way the speech 
itself, if read as a whole, can be 
used to support the doctrines that would 
be as unpalatable to 
myself as I imagine to the Prime 
Minister. " Halifax had given 
McCarthy a copy of the note. King Papers, 
J1 Series, vol. 344, 
McCarthy to King, 1 February 1944. 
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in my opinion, absolutely right when he deprecated this talk 
of a British Commonwealth unit in foreign affairs; talks 
based on views held, I'm afraid, in pretty high quarters, 
in the White House, in No. 10. Acting in unison as separate 
states is one thing; acting as a unit is quite another ... 
25 
Press comment in the United States on the "Halifax affair" 
was lacklustre; in the other Dominions it ranged from indifference 
to support of Mackenzie King's position; and in the United Kingdom, 
there tended to be somewhat more hostility from the predictable 
sources, The Sunday Times and The Economist. For King, in spite of 
his Zeitmotif of national unity at all costs, there was never any 
discernible political danger. The wily politician in him had taken 
over, and he readily exploited the emotions raised by the affair. 
He outflanked the Opposition by using answers to questions on the 
Commonwealth given by John Bracken, the Conservative leader, who 
did not have a seat in the House of Commons, in an interview with 
Maclean's magazine. When the Conservatives rallied in the House of 
Commons to attack King's remarks, the Prime Minister simply told the 
members they were being inconsistent, since they were criticizing 
the very words of their own leader. 
26 
Was there a motive behind the Halifax speech? Was it a 
British baZZon d'essai designed to test Dominion reactions when the 
international presence of these countries was on the ascendant, or 
even an oblique British attempt to indicate discomfort to 
Australia 
25. DEA file 7-V(s), Pearson to Robertson, 1 February 1944. 
26. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2352, copy of 
MacZean's interview with John Bracken, 1 May 1944. Bracken 
had said "I do not favour the establishment of any permanent 
agency which would unduly centralize the influence or increase 
the rigidity of the Commonwealth structure. Such conferences 
as are held should be advisory and consultative and their 
findings should not be binding unless approved by Parliament. 
" 
In London, Charles Ritchie had engaged in a forceful conver- 
sation with Geoffrey Crowther of The Economist, who 
in a 
leader of 5 February 1944, had stated that if Canada was not 
pleased with closer Commonwealth integration, she should con- 
tract out of the Commonwealth. Ritchie had replied that 
Canada would never do this, and received a compliment 
from 
the Prime Minister for his forthrightness. 
As for Crowther, 
King was not averse to minuting 
"the man is an ass" in the 
margin of Ritchie's letter. Ritchie to 
Wrong, 9 March 1944. 
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and New Zealand at their hurriedly drafted mutual ANZAC Agreement of 
1 January 1944? Perhaps Halifax was only guilty of harbouring mean- 
dering aristocratic thoughts of an earlier era, all too symptomatic 
of an Empire under duress and in decline. 
27 
There is no ready answer 
since the concept of a common policy always remained nebulous and 
confused. Halifax had advocated a common foreign policy through the 
unison of many voices; King had more or less argued that acting in 
unison was different from acting as a unit. On the surface, there 
appeared to be little difference in the perspectives of both men, 
other than the obvious attitudinal one of clinging to power and status 
in the one case, and acquiring it in the other. If a unitary Common- 
wealth policy was perceived by the British to be both politically and 
strategically organized, then there is more credibility in accepting 
the "testing the Dominions" theory, since Cranborne would propose 
plans for a Commonwealth defence policy at the Prime Ministers' Meet- 
ing in May 1944. Conversely, as was more probably the case at this 
time, a common policy was meant to become more of a "British Common- 
wealth" political entity, with defence falling under a separate agree- 
ment, then Halifax, Cranborne, Beaverbrook and Churchill were pro- 
bably swimming against the tide of the new world order, embodied in 
the plans being developed by their own officials for discussion at 
the conference tables of Dumbarton Oaks later in the year. The exis- 
ting state of affairs was amply demonstrated to Churchill a few months 
later when his regional councils scheme was soundly rejected by the 
prime ministers. 
A "single voice" Commonwealth policy could simply not function 
for four Dominions with so many diverse policy interests. Moreover, 
Dominion leaders did not really comprehend the domestic political 
fabric of their individual countries when it came to Commonwealth 
policies. For example, Herbert Evatt, the Australian Minister of 
External Affairs, told Mackenzie King that the latter's decisive 
27. Canadian interview subjects who were asked questions 
about a motive all believed that Halifax was merely reflecting 
ideas which were current at the time. Lord Garner has commen- 
ted that he and Malcolm MacDonald had disagreed on this point, 
MacDonald having perceived the speech as more of an opinion- 
gathering device. Interview with Lord Garner, 8 November 1979. 
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electoral victory of June 1945 would be perceived throughout Canada 
as a gigantic "slap" at Halifax. King was so perplexed by Evatt's 
remark that he wondered how the capital of Nova Scotia could possibly 
have become an election issue. 
28 
The Halifax speech may have given 
the denizens of the East Block much to consider, but there certainly 
was not a domestic political aftertaste. 
The discussion of Curtin's proposals at the Prime Ministers' 
Meeting in London in May 1944 was anticlimactic. References to a 
unitary Commonwealth policy were muted, probably as a result of the 
immediate aftermath of the Halifax speech and of MacDonald's soothing 
despatches from Ottawa: 
If we allow matters to develop in practice, without 
making challenging speeches on the theory of Empire unity 
or seeking abruptly to create new formal machinery for 
achieving it, Canada will undoubtedly become an increasingly 
co-operative and useful partner in the Commonwealth. By 
that method, Mr. Mackenzie King himself can be 'brought 
along'. 29 
Also, there were more important and certainly more concrete 
issues worthy of discussion. Numerous meetings were devoted to the 
military conduct of the war, although these were more characteristic 
of briefing sessions than consultative discussions. Perhaps the most 
fruitful talks were those concerning the proposed world security or- 
ganization, where it became clear that in spite of all fears, the 
Foreign Office had not planned for a "British Commonwealth and Empire" 
seat on the proposed Security Council. Predictably, as in his speech 
to the Canadian House of Commons, Mackenzie King expressed his satis- 
faction with the current structure and function of the British Com- 
monwealth, and when Cranborne brought forward proposals for Common- 
wealth defence, the Canadian Prime Minister responded in the non- 
committal fashion which was by now wholly expected of him in Common- 
wealth circles: the proposals were interesting, would merit further 
study, but of course he was in no position to commit the Canadian 
Government without engaging in prior consultation with his Cabinet 
colleagues. Pragmatic as the Australian scheme was, it was for this 
28. King Diary, 13 June 1945. 
29. Dominions Office, DO 35/1489, WC 75/35, memorandum by 
Malcolm MacDonald, "Imperial Co-operation", 11 March 1944. 
172 
reason too that Curtin's proposals were relegated to become almost a 
footnote to the proceedings, before being dismissed altogether as 
another one of many imaginative plans for what was increasingly be- 
coming an undefineable association. 
Mackenzie King repeated his message to those who needed to 
hear and heed it most - the politicians at Westminster. Having been 
asked to address the Houses of Parliament, King argued that Common- 
wealth unity could only be maintained by basing it upon principles 
which could be accepted by all nations, and stated: 
We cannot be too careful to see that, to our own 
peoples, the new methods will not appear as an attempt 
to limit their freedom of decision or, to peoples outside 
the Commonwealth, as an attempt to establish a separate 
bloc. Let us beware lest in changing the form, we lose 
the substance; or, for appearance's sake, sacrifice 
reality. I am told that, somewhere, over the grave of 
one who did not know when he was well off, there is the 
following epitaph: 'I was well; I wanted to be better; 
and here I am'. 3 
During the Prime Ministers' Meeting, King and his officials 
were shown a considerable amount of Foreign Office print from missions 
abroad, particularly from the British embassy in Washington. Halifax 
and his staff in their despatches stressed that if Commonwealth soli- 
darity was presented with emphasis on Imperial preference or on ex- 
clusivity of any kind, American willingness to consider plans for 
international political or economic cooperation would suffer. Robert- 
son was encouraged by this "sensible appreciation" of the Canadian 
position. 
31 
Although Halifax himself, like many others, still hank- 
ered for Commonwealth agreement on major lines of policy which would 
still allow members to "adapt their tactics to the needs of changing 
circumstances", he went much further in suggesting that the term 
"Dominion" would probably fall into desuetude and that in terms of 
the order of precedence, the senior representative of His Majesty 
in a nation's capital would not always be the representative of the 
United Kingdom. 
32 
Perhaps Halifax too was slowly "coming round". 
30. DEA file 6133-40, vol. 2, copy of Mackenzie King's speech 
at Westminster, 12 May 1944. 
31. DEA file 62(s), Robertson to Wrong, 10 May 1944. 
32. Dominions Office, DO 35/1204, W6458/1103/68, despatch no. 
379, Halifax to Eden, 14 April 1944. The despatch was later 
printed for confidential circulation as a memorandum. 
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The notion of the British Commonwealth as a great power in 
international politics did not readily fade away in functional areas 
of interest either. For example, the delegation of the United King- 
dom to the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia in the 
spring of 1944 was referred to in the official records of the meeting 
as the delegation of the "British Empire", which, as Mackenzie King 
pointed out, was a League anomaly which had been changed in 1927,33 
Indeed, Hume Wrong believed that the meeting of the prime ministers 
in May had if anything strengthened beliefs in the United Kingdom of 
the merits of a unitary Commonwealth policy, since in a debate at 
Westminster near the end of the month, every participant, including 
Churchill and Eden, spoke of the British Commonwealth as a great 
power. "All the speakers appeared to believe, " Wrong concluded, 
"that the Commonwealth would simultaneously and automatically go to 
war as a whole. "34 Canadian fears were somewhat allayed when Attlee's 
Labour Party came to power in 1945, but with them too there was often 
some cause for concern, particularly during the financial crisis in 
the autumn of 1947, when Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin advocated an 
Imperial Customs Union. On that occasion, Pearson observed that 
"There is a real danger of dramatic perfervid utterances in London 
making much more difficult here an already difficult situation. Bet- 
ween the dehydration of Mr. Attlee and the geysers of Mr. Bevin, I 
"35 prefer the former. 
Ironically and perhaps not surprisingly, it was not until 
the emergence of independent Asian members within the Commonwealth 
that the rhetoric of British politicians was succeeded by semblances 
of realism. Ironically, and not surprisingly, more realistic atti- 
tudes prevailed in the far-flung corners of the Commonwealth, as 
John Curtin's report to his parliament on the 1944 Prime Ministers' 
Meeting indicated: 
33. DEA file 6065-40, despatch no. 707, King to Massey, 
7 June 1944. 
34. DEA file 62(s), memorandum from Wrong to Robertson, 
26 June 1944. 
35. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 68, file D-12-5, 
Pearson to Robertson, 8 September 1947. 
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I do not seek to convert my friend, Mr. Mackenzie King, 
to my point of view any more than I can accept, from the 
Australian point of view, his opinion that the present means 
of co-operation has worked with complete success. A pre- 
eminent characteristic of the British Commonwealth is its 
diversity within the framework of its unity. 36 
**ý 
In the 1940s, Commonwealth consultation presented a curious 
dichotomy: it allowed Canada and the other Dominions to be informed 
and to an extent influence United Kingdom policy decisions, and in 
turn by following the mother country's lead, learn how to engage in 
diplomatic intercourse with others; yet on the other hand, consulta- 
tion often appeared to reinforce the concept of a unitary Commonwealth 
policy. Consultation had developed along a variety of lines: the 
Imperial Conferences, which in the 1940s were termed Prime Ministers' 
Meetings; telegraphic contact between the prime ministers, handled 
through the Dominions Office which had been established in 1925 and 
the respective Departments of External Affairs; the High Commissioners 
in situ in the Commonwealth capitals; and, becoming more prominent 
as air transport evolved, the numerous interchange of visits of minis- 
ters and officials. The process had become looser, through practice 
almost completely non-binding and certainly less one-sided. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the evolution and nature of consultative 
procedure will be largely ignored, its significance having been more 
than adequately examined in other works. 
37 
Instead, it may prove more 
useful to study briefly the less visible but for Canada more valuable 
dimension of Commonwealth consultation, that represented by attitudes 
toward consultation within the bureaucracy at Whitehall, and by the 
role of the High Commissioner in London and in Ottawa, as well as 
other representatives in the field. 
36. War Cabinet (U. K. ), CAB 66, WP(44)510, memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Cranborne), 9 Septem- 
ber 1944. Curtin made the speech on 17 July 1944. 
37. See, for example, Keith Hancock, Survey of r_t`sh 7:. - 
monweaZth Affairs; Problems of Nationality, 1ý18-193%' (London, 
1937); Nicholas Mansergh, Survey o British Commonwealt;, 
Affairs; Problems of Wartime Cooperation and 7 os t-: r' ,r Chance, 
1939-1., )52 (London, 1958) ; and Mansergh, he J_-=cr_L'eal h . 
-x- 
perience (London, 1969). For an approach which makes use of 
both British and Canadian documentary records, see Philip G. 
Wigley, L'J ada and the Trans-+ ion to Commonw, `-, 
Zth; 
Canadian Re? >'ý, 1ý? 1 -2»2 (London, 1977). 
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The role and status of the High Commissioner was not clearly 
defined in the 1940s, and indeed his consultative role was never ade- 
quately explained. Mackenzie King had always been exceedingly cau- 
tious - for the usual reasons - in allowing the Canadian High Commis- 
sioner in London to consult with the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs and other Cabinet ministers. In a 1929 letter to Leopold 
Amery, then Dominions Secretary, King had been blunt, his language 
noticeably Skeltonian: 
First of all, these conferences are either official or 
they are not. If they are not, they are unnecessary and 
should be avoided... If they are official, it would then 
appear that by continuing to countenance them, our Govern- 
ment would be helping to build up in London, in conjunction 
with the Secretary of State for the Dominions, a sort of 
Cabinet... the members of which will have had from their 
Governments no instructions of any kind and with respect 
to the doings of which their Governments, in the nature 
of things will have little or no knowledge. 38 
Clearly, the Canadian Prime Minister perceived the role of 
the High Commissioner to be more of a representative than an inter- 
locutor - with information continually being exchanged on the esta- 
blished channel of prime minister to prime minister - and as Canada's 
representative he "should hold a position corresponding in dignity, 
importance and status to that of the Ambassadors or Ministers who 
represent Foreign States. x, 
39 
When in 1936, Malcolm MacDonald, then 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, suggested similar meetings 
without minutes being taken, King's response was again unequivocal. 
The practical gains of regular meetings between the High Commissioner 
and the Dominions Secretary would be problematic and unhelpful in- 
ferences drawn abroad so certain, that: "it must be concluded there 
is no compelling case for improvising additions to the structure of 
the established procedure. "40 When a crisis atmosphere developed 
following the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939 
and Vincent Massey attended meetings between the High Commissioners 
38. DEA file 50020-40, King to Amery, 22 March 1927; in res- 
ponse to Amery to King, 24 December 1926. 
39. 
40. DEA file 50020-40, King to MacDonald, 16 June 1936; in 
response to MacDonald to King, 21 May 1936. 
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and the Dominions Secretary, King politely but firmly reprimanded him 
and instructed him to meet with the Dominions Secretary, Sir Thomas 
Inskip, on his own. 
41 
Massey could then only receive general infor- 
mation in this fashion, but when details and commitments were involved, 
conventional channels were the rule. In addition, Massey laboured 
under the weight of the personal distrust the Prime Minister had of 
him, King's assumption being that the High Commissioner's fondness 
for fraternizing with British aristocracy automatically tainted him as 
an imperialist. 
Yet during the war, a practice emerged of having High Commis- 
sioners' meetings on a daily basis, and Massey, like his peers, was 
in constant attendance. Although Massey made numerous valuable con- 
tributions to these discussions, he was often frustrated because he 
did not receive as much information as S. M. Bruce, the Australian High 
Commissioner, who in effect had British War Cabinet status. MacDonald, 
himself now British High Commissioner in Ottawa, upon reflecting on 
the way daily meetings had simply emerged, noted in a 1944 memorandum 
that "I am certain that if this child's birth had been publicly announced 
some years ago, it would have been still-born. "42 Although Mackenzie 
King still entertained suspicions of possible commitments arising from 
the daily meetings, he referred to them in his parliamentary reply to 
the Halifax speech as a proven and valuable means of consultation. 
King had even agreed to a suggestion by Curtin at the May 1944 Prime 
Ministers' Meeting to have the High Commissioners meet with the United 
Kingdom Prime Minister on a monthly basis. Having demolished Curtin's 
proposals for a secretariat, King could afford to be expansive and 
conciliatory, especially since neither Churchill nor Smuts were in 
attendance at the time. 
43 
Mackenzie King also realized that the nature 
of the war made numerous meetings inevitable, and Canada had a vested 
interest in being informed, especially on the state of Anglo-American 
relations. During this period, the Americans were reluctant to share 
41. DEA file 50020-40, King to Massey, 23 March 1939. 
42. Dominions Office, DO 35/1489, WC 75/35, memorandum by 
Malcolm MacDonald, "Imperial Co-operation", 11 March 1944. 
43. Dominions Office, DO 35/1490, WC 75/37, memorandum from 
Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary to the War Cabinet) to Churchill, 
17 May 1944. 
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too many documents with the Canadians, so the consultative link with 
the United Kingdom, in spite of occasionally audible remonstrances, 
had to remain strong. Paradoxically, it was precisely close consul- 
tation with the United Kingdom which inhibited any possible American 
overtures for closer consultation in Washington. 
A unique situation arose when the British government changed 
from Conservative to Labour in 1945. Labour parties were also in 
power in Australia and New Zealand and fraternal links between the 
parties in the three countries blossomed, no doubt encouraged by 
Michael Foot's sympathetic articles in the Daily Herald concerning 
the Antipodean positions at the San Francisco Conference, and Denis 
Healey's work in the party's international research bureau at Trans- 
port House. Australia in particular had expressed great interest in 
the peace settlement in the Pacific, and therefore desired closer and 
more formalized consultation, something which Canada of course did not 
wish at any cost. In order to appease the Australians, Lord Addison, 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in the new government, 
told the House of Lords in October 1945 that the policy of daily con- 
sultation with the High Commissioners, which had been the rule under 
his predecessor Cranborne, would be continued. Addison was guilty of 
a white lie, since both the Canadian and New Zealand High Commissioners 
were absent on home leave, and with Evatt's presence in London at the 
time, the Australian situation was, to put it mildly, irregular. 
44 
In 
over-reacting to the issue, Mackenzie King perhaps unwisely turned 
down an opportunity for Canada to exercise some influence by refusing 
to sanction his High Commissioner or a representative attending brief- 
ing sessions concerning meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
which were to consider the peace settlements. British officials had 
sensed - quite correctly as it later turned out - that Dominion opinions 
would not carry much weight at the general peace conference at Paris. 
Ironically, King had believed that Canada should deserve separate re- 
presentation on the Council45 and had forgotten the cardinal rule of 
44. DEA file 50020-40, Frederic Hudd (Canadian Deputy High 
Commissioner) to Hume Wrong, 27 October 1945; also Foreign 
Office, FO 371 Series, W9595/3523/68, minute by J. D. Greenway, 
1 July 1943. Evatt did not get along well with Bruce, the 
Australian High Commissioner and a former Prime Minister. 
45. King Diary, 28 August 1945. 
178 
Dumbarton Oaks - that Canada could not aspire so high as to be in the 
company of the great powers, but could, if the need arose, secure 
changes through close consultation with a sympathetic British delega- 
tion. Meetings of the High Commissioners in London continued, but 
only on an ad hoc basis. 
Mackenzie King must have heaved a sigh of relief when Norman 
Robertson succeeded the unlucky Vincent Massey in the autumn of 1946. 
Robertson was to share the temper of the Prime Minister when it came 
to the question of regularized meetings of the High Commissioners. 
Robertson had been out-manoeuvred by J. A. Beasley, the Australian 
High Commissioner, who in early 1947 had apparently secured general 
agreement for regular meetings. On this occasion, the Canadian in- 
structions came not from the Prime Minister but from Under-Secretary 
Lester Pearson: "It is felt that great caution should be exercised 
in this matter and that there should be no developments which would 
give the impression that a Cabinet of High Commissioners was being 
established, or any unnecessary institutional machinery., 
46 
Nothing 
came of the Australian initiative. When Lord Addison retired from 
his position at what had become the Commonwealth Relations Office in 
October 1947 in order to devote more of his energy to his role as 
government leader in the upper house, he was replaced by Philip Noel- 
Baker, who, through a combination of his "ardour of innocence" and a 
request from the South African High Commissioner again threw open the 
subject of frequent and regular meetings of Dominion representatives. 
Robertson reminded Noel-Baker that Addison's previous ready enthusiasm 
"47 for scheduled consultation had "soon petered out from inanition. 
Rumours and rhetoric effectively came to an end in December 1947 when 
the High Commissioners from the new Dominions of India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon were invited to the ad hoc meetings. Governing political con- 
siderations, particularly the dangerously widening gulf between East 
and West, necessitated an inevitable degree of differentiation, even 
within the meetings of the High Commissioners. Indeed, Robertson re- 
ceived messages from the Foreign Office implying that he would not 
miss much if he failed to attend certain meetings. Foreign Secretary 
46. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 428, cable no. 341, Pearson 
to Robertson, 28 February 1947. 
47. DEA file 50020-40, Robertson to Pearson, 13 November 1947. 
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Bevin would however be available following the meeting to discuss 
policy issues with the Canadian High Commissioner, and if this was 
inconvenient, Robertson could simply turn up at the Foreign Office 
for consultations the following day. The Canadians were also in 
favour of smaller gatherings. Constantly fearful about the effect 
of dreaded leaks on a domestic public opinion which was assumed to 
be more volatile than it was, Canada objected to having items from 
the agenda of the United Nations discussed on grounds of security. 
48 
The emergence of the new Commonwealth therefore quelled in practice 
any residual tendencies to develop what would appear to be a formal 
consultative body of High Commissioners in London. 
In Whitehall, Commonwealth affairs came under the purview of 
the Dominions Office, a department which often fought allegations 
from the Foreign and War Offices that it was little more than a glo- 
rified post office. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, as inter- 
national institutions were created, Foreign Office interest in the 
rules and the opinions of the Dominions grew, but with some corres- 
ponding impatience. - Although generally recognized that "full and 
constant consultation" - perhaps for the Foreign Office by now a 
euphemism for information transfers - with the Dominions was abso- 
lutely essential if the United Kingdom wished to succeed in maintain- 
ing the British Commonwealth as a key element of its foreign policy, 
there were frequent murmurs of discontent in the Foreign Office over 
the practical problems involved in Dominion consultation when policy 
decisions had to be hurriedly taken and over what was perceived to be 
an overly old-fashioned and avuncular attitude exhibited 
by the Domi- 
nions Office. According to Gladwyn Jebb, the threat of the 
foreign 
Office becoming "muscle-bound" as a result was a constant danger. 
"Generally speaking, " he informed Sir Alexander Cadogan 
in May 1943, 
"I have the slight impression that the Dominions Office are on some 
occasions more royalist than the King and so sensitive of 
Dominion 
opinion that they hardly welcome any expression of views 
by His Majes- 
48. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2105, file AR 405/1/4-20, 
vol. 1, cable from Robertson to Pearson, 
16 July 1948. 
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ty's Government at all. "49 In practice, the timing of consultation 
was deemed to be more vital than its continuity. For example, did 
Dominion silence on an issue on which information had been distri- 
buted, indicate approval, disquiet, acquiescence or lack of interest 
in the policy line taken? Why bother with consultation at all when 
Dominion unanimity was impossible to achieve? 
In order to both ease the growing consultative burden borne 
by the Dominions Office and to protect Foreign Office interests, a 
Dominions Intelligence Department was formed within the Foreign Office 
in 1942. Essentially, the Department provided a valuable service to 
the Dominions in allowing the High Commissions access to all Foreign 
Off ice political summary telegrams, and served as a direct conduit 
for more secret information which the High Commissions could pass on 
to their governments. The general rule was that the Dominions Office 
should assume responsibility for communicating official policy to the 
High Commissioners, while the Dominions Intelligence Department would 
supply "informal guidance" and factual information directly to the 
High Commissions. Vincent Massey quite rightly identified the new 
system as one which would broaden and not duplicate consultation, and 
for the most part, this was indeed the case. 
50 
But where the Dominions Intelligence Department appeared to be 
the ideal mechanism in theory, in practice there were numerous limi- 
tations to its efficiency. Contacts between the High Commissions and 
the Department were at a relatively junior level, and the more secret 
documents were not discussed. Telegrams and despatches read during 
the war at the daily High Commissioners' meetings were usually of a 
more classified nature, but their content was imparted hurriedly, and 
in spite of Cranborne's entreaties for greater circulation of more 
49. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W8107/4084/68, minute from 
Jebb to Cadogan, 31 May 1943; also office circular no. 14, 
"Consultation with Dominion Governments", 31 May 1943. As an 
example, Jebb cited the UNRRA episode and stated that Canada 
had backed down from its rigid position while the Dominions 
Office had prophesied doom. 
50. Pearson Papers, Pre 1948 Series, vol. 1, Massey to Pearson, 
4 March 1942; also FO 371 Series, W4373/4084/68, memorandum, 
"The Dominion Work of the Dominions Intelligence Department", 
13 January 1943. 
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secret telegrams to the High Commissioners - all "responsible and 
discreet" men - Churchill, who was obsessed with security, refused 
to soften his position to allow wider circulation. 
51 
Further, Sir 
Basil Newton, a senior diplomat who had to be given a position some- 
where before his impending retirement, was charged with the super- 
vision of the Dominions Intelligence Department. He had no real 
practical knowledge of the concerns of the Dominions, having, like 
his entire staff, never served in a Dominion. Upon different occa- 
sions, Newton ventured schemes for a "Dominions Corner" at the Foreign 
Office, where it was envisaged that Dominions' representatives could 
sit and consult with British officials and each other in agreeable 
surroundings perhaps quaintly reminiscent of an earlier age. Newton 
went so far as to actually attempt to create a separate reporting net- 
work in the Dominion capitals, a move which provoked the ire of Domi- 
nions Office officials, since political reporting in Commonwealth 
capitals was already very capably carried out by Dominions Office 
officers abroad. In Ottawa, for example, the Foreign Office member 
of the High Commission was of very junior rank, and was responsible 
for coordinating the bomber transport run across the Atlantic, not 
for frequent consultation with East Block officials. 
52 
Newton's 
system survived only one series of despatches from Commonwealth capi- 
tals, thereby demonstrating yet again the chief problem confronting 
the Foreign Office in its dealings with the Dominions: unfamiliarity 
and impatience. 
When it came to outright disagreement with a Dominion over a 
question of high policy, the Foreign Office was more prone to exhibit 
51. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W16621/15409/68, Cranborne 
to Eden, 16 November 1944; Churchill to Eden, 21 January 1945. 
52. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W12539/4084/68, Allan Mait- 
land (of the U. K. High Commission in Ottawa) to J. D. Greenway 
(of the Dominions Intelligence Department, Foreign Office), 
19 August 1943. When Maitland's single report, which concerned 
itself mainly with the activities of John Grierson and the 
National Film Board, did not come up to expectations, Newton 
suggested that he be replaced. W16485/4084/68, minute by Sir 
Basil Newton, 4 November 1943. Lord Garner has stated that the 
Dominions Intelligence Department did much to aggravate the 
tension which already existed between the Foreign and Dominion 
Offices. Interview with Lord Garner, 8 November 1979. 
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intolerance than the Dominions Office. This was particularly evident 
in Canada's fight for recognition of the functional principle in its 
initial stages, when one Foreign Office official dryly observed that 
"the Dominions have not yet realized the grave responsibilities which 
membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations implies .,, 
53 
The 
passage of time and a change of government in the United Kingdom did 
not do much to change prevailing attitudes of impatience within the 
Foreign Office when there was a need for quick policy decisions. As 
late as March 1947, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had upon the ad- 
vice of his officials suggested a review of consultative procedures, 
since it was found too difficult to accept the necessity of consul- 
tation when events were moving too quickly. The Permanent Under- 
Secretary in the Dominions Office, Sir Eric Machtig, in turn argued 
the feelings of his Department, which was that the Dominions should 
be brought into consultations at an earlier stage in policy develop- 
ment. The Foreign Office then conceded that the best thing to do 
would be to send a circular memorandum around the department reminding 
everyone to keep the welfare of the Dominions in mind in their work 
and to observe the effects of this memorandum before any further mea- 
sures were taken. 
54 
Such circulars merely served as placebos and did 
little to change long-standing views. 
Although the Dominions Office was at times perceived by both 
the Foreign Office and the Dominions themselves as being somewhat 
over-protective of Dominion interests - which were at any rate not 
always uniform - it exhibited a greater propensity to accept and even 
encourage the evolution of the Commonwealth along lines preferable to 
Canada. Frequently, attitudinal changes were more a product of mis- 
sives originating from British High Commissions abroad than from the 
Whitehall "think-tank. " In this sense, Malcolm MacDonald's position 
as High Commissioner to Canada assumed special significance. MacDonald 
53. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, U1677/70, minute by J. D. 
Greenway, 12 April 1943. 
54. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W2552/1011/68, Bevin to 
Addison, 20 March 1947; also W2803/1011/68, Sir Eric Machtig 
to Sir Orme Sargent (Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the 
Foreign Office), 11 April 1947; Sargent to Machtig, 21 April 
1947. Bevin had been angry over Evatt's complaint at British 
failure to consult Australia regarding the signing of the Anglo- 
French Alliance. 
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had the trust and confidence of Mackenzie King - which is more than 
Massey ever enjoyed - and this, coupled with his personal friendship 
with both Robertson and Heeney, allowed him great familiarity with 
both the making and the makers of Canadian foreign policy. Although 
relations with Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, who succeeded MacDonald in 
1946, would be very cordial, they would not attain the same level of 
intimacy. 
Consistently, MacDonald's despatches were filled with refer- 
ences to the great abilities of Canadian ministers and officials, 
which related to the assertion made by the High Commissioner "that 
Canada has 'grown-up' in the last few years, despite all her internal 
difficulties, she has found herself. " Observing also that Canada was 
"hyperconscious" of its status as a free nation, MacDonald noted that 
Canadian officials were ever-vigilant lest the association with the 
United Kingdom appear to others as not free but slavish. Britain 
had greatly under-rated Canada's quality in the past and had to be 
cognizant of the sensitivity of Canadian feelings regarding American 
opinion and temperament. Perhaps idealistically, and in that much 
like the Canadians themselves, MacDonald believed that Canada could 
act as a bridge between the United Kingdom and the United States 
since Canada was a nation with "deep-set British traditions living 
in an essentially North American environment., 
55 
MacDonald's opti- 
mism was somewhat premature. By late 1945, however, MacDonald had 
not changed any of his views demonstrably, and although he did not 
doubt there was a tendency within Canada to exaggerate things, Canada's 
position in the world was nonetheless growing in importance. Further- 
more, continued good relations between Britain and Canada were essen- 
tial to the continued well-being of the Commonwealth, and therefore 
to the maintenance of the United Kingdom's position in the world. 
56 
Undoubtedly the weight of MacDonald's views, together with 
those of Stephen Holmes, a similarly inclined official of the Dominions 
55. Foreigh Office, FO 371 Series, W4917/2990/68, memorandum 
by MacDonald, "The Post-War Position of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations", 23 February 1943. 
56. Dominions Office, DO 35/1487, WC 75/22, memorandum by Mac- 
Donald, "United Kingdom Representation in Canada after the War; 
Relations between Britain and Canada", 6 November 1945. 
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Office who in 1943 had been appointed counsellor at the British embassy 
in Washington in recognition of a strong Dominion presence in the 
American capital, helped to both mould opinion and avoid bureaucra- 
tic pratfalls at Whitehall. The despatches and memoranda forwarded 
by the two men, printed and widely circulated through both the Foreign 
and Dominion Offices and often passed on to the War Cabinet, obviated 
the need for any policy-formulating function for the Dominions Intel- 
ligence Department. Whereas MacDonald and Holmes had both written 
of the need to treat Canada as an equal which was rapidly developing 
into a recognized power in its own right, the Dominions Intelligence 
Department in mid 1944 still toyed with anachronistic schemes of 
personnel exchanges between the various Departments of External 
Affairs and the Foreign Office for training purposes. Sir Eric Mach- 
tig, who correctly perceived this plan as one which would provoke 
cries of "centralization" from Canada and from his own Dominions 
Office, praised the theoretical intent of the scheme, but diploma- 
tically concluded that its implementation was another matter alto- 
gether, and that the proposal "rather goes off the rails .,, 
57 
In order to meet the needs of what was clearly becoming a 
more expansive and complex Commonwealth relationship, the bureau- 
cracy in London changed following the war. There had been some spe- 
culation during 1945 that the Dominions Office would be merged with 
the Colonial Office, a view which Hume Wrong and his disciples did 
not share, believing instead that a merger between the Dominion and 
Foreign Offices would be a more logical recourse since it "would 
make the real nature of the Dominions Office more obvious without 
at the same time losing for us some of the advantages which the 
Dominions Office provides. " 
58 
As it happened, the Dominions Office 
became the Commonwealth Relations Office in mid-1947, and as such 
also absorbed the India and Burma Offices. The office of the new 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations now occupied the same 
57. Dominions Office, DO 35/1204, WX 75/39, minute by Machtig, 
4 May 1944 on Foreign Office memorandum "Programme of Contri- 
butions from the Foreign Office towards Commonwealth Collabo- 
ration", April 1944, (W5904/1103/68). 
58. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
John Holmes to Hume Wrong, 31 October 1945. 
185 
chambers where Joseph Chamberlain had planned the Boer War and Win- 
ston Churchill had made decisions about Palestine in 1922 - hardly 
an historical atmosphere which inspired optimism, according to Fred- 
eric Hudd, second-in-command at Canada House. 
59 
An Official Cabinet 
Committee on Commonwealth Relations was also brought into being by 
July 1947, more or less because of the imminent independence of India 
and Burma. The expansion of Commonwealth membership was not the 
committee's sole concern, as consideration was given to the question 
of the status of High Commissioners and ambassadors, 
60 
equality in 
their order of precedence not being achieved until late 1948. The 
Dominions Intelligence Department had also become the Commonwealth 
Liaison Department and with the change in name had also come a change 
of intent: instead of solely keeping other parts of the Commonwealth 
informed of United Kingdom policy, the Department was now to concen- 
trate as much on keeping the Foreign Office posted on Commonwealth 
affairs. In addition, Sir Basil Newton had retired and had been re- 
placed by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, a former inspector of British mis- 
sions abroad, and a strong advocate of Foreign Office reform. 
61 
Mackenzie King, though constantly suspicious of British de- 
signs at this time, must have observed the changes with something 
of an approving eye. When it came to nomenclature, King preferred 
the use of the term "Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs", 
since it appeared to indicate more clearly the nature of the office 
and for the entirely predictable reason that "It has been our ex- 
perience that the term 'Dominions' as applied to some members of 
"62 the Commonwealth tends to be misinterpreted here and abroad. 
59. DEA file 5617-40, Hudd to Robertson, 15 October 1947. 
Robertson was in Ottawa at the time to assist in financial 
discussions. 
60. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W4995/4414/68, Minutes of 
the First Meeting of the Official Cabinet Committee on Com- 
monwealth Relations, 4 July 1947. 
61. DEA file 5617-40, Holmes to Pearson, 16 July 1947. 
62. Ibid., cable from King to Attlee, 14 June 1947. Fraser 
of New Zealand favoured "relations", Smuts preferred 
"affairs", 
and Chifley of Australia thought the question should be dis- 
cussed at a Commonwealth conference at Canberra at the end of 
August. Cable from Addison to St. Laurent, 23 June 1947. 
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With the growing Dominion presence in foreign capitals, con- 
sultative development was characterized by a paradox not unlike the 
one mentioned in the context of a common policy: consultation with 
United Kingdom representatives in foreign capitals was beneficial 
to Canada, but too much could lead the host country to entertain a 
distorted view of the relationship. Of greatest value were the 
fortnightly meetings at the British embassy in Washington which had 
developed during the war. Presided over by the United Kingdom am- 
bassador, the gatherings were attended by the Dominion heads of mis- 
sion, the Chiefs of the British Joint Staff Mission, and by repre- 
sentatives of special branches of the British embassy, such as food 
and finance. Another series of fortnightly meetings were held in 
turn in the chanceries of the Commonwealth missions, where the se- 
cond-in-command usually attended what was invariably an informal 
and wide-ranging discussion of global issues and domestic develop- 
ments in each of the Commonwealth countries. Pearson acknowledged, 
as had Wrong earlier in the decade, that the combination of a high 
turnover of officials and the wide-ranging course of discussions 
made the major meetings at the British embassy exceedingly difficult 
to record for transmission to the East Block in Ottawa. Although 
concerned about security at these large meetings, Pearson valued 
much of the secret military information which was offered, but des- 
paired when it seemed that the meetings too often became "grouse 
sessions about the inefficiency of the Americans., 
63 
One is led to 
conclude that the meetings served more as a barometer on the nature 
of British reaction to American policy trends and less as a forum 
for the Dominions to express concerns which had already been commu- 
nicated to the British through the usual channels. In the Canadian 
case, however, when issues arose which were perceived by Ottawa as 
being more trilateral in nature, such as relief and international 
civil aviation, good use was made of the Commonwealth representatives' 
63. Pearson Diary, 17 April 1943; also Wrong Papers, vol. 3, 
file 22, Pearson to Robertson, 17 March 1945: "I do not like 
the critical and suspicious atmosphere that seems to be in- 
creasing at these meetings. British officials give me the 
impression that they are finding it more and more difficult 
to be patient in the face of what they consider to be unjust 
criticisms and attacks, and less willing to admit that these 
may not always be as unjust as they think. " 
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meetings to restate and circulate the Canadian position. 
64 
Care was 
also always taken to prevent the Americans from interpreting the 
meetings as common policy-making sessions. 
Where there was more Canadian nervousness about meetings 
with the British in the United States, particularly during 1943, 
was in relation to the establishment of the first functional orga- 
nizations, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra- 
tion (UNRRA), and the Interim Committee on Food and Agriculture. 
Particularly anxious about prejudicing the position taken in regard 
to independent membership on the Central Committee of UNRRA, Canada, 
with its fellow Dominions, uneasily agreed to attend meetings sug- 
gested by the United Kingdom delegation at the food and agriculture 
conference held at Hot Springs, Virginia in May 1943. A case in 
point illustrated the dilemma: the British delegation, eager to have 
a Commonwealth party to celebrate Empire Day, quickly discovered that 
the four Dominions could not agree among themselves whether to attend. 
On the final day of the conference, the United Kingdom gave a party 
for its own members and informally invited the Dominions to attend, 
which they did, without any apparent scruples. As one member of the 
Dominions Intelligence Department summed up the situation in London: 
"The Dominions will only co-operate if they are not formally bound 
to do so... they prefer us to give the party and pay for the drinks. 
They then feel free to come or not as they like, and to damn us 
heartily afterwards. " 
65 
Hot Springs had in fact been the first in- 
ternational conference for the new world order, and fortunately for 
all concerned, Commonwealth conference consultation had largely left 
pettiness behind by the time of the Dumbarton Oaks meetings in 1944, 
where meetings of the non-participating Dominions with British re- 
presentatives were a necessity and greater issues were at stake. 
64. DEA file 51-C(s), despatch no. 2105, Pearson to King, 
11 September 1943. Pearson took advantage of Churchill's 
presence at the meeting to bring up the topic of interna- 
tional civil aviation. 
65. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W11982/4567/68, unsigned 
minute, 21 June 1943. Another anonymous view: 
"My definite 
impression is that the Canadians, who were noticeably more 
grown up than the other Dominion representatives, 
definitely 
thought that the Australians and others were being rather 
childish... I do feel -I may be wrong - that the younger 
Cana- 
dians are getting beyond the schoolboy stage. 
" 
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In Moscow, a similar system operated as in Washington with 
meetings being held every second Saturday morning at the British 
embassy. Because of the paucity of evidence on practically all 
issues within the Soviet Union, it was a sensible idea to compare 
what one had with others, and where so much reporting was based upon 
speculation, to share one's findings and opinions with those of other 
parties, including the United States. The British and Americans were 
also often recipients of information from the Canadians, as Dana Wil- 
gress' expertise as ambassador with fluency in Russian and a career 
which had started as a youthful Canadian trade representative in 
Russia during the Great War was universally appreciated. The Com- 
monwealth meetings continued after the war, and although John Holmes, 
who served as Charge d'Affaires in Moscow from 1946 to 1948, believed 
that the meetings should become less formal and more of an open forum, 
he nevertheless wrote Lester Pearson in Ottawa that the greatest value 
of the gatherings was that by pooling information they produced a 
clearing of minds on the nature of events in the Soviet Union. To 
allay anxious minds in the East Block, Holmes also stated: "I have 
no reason to believe that the holding of these meetings has led to 
any misunderstanding by foreign missions of the nature of the Com- 
monwealth. "66 Pearson, not convinced, replied: 
Whatever the attitude of other foreign missions in 
Moscow may be, it seems to me that the Soviet Government's 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Commonwealth may be 
considerably increased by what must appear to them as the 
spectacle of managers of subordinate offices going every 
fortnight to the Head Office of the Commonwealth in Moscow 
for instructions and enlightenment. 
67 
Pearson had been concerned about the security risk imposed 
by Indian representatives being privy to the discussions, especially 
while in Washington top secret negotiations for a military alliance 
against the Soviet Union were underway. Pearson's subordinates in 
Moscow evidently did not hold the Soviets to be as naive as he ap- 
parently did, and as John Watkins, an officer at the Canadian embassy 
wrote to Escott Reid, there was never any doubt that the 
Kremlin knew 
66. DEA file 50386-A-40, despatch no. 278, Holmes to Pearson, 
14 July 1948. Also interview with Arnold Smith, 6 June 1980. 
67. Ibid., Pearson to Holmes, 23 July 1948. 
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who influenced whom and what was what in the Commonwealth relation- 
ship. 
68 
The San Francisco Conference had after all demonstrated to 
the world the lack of a unitary Commonwealth policy. In 1946, a 
Commonwealth cacaphony had erupted in the first session of the Gene- 
ral Assembly of the United Nations, as India assailed South Africa 
over the treatment of its Indian population. Earlier, following the 
Halifax speech in Toronto, Molotov had remarked to Wilgress that 
Mackenzie King had taught Lord Halifax his lesson. 69 Where the 
Soviet Union could use the existence of the meetings for its own 
purposes was in trying to subvert Indian's chances of remaining in 
the Commonwealth as a republic. Constitutionally, the nature of 
the Commonwealth was probably clearer to the Soviets than to the 
Americans. 
Pearson, no doubt aware of the above considerations, was 
nevertheless fearful of the external appearance of Commonwealth con- 
sultation in foreign capitals. He wished meetings to be ad hoc, 
and when he discovered in July 1948 that there were informal weekly 
meetings of Commonwealth representatives in Nanking, he was not 
pleased: "There are considerations which make it necessary to take 
a somewhat reserved attitude towards standardization of the practice, 
as well as towards discussion of certain subjects at such meetings. "7° 
The gatherings did not become regular. 
Informal meetings took place in other foreign capitals, but 
these were irregular and without much significance. In a few Latin 
American countries, for example, the presence of nationalistic 
French Canadian representatives in capitals where British diplomats 
were generally of the "old school", added some fireworks to consul- 
tation, especially when other Commonwealth members were not repre- 
sented. Although not quite causing a crisis in Anglo-Canadian rela- 
tions, there was embarrassment in both London and Ottawa when the 
British minister in Havana labelled his Canadian counterpart a 
"se- 
paratist" - that is, meaning separation from the British 
Empire - 
68. DEA file 50385-A-40, despatch no. 278, Watkins to Reid, 
10 January 1949. 
69. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 344, file 3712, Wilgress to 
King, 4 March 1944. Molotov had expressed great interest in 
King's speech in Parliament. 
70. DEA file 50386-A-40, Pearson to T. C. Davis (Canadian Am- 
bassador to China), 22 July 1948. 
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and when Sir D. Gainer, British ambassador to Brazill, referred to 
his Canadian colleague Jean Desy, as a "pompous, vain and self- 
advertising little man... and I begin to suspect that he'renders only 
li service to the Empire. .. "7l P Clearly, Commonwealth consultation 
was not feasible on all fronts. 
Although Canada had passed on copies of despatches to the 
United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members, particularly reports 
which emanated from the consulate in Greenland, various missions in 
Latin America, and from Wilgress in Moscow - each time to effusive 
gratitude from London - it was not until late 1949 that a standard- 
ized system for distribution of Canadian print to Commonwealth coun- 
tries other than the United Kingdom was implemented. The advantages 
of keeping other member countries as fully informed as possible, 
thereby encouraging them to do the same, appealed to Canada, but 
there was an ulterior motive: Canadian membership on the Security 
Council was due to expire. 
72 
Before this time information had been 
shared on an ad hoc basis, and was often informally imparted at in- 
ternational conferences, or at the request of the resident High Com- 
missioner. The path of communication between Dominion capitals was 
used, but it was not well-worn. Consultation between the Dominions 
was characterized by a certain awkwardness and even unilateralism, 
which in turn emphasized the divergent interests and priorities of 
the countries. Instances were numerous: South Africa frequently 
consulted Canada through Canada House in London instead of directly 
or through the Canadian High Commissioner in Cape Town; Herbert 
Evatt failed to make the requisite courtesy call on the Canadian 
71. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W6688/266/68, report from 
Sir D. Gainer, 10 June 1946; W1192/102/68, Dodds (UK minister 
to Cuba) to Mason (Foreign Office), 14 January. The Canadians 
were quite descriptive about their British counterparts as well. 
King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 232, file 2260, memorandum from 
Robertson to King, 25 April 1946. 
72. DEA file 10984-C-40, draft memorandum by R. A. D. Ford, 
"Distribution of Information to other Commonwealth Governments", 
1 November 1949. Also letter from Wilgress (now High Commis- 
sioner to the U. K. ) to Heeney (now Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs), 28 June 1949. Wilgress believed that in- 
creased Canadian willingness to distribute information would 
help to convince the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Foreign Office to give Canada preferential treatment regarding 
information concerning the North Atlantic area and Western 
Europe. 
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High Commissioner in Canberra before departing for an official visit 
to Ottawa; and Canada launched its draft convention for an interna- 
tional civil aviation authority on its unsuspecting peers- 
73 
In view of this tendency toward unilateral action, which the 
United Kingdom had-also not failed to exhibit when warranted by ex- 
pediency, there was by 1948 a growing belief in Britain and in Aus- 
tralia that there should be some form of regularization of consul- 
tative practice so that consultation could take place early while 
policy was still in its formative stages. As a result, the meeting 
of prime ministers in October 1948 duly produced a statement on Com- 
monwealth consultation which, in addition to affirming existing 
practices, called for meetings of the prime ministers to be held as 
often as practicable, with meetings of foreign ministers possibly 
taking place twice a year, the first to take place in Ceylon in May 
1949.74 Louis St. Laurent, already leader of the Liberal Party but 
not yet Prime Minister, was summoned to London to act for the ailing 
Mackenzie King who was confined to his suite at the Dorchester Hotel. 
St. Laurent indicated that it would be more in the interests of the 
Commonwealth if there was no rigidity or formalization - meetings of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations offered a more natural 
setting for consultation amongst foreign ministers. Both Canada and 
South Africa reserved their positions on the proposal, but signifi- 
cantly, India, Pakistan and Ceylon - now represented as Dominions at 
their first Prime Ministers' Meeting - were in favour. The text of 
the proposal was not completed, pending subsequent agreement on the 
frequency of the meetings and their venue. In the telegraphic con- 
sultation which followed, Canada and South Africa firmly indicated 
their unwillingness to give in and the proposal for 
formal meetings 
73. DEA file 50020-40, Holmes to Wrong, 11 May 1946; also K. A. 
Greene (Canadian High Commissioner to Australia) to Pearson, 
27 May 1948. The Australians had been particularly grateful 
for copies of despatches from the Canadian Charge 
d'Affaires 
in Prague where Australia was not represented. F. M. 
Forde 
(Australian High Commissioner to Canada) to Pearson, 6 Decem- 
ber 1947. 
74. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 325, file 3416, copy of 
U. K. 
paper PMM(48)16 (revise), 
"Commonwealth Consultation", 21 
October 1948. 
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was eventually abandoned. 
75 
Practical Commonwealth consultation at the United Nations was 
realized, as were meetings which would discuss specific fields such 
as finance and education. When viewed against the modes of consul- 
tation which had developed in London, in foreign capitals, and in 
Ottawa, it should come as no surprise that the Canadians were gener- 
ally content - as Mackenzie King often said - with the "existing 
nature of consultation". But this "existing nature" had been in a 
state of flux and change during the 1940s, and had led ultimately 
to what was preferable to Canada: an inside view of the making of 
great power policy and an opportunity to influence policy which 
could affect continuing bilateral and newfound multilateral Cana- 
dian concerns. To a degree, the Commonwealth had begun to reflect 
Canada's functional principle. 
75. DEA file 50023-40, memorandum, 
"Meetings of Commonwealth 
Ministers responsible for foreign affairs: proposals of 
1948 
and discussion of them", 15 December 
1949. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NEW COMMONWEALTH 
In 1884, Lord Rosebery uttered what in retrospect can be con- 
sidered to have been both an inventive and prophetic remark: "There 
is no need for any nation, however great, leaving the Empire, because 
the Empire is a Commonwealth of all Nations. "l The coming of inde- 
pendence of the Asian colonies of the Empire during the late 1940s 
marked the greatest transition of the character of the Commonwealth 
as well as the greatest challenge to Rosebery's definition of it. 
The central question was whether the emerging nations of Eastern Asia 
would decide at independence to remain within the association, or pre- 
fer to assume what was seen as complete independence without it, as 
Ireland and Burma eventually did. The emergence of new members as 
republics within an association whose membership had heretofore rested 
1. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2352, anonymous memo- 
randum of 4 June 1947. Lionel Curtis had been thought to be the 
originator of the expression "Commonwealth of Nations". Curtis 
acknowledged that Rosebery had first used the phrase, but stated 
that it had entered his own head independently. Letter from 




on a constitutional common denominator, certainly represented a radi- 
cal change. Although not quite as visible but also important in 
heralding a new era in Commonwealth realtions, was the collapse of 
the idea of a concerted Commonwealth defence system, which had al- 
ways lurked beneath the surface of Commonwealth relations for the 
better part of the century. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
Canadian attitudes and involvement in both areas of change. 
At the San Francisco Conference, Mackenzie King had confided 
his brooding and pessimistic thoughts on peace and the dangers of 
renewed warfare to his diary. To him, the election of Clement Attlee's 
Labour Party in the United Kingdom immediately following the conference 
had appeared as a bright spot on an increasingly troubled horizon. Here 
was a government which unlike the previous Conservative one was not 
founded upon "force and power", and what was more, the Canadian Prime 
Minister was relieved "that at Imperial Conferences and Peace Confer- 
ences I know I will not have to be bucking centralized Imperialism 
again. "2 Time would prove King to have been overly optimistic. Upon 
his first meeting with the new Labour Government in November 1945, 
when Mackenzie King had journeyed to London to discuss the implica- 
tions of the revelation of a Soviet espionage ring in Ottawa, he was 
asked by Attlee and Addison to offer his views on how to better 
strengthen the coordination of the defence of the Empire. 
The Canadian Prime Minister had been unfailingly consistent 
in expressing himself on this subject since 1923, when the Imperial 
Conference had affirmed "that it is for the Parliaments of the several 
parts of the Empire, upon the recommendations of their retrospective 
Governments to decide the nature and extent of any action which should 
be taken by them. " In 1926 and again at the 1937 Imperial Conference, 
the right of the individual Dominions to control their own defence 
policies was re-stated, but encouragement was given for freer inter- 
change of military information, standardization of military equip- 
ment, cooperation for the defence of communications installations, 
and for continuance of arrangements some of the Dominions 
had with 
Britain for concerting the scale of defences of ports. The Dominions 
had also been consistently invited to participate through represen- 
2. King Diary, 26 July 1945. 
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tatives on a Committee of Imperial Defence, a body which had existed 
since 1911. Canada had taken its place on the Committee before the 
First World War but eschewed participation thereafter. The Second 
World War, according to a 1948 Canadian Cabinet memorandum, had for- 
cibly demonstrated the vulnerability of Canadian dependence upon 
United Kingdom sources for arms and equipment, a problem also illus- 
trated by the difficulties encountered when the United States and 
Canadian forces undertook joint operations later in the war. As a 
result there was a growing realization within governing circles in 
Canada - especially within the East Block - that cooperation in the 
military field with the United States was at least as important as 
working together with the United Kingdom. 
3 
Following the formation 
of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940, Canadian and Ameri- 
can defence interests became more closely allied, a development which 
paralleled tendencies towards closer economic and industrial integra- 
tion between the two countries. 
Mackenzie King instinctively abhorred the idea of a shared 
Commonwealth defence scheme controlled from London, whether as part 
of a unitary foreign policy or as an entity unto itself in the form 
of the Committee on Imperial Defence. His reaction to anything which 
smacked of centralization - as Curtin and Halifax discovered to their 
dismay - was always negative, regardless from which quarter proposals 
emanated. But there was a method to what many - particularly British 
officials - saw as the Canadian Prime Minister's paranoia. King 
earnestly believed that the slightest encouragement from his govern- 
ment, even on a technical matter, would cause British Conservatives, 
those who in his eyes were concerned with "force and power", to em- 
bark on new and to him more preposterous schemes for Commonwealth 
defence centralization. His belief was not completely unfounded. 
When a Canadian Joint Staff Mission was officially created in London 
in March 1944, Cranborne, though disappointed that the Canadians 
would not agree to have the mission serve as a direct link between 
the Canadian and the British Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless indicated 
his optimism in a letter to Churchill: 
3. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
memorandum, "Defence Cooperation within the Commonwealth", 
2 October 1948. 
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We are hoping after the war for the closest possible 
collaboration, militarily and otherwise, within the British 
Commonwealth. Canada has, as you know, at times displayed 
a tendency to pursue an independent line and to seek closer 
cooperation with the United States rather than with us. This proposal for closer liaison in London in the military 
sphere is, coming as it does from the Canadian Government, 
a rare and encouraging sign for future collaboration. 4 
It was Cranborne too, who, following the embarrassing with- 
drawal of Curtin's plans for a rudimentary Commonwealth secretariat 
at the May 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, introduced proposals for 
Post-war Commonwealth defence coordination. Cranborne suggested a 
standing committee of the Imperial Conference which would deal with 
strategic questions; regular meetings between Defence Ministers and 
Chiefs of Staff of Commonwealth members; an extended system for inter- 
change of military staffs; exchange and training of officers through 
defence colleges; studies of how industrial potential could be co- 
ordinated throughout the Commonwealth; and the continuation on a 
common model of the organization, training and equipment of forces 
throughout the Commonwealth. Peter Fraser, the Prime Minister of 
New Zealand, also circulated a note which called for increased plan- 
ning powers for the Committee of Imperial Defence and the establish- 
ment of local committees in the Dominions and colonies which would 
be responsible to the central committee in London. 
5 
Before the prime ministers gathered in London, the philosophy 
expressed by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee was that the ideas 
of a world security system as envisioned in the Foreign Office's 
"United Nations Plan" and of a coordinated Imperial defence policy 
were not incompatible. The British Commonwealth could therefore take 
its "proper place" in a world security system, and to do so, "the 
individual Governments of the Commonwealth must be ready to bear their 
4. Dominions Office, DO 121/10A, Cranborne to Churchill, 28 
March 1944. 
5. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 322, file 3407, copy of United 
Kingdom document PMM(44)14,15 May 1944. At the end of his note, 
Fraser had added that his proposals should not be regarded "as 
detracting from the necessity for and the importance of an ade- 
quate and effective World Security Organisation such as is con- 
templated in the Moscow Declaration, 1943. " 
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full share in our general defensive organisation, and to undertake 
commitments which may appear to limit to some extent their indepen- 
dent sovereignty. "6 Moreover, a British Commonwealth defence system 
would be securely in place if, as it might happen, the global system 
would collapse. Nothing could have been further from the Canadian 
point of view, either traditionally or in relation to the way the 
functional principle was being adapted by Hume Wrong and his charges 
in the Post-Hostilities Problems Committee in Ottawa. As Norman 
Robertson informed the Prime Minister on the day of the presentation 
of Cranborne's and Fraser's proposals: 
Main security problem after the war is world security, 
not regional or Commonwealth security. It would be unreal- 
istic to consider defence arrangements between Commonwealth 
countries as in any way an alternative or substitute for a 
strong world security organisation to which each of us will 
have to make our appropriate and proportionate contribution .7 
As it happened, there was virtually no discussion of Cran- 
borne's proposals, and they were deferred for further consideration 
at an unspecified date. Mackenzie King, having told the meeting 
that such questions were best discussed in peace-time, returned with 
the proposals to Ottawa, no doubt hoping all the while that future 
circumstances, such as an imminent British election, would make the 
entire issue of Commonwealth defence fade away. 
In Ottawa, there was a sporadic amount of discussion of Cran- 
borne's proposals which declined as the busy Department of External 
Affairs became more preoccupied with the challenges presented by the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. 
General Maurice Pope, however, gave the issue some attention during 
the summer of 1945. He readily admitted that "my perplexity arises 
from the fact that, as always, the British case is stated from such 
a high moral plane that those who find themselves constrained to take 
a contrary view find themselves in the invidious position of one who 
6. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W5448/1534/68, War Cabinet 
Document C. O. S. (44)58, "The Co-ordination of Defence Policy 
within the British Commonwealth in Relation to a World System 
of Security", 31 March 1944. 
7. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 323, file 3411, memorandum 
from Robertson to King, 15 May 1944. 
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is in the act of letting the side down. ,8 To prove his point, Pope 
specifically referred to Cranborne's line of argument which commenced 
with the notion of a close link between a Commonwealth defence system 
and the world security system under the United Nations but then stated 
that the British Commonwealth, its nations "freely acting in associa- 
tion", would compose one of the four great powers in the global de- 
fence system. General Pope agreed that existing schemes of defence 
cooperation, such as interchanges of staff officers, and standardi- 
zation of equipment, should continue pursuant to Canada's continental 
defence requirements, but any scheme of Commonwealth defence coopera- 
tion must of necessity wait until it was made clear what regional de- 
fence agreements would be initiated under the aegis of the new Secu- 
rity Council. 
9 
Some months later, Malcolm MacDonald offered a progress re- 
port on Canadian reactions to Cranborne's proposals to Lord Addison, 
Cranborne's successor in the newly-elected Labour Government. The 
High Commissioner wrote that Mackenzie King had found solace in his 
familiar "Parliament will decide" dictum, and there appeared to be 
an "unhealthy tendency" in Canada to think of the United Nations as 
a security system in spite of the fact that at one time the entire 
"burden of keeping the Axis at bay" had been placed upon the Common- 
wealth. Canada produced its case against a Commonwealth defence 
system by emphasizing two factors: the role of the United Nations 
in global security and Canada's special relationship with the United 
States. 
10 
To MacDonald, it appeared that Canada relied too heavily 
on these factors, and was unwilling to accept the military commit- 
ments which the maintenance of its new middle power status would 
logically require. MacDonald also reported that Robertson reacted 
negatively to the continuation of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
8. Pope Diary, vol. 1, secret file 30-6, memorandum prepared 
for Robertson, Wrong and Heeney, 11 August 1945. Pope added: 
"The British habit of investing their policies with such a 
cloak of sanctity reminds me of Professor Banse's amusing dic- 
tum, 'They say Christ, but they mean cotton. "' 
9. Ibid. 
10. Dominions Office, DO 35/1746, WG 785/1/2, MacDonald to 
Addison, 25 October 1945. 
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the Under-Secretary arguing that much more could be gained through 
bilateral discussions as a means of considering what contributions 
could be made jointly to a regional defence system under the United 
Nations. Hume Wrong, the resident realist and sometime cynic of the 
Department of External Affairs, went even further, telling Stephen 
Holmes, now Deputy High Commissioner, that the whole concept of Im- 
perial Defence was unreal, that it meant little or nothing to Canada, 
and that any rate it had to be completely reviewed in light of the 
atomic bomb. Arnold Heeney, who as Secretary to the Cabinet was well- 
placed to take an interest in defence questions, believed that the 
British inclination to speak of "our Dominions" still uncomfortably 
lingered, and it was indeed high time that British policy-makers 
treated the Dominions as separate entities according to their di- 
vergent interests and aspirations. 
11 
The Canadians seemed more aware 
of changed and changing conditions in the global balance of power 
than the British at this stage, yet at the same time exhibited too 
much sensitivity when it came to possible United Kingdom intentions. 
12 
The functional principle weighed heavily in the Canadian approach to 
the issue of concerted Commonwealth defence and as such reflected a 
desire - though not always lucidly articulated and often simply ex- 
pressed as fear of British plans - that the benefits enjoyed by mem- 
bers of the Commonwealth at present could quickly disappear with the 
onset of formal Commonwealth machinery. 
What could be regarded as the deciding battle on the Common- 
wealth defence issue took place during 1946. Another Prime Ministers' 
Meeting was in the offing for the spring, and although Canadian offi- 
cials had been relatively content with the pragmatic issue-oriented 
approach followed at the 1944 meeting and exhibited again in 1945 at 
the special conversations in London before the San Francisco Confer- 
ence, Mackenzie King was ill at ease. More than a little annoyed by 
rather clumsy wording in the British invitation which implied that 
11. Dominions Office, DO 35/1746, WG 785/1/2, memorandum from 
Stephen Holmes to Malcolm MacDonald regarding dinner both men 
had with Hume Wrong and Arnold Heeney, 10 November 1945. 
12. A similar conclusion was drawn in Frederic Soward's policy 
review of 1951 and 1952. DEA file 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), 
Chapter 3, "Foreign Policy and Defence", pp. 132-133. 
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his presence was essential to satisfy British public opinion, he was 
more preoccupied with a full legislative programme, which included a 
budget and a Dominion-Provincial conference. Consequently the Prime 
Minister believed that he could only attend the latter part of the 
London discussions if at all, and was if anything more concerned with 
attending the Paris Peace Conference later in the summer, which he 
had hoped could be combined with Commonwealth talks. 
13 
King of course 
realized that it would be politically disadvantageous to let the other 
Commonwealth prime ministers meet without him. As it was, the Prime 
Ministers' Meeting really became a series of bilateral discussions, 
owing to the diverse schedules of the prime ministers. 
There were other background causes for concern. In London, 
officials spoke of the formation of a route squadron composed of 
personnel from the air forces of Commonwealth members. In a letter 
to Malcolm MacDonald in February, Norman Robertson stated that it 
would not be possible for the Royal Canadian Air Force to participate 
in a venture of this kind, chiefly because of the complexity of the 
problems involving the transition of the RCAF from a wartime to a 
peacetime footing. 
14 
On the other hand, Canadian policy-makers demon- 
strated a greater interest in defence cooperation of a more functional 
nature, such as defence research. They were successful in convincing 
their British counterparts to revise a planned agenda for a summer 
conference of scientists in order to include greater consideration of 
research coordination with the United States. A basic tenet which 
Canada also impressed upon the United Kingdom in this instance was 
that more could be accomplished technically through agreements con- 
cluded at departmental levels than officially by the governments 
themselves. 
15 
13. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
cable no. 155, King to Attlee, 23 April 1946; also King Diary, 
8-10 May 1946. 
14. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 413, copy of letter from 
Robertson to MacDonald, 23 February 1946. Robertson had pre- 
faced his letter with a sentence which King had underscored 
and questioned: "The matter has now been carefully considered 
and it is recognized that the aims of the proposed organization 
are important and would meet a definite need. " 
15. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2350, memorandum 
from Wrong to King, 19 March 1946 and letter from Norman 
Robertson to Stephen Holmes, 16 March 1946. 
201 
Also during the early spring of 1946, a two-day debate at 
Westminster which dealt chiefly with demobilization, garnered a dis- 
aproportionate share of press attention, the result of course being 
that there was once again public speculation on the possibility of a 
grand Imperial security scheme. King cabled Massey to stress that he 
favoured the abolition of the term "Imperial Defence" altogether from 
current usage since it inevitably caused misunderstandings. In res- 
ponse to the press reports which had appeared in the United Kingdom, 
the Prime Minister emphatically restated the Canadian position to 
Massey: 
The strategic interests of the Commonwealth are so 
diverse that their protection requires the coordination 
of defence between individual Commonwealth countries and 
foreign states. This is obvious in the case of the United 
Kingdom when one considers the British defence interests 
in western Europe. In some quarters in London there is 
difficulty in realizing that it is also obvious elsewhere. 
l6 
Yet even among the enlightened British representatives in 
Ottawa, there existed a proclivity to explain Canadian recalcitrance 
as a "selfish canniness" which was more concerned with cooperation 
in the short run rather than the long: 
Occasionally, and against her better judgment, she 
(Canada) professed to believe that cooperation with us and 
others in defence or in other aspects of the responsibili- 
ties of nationhood is sought as a matter of form, that her 
contribution would be but a drop in the bucket. But fun- 
damentally it is still a reluctance to commit herself in 
the international field which militates against full co- 
operation. She must be brought to realise that this habit 
of mind is not the characteristic of maturity or adult 
stature. She cannot, in other words, have it both ways. 
l7 
But the United Kingdom could not have it both ways either. 
Australia, through the energy of Herbert Evatt, had claimed a greater 
role in decisions relating to the defence of the Pacific Ocean, un- 
mindful of the fact that the United Kingdom wished to use the stra- 
tegic advantages it held there to bargain with the United States on 
16. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 410, cable no. 695, King to 
Massey, 23 March 1946. 
17. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W5336/102/68, copy of des- 
patch no. 172, Stephen Holmes to Lord Addison, 13 April 1946. 
This document was printed and circulated in the Foreign Office. 
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a global scale. The insouciance of the Australians was demonstrated 
when their representative on the Japanese Peace Council publicly 
proclaimed his role as one of mediation between the polarized posi- 
tions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union. This assump- 
tion enfuriated the Foreign Office. What struck the Canadians as 
Australian brashness led John Holmes to conclude at Canada House that 
"I think their irresponsibility is going to win our point on Common- 
wealth foreign policy. It is certainly helping to win us support in 
the Foreign Office. " 
18 
There was no real surprise on anyone's part therefore, when 
Australian Prime Minister J. B. Chifley reacted angrily to newspaper 
reports which appeared during his attendance at the May 1946 Prime 
Ministers' Meeting. Streamer headlines, particularly in the Beaver- 
brook press, announced that Empire statesmen were giving considera- 
tion to the creation of a "Super Cabinet of 20". 
19 
Field Marshal 
Smuts, fearful of what was apparently occurring in London, and that 
British officials would use the interval between his and Mackenzie 
King's arrival to try to influence him to change his attitude in 
order to create an absence of allies for the Canadian Prime Minister, 
requested a memorandum describing the Canadian position on Common- 
wealth defence through the Canadian High Commission in Cape Town. 
20 
Such fears of a grand Commonwealth defence design and British 
expectations of at least some increased commitments from the Dominions 
were all for naught because nothing was agreed upon in London, or at 
least, not while Mackenzie King was there. On 23 May, he rejected 
the view put forward by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that the Domi- 
nions should accept responsibility for the defence of their respec- 
tive regions of the Commonwealth, and stated that as he had already 
informed the United Kingdom, he could make no commitments whatsoever 
18. DEA, file 6133-40, vol. 3, John Holmes to Hume Wrong, 
1 May 1946. 
19. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
cable no. 996, Massey to King, 24 April 1946. The Times was 
also guilty. A report of 3 March indicated the imminent for- 
mation of a grand organization for Commonwealth defence. 
20. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 324, file 3413, background 
memorandum for King prepared by James Gibson, April 1946. 
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without close consultation with his colleagues. Bevin's often emo- 
tional speech, which detailed the state of the United Kingdom's bur- 
den of defence obligations, caused Robertson to observe that "Although 
the facts of the United Kingdom position are sobering, there was an 
air of unreality in much of the discussions because of the almost com- 
plete failure to consider the position of the United States in rela- 
tion to general responsibilities for the maintenance of world secu- 
rity. ', 
21 
Mackenzie King returned to Canada after reluctantly agreeing 
to present to his Cabinet a British proposal for the establishment of 
positions for military attaches who would work closely with British 
military planners. The Cabinet did not debate the proposal until 
November, which gave the Prime Minister enough time to allow his sim- 
mering anti-centralization thoughts to become obsessive, especially 
in the wake of Whitehall impatience for a decision, and the publica- 
tion of a United Kingdom White Paper which implied somewhat more res- 
ponsibility for the attaches - that is a decision-making role - than 
Canada had been led to expect. 
22 
Significantly, the White Paper had 
eliminated the word "Imperial" from the name of the Defence Committee, 
but made no mention of the role of the United States in defence mat- 
ters. 
During the interim period, the Canadians also went to work on 
the British press. A case in point was the North American visit of 
the editor of The Times, R. M. Barrington-Ward. In Ottawa, he was 
given an official dinner with the Prime Minister himself presiding, 
and was undoubtedly surprised as Mackenzie King, Arnold Heeney and 
Lester Pearson individually drew him aside to impress him with the 
finer points of the Canadian argument against a Commonwealth defence 
scheme. If that were not enough, the beleaguered editor then journeyed 
21. Privy Council office, vol. 107, file U-10-11, cable no. 
1226, Robertson to Wrong, 25 May 1946. 
22. DEA, file 7CM-l(s), "Memorandum for the Prime Minister; 
Canada-United Kingdom Defence Questions", 13 November 1946; 
also copy of United Kingdom White Paper, Cmnd. 6923, "Central 
Organisation for Defence", 5 October 1946. The Governor General, 
Viscount Alexander of Tunis, was helpful in calming the Prime 
Minister's nerves when King sought advice on this matter. See 
James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada; Peacemaking and De , _? 2 rý<_-nce , 
pp. 223-4. 
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to Washington, where among the first people he encountered was am- 
bassador Hume Wrong, who did not mince his words either: 
Commonwealth defence could not be treated separately 
in any realistic sense, and it was foolish to talk about 
it as though it could be planned and organized on any 
Commonwealth basis. If we had to use the phrase, it would 
probably mean in Canada, that Canada, in association with 
the United States, would take responsibility for the defence 
of North America and the sea approaches. It could not mean 
that we could make a 'contribution' to the organization of 
the defences of Commonwealth interests in other parts of 
the world. 23 
On 15 November, the Canadian Cabinet, after much discussion, 
agreed to appoint one liaison officer from each of the Armed Services 
and the Defence Research Board to serve as staff members at Canada 
House where they would under no circumstances partake in any planning 
exercises and would be solely responsible to the High Commissioner. 
The British really had no choice but to accept the Canadian decision 
which Attlee agreed was "eminently characteristic., 
24 
Events quickly 
overtook any further deliberations for a centralized form of Common- 
wealth defence, and with the exception of related questions at the 
1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting - which by then lacked any conviction 
since the Commonwealth had expanded - and the issue of a Commonwealth 
Division in the Korean War in 1950, the notion of a grand Imperial or 
Commonwealth defence system which had endured for half a century 
quietly came to an end. 
To be sure, the Canadian case had been over-stated, but for 
Canada the question of defence had to be examined in terms of a North 
Atlantic partnership which perforce had to include a very close func- 
tional relationship with the United States. This realization placed 
Canada in a more receptive and even leading position during the next 
year as plans for Western Union and the North Atlantic Treaty began 
to germinate. As Smuts lucidly remarked in 1948, "The more machinery 
we have, the more friction there will be. " 
25 
By not straying from 
23. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2350, Wrong to Pear- 
son, 9 November 1946; also Pearson to Robertson, 18 November 1946. 
24. Dominions Office, DO 35/1748, WG 785/1/14, minute by Attlee, 
23 November 1946. 
25. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2351, Smuts quoted in 
a Chatham House paper by Nicholas Mansergh, 27 July 1948. 
205 
the narrow definition of its own self-interest in the field of de- 
fence, and because of its conception of the Commonwealth as an un- 
fettered association of independent states, Canada may have prevented 
subsequent intra-Commonwealth friction or even dissolution over the 
defence issue. Such friction may have served to discourage newer 
members from remaining in the association. 
*** 
Pillau and Kurma, burning hot, 
Pickles and lime and mango juice, 
A still remembered saint, Rajghat, 
Sarees and smells and Republican hues, 
All these, we hope, haven't ruined the health 
Of our valiant guests from the Commonwealth. 26 
The defence issue had been a continuous one in Commonwealth 
development, seemingly always to loom in the background between meet- 
ings of the prime ministers and in the foreground during them. In 
short, Commonwealth leaders were faced with a known quantity and 
guided their responses according to what would best suit their own 
interests and their conception of the common interest. But although 
changes in the membership of the Commonwealth had been long in coming, 
the pace of developments during the 1940s, already exhibited in the 
growth of international personalities of the Dominions, but more so 
in the independence of former colonies, especially India, marked a 
sharp change in the evolution of the association. The rapidity of 
this development, with its constitutional overtones, threatened the 
continued existence of the Commonwealth, and after some initial 
hesitation, Canada played no small part in helping to bring matters 
to an agreeable conclusion. 
Mackenzie King, with some justification always wary of cen- 
tralist designs, never lost faith in the internal dynamic of the 
Commonwealth as a force for good. The concept of freedom with asso- 
ciation appealed to his late nineteenth century liberal views, and 
was consistent with the tenets of community and fellowship he had 
expressed earlier in Industry and Humanity. In 1923, King had indi- 
26. Pearson Papers, Pre-1958 Series, vol. 2, copy of a verse 
from Krishna Menon (Indian High Commissioner to the United King- 
dom) to Warwick Chipman (Canadian High Commissioner to India), 
27 April 1950. 
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cated some uncertainty over the connotations of "Empire" and "Common- 
wealth", and had concluded that "Community of British Nations" repre- 
sented the most appropriate means of description, since it held pro- 
mise for a future ideal relationship. 
27 
In making this assessment, 
King had reflected upon his past visit to India while Deputy Minister 
of Labour in 1908, when, in addition to stating that Indians were too 
different to assimilate into the fabric of Canadian society, he asser- 
ted that India would eventually aspire to self-government, however 
long it may take. 
28 
By the time a draft British declaration of policy on India 
arrived in Ottawa in March 1942, events in India, the war and changes 
in the Commonwealth itself had convinced the Canadian Prime Minister 
that the time for India's moment had come, and he reacted by taking 
an uncharacteristic initiative to promote the cause of Indian inde- 
pendence. The British document, which was to be discussed with Indian 
leaders by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, stipulated that 
the object of United Kingdom policy was to create a union in India 
which would effectively make India a Dominion, equal to the other 
Dominions and bound like them by a common allegiance to the Crown. 
The Congress Party, under Pandit Nehru the driving force for Indian 
independence, had earlier indicated that immediate independence and 
not Dominion status was its desired goal, a view not likely to court 
favour with the British, Churchill in particular, who was very much 
against reform taking place during the war. He was more concerned 
with the political expediency of the Cripps mission than whether or 
not it produced results. Indeed, there were many other factors to 
consider: the Muslim League, representing India's largest minority, 
insisted on the recognition of its interests through the formation 
of Pakistan; the Indian army was not wholly supportive of the ideas 
of Congress; and there were the Untouchables and the treaties with the 
27. Unpublished paper by the author, "Canada and the Crisis at 
Chanak: A Hesitant Step Toward Autonomy" (April 1978), p. 26, 
Mackenzie King to Peter Larkin (Canadian High Commissioner to 
the United Kingdom), 6 January 1923. 
28. For an informative account of the development of King's 
views before the 1940s, see Eayrs, In De'enc; - 
Peacemaking and Deterrence, pp. 226-231. 
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many princes to bear in mind. Into this Asian maelstrom stepped the 
well-intentioned Canadian Prime Minister with a telegram of encour- 
agement, designed to harm no one, least of all the British, since 
the Indian question was their largest public relations problem in 
the United States: 
The Canadian Government heartily welcomes the statement 
of policy laying down the steps it is proposed to take for 
the earliest possible realization of complete self-govern- 
ment in India... We believe that a fully self-governing 
India has a great part to play in free and equal associa- 
tion with the other nations of the British Commonwealth 
and that a free India, fighting alongside the other free 
peoples of the world, will strengthen immeasurably the 29 common cause... 
Churchill was not pleased, especially when an additional 
telegram from King detailed a conversation between himself and T. V. 
Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister and brother-in-law of Chiang Kai- 
Shek. The Generalissimo had told Soong that the military situation 
in India could only be improved if India were immediately given its 
independence, an aim which Mackenzie King and his colleagues believed 
could be achieved if no time were lost in publicizing and gaining 
acceptance of the United Kingdom government's proposals. In a sub- 
sequent telegram in which he offered his good offices to assist 
Cripps in his mission, Mackenzie King could not conceal his eagerness 
to promote his view of the Commonwealth as a community of equal and 
like-minded nations: 
Having regard to the evolution of self-government in 
Canada and the position taken by Canada in peace negotia- 
tions after the last war, and at subsequent Imperial Con- 
ferences with respect to equality of status of all self- 
governing parts of the British Commonwealth, it might well 
be that strong assurances to India on the part of Canada 
as to the helpful role we would be prepared to take on her 
behalf might not be without some real effect at this time. 
30 
So possessed was King by the idea of the mission which 
he and Canada could fulfil that on the same day he telephoned Soong 
in Washington to relay a message to Nehru via Chiang, stating that 
the Canadian Prime Minister, as the grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, 
29. DEA, file 11004-40, cable no. 73, King to Churchill, 15 
March 1942. 
30. DEA, file 11004-40, cable no. 79, King to Churchill, 15 
March 1942. 
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would do his utmost to bring self-government to India, and would sup- 
port any promises which Cripps might make. 
31 
Churchill was unaware 
of this last assurance, but took umbrage at the two cables addressed 
to him, and informed King that the "Indian problem" was not consti- 
tutional but internal, and that Chiang - without assuming too much 
one can read "King" - was "blissfully ignorant of Indian affairs . 
"32 
He also implied that the errant Canadian Prime Minister should have 
patience until the Cripps mission produced results, something it did 
not do, since on defence questions too little had been offered too 
late. 
No doubt King was disappointed and surprised by Churchill's 
response, but a personal letter of thanks from Leopold Amery, the 
Secretary of State for India, probably helped to soothe his wounded 
pride. Mackenzie King had, after all, expressed his long-standing 
views with intent to proffer advice to India much in the same way he 
had sent messages to Eamon de Valera a year earlier in offering to 
lend his support to secure the independence of Ireland within the 
Commonwealth framework. 
33 
There had been no apparent attempts to 
mute King's zeal by the officials of the Department of External Affairs. 
Henry Angus, a special wartime assistant, and at the time the acknow- 
ledged Indian expert within the Department, did not deal with the 
Prime Minister directly; Robertson and Wrong on the other hand, had 
demonstrated comparatively little interest in India at this stage. 
Had Mackenzie King trusted Vincent Massey's opinions from London, he 
may have entertained a better idea of what to expect from Churchill. 
In his cable to the United Kingdom Prime Minister of 15 March, 
Mackenzie King had suggested that "as evidence of readiness of Domi- 
nions to accord recognition of Dominion status to India in so far as 
that may be possible while war is in progress, an exchange of High 
Commissions between the Dominions and India might be immediately 
arranged. " When this question was brought before the Canadian Cabinet 
31. King Diary, 15 March 1942. 
32. cf. Eayrs, p. 232. 
33. For more on Canada's wartime relations with Ireland, see 
Fred McEvoy, "Canadian-Irish Relations during the Second World 
War", The Journal o, ̀  Imperial Emd Con mon 4. ea Z t-%: V, 
no. 2 (January 1977), pp. 206-226. 
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War Committee on 26 March, it was decided not to name a High Commis- 
sioner until it was clear what the Cripps mission had achieved. 
34 
Earlier, and shortly before his death in 1941, O. D. Skelton, the 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had written to the 
Prime Minister that the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner 
to India would be of definite value on Indian public opinion, but 
that any such gesture would be wasted as long as Canada refused to 
enfranchise East Indians living within British Columbia. "If we 
could take some action on the franchise matter and the right man 
could be secured, " Skelton opined, "it might be possible to help in 
this difficult situation. " The Prime Minister's opinion had been 
hastily written on the bottom of Skelton's memorandum: "Let sleeping 
dogs lie. "35 As usual, where domestic policies were concerned, poli- 
tical expediency became Mackenzie King's watchword, and it was to 
this more characteristic philosophy that he returned when his con- 
ciliatory foray into the complexities of the Indian question had been 
rebuffed, especially when it became evident that representations by 
India to the Dominions Office had wished for a quick settlement to 
the franchise problem. The advantages which the Commonwealth and 
Canada would have gained through Indian independence and association - 
King almost surely counted on the fact that an independent India 
would never agree to a common foreign policy - took second place to 
the exigencies of domestic politics. 
In October 1943 Prime Minister John Curtin of Australia an- 
nounced that his country would be sending a High Commissioner to India. 
In the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, John Holmes, while 
acknowledging the fears of the politicians of a revival of the divisive 
34. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee, 26 March 1942. King had also mentioned the 
prospect of appointing a High Commissioner in his cable to 
Churchill of 6 March. Massey, who could have been helpful 
had he known what was being planned, was not informed of the 
Canadian position until a week later. DEA, file 11004-40, 
cable no. 500, Pearson to Massey, 14 March 1942. 
35. DEA, file 11004-40, memorandum from Skelton to King, 20 
January 1941. For an in-depth appraisal of domestic considera- 
tions, see J. F. Hilliker, "The British Columbia Franchise and 
Canadian Relations with India in Wartime, 1939-1945", BC 
46, (Summer 1980), pp. 40-60. 
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question of the status of East Indians in Canada, argued that an ex- 
change of representatives with China had not produced a controversy 
among Chinese Canadians who also could not vote, that Australia had 
not altered its restrictive immigration policies, and that India had 
now appointed a High Commissioner to South Africa. "An able and tact- 
ful Canadian in New Delhi, co-operating with the Australian represen- 
tative, " Holmes wrote, "might play a crucial role in India. Finding 
such a man would, of course, be difficult, but it would be worth while 
making a determined effort to get the right man. " Hume Wrong was more 
realistic about the Canadian role envisioned by his junior: "I have 
doubts whether the Can[adian] Gov[ernment] would or could play much 
part in 'settling' the Indian problems, but apart from this there is 
a good case for having a Canadian H. C. in New Delhi. I'm sorry Aus- 
tralia got in first. "36 In March 1944, Henry Angus, the departmental 
expert and himself a possible contender for the job, indicated that 
Canadian representation in India could possibly aid the political 
situation there by offering a source of accurate information concern- 
ing the handling of analagous problems in the Canadian experience - 
Confederation initially affecting only four provinces being the most 
obvious example - and by dispelling distrust of the United Kingdom 
by again citing Canadian comparisons. 
37 
The senior officials of the 
Department of External Affairs appeared to wish to have nothing to do 
with these recommendations, nor with representations from Malcolm 
MacDonald in April 1944 and September 1945 which conveyed anxious 
Indian desires for an exchange of High Commissioners. When Norman 
Robertson found himself in London in November 1945, he finally touched 
upon the ideal delaying tactic: Canada, he informed Sir Eric Machtig, 
although willing to receive a High Commissioner from India, would only 
36. DEA, file 11004-40, Holmes, "Note for Mr. Wrong" and minute 
by Wrong, 3 November 1943. In March 1943, General Victor Odlum, 
Canadian Minister to China, wrote King that he should appoint a 
High Commissioner to India with whom he could compare notes. 
Note from Keenleyside to Robertson, 21 June 1943, referring to 
letter from Odlum to King, 2 March 1943. 
37. DEA, Papers of the Under-Secretary Series, vol. 827, file 
735, memorandum from Angus to Robertson, 1 March 1944; also 
memorandum from Harry Ferns to Hugh Keenleyside, 5 November 
1943. 
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reciprocate when the United Kingdom had appointed one of its own. 
38 
The Canadians had repeatedly emphasized that the beleaguered 
condition of their fledgling Department of External Affairs had pre- 
vented them from finding an ideal candidate to be High Commissioner. 
This excuse served to divert attention from the primary political 
concern: the odious spectre of disenfranchisement of East Indians 
in British Columbia. There appeared to be, however, some genuine 
concern about the qualifications of any prospective choice for the 
position, a view shared in 1946 by Sir Girja Bajpai, the Indian Minis- 
ter to the United States. who led Hume Wrong to report that "Bajpai is 
obviously deeply concerned over the inexperience and impulsiveness of 
the new Indian Government and hopes that the Americans and ourselves 
at least will have representatives there able to step out of the or- 
dinary diplomatic role by giving wise counsel behind the scenes . 
"39 
Angus had said precisely the same thing earlier. A 1942 list of 
possible appointees had included several who would surely have met 
the description: Henry Angus, Edgar Tarr, Brooke Claxton, and George 
Ferguson, a former High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. As it 
happened, John D. Kearney, a judge who had been a credible High Com- 
missioner in Ireland, was appointed High Commissioner to India fol- 
lowing India's accession to Dominion status in August 1947, when 
Canadian preoccupation with India's constitutional fate began in 
earnest. Although not an "Indian expert", Kearney would perform his 
duties well, his facility probably enhanced by his experience in Ire- 
land. In April 1947, persons of East Indian, Chinese and native In- 
dian origin were given the franchise in British Columbia. 
With the exception of the High Commissioner issue, Canadian 
relations with India, though cordial, did not figure prominently in 
Canadian foreign policy until the imminence of Dominion status for 
India. Pearson was on friendly terms with Bajpai in Washington, but 
then with whom was Pearson not on good terms? The staff of the Cana- 
dian embassy in the United States had been involved in continued good- 
will exercises to assist the United Kingdom to cope with the negative 
American publicity occasioned by its policies in India, something made 
38. DEA, file 11004-40, Robertson to Machtig, 3 November 1945. 
39. Ibid., Wrong to Pearson, 2 December 1946. 
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more difficult by the fact that Bajpai - until 1946 still classified 
as the Indian "Agent-General" - was included in the British Embassy 
List. 
40 
One of the first issues which confronted the General Assem- 
bly of the new United Nations in 1946 was the dispute between India 
and South Africa over the latter's treatment of its Indian population. 
Although Canada refused to be drawn into a discussion of the merits 
of the controversy between its fellow Commonwealth members, Canadian 
interventions in the General Assembly were centered on the doubt which 
existed regarding the constitutional competence of the Assembly to 
judge such matters and pass the sort of condemnation of South Africa 
which India had requested. States favourable to the Indian point of 
view perceived the Canadian position - or lack thereof - as merely a 
covert way of joining the other white countries in defence of South 
Africa's racially discriminatory policies. Canada did, however, vote 
in favour of a resolution to request South Africa to place South West 
Africa, a mandated territory, under the trusteeship system. 
41 
Of a more sustained interest were economic questions. Canada 
had generously offered to give India one hundred thousand tons of 
wheat in October 1943, provided that shipment could be arranged from 
western Canadian ports. The offer proved to be more difficult to fol- 
low through than imagined, since the United Kingdom desperately needed 
to husband all shipping resources in the North Atlantic for its own 
needs. Wheat should continue to be shipped to India from Australia 
as before, the British argued, but Canada could make token shipments 
when there was room in available-ships. As a result, and in spite of 
the personal efforts of both Mackenzie King and Vincent Massey, by 
October 1944 India had only received five hundred thousand bushels of 
Canadian wheat. 
42 
Apparently another well-meaning Canadian effort had 
40. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 389, Pearson to Robertson, 
28 December 1945. 
41. Reid Papers, vol. 5, memorandum by Escott Reid, "The Role 
Played by the Canadian Delegation in Discussions on the Main 
Political Issues which came before the Second Part of the First 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 
October 23 - December 20,1946", 22 December 1946. 
42. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 44, file D-13-5-1, 
letter from Oliver Master (Acting Deputy Minister of Finance) to 
Karl Fraser, Director of Administration of the Canadian Mutual 
Aid Board, 6 October 1944; also, cable no. 185, Attlee (Secre- 
tary of State for Dominion Affairs) to King, 18 December 1943. 
Canadian wheat shipments were increased later in 1944 in response 
to an Indian seasonal food shortage and an Australian drought. 
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gone astray. The arrival in January 1944 of an Indian supply mission 
in Ottawa which requested assistance in the form of 160 locomotives 
and $200 million worth of trucks, resulted in the signature of a Mu- 
tual Aid Agreement between India and Canada in November of the same 
year. 
43 
The hope of the commercial departments of the government was 
that the long-term prospects for trade such as this would lead to a 
lucrative Canadian trade market with India following the war. 
By 1947, as he realized that the end of his remarkable career 
was drawing near, Mackenzie King appeared to suffer from a melancholia 
which reflected despair for the prospects of continued peace, with or 
without the United Nations. His dark mood also coloured his approach 
to the prospect of an expanding Commonwealth, particularly with a 
restless India about to achieve an independence the suddenness of 
which surprised him, and which could lead to many unforeseen and 
dangerous developments. Would India break free of the Commonwealth 
and establish alliances with other Asian countries thereby undermining 
the stability of the world? Would an independent India be willing to 
accept an "associated" link with the Commonwealth and where would this 
place other members? Worst of all, was the notion of a restructured 
Commonwealth merely another British ploy for conformity in disguise? 
King's idiosyncratic and overly-cautious approach to foreign policy 
during his last two years of his tenure as Prime Minister was diamet- 
rically opposed to the views being promulgated by the Department of 
External Affairs, now under new management. The Prime Minister, to 
be sure, could still make a scene in Cabinet, but his customary tight 
and cautious control of foreign affairs was no more. Louis St. Laurent 
launched a new era in Canadian foreign policy when he outlined its 
principles in his oft-quoted Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto 
on 13 January 1947. One of the foundations of Canadian foreign policy, 
according to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was the Com- 
monwealth, which exhibited "the vitality of a living functioning or- 
43. Canada, Treaty Series, 1944, No. 31, "Agreement between 
Canada and India on the Principles Applying to the Provision 
by Canada of Canadian War Supplies to India under the War 
Appropriation (United Nations Mutual Aid) Acts of Canada, 
1943 and 1944", 17 November 1944. 
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ganism which has been and which can continue to be used for good ... 1144 
King may have made the same statement during one of his more idealistic 
periods, but by this time St. Laurent's words carried more conviction. 
To maintain the status quo in the Commonwealth was unwise, St. Laurent 
believed, and as he later wrote a disgruntled member of Parliament with 
reference to Churchill's famous remark about the demise of the asso- 
ciation, "The alternative is certainly not something which would be 
described as the liquidation of the Commonwealth and I am afraid I 
do not grasp what is meant by such an expression. "45 Neither did St. 
Laurent's deputy Lester Pearson, who, in addition to exhibiting his 
own brand of infectious nationalism, was also once again working 
closely with his idealistic influence Escott Reid, who as in Washing- 
ton, so in Ottawa was Pearson's closest adviser. Evidently, Mackenzie 
King missed being in control of foreign policy and having Robertson 
and Wrong at his beck and call to offer counsel. His resentment 
boiled over when St. Laurent read a reply to a British telegram in 
Cabinet on 28 May 1947 which heartily endorsed the admission of India 
and Pakistan as full members of the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister 
insisted that a Canadian response be more understated because, not 
having been privy to the negotiations for Indian independence, the 
matter did not really concern Canada. 
46 
His strange moral tone pre- 
vailed, yet Pearson, as ever, was able to detect grounds for optimism: 
We have accomplished one important thing. We have 
concurred, if negatively, in the addition of a new Indian 
state or new Indian states to the Commonwealth providing 
the Indians themselves desire that solution. We have, 
therefore, given our support to the doctrine that the 
composition of the Commonwealth cannot be changed without 
the consent of the existing members. 47 
Mackenzie King's petulance resulted in under-stated responses 
to British enquiries at the official level at least for the time being, 
44. DEA, Statements and Speeches Series, no. 47/2, Louis St. 
Laurent, "The Foundation of Canadian Policy in World Affairs", 
13 January 1947. 
45. St. Laurent Papers, vol. 17, file 100, letter from Louis 
St. Laurent to J. M. Macdonnell, 8 March 1947. 
46. King Diary, 28 May 1947. 
47. Pearson Papers, vol. 13, Pearson to Robertson, 2 June 1947. 
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but did not deter intensive analysis of the Indian independence issue 
within the Department of External Affairs, the results of which were 
eventually formulated into policy. 
Before India became independent and as such a member of the 
Commonwealth on 15 August 1947, study of the situation in the Depart- 
ment of External Affairs, as in the United Kingdom, was generally of 
a legalistic nature. Phraseology of British cables was studied in- 
tently, particularly references to "India remaining in the Common- 
wealth. " As Reid informed Mackenzie King, "India up to the present 
has not been a member of the Commonwealth and the question now is not 
whether India should remain in the Commonwealth, but whether India 
should be offered membership in the Commonwealth. " Perhaps the phrase 
"independence within the Commonwealth", which had been used in British 
telegrams, in lieu of the unpleasant "Dominion status", would be more 
appropriate to describe the anomalous position of India. 
48 
The Prime 
Minister was intrigued, but still firmly advocated a low-key approach. 
Neither Mackenzie King nor his officials needed to have worried, since 
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had already acknowledged the 
fact that both Canada and South Africa were averse to the term "Domi- 
nion status". Indeed, the Canadians would have been surprised had 
they known the thoughts of Clement Attlee, themselves indicative of 
how far the British were prepared to go to maintain Commonwealth 
membership: 
What I think is required is finding the formula which 
will enable the greatest number of independent units to ad- 
here to the Commonwealth without excessive formality in 
their internal constitutions or in their relationship to 
Great Britain, the Commonwealth and one another. Some 
such phrase for instance as "The Associated States of the 
Commonwealth" might provide an umbrella under which a 
number of independent States might be brought together... 
49 
British intentions were made clear to the Canadians through 
a visit to Ottawa in August 1948 by Sir Norman Brook, the Secretary 
to the United Kingdom Cabinet. A Prime Ministers' Meeting had been 
48. R. A. MacKay Papers, vol. 2, file "Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference - Correspondence and Memoranda, 1947-48", 
memorandum from Reid to King, 30 May 1947. Reid's emphasis. 
49. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, W4785/4414/68, personal 
minute by Attlee, 14 May 1947. 
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scheduled for October of that year, the purpose of Brook's tour being 
to seek informally the views of the "older members" on possible re- 
definition of Commonwealth relationships which would in turn be dis- 
cussed at the forthcoming meeting, though not necessarily at the con- 
ference table. The single most significant impression the Canadians 
were left with was that the United Kingdom intended to avoid any at- 
tempt to devise a new "constitution" for the Commonwealth when the 
prime ministers met in October. Nor did the British government have 
in mind any new "centralized" schemes for defence or otherwise, thereby 
appearing to be closer to prevailing Canadian conceptions of the Com- 
monwealth relationship than ever before. The expressions "British 
Commonwealth of Nations", "Dominion" and "British subject", would be 
discontinued in practice and replaced with "The Commonwealth of Nations", 
"Commonwealth country" and "Commonwealth citizenship". While willing 
50 
to accept republican governments within the Commonwealth, the British 
however believed that there should be some common bond in the form of 
a link to the Crown between members, either as defined by the Statute 
of Westminster for the older members, or through having the president 
of republican Commonwealth countries function as the representative 
of the King. A two-tiered Commonwealth, one group of countries main- 
taining their constitutional relations with the Crown inter se as 
before, with the others enjoying "associated membership status" was 
rejected, although it was conceded that if unilateral action by India 
or Ireland before the meeting caused such fragmentation, then such a 
salvage operation might prove to be a last recourse. Pakistan, which 
was created at the same time as the Dominion of India, would probably 
follow India's example in choosing either to remain in or separate 
from the Commonwealth. Ceylon, whose independence within the Common- 
wealth in late 1947 with previously negotiated defence and external 
relations agreements with the United Kingdom, Canada had chosen to 
consider as sui generis, was not likely to act unilaterally either. 
50. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
memorandum from Heeney to King, "Commonwealth Relationships: 
Attitude of U. K. Government", 30 August 1948; also copy of 
United Kingdom paper "Commonwealth Relationship; Statement 
of General Principles", October 1948. 
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Kearney at one point even undertook a special journey to Colombo to 
reassure Ceylonese leaders of Canada's support, in view of repeated 
Soviet use of the veto to deny Ceylon membership in the United Nations, 
an action which also afforded the Soviet Union an opportunity to attack 
"Western imperialism. , 
51 
Ireland52 caused some anxiety. John A. Costello, the Irish 
Prime Minister, visited Ottawa shortly after Brook had departed, and 
utilized the occasion to announce that Ireland intended to repeal its 
Executive Authority (External Relations) Act of 1936, which at that 
time had authorized the King to act on behalf of Ireland with regard 
to the appointments of diplomatic representatives and conclusion of 
international agreements. Mackenzie King was horrified that Costello had 
chosen to make his statement in Ottawa, and even more so by an error in 
protocol perpetrated by his former department. The menu for the offi- 
cial dinner which came after Costello's news conference, had included 
toasts to the King and to the President of Ireland, thereby - at least 
in King's view - lending some legitimacy to the Irish action. The 
event awakened the Canadian Prime Minister's hibernating spirit of 
reform: "I began to feel that my real mission might be that of having 
to do with keeping together the communities that today are part of 
the British Commonwealth... My own feeling is that reality is more im- 
portant than appearance. "53 
The officials of the Department of External Affairs were also 
concerned about the practical consequences of Costello's action. At 
a meeting of top officials held in Pearson's office on 14 September, 
51. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, file 2352, memorandum 
regarding the independence of Ceylon, n. d. (November 1947). 
52. The Departmental decision to use the term "Ireland" had 
been made in 1937. John Holmes noted in March 1948 that it 
seemed that everyone but Canada was using the term 
"Eire" and 
he thought "Ireland" now sounded a trifle pedantic. Escott 
Reid disagreed; "The Irish Government calls it (sic) Ireland 
and that is good enough for me. " DEA, file 6065-40, Holmes to 
Reid, 30 March 1948. Also interview with J. W. Pickersgill, 
28 May 1980. 
53. King Diary, 8 September 1948. King was critical of St. 
Laurent and Pearson for not being aware of the damage the menu 
cards might cause. Also Privy Council Office, Series 
18, vol. 
107, file U-10-11, memorandum, "The Status of Ireland: The 
External Relations Act", 9 September 1948. 
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which included both Robertson and Wrong, it was agreed that the situa- 
tion had now been altered, and there existed a distinct possibility 
that the problem of "independence within the Commonwealth" would come 
up for discussion at the forthcoming meeting. Although Ireland would 
not be represented at the meeting, India would, and Nehru might argue 
that the members of the Commonwealth had continued to regard Ireland 
in practice as a peer - they could therefore not object to India re- 
maining a member on the same basis. Doubts were ventured by all offi- 
cials present over the feasibility of a vague formula which would 
allow Indian association with the Commonwealth but which would also 
not weaken the constitutional ties of the other members. Pakistan, 
it was noted, appeared to have less desire to weaken the Commonwealth 
link, and by virtue of its geographic location, given global events, 
was of greater strategic importance to the western democracies. The 
overall feeling concerning India, however, was that some bond, no 
matter how tenuous, should maintain Indian association with the Com- 
monwealth, and, by implication, with the "Western World., 
54 
The Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth met in London in mid- 
October 1948. That there had been a change in prevailing British 
attitudes since the last meeting was undeniable, as even the King in 
his speech at Buckingham Palace on 13 October used phrases like "Our 
Commonwealth" and "My ministers from the Commonwealth" - there was 
never any mention of "Empire" or "Dominions", or even "British" - much 
to Churchill's dismay. Joining the representatives of the "older mem- 
bers" at the Cabinet table at 10 Downing Street were those of the new: 
Pandit Nehru of India, Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, D. S. Senanayake 
54. DEA, file 50023-40, memorandum, "Discussion on Prime Minis- 
ters' Conference to be held in London on October 11,1948. " The 
meeting in Pearson's office was attended by Hume Wrong, Norman 
Robertson (both home on leave), Arnold Heeney, Escott Reid, 
R. A. MacKay and Alfred Pick. MacKay had replaced Angus, who 
had returned to academic life, as the departmental 
"Indian 
expert", and he and Pick were responsible for most of the pre- 
paratory work for the October 1948 and April 1949 Prime Ministers' 
Meetings. "Subsidiary" constitutional issues were also discussed 
at this meeting, and of interest is that Pearson 
favoured a 
change of title of the "Governor-General" to 
"Viceroy" or "Regent" 
because of American misinterpretations. One surmises that such 
misinterpretations would only have worsened had 
Pearson's ideas 
been translated into policy. 
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of Ceylon and, to foreshadow future Commonwealth difficulties, Sir 
Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia. The meetings were largely 
concerned with economics and finance, the position of the Sterling 
Area being particularly precarious at the time. European recovery, 
the inevitable review of foreign and defence policy issues, Common- 
wealth consultation, and inconclusive deliberations on the status of 
High Commissioners were also featured. Much to his disappointment 
and everyone's concern, Mackenzie King spent the greater part of the 
conference in bed nursing a heart condition, but that did not pre- 
vent him from holding court in his suite, where among many visitors, 
he had occasion to speak to Nehru, and told the Indian Prime Minister 
of his own concept of a "Community of Free Nations", enhanced by 
stories of his maternal grandfather. 
55 
His fears of centralization 
and dependence had by this time been transferred south of the Cana- 
than border. High Commissioner Norman Robertson replaced the Prime 
Minister until Louis St. Laurent arrived from Canada. 
The two most significant events of the meetings took place 
informally and away from the conference table. On 17 October, a 
meeting was held at Chequers between the Ministers of External Affairs 
and Finance of Ireland on the one hand, and Attlee, Noel-Baker, St.. 
Laurent, Evatt and Fraser on the other. The Irish ministers were in- 
sistent that the establishment of genuine friendly relations with the 
United Kingdom depended upon what they termed the removal of every 
vestige and every appearance of the former state of dependency. In 
other words, the External Relations Act would be repealed. To St. 
Laurent's view that Canada would favour a system based upon retention 
of the Crown as Head of State for external purposes and British asser- 
tions that the United Kingdom would prefer a constitutional rather 
than a contractual link, the Irish remained adamant, and gave vague 
assurances about their preference for some form of association. As 
Robertson concluded in his summary of the meeting, the Irish had given 
little consideration to the development of a constructive policy. 
56 
55. King Diary, 13 October 1948. 
56. DEA, file 50023-40, cable no. 1831, Robertson to Pearson, 
21 October 1948. 
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Before leaving London, Nehru had prepared a "ten points" memo- 
randum in which he outlined the terms and conditions by which India 
could remain a member of the Commonwealth. First and foremost, the 
declaration of status of India as a "sovereign democratic republic" 
would be left as it was in the draft constitution pending approval 
by a Congress Party conference; also, in a novel reference to the 
Crown, the King was designated "the first citizen of the Commonwealth" 
and its "fountain of honour. " Of greatest concern to Canada, in view 
of its restrictive immigration policies, was Nehru's proposal that 
either in the constitution or in a separate statute passed at the 
same time, Indian nationals would be assured of being Commonwealth 
citizens, as would those nationals of other Commonwealth countries 
when in India, on a reciprocal basis. 
57 
A new British nationality 
act had defined the term "Commonwealth citizen" as being applicable 
to all British subjects, and had conferred upon them the right to 
enter and remain in the United Kingdom. Did India expect a similar 
concession on Canada's part under its new nationality act? Moreover, 
if, as it seemed certain, Ireland left the Commonwealth, it was un- 
likely that the intermediary position Irish nationals enjoyed between 
British subjects and aliens in most Commonwealth countries would be 
removed. Where would that leave Indian "Commonwealth citizens"? 
Further, apparent willingness on the part of older Commonwealth mem- 
bers to study methods on how to maintain some relationship with an 
independent Ireland caused some concern among representatives in New 
Delhi. "I was afriad that Ireland was being given the same recogni- 
tion outside the Commonwealth as when she was in it, " Kearney noted 
in his diary, "and that this might have a bad effect on Sir Archi- 
bald's (Nye, U. K. High commissioner) negotiations with India and 
might tempt India to follow the same course as Ireland .,, 
58 
Kearney's 
uncertainty reflected that felt to a degree in all Commonwealth capi- 
57. MacKay Papers, vol. 2, file "Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference, Correspondence and Memoranda, 1947-48", memorandum 
by Reid, "Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State for Ex- 
ternal Affairs", 29 November 1948. Pearson, newly appointed 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, was campaigning for a 
seat in the riding of Algoma East, his portfolio ably tended 
by Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence. 
58. John D. Kearney Diary, vol. 1,26 November 1948. 
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tals; the Comwonwealth could not become a structured and ordered 
entity, yet there had to be an adequate demonstration of the advan- 
tages of membership. 
Prospects were bleak for any acceptable solution by the end 
of 1948. Before the end of the year the Republic of Ireland Bill 
had been debated and passed by the Dail in Dublin - proclamation 
would wait until Easter Day 1949, the anniversary of the Easter rising 
of 1916. In India, the Congress Party had accepted the draft con- 
stitution, which would come into effect on 15 August 1949. The Crown 
would thereafter cease to have any meaning for India and, if there 
was to be agreement on India's position in the Commonwealth, it would 
have to come before August. "The problem thus presented is one of 
intense difficulty and raises far-reaching and fundamental issues, " 
s 
Prime Minister Attlee stated in a message to Prime Minister St. Laurent, 
º "It can only be resolved by the Commonwealth countries in consultation , 
º59 
India could not and would not become another Ireland. 
The Commonwealth prime ministers were asked to meet in London 
in April, their dilemma best elucidated by Peter Fraser of New Zealand: 
I have the greatest desire to see India retained in 
the Commonwealth, but, for the moment, see no satisfactory 
means of bringing this about. Are the members of the Com- 
monwealth who do wish to retain the Crown to end up with a 
form of words covering an arrangement which is entirely 
nebulous? Are we justified in releasing India from the 
obligations which the rest of us willingly assume without 
any reasonable accommodation on the part of India in return? 
These are matters which must be faced frankly and freely 
around a conference table before a decision is made. 60 
Within the East Block in Ottawa, analysis of possible solu- 
tions continued, there being as at Whitehall earlier a proclivity to 
be mesmerized by the constitutionalities involving the role of the 
Crown. Sir Norman Brook visited Canada once again on 10 March to im- 
part the current position of the United Kingdom Government. Memoranda 
which he brought with him suggested that India could be retained in 
the Commonwealth even without a link to the Crown, through formal 
59. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 274, file 2783, cable from 
Attlee to St. Laurent, 25 February 1949. 
60. Privy Council Office, Series 18, vol. 107, file U-10-11, 
Fraser to St. Laurent, 24 March 1949. 
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public declarations of intent of Commonwealth members and India. In 
view of the grave deterioration of East-West relations and develop- 
ments in China, the United Kingdom and Canada were as one in their 
wish to keep India within the Commonwealth not only on strategic 
grounds, but as a bridge between Asia and the West. Accordingly, 
the Canadian Cabinet expressed general agreement with British in- 
clinations, but added an important proviso: Canada was fully satis- 
fied with the existing basis of Commonwealth relations and would con- 
sider it desirable that India retained some formal link with the 
Crown, even as a republic. That link should best not address the 
question of Commonwealth citizenship, the major Canadian concern, 
unless it was made clear that there would be no change in the status 
61 
quo. 
In New Delhi Kearney perceived the problem as having less of 
a legal nature than an outright political one. He correctly detected 
in the attitude of the United Kingdom "a disposition to admit India 
to the Commonwealth without necessarily having any real link with 
the Crown. " It would be wise, he added, as his colleagues in Ottawa 
knew full well, for Canada to leave all initiatives with the United 
Kingdom "... and to reserve our position as to whether any arrangement 
that the United Kingdom may work out directly with India will be ac- 
ceptable to us. " 
62 
Nonetheless, Louis St. Laurent sent Pandit Nehru a message 
in which he outlined Canada's satisfaction with the existing form of 
association of Commonwealth members and the desire not to have Canada's 
61. MacKay Papers, vol. 2, file "Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference, London 1949, Correspondence and Memoranda", "Revi- 
sion by Mr. Heeney of the Memorandum of March 16,1949, Presen- 
ted to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on India and 
the Commonwealth", 17 March 1949. Heeney was now Under-Secre- 
tary of State for External Affairs. Reid had served as Acting 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs following Pear- 
son's elevation to the Cabinet. 
62. Ibid., despatch no. 132, Kearney to Pearson, 18 March 1949. 
Kearney was overly wary on another count: "On balance, I am 
slowly veering to the view that any innocuous phrase regarding 
the King might just as well be left out. It would certainly 
make Mr. Nehru's task of joining the Commonwealth with the con- 
currence of his party a lot easier. If India joins the Com- 
monwealth on such terms as will split the Congress Party, her 
worth to the Commonwealth will, I fear, be greatly diminished. " 
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traditional relationship with the Crown altered in any way so as to 
avoid any public misgivings occasioned by the appearance of a weak- 
ened role for the Crown. In addition: 
The above considerations prompt me to express the 
sincere hope that you may see your way clear to retain- 
ing some link between the sovereign republic of India 
and the Crown. It seems to me that any alternative 
presents not only constitutional but real practical 
difficulties; for example, we might be hard put to 
defend against foreign objections the continued exchange 
of trade preferences. 63 
Pearson represented Canada at the London conference, St. 
Laurent having decided to campaign for the forthcoming election. In 
his task, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs was 
ably assisted by Robert MacKay and John Kearney, both of whom had of 
course been associated with "the Indian problem" for the past few 
years. On his first evening in London, Pearson had dinner with Noel- 
Baker, and both men, after discussing the gamut of possible actions 
and equally possible reactions on the part of other participants, 
agreed that "[ i] t is simply a matter of discovering the lesser of the 
evils. " 
64 
Pearson met with Nehru on 21 April: "I pointed out to 
him that we in our turn did not desire in Canada to alter in any way 
our present connection with the Crown which met our needs and our 
wishes but that we recognized that India's position in this regard 
was different. " For his part, Nehru said that there was a considera- 
ble amount of opposition to any form of Commonwealth association in 
his country but he appreciated the advantages membership entailed, 
and significantly, the symbolic value of the Crown. The Indian 
Prime Minister then gave Pearson a copy of a memorandum which esta- 
blished the Indian position for the conference. Pearson thought the 
paper represented a sound basis for discussion and possible agreement, 
the Indian reference to the status of the King in regard to India 
63. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 274, file 2783, personal 
message from St. Laurent to Nehru conveyed through Canadian 
High Commissioner, 31 March 1949. Jules Leger, at this time 
First Secretary at Canada House, has commented that the per- 
sonal friendship which developed between Nehru and St. Laurent 
at the October 1948 meeting was unrivalled. Interview with 
Jules Leger, 5 September 1980. 
64. Pearson Papers, vol. 9, file "Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, April 1949", cable no. 824, Pearson to Heeney, 21 
April 1949. 
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arising "from the free association of which the King is the symbol 
and appertains to that association alone., 
65 
Such an attitude had not been entirely unexpected, for on 20 
April, MacKay had prepared a memorandum which looked closely at the 
Crown linkage question. Accepting the fact that it now appeared that 
the Commonwealth had reached the stage of "personal union", that is, 
where the only formal link in the association was a common monarch, 
he argued that the King by mutual agreement should be given a title 
symbolic of his headship of the Commonwealth as a whole - "Titular 
Head of the Commonwealth" or "Honorary or Royal Patron of the Common- 
wealth" were possibilities. This recognition of the King would be 
augmented by reciprocal declarations: India would express its desire 
to remain in the Commonwealth; the other members would accord formal 
recognition of India's continued membership. There should be emphasis 
and mention of historical continuity in the declarations, so as to 
defend the continuation of "Imperial" preferences and at least some 
of the aspects of common citizenship which India alone appeared to 
desire. 
66 
The first meeting of all participants took place on the morn- 
ing of 23 April and lasted two hours. Everyone performed as predicted: 
Nehru outlined his proposals as indicated in the memorandum which Attlee 
and Pearson had received earlier; Chifley of Australia expressed his 
concern that his country's link with the Crown should not be altered 
or weakened; Fraser of New Zealand echoed his neighbour's sentiments, 
and added that in current turbulent times interdependence was more 
important than independence; Liaquat All Khan of Pakistan, ever-wary 
of his country's security, stated that mere association with the Com- 
monwealth was not enough, a view echoed by Senanayake of Ceylon. All 
were of course in favour of India remaining in the Commonwealth, but 
it struck Pearson as curious that the least support for India would 
come from its neighbours, themselves new members of the Commonwealth. 
Dr. D. F. Malan, the Prime Minister of South Africa, startled and sur- 
prised the meeting, particularly in view of the strained relations 
65. Pearson Papers, vol. 9, file "Report on Commonwealth Meet- 
ings, April 22-27,1949", "ii. The Indian Proposals". 
66. MacKay Papers, vol. 2, memorandum by MacKay, "India and the 
Commonwealth-Alternative Links", 20 April 1949. 
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between India and South Africa, by strongly supporting India's con- 
tinued association with the Commonwealth, its republican constitution 
notwithstanding. The people of South Africa had not placed the same 
importance on allegiance to the King as had the other "older members", 
but they perceived trouble on the international horizon, and did not 
wish to stand alone. Pearson, who had earlier deferred to allow the 
prime ministers to speak first, pointed out the adaptability and flexi- 
bility which the Commonwealth had often demonstrated in the past and 
could hopefully do so again. Canada was content with its relation- 
ship to the Crown, and did not wish anyone to be given the impression 
following the conference that the link had been weakened. The Cana- 
than Government accepted the fact that India did not wish to be bound 
by allegiance and welcomed the Indian statement for close and friendly 
association with the other members of the Commonwealth and the reten- 
tion of the King as the symbol of that free association. 
67 
Pearson 
would save Canadian anxieties for the still-present and worrisome 
Indian reference to Commonwealth citizenship for a more appropriate 
time. 
Essentially, the pattern of discussion which followed the 
first meeting, characterized by all participants remaining consistent 
with their previously indicated positions, revolved around recommen- 
dations made in a draft memorandum by Attlee. The British Prime Minis- 
ter suggested that there should be two declarations, one on behalf of 
India which would affirm continued Indian membership in the Common- 
wealth, the other on behalf of the other Commonwealth members would 
declare their continued membership and common allegiance to the King, 
who also served as the symbol of their free association. No one 
seemed to like Attlee's effort too much, especially the Canadians, 
who felt it was too formal and not amenable to easy public comprehen- 
sion. Pearson believed that the two declarations should be combined 
into one, so as to inspire a greater sense of common purpose, advice 
which Attlee heeded in presenting another draft to the conference on 
25 April. Malan, and to an extent Pearson, voiced their doubts about 
the use of the term "Head of the Commonwealth", which might be seen 
67. Pearson Papers, vol. 9, cable no. 838, Pearson to St. 
Laurent, 23 April 1949. 
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to imply that the structure of the Commonwealth was being fundamen- 
tally altered. Attlee countered by stating that it was certainly 
not his intention to imply that there would be any new functions for 
the King, or the creation of a super state for that matter, but a 
substitute formula was required to define India's position. in the 
Commonwealth. 68 
Lester Pearson, whose role in securing drafting changes be- 
came more significant as time passed, became a working member of a 
drafting team which also included Clement Attlee and Sir Stafford 
Cripps. After several further meetings to consider the declaration, 
which featured additional intransigence on the part of Malan to accept 
the King as "Head of the Commonwealth", Indian impatience at Pakistani 
efforts to have a provision for "mutual assistance" enshrined in the 
declaration, as well as the phrase which stated that the Commonwealth 
"had proved its value as an instrument" - which clearly in Nehru's 
mind it had not done in the course of Indian history - the declara- 
tion appeared to be complete by 27 April. Pearson had, however, 
managed to get the Canadian point of view across concerning preferen- 
tial treatment given to Commonwealth citizens. Consideration of an 
"Agreed Minute on Preferential Treatment with regard to Citizens and 
Trade" took place at the fourth meeting on 26 April. In what amounted 
to a re-statement that relations between Commonwealth countries were 
not exactly foreign, and in that perhaps a re-affirmation of the 
inter se doctrine, the minute stated that each Commonwealth country 
could take the necessary steps to maintain its right to offer citizens 
and trade of other member countries "treatment more favourable than 
that accorded to the nationals and trade of foreign countries. " Pear- 
son, doubtlessly aware of Canadian public opinion and perhaps also of 
recently dashed hopes for liberalization of Canadian-American trade 
relations, objected to the words "more favourable" as being too pro- 
vocative, should the minute ever be made public. All that was required, 
Pearson stressed, was a preservation of the right to follow current 
practices. As a result of the Canadian intervention the draft was 
amended to read "to enable it to maintain the right to accord prefer- 
68. For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the decla- 
ration, see Eayrs, pp. 251-255. 
227 
ential treatment as has been customary. 1169 
Following some eleventh hour drafting changes, which again 
dealt with the role of "The King, as the symbol of the free associa- 
tion of the independent member nations, and thus the Head of the Com- 
monwealth" - "thus" was changed to "as such" - the historic Declara- 
tion of London was released to the press on the afternoon of 27 April 
1949. 
The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, whose 
countries are united as Members of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations and owe a common allegiance to the Crown, which 
is also the symbol of their free association, have considered 
the impending constitutional changes in India. 
The Government of India has informed the other Govern- 
ments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian 
people that under the new constitution which is about to 
be adopted India shall become a sovereign independent re- 
public. The Government of India has however declared and 
affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of 
the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The King 
as the symbol of the free association of its independent 
member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth. 
The Governments of the other countries of the Common- 
wealth, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth 
is not hereby changed, accept and recognize India's con- 
tinuing membership in accordance with the terms of this 
declaration. 
Actordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
hereby declare that they remain united as free and equal 
members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating 
in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress. 
7° 
Pearson was indefatigable. That same afternoon he made a 
brief broadcast in which he stated his positive view of the asso- 
ciation: "Our Commonwealth of Nations is a dynamic, not a static 
concept... In diversity and freedom and in the free will to cooperate 
69. Pearson Papers, vol. 9, "Report on Commonwealth Meetings, 
April 22-27,1949", "v. Agreed Minute on Preferential Treatment 
with Regard to Citizens and Trade. " 
70. Ibid., "Report on Commonwealth Meetings, April 22-27, 
1949. " 
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lies its strength. "71 Now a diplomat turned politician, Pearson was 
the only participant not a prime minister in attendance at the inner 
table, and demonstrated a superior skill for conciliation which was 
already internationally appreciated and which would increase in the 
ensuing years. Although some informed Canadians believed that India 
had not gone far enough in pressing its claims, 
72 
there was general 
contentment within the Department of External Affairs, and certainly 
in the government as a whole, in that the potentially explosive public 
issue of the alteration of the position of the Crown, and an embar- 
rassing illumination of restrictive Canadian immigration policies had 
been avoided. But there was something more than that. Canada had 
exercised caution in its attitude to greater Commonwealth membership 
during the early 1940s, a caution bred from the exigencies of satis- 
fying domestic public opinion and from an innocent unfamiliarity with 
any global entanglements beyond well-worn North Atlantic patterns. 
Commonwealth defence had been a somewhat different matter, where Cana- 
dian views had solidified into policy through the experience of saying 
"no. " When a qualified "yes" for Commonwealth preservation and change 
was required during the latter years of the decade, Canada did not 
hesitate to assume responsibility as the senior member of the Common- 
wealth to help to ease this change, surely a fitting role, since it 
was the "Canadian view" of the Commonwealth which had prevailed. 
71. Pearson Papers, vol. 9, transcript of BBC broadcast by 
Pearson, 27 April 1949. In his notes Pearson added: "Fortu- 
nately the release time here, 2 A. M., made it possible for the 
Prime Minister to read the Declaration in Ottawa that afternoon 
and for me to broadcast it over the 10 o'clock news. This meant 
that in the next morning's papers when the Declaration was re- 
leased here, there were reports from Ottawa about its reception 
there and reference to my broadcast. I have the feeling here 
that some of the people thought that I beat the gun. All I did 
of course was take advantage of our six hours differential. " 
"Notes on Visit to London, April 19-30,1949. " 
72. Edgar Tarr in particular. In a letter to Sir Girja Bajpai, 
he wrote: "My joy arising out of the settlement is, however, 
somewhat tempered by the apprehension that India may have con- 
ceded too much. My preference was for a declaration by the 
Prime Ministers to the effect that their countries constituted 
the Commonwealth of Nations and that the form of any of them, 
whether republican or monarchal, is a matter of purely domestic 
concern. " Canadian Institute of International Affairs Records / 
Edgar Tarr Papers, vol. 2, file "India 1935/49", Tarr to Bajpai, 
9 May 1949. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONTINENTALISM AND AMERICAN HEMISPHERICS 
The nascent Canadian diplomacy of the age, together with the 
development of middle power status, were but ancillary factors govern- 
ing Canada's evolving position on the North American continent and in 
the Western Hemisphere. What mattered most was that the United States 
had aggressively emerged from its isolationist hemispheric shell to 
embrace the new world order, significantly this time as both partici- 
pant and protagonist. During the 1940s, Canadian-American relations 
were but a small portion of this grand American global reconversion, 
yet to Canada these relations became all-pervasive by the end of the 
decade. To analyze and disentangle the gamut of issues comprising 
the continental relationship during this period is at best an onerous 
task and well beyond the scope of this study. Much of the tenor of 
Canadian-American relations has already permeated earlier chapters. 
Instead, this chapter will endeavour to examine several pertinent 
areas, in the way of sketching an overview, and will include some 
general aspects of Canada's political relations with the United 
States; an analysis of Canada's changing position in the Western 
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hemisphere, particularly Canada's relationship with Latin America and 
the prospect of membership in the Pan-American Union; and lastly, offer 
some commentary on continental economic and commercial issues. Through- 
out, the views of Ottawa's policy-makers, particularly those resident 
in the Department of External Affairs, will be observed. 
**k 
"In the nature of things, " John Bartlet Brebner has written, 
"It is mere common sense to build upon past experience of interna- 
tional association ... the experience of naturally interlocked 
nations can school people and their statesmen for larger international 
responsibilities. "1 During the 1940s, Canadian policy-makers tended 
to share Brebner's thesis, for in their view Canada had evolved into 
an interlocutor, arbiter, or much-vaunted "lynch-pin" between the in- 
terests of the United Kingdom on the one hand and the United States 
on the other. It was also their pious hope that such a role would 
assume greater significance in the multilateral future which beckoned 
at war's end. However central to Canada's interests the maintenance 
of a separate symbiotic existence of its own with both greater powers 
was, before the end of the decade what had long been forecast had 
finally become fact - in the most realistic of geopolitical and eco- 
nomic terms, it was Canada's relationship with the United States which 
would assume greatest importance from now on. 
In Louis St. Laurent's Gray Memorial Lecture at the Univer- 
sity of Toronto in January 1947, in which he endeavoured to articulate 
the foundations of Canada's foreign policy, he stated that it was not 
at all customary for Canadians to think in terms of actually having a 
policy with respect to the United States. Bilateral relations with 
the Southern neighbours were, he argued, more than "mere empirical 
neighbourliness", and the solving of those mutual problems which 
occasionally surfaced. Instead, the continental relationship was 
characterized by evolving forms of negotiation, arbitration and com- 
promise, together with a willingness to "... consider the possibility 
1. John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Tr angle; The ynter- 
play of Canada, the United States and Great Bri-a-n, introduc- 
tion by Donald G. Creighton, Carleton Library Series ##30, 
(Toronto, 1945,1966), p. 335. 
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of common action for constructive ends. "2 These were hardly words 
designed to captivate his audience, yet they probably came closest 
to defining the essence of Canadian policy during the period, or, 
for that matter, ever since. 
The translation of a nebulous policy of good-will into affirm- 
ative action of lasting benefit to Canada was exceedingly difficult 
during the 1940s. Canada, Escott Reid bluntly stated in a 1942 memo- 
randum, takes "a positive pleasure in trying not to influence the 
course of history", and this taciturn approach was the reason for 
Ottawa's failure to accept "adult" responsibilities in its relations 
with Washington. 
3 
To an extent Reid was correct. As elucidated in 
the initial chapter, it was not until late 1943 that the Canadian 
Legation in Washington was elevated to the level of an embassy - and 
then seemingly only as a reflexive response to similar Latin-American 
actions. Also complicating matters was the fact that Canada's repre- 
sentatives to the United States, with the exception of Loring Christie's 
brief tenure as Minister from 1939 to 1941, were invariably political 
appointees who demonstrated little interest in the policy workings of 
the State Department. Although Leighton McCarthy, who served as Min- 
ister and first ambassador to the United States for the greater part 
of the war until Lester Pearson's accession to the post in early 1945, 
had the tremendous advantage of being counted among President Roose- 
velt's personal friends, the loyalty the friendship inspired on 
McCarthy's part did not always resonate with his own deeply pro-British 
sentiments, to say nothing of views emanating from the East Block in 
Ottawa. 
4 
2. DEA, Statements and Speeches Series, No. 47/2, "The Founda- 
tion of Canadian Policy in World Affairs; Address by the Right 
Honourable Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at Toronto 
University, January 13,1947. " 
3. Reid Papers, vol. 6, memorandum, "The United States and 
Canada: Domination, Cooperation, Absorption", 12 January 1942. 
4. In one instance, Pearson was horrified when McCarthy re- 
quested his comments on a speech which ended "A British subject 
I was born, a British subject I will die. " Pearson Diary, 
6 January 1943. 
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Problems of liaison in Washington went further. Nominally 
second-in-command to McCarthy, Pearson had neither the time - by vir- 
tue of other commitments such as his presidency of the Supply Committee 
of UNRRA - nor the representational allowances to devote himself fully 
to the potentially rewarding task of State Department liaison. One 
must view the Canadian mission in Washington at the time as being 
essentially a microcosm of the Department of External Affairs in 
Ottawa: woefully understaffed for the sheer volume of work it was 
expected to produce. After stoically bearing the weight of State 
Department liaison responsibilities for several years, Pearson ven- 
tured to suggest that a counsellor with such duties be appointed. 
5 
The staffing problems improved shortly thereafter. 
What diplomatic liaison there was suffered from two basic 
inhibiting factors, which seemed to become more worrisome as the war 
progressed. The first, at least in the Canadian view, was a disposi- 
tion amongst American officials and politicians to assume that there 
were no conflicts at all in the bilateral relationship, which in their 
minds seemed to be relegated to the status of domestic concern. It 
was expected that Canada would "go along" with the United States in 
its altruistic plans for future international organizations without 
question, and, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, the Americans 
never really did accept the middle power status which Canada so assi- 
duously sought during these years. Secondly, although there was an 
acknowledgement of the frequent Canadian role as interlocutor between 
Britain and the United States, this valued role, of such symbolic 
domestic political significance, particularly to Mackenzie King, was 
at times of necessity or convenience overlooked by the United States - 
there being no traditional consultative mechanism as with the United 
Kingdom - in its preoccupation with grander questions stemming from 
the turbulent tide of international events. 
Lester Pearson, by virtue of his own outstanding abilities 
together with his prominent presence in Washington during the latter 
war years, was perhaps in a better position to provide articulate 
comments on American foreign policy than most. His 
lucid and often 
5. Pearson Papers, Pre-1948 Series, vol. 2, Pearson to 
Robertson, 30 October 1944. 
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amusing diaries of the time attest to his own rather perplexed state. 
Amazed at how Americans could be both liberal and isolationist at the 
same time, and in so doing reflect views accepted in part by Washing- 
ton's decision-makers, Pearson concluded in early 1943 that "American 
policy after this war is not going to be much more intelligent than it 
was after the last. The fact of the matter is that most Americans are 
natural isolationists, and only international co-operators in an 
emergency., 
6 
He perceived a form of neoisolationism to be in the 
works, which, in itself an admission that American could not secure 
immunity from danger by turning inwards, was premised on the sheer 
global might of the United States. Such strength could breed domina- 
Lion without acceptance of international responsibilities and would 
shape the policy of other countries. 
7 
Needless to add, the emergence 
of such a power to the south would of course be of fundamental concern 
to Canada, which through the application of its functional principle 
wished to be treated in a manner proportionate to its own efforts and 
status. 
Pearson adopted a more qualified point of view following the 
San Francisco Conference and subsequent American congressional ratifi- 
cation of the United Nations Charter. Whereas optimism could then be 
cautiously allowed in observing the multilateral aspects of United 
States foreign policy, its bilateral dimension became a focus of con- 
cern in Pearson's writings. His exasperation surfaced in a letter to 
Norman Robertson following a meeting with President Truman and a pro- 
minent senator: 
Both gentlemen closed my visit by (sic) emphatic state- 
ments that Canada was the great friend of the United States 
and if only all countries were as reasonable and neighbourly 
as we were, how much better the world would be. As I have 
said many times before, this approach is all very gratifying, 
but makes it somewhat more difficult for us to impress on our 
friends here that there are, nevertheless, Canadian-American 
problems, the solution of which is sometimes not made easier 
by the American tendency to treat us as another State of the 
Union, but one without congressional representation; a kind 
of external District of Columbia. 
8 
6. Pearson Diary, 14 January 1943. 
7. DEA, file 4901-40C, Pearson to Robertson, 6 January 1943. 
8. Pearson to Robertson, 2 March 1945, copy of letter in 
Pearson Diary. 
234 
Although diplomatic participants and political observers alike 
believed that irritants had developed in the bilateral relationship, 
the extent of successful cooperation between both countries was monu- 
mental. Of overriding significance was the combined war effort, which, 
following the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 
August 1940 and the signing of the Hyde Park Agreement in April 1941, 
reflected close coordination in both military and economic production 
matters. The activities of numerous boards in joint venture produc- 
tion, while occasioning both bickering and frequent headaches in terms 
of either country's attempts at coherent policy formulation, had the 
decided advantage of further broadening the spectrum of trans-border 
contacts. 
9 
Perhaps the incident which most bruised feelings and generated 
acute embarrassment on both sides of the border occurred in December 
1941 when the war theatre was suddenly brought to Canada through the 
occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, two French islands off the 
coast of Newfoundland, by Vice-Admiral E. -H. Muselier of the Free 
French forces. In retrospect, the sequence of events and resultant 
diplomatic embroglio appear almost comic, but there were grave fears 
at the time that these strategically important islands would be uti- 
lized by the Vichy Government to subvert convoy movements across the 
Atlantic. When Muselier took the islands, after having first consulted 
with Canada and agreeing to undertake no such action, the United States, 
not at the time overly enamoured with General de Gaulle's Free French 
forces, placed the blame squarely on Canada, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull going so far as to enquire by press release that measures the 
Canadian Government would be prepared to undertake to restore the sta±: Us 
quo. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, annoyed with both the French and 
the Americans, the former for breaking their word with the knowledge 
that a Canadian expeditionary force was on alert for such an engage- 
ment, the latter for issuing an ultimatum that Canada expel the French, 
9. Again, not without problems. According to General Maurice 
Pope, trans-border contacts of a civilian nature dealing with 
war materials often lacked military expertise. More coordina- 
tion was required. Pope Papers, vol. 2, Pope to Pearson, 
29 August 1944. 
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firmly denied Canadian responsibility for or complicity in the affair. 
In any event the State Department was embarrassed when American public 
opinion reacted angrily to the press release. As it happened, the new 
order did prevail, Canadian policy-makers realizing however that 
"there is very little we can do to influence American policy in this 
matter. " 
10 
Some rancour remained and while in late 1944 the then 
American ambassador to Canada, Ray Atherton, would admit that American 
handling of the incident had been rather misguided, he did so in such 
a fashion as to leave Norman Robertson with the distinct impression 
that "... if we had kept in closer touch with the State Department we 
would always have agreed with them. "" 
If the tone of "action before consultation", with consequent 
unease in Ottawa was set by the St. Pierre and Miquelon affair, then 
the presence of some 46,000 American military and civilian personnel 
in the Canadian North-West by 1943, compared to one-seventh that amount 
of Canadian personnel, was unsettling indeed. Canadian sovereignty, it 
was believed, appeared to be threatened. Provision had been made in 
the Ogdensburg Agreement for military cooperation between the United 
States and Canada, including the construction of "aerodromes" for a 
North-West Staging Route. Similarly, the "Canol" project, which was 
designed to produce oil from a field at Norman Wells to meet American 
needs for the staging route, also greatly augmented construction in 
the region and brought more American labour north. 
Ironically, it was the British High Commissioner, Malcolm 
MacDonald, who managed to focus if not galvanize Canadian anxieties. 
As part of MacDonald's need to explore his vast country of accredita- 
tion, he journeyed to western Canada in the spring of 1943. Upon 
return, the High Commissioner reported his grave concerns in a brief 
memorandum which eventually surfaced in the Canadian Cabinet War 
Committee: 
10. Pearson Papers, vol. 1, Pearson to Massey, 9 January 1943. 
11. DEA, file 71(s), Robertson to Pearson, 24 October 1944. 
For a precise account of the entire incident, see C. P. Stacey, 
Arms, Men & Governments : The War Policies of Canada, 1939-19 _ ̀ , 
(Ottawa, 1970), pp. 370-3. 
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The Americans are doing the greater part of the planning 
and execution... at present at any rate the Canadian authori- 
ties have too little influence on the shaping of these affairs 
in Canadian territory. The situation even seems so disturbing 
that I venture to write this personal, informal and frank note 
on the subj ect. 12 
MacDonald suggested that the cause for American aggressiveness 
stemmed from feuding between the War and State Departments in Washing- 
ton, a popular Foreign Office view; in the Department of External 
Affairs, Hugh Keenleyside, perhaps the officer most familiar with the 
matter, held the opinion that the problem arose from the basic United 
States army conception of the prerogatives of a Commander -in-th e- 
Field. 
13 
Nonetheless, the extent of Canadian concern was emphasized 
less than a month later through the establishment of the office of 
Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in the North-West, a position 
which would centralize Canadian authority in the region and delegate 
such powers from Ottawa in a manner which would ensure that Canada's 
sovereign interests would be upheld. 
To be sure, there were other sources of friction between Canada 
and the United States, often emanating from the conflict between the 
concept that "the American way" was by definition the best way on the 
one hand and Canada's need to assert visible independence in its policy 
actions on the other. Minor contretemps involving the sale of wheat, 
boundary regulation and the activities of commercial enterprises fell 
into this category, but they were not beyond resolution through the 
evolving forms of negotiation, arbitration and compromise with which 
St. Laurent had characterized the essence of the bilateral relationship. 
In Mackenzie King's view, the extent and harmony of the com- 
bined continental war effort, particularly defence cooperation as 
defined under the Ogdensburg Agreement, an exemplary demonstration 
of neighbourly cooperation, served as one of his most astute political 
accomplishments. However he continually entertained suspicions of the 
ultimate North American desires of the United States. Would enhanced 
12. DEA, file 52-B(s), "M. M. ", "Note on Developments in North- 
Western Canada", 6 April 1943. 
13. DEA, file 52-B(s),, memorandum by Hugh Keenleyside, "United 
States Activities in North-Western Canada", 9 April 1943. 
23 7 
continental integration, which to him seemed inevitable, if not in 
strict economic terms welcome, be consistent with the role which Canada 
aspired to win for itself in the post-war world? Could Canada expand 
its relationship with its great neighbour to the south, strengthen 
its own hemispheric roots as an American nation and still emerge a 
credible middle power? The Prime Minister espoused a view that all 
was possible, and what was more, Canada would maintain its link with 
tradition in becoming "the greatest of nations of the British Common- 
wealth. ýý14 
We shall return to the politico-economic queries posed above 
in due course, as they are of central importance to Canada's rela- 
tionship with the United States during the decade. However, it will 
prove beneficial to first examine Canada's developing affiliations 
with Latin America, in itself somewhat of a departure from the esta- 
blished pattern. 
*** 
Canada, as both a nation of the British Commonwealth and one 
situated in the Americas, found itself at a sort of a crossroads during 
the war. The juxtaposition of its constitutional and historic ties 
with the motherland, combined with the significance generated by the 
emergence of a new and hemispheric brand of Monroe Doctrine to the 
south, added a dialectical dimension to Canadian foreign policy. In 
other words, while a search for countervailing forces to the power of 
the United States was not an expressed tenet of Canadian policy, it 
was nonetheless in existence, exemplified by Canada's own broadening 
multilateral and regional interests. 
The development of Canada's relations with Latin America came 
not as a result of some single-minded policy nor campaign - indeed the 
Prime Minister never had great love for any Latin Americans - but 
perhaps out of an evolving desire to achieve greater influence in a 
geographic region peculiar to Canada. Conversely it must be stated 
that this was a reciprocal sentiment, as the Latin-Americans sought 
to broaden their own horizons, though in a more obvious manner. For 
them, membership in the League of Nations had been an effective multi- 
lateral counterweight to the domination of the United States; in their 
14. King Diary, 30 December 1942. 
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view the legacy of the war would be a new and unknown international 
organization, in this instance including a more powerful United States 
of America. 
For Canada, trade and later security became the basis of the 
relationship with Latin America. In the short term, Canada hoped 
to find compensatory markets for those lost in Europe as well as 
dollar exchange and sources of supply. As the war progressed, and 
certainly in the immediate post-war period, the economic problems 
which Canada shared with other American states such as productivity, 
secondary industry and transportation were accentuated; future trade 
with these countries could help resolve some of these endemic diffi- 
culties. In addition, the fall of France and shipping losses in the 
Caribbean forced Canada to cast a wider eye to include an examination 
of hemispheric defence. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, after 
all, only looked after the northern half. 
15 
Whereas Canada gingerly and as a result of relegated priori- 
ties perhaps haphazardly inched its way toward closer diplomatic 
ties with Latin American countries, these nations in their turn 
favoured a more direct approach. For example, in 1943, Dr. Oswaldo 
Aranha, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, appealed to what he quite 
correctly judged to be susceptible sentiments in Canadian policy- 
making circles: "Brazilians also consider that Canada is a help and 
a comfort to them in dealing with the United States of America. , 
16 
Although the "Canada as mediator" chord had been sounded, the func- 
tionalists in Ottawa did not wish to be enticed. To them mediation 
mattered more when it could be conducted between great powers. 
Similarly, the representational aspects of diplomacy suffered 
from neglect. Exchanges of diplomatic missions, as well as high- 
level visits either to or from Canada were actively discouraged by 
Canadian representatives in Washington and officials in Ottawa. 
15. This at least was the Foreign Office view. Foreign Office, 
FO 371 Series, A1907/616/51, paper prepared by R. A. Humphreys of 
the Foreign Office Research Department, "Canadian Relations with 
the Pan-American Union", 18 February 1943. 
16. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, A8849/2811/51, despatch from 
Sir Noel Charles, U. R. ambassador to Brazil, 14 September 1943. 
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Mackenzie King, in his capacity of Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, only agreed to see Latin-American envoys on rare occasions; 
diplomats as a matter of course made their demarches to the Under- 
Secretary or to the small American and Far Eastern Division. In 1944, 
H. L. Keenleyside, who bore the title of Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, headed this division, and was ably assis- 
ted by R. M. Macdonnell, as well as by F. H. Soward and H. S. Ferns, 
both of whom had been seconded to the Department as Special Assis- 
tants. Not one of the officers was solely charged with Latin-American 
questions, since there was the Far East to consider as well, although 
Soward's major responsibility was in the field. One is left with the 
impression that despite the lower level of importance attached to 
relations with Latin America, the Department of External Affairs was 
sorely understaffed to manage even those contacts which existed. 
Canadian interest in Latin America had traditionally been of 
a commercial variety, as several Canadian companies had pursued con- 
siderable investment activities from the time of the First World War. 
Decidedly the greatest was the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power 
Company, a firm with majority Canadian ownership, which controlled 
tramway, power, telephone and gas companies in Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo. Assets at the end of 1942 totalled some $394 million, far 
surpassing, for example, those of any British company active in Latin 
America. 
17 
Several other Canadian firms were involved in public 
utilities in the region, as well as in the mining and petroleum 
industries. Canadian banks were also well-represented, and of some 
53 chartered bank branches situated in Latin America in 1942,30 were 
located in Cuba, the Royal Bank of Canada operating the other branches 
in Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay and Brazil. Business 
must have been quite healthy, since the Inspector General of Banks was 
of the opinion that the Latin-American branches of the chartered banks 
were above the Canadian average in their money-making capabilities. 
18 
During the war years, despite burgeoning trade, the bilateral 
balance of trade tended to favour Latin America, as traditional Cana- 
17. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, memorandum by 
F. H. Soward, "Report on Canadian Representation in and Relations 
with Latin American States", 17 April 1944. This company has 
since become BRASCAN International and has been nationalized. 
18. Ibid. 
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than exports of farm machinery, other metal manufactures and rubber 
goods were diverted into war production. Newsprint was the sole 
exception, exports to Latin America actually increasing during this 
period. However Canadian imports of crude petroleum, coffee and 
fruit increased disproportionately. The higher volume of trade, as 
well as the potential for strong markets following the war, prompted 
a marathon Canadian trade mission of several months duration led by 
J. A. MacKinnon, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, in the autumn of 
1941. This effort, unique in that such a tour had never been under- 
taken before, in addition to the fact that it took place at a time of 
war, did not provoke immediate signatures on Canadian contracts but 
served as more of a commercial familiarization and publicity exercise 
for all concerned. As a result, it provided at least a glimpse of a 
Canadian sovereign presence, and made the hosts aware of Canada's 
war effort. Canadian trade promotion activities in South America 
had thus far been traditionally assisted by British trade commission- 
ers in the region. 
19 
Commercial relations were not without their problems, as would 
be expected in a market which gave virtually unlimited and well-pro- 
tected access to products from the United States. In those cases 
where Canada had negotiated most-favoured-nation treaties with 
clauses allowing Canadian freedom of action with respect to British 
Commonwealth countries or where the British trading umbrella auto- 
matically took Canadian interests into consideration, competition 
was at best a laborious affair, plagued by the manner by which the 
British connection was deftly exploited by the United States through 
subtle references to the fraternal bond of American republics. Fur- 
ther, the United States had entered into incredibly favourable trade 
treaties which Canada could never hope to match. The United States- 
Cuba Trade Treaty, for example, allowed for rebates as high as 70 per 
19. Escott Reid Papers, vol. 5, file 5, Diary of 1941 Canadian 
Trade Mission to South America. Reid, who accompanied Mac- 
Kinnon, believed the trip was too long but came to the conclu- 
sion that the South Americans desired closer ties with 
Canada 
both economically through most-favoured-nation trade agreements, 
and politically, since it was felt Canada was 
destined to play 
an active role in hemispheric politics following the war. 
Also 




cent of the normal tariff. Nonetheless, Canada's sizeable commercial 
interests in Latin America were recognized by both the United States 
and United Kingdom in wartime consultations concerning the black- 
listing of and later economic warfare against Latin-American firms 
which were found to be dealing with the Axis powers. 
20 
The onset of the war brought semblances of a more coordinated 
effort by Canada to expand its relationship with Latin America into 
other fields of endeavour. A modest publicity campaign, mounted by 
Canadian embassies in South America, which numbered three by mid-war, 
and assisted by the Wartime Information Board, which had its own 
Latin-American section, sought to elicit some understanding in these 
countries of Canada's participation in the war. It was hoped that 
such an effort would help to clarify that most difficult and unex- 
plainable of questions, the constitutional status of Canada within 
the British Commonwealth. Cultural publicity and activities were 
pursued by the Canadian ambassador in situ, Jean Desy in Brazil 
probably being the most energetic in this respect. 
21 
In Ottawa, an 
interdepartmental committee, comprising representatives of the De- 
partments of External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, the Wartime Infor- 
mation Board and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, was formed 
in 1942 to coordinate the dissemination of information about Canada 
and the war in Latin America. In the event, this Committee met only 
irregularly, "there not being sufficient new publicity to justify 
"22 monthly meetings as was originally suggested. Although the Latin- 
Americans were well-represented in Ottawa, one must conclude that the 
public affairs aspect of their work was ineffectual, and did not, with 
the possible exception of Argentina's pro-Axis sympathies, merit 
attention in the Canadian press. 
20. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, memorandum by 
F. H. Soward, "Report on Canadian Representation in and Rela- 
tions with Latin American States", 17 April 1944. 
21. Canada entered into a cultural exchange agreement with 
Brazil in 1944. Desy's British colleague commented that he had 
met with outstanding success and had established a respected 
position for himself and his country in Brazil. "His French 
characteristics have affinities with Brazilian temperament. " 
Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, A8849/281/51, Charles to Eden, 
14 September 1943. 
22. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, memorandum by 
F. H. Soward, "Report on Canadian Representation in and Relations 
with Latin American States", 17 April 1944. 
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In a 1944 Gallup Poll, 72* per cent of those Canadians polled 
revealed that they had -never heard of the Pan-American Union nor knew 
its purpose. 
23 
The publaic's gaze had tradition ally been fixed upon 
the North Atlantic triangle, and through the American media, more 
recently on the war in the Pacific. This focus= was largely shared 
within the Department of Icternal Affairs, and Indeed several high- 
placed civil servants believed that the establishment of consulates 
or trade missions in important cities in the United States should be 
a prerequisite to estab&ishing a more visible diplomatic profile in 
Latin America, which gene-rally seemed to share few of Canada's global 
interests. 
24 
However, concerns : for the development of the post-war world 
order, and Canada's pl-ace-therein, as well as a more pronounced re- 
gional role taken by the : th±Lted States, caused +olicy-makers to again 
contemplate closer linkag iwith the Pan-Americas Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, or Pan- nerican Union, as th'e entire organization 
was called. Arguments fore a Canadian membershirp of sorts had been 
held in abeyance for the past' twenty years, turkned aside by either 
Canadian anxiety as to what-r- esponsibilities aAociation would en- 
gender, or a lack of enthusiasm on the part of tthe United States at 
"25 having a "Dominion amongst the republics. ' 
As early as 1928, when the Pan--American Conference met at 
Havana, there had been. a. Latin American initiattive to extend an invi- 
tation to Canada to take rpart. At the tine, Frank Kellogg, the Ameri- 
can Secretary of State, -iiiformed the Canadian sinister in Washington, 
none other than Vincent. ssey, that the United States would be 
pleased to see Canada as- aT- member of the Pan-American Union but that 
Canada's position in the British Empire could pfose difficulties. In 
1936, before the advent of*a similar meeting o4f foreign ministers at 
23. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol? 2128, memorandum by 
F. H. Soward, "Report on Canadian Representation in and Rela- 
tions with Latin Abierican States", 17 April 1944. 
24. Interview with the Honourable J. W. -Fickersgill, 28 May 
19 80 . 
25. There had been no objection from and quarter to Canadian 
participation in inter-American bodies which were of a tech- 
nical nature, most notably the Postal Union of the 
Americas 
and Spain (1931), the Inter-American Radio Office 
(1940), and 
the Inter-American Statistical Institute (1943). 
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Buenos Aires, the American position was unequivocal: while the United 
States did not wish to make any suggestion as to what Canadian policy 
should be respecting entry into the Union, it would support such a 
proposal with great pleasure. 
A consistent view on this question on the part of the United 
States was not to be, however, as in December 1941 then Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles informed Hume Wrong in Washington that in Presi- 
dent Roosevelt's view, an invitation to Canada to be present at the 
Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro in a month's time could not 
be supported. The position of the United States in the Pan-American 
Union, it was then argued, was based upon fraternal agreements between 
member countries, thus rendering participation by governments other 
than American republics impossible. Welles also seemed certain that 
several Latin American nations would oppose participation by Canada 
because of its "Dominion status" - not that any country including the 
United States knew precisely what the term meant - but agreed to raise 
the question in unofficial fashion at the conference. Welles later 
informed his Canadian interlocutors that he had discovered sufficient 
varying opinions among the Latin-Americans to mitigate against any 
invitation being extended to Canada at the present time. In Ottawa, 
rejection in such an off-hand manner was not taken without some bit- 
terness at least by some within the Department of External Affairs; 
numerous Latin-Americans had made similarly unofficial approaches to 
their peers to the contrary and had indeed conveyed their desire to 
have Canada in attendance at further meetings directly to Canadian 
representatives in both Washington and Ottawa. 
By 1943 American policy had lurched once again, President 
Roosevelt himself this time telling Leighton McCarthy that the United 
States would welcome Canadian observer status in the Pan-American 
Union for the duration of the war, a status which Canada has unfail- 
ingly maintained since. 
26 
In 1947, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who, 
with the advent of the Marshall Plan, had maintained the high profile 
which had stood him in such good stead at the San Francisco Conference 
of the United Nations, pointed at the vacant chair embla- 
26. In December 1982, a Parliamentary Committee recommended 
that Canadian membership in the Organization of American States, 
the successor to the Pan-American Union, would be desirable. A 
decision remains in abeyance. 
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zoned with the Canadian coat of arms which had in apparent foresight 
been included when the Pan-American Building was erected in Washington 
in 1910: 
By every rule of righteousness she is eligible to this 
association. By every rule of reason we would wish her here. 
I would welcome the final and total new world unity which 
will be nobly dramatized when the twenty-second chair is 
filled and our continental brotherhood is complete from the 
Arctic Circle to Cape Horn. 27 
Righteousness, reason and continental brotherhood notwith- 
standing, in Ottawa the denizens of the East Block, as their political 
masters, had exhibited few firm opinions on the issue either way, and 
for his part the Prime Minister in typical and probably wise fashion 
chose to employ his well honed obfuscatory skills. When Wrong had met 
with Welles in 1941, Mackenzie King wrote that he was not at all sur- 
prised by Roosevelt's usage of a narrow legalistic position concerning 
Canadian participation at the Rio Conference, that he could see the 
President was preoccupied with related thoughts, such as that the 
United Kingdom might be disposed to take advantage of the situation 
and in turn attempt to influence United States' policy in the region. 
To Wrong's suggestion, echoed by Robertson, that he personally take 
the question up with the President, the Prime Minister adopted a 
rather sanguine attitude: a message should be relayed to Roosevelt 
indicating that King fully understood his rationale and that Canadian 
interest in the conference had stemmed solely from a desire to encour- 
age cooperation between the United States and South America. 
28 
Whether 
or not the President, or for that matter, the State Department, would 
accept such a pronouncement was moot, the Canadian approach to member- 
ship in the Pan-American Union was to continue to be decidedly cautious 
and unobtrusive. Mackenzie King, as usual attributing significance to 
public awareness, or in this case an evident lack thereof, had voiced 
the official position in the House of Commons two years earlier and 
there the matter appeared to rest: 
27. Privy Council Office, RG2/18 Series, vol. 75, file D-19-20, 
untitled background memorandum for Cabinet on Pan-American 
Union, Section II, Part I, "The Previous Attitude of the United 
States, 1924-47", n. d. , 
(August, 1947). 
28. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 310, file 3309, memorandum, 
Robertson to King, 17 December 1941. 
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Public opinion in favour of some such course has un- doubtedly increased in recent years. I do not, however, 
consider that it has become sufficiently wide-spread, or 
sufficiently informed and mature, to warrant immediate 
steps in that direction. It is a possibility which should 
be given consideration in the future, along with other means, 
trade and governmental, of bringing about closer relation- 
ships between our country and these countries which are 
destined to play an increasingly significant part in the 
world's affairs. 29 
Within the Department of External Affairs, however, the issue 
could not be so simply evaluated, and although there was not what 
might be termed a strict departmental view, other than the official 
one of course, there existed great diversity of opinion. Hugh Keen- 
leyside, for example, in his capacity as Assistant Under-Secretary 
responsible for Latin-American affairs, had consistently argued in 
favour of Canadian participation in Pan-American conferences of 
foreign ministers. In a rather strident memorandum prior to the Rio 
Conference of 1942, Keenleyside stated that the meeting had been con- 
vened for the purpose of coordinating hemispheric defence and hence 
would be of vital interest to Canada. It would seem absurd for Canada, 
which had for two years been fighting what had become a common foe, to 
be absent from a meeting specifically designed to consider means by 
which the enemy could be defeated. Involvement in such hemispheric 
discussions would follow quite naturally from the Ogdensburg Agreement. 
In the event of a call for mobilization of the resources of the hemis- 
phere, the Hyde Park Agreement could also be extended to encompass the 
hemisphere. In addition, Canada could assist the United States and 
other allies in bringing pressure to bear on the as yet non-belligerent 
countries of the hemisphere. According to Keenleyside, the only ra- 
tional arguments against Canadian participation would be the difficulty 
of forming a suitable delegation and the possibility of getting into 
defence commitments involving Latin-American partners. 
30 
29. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, vol. 3,30 March 1939, 
pp. 2420-1. Before the 1941 Rio Conference King would add that 
Canada as a belligerent could not very well request an invita- 
tion for membership of an organization which was chiefly com- 
prised of neutral countries, including at the time the United 
States. Debates, vol. 3,6 August 1940, p. 2540. 
30. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 310, file 3309, Keenleyside, 
"Memorandum for the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for 
External Affairs", 11 December 1941. 
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Both concerns were of course central to Mackenzie King's 
thinking, as his own minutes on the Keenleyside memorandum demon- 
strated. A high-profile Canadian delegation, as would undoubtedly be 
warranted, would garner publicity at a time when it was unclear where 
public opinion rested. Furthermore, the entire concept of enduring 
defence commitments of any sort, other than those recently developed 
with the United States, was anathema to Mackenzie King's philosophy 
of international relations, there being more than enough instances 
during his long tenure as Prime Minister to confirm his views. 
In response to a request for comments on the subject from 
Keenleyside, General Maurice Pope in Washington focussed on the de- 
fensive and security aspect which Canadian membership in the Pan- 
American Union would entail. A Canadian decision to join the Inter- 
American Def ence Board, a sub-organization of the Pan-American Union 
which had recently come into being, would per force necessitate ad- 
herence to the whole. However, Pope was finely attuned to prevailing 
State Department concerns, where in some quarters it was feared that 
Canadian admission would bring with it an element of the outside world, 
which, in addition to everything else, would be non-American. He com- 
mented further that whereas the Permanent Joint Board on Defence pos- 
sessed a sound raison d'etre, there would be no real significance in 
a Canadian military relationship with Bolivia or Guatemala. Pope 
deemed the entire question to be of the political variety best avoided 
and passed it on to Lester Pearson, who perhaps wisely chose to let 
the matter rest in his bulging pending file. In the same letter to 
Keenleyside, Pope in more telling fashion expressed the evolution of 
thought on the subject which had occurred among his colleagues in 
Ottawa: 
There was a time when I should have looked upon Canada's 
entry into the Pan American Union as a form of apostasy. 
But time works its changes. Indeed, change, political as 
well as otherwise, seems to be a natural law. The idea no 
longer shocks me. We form part of this Continent (sic) and 
this being so I see no reason why we should not at the appro- 
priate time join our neighbourhood club. I do not in the 
slightest fear that such a step would weaken the intra- 
Imperial connection. No more so than the fact that our 
attending different churches on Sunday in no way militates 
against our intimate and effective collaboration during the 
other days of the week. 
31 
31. Maurice Pope Diaries, vol. 1, letter from Pope to Keenley- 
side, 15 April 1942 in response to Keenleyside to 
Pope, 12 April 
1942. 
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If within the hierarchy of the Department of External Affairs 
there existed tacit approval but no overt enthusiasm for eventual Cana- 
than adherence to the Pan-American Union, and if Keenleyside was per- 
ceived as the greatest proponent of such union, then from London Vin- 
cent Massey was surely its greatest detractor. The High Commissioner 
wrote copiously on the subject from 1945 onward, prefacing each rumi- 
nation with a disclaimer stating that his views were acquired while 
Canadian representative in Washington over a decade earlier. More 
likely than not his personal views of the British Commonwealth, rein- 
forced during his tenure in London, moulded his opinions. 
Massey developed convincing arguments. In response to the 
frequently expressed view that adherence to the Pan-American Union 
would substantially increase trade between Canada and the Latin- 
American countries, Massey stated that such an assertion was falla- 
cious, as Canada would continue to develop its commerce with the 
region as heretofore: through direct trade and diplomatic represen- 
tation. 
32 
Bearing in mind the importance of Canada's international 
status, Massey cautioned that it would be more prudent to consider 
membership after "a period of zealous and unanimous courtship. .. rather 
than to apply again, cap in hand. " Canada had insisted on equality 
of status for all members of the Commonwealth; in the larger Pan- 
American Union, Canada could conceivably find equality with Paraguay, 
certainly not with the United States. Further, Massey argued, Canada 
had consistently opposed the establishment of a Commonwealth Secre- 
tariat, most recently in defeating Australian Prime Minister John 
Curtin's proposal at the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 
1944, yet the Pan-American Union was in essence a secretariat, member- 
ship thus having similar ramifications for Canadian sovereignty. As 
there existed no geographic, strategic, cultural or political unity 
within the Americas, "unless one believes that the Isthmus of Panama 
has some mystic significance", Canada's participation would inevitably 
be premised on the most tenuous if not artificial of terms. Massey 
thought relations with the Latin-Americans had traditionally been con- 
32. Also, there was no evidence that any member country had 
increased its trade with any other through the machinery of 
inter-American organization. DEA, Washington Embassy Files, 
vol. 2128, despatch No. A54, Massey to 
King, 22 February 1945. 
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ducted in their own preferred rhetorical fashion, a manner which was 
apparently alien to the more high-minded and sophisticated Canadians. 
33 
For all of Massey's crusading fervour, and it was indeed con- 
siderable, 
34 
he correctly identified the single greatest concern of 
policy-makers in Ottawa which could ensue from Canadian membership 
in the Pan-American Union: the Canadian position on issues which 
divided the United States from the other republics. Without being a 
member, Canada could afford to maintain a position of dignified aloof- 
ness, however, "We should find it very difficult", Massey wrote, "to 
avoid joining with Latin America in an anti-United States attitude on 
the one hand or on the other being classed (sic) simply as a puppet 
of Washington. x, 
35 
In the aggregate, views within the Department of External 
Affairs on the issue tended to fall betwixt and between the Keenley- 
side and Massey extremes. In Washington, Lester Pearson became a 
repeated nay-sayer to numerous Latin-American invitations for Cana- 
dian membership, duly informing his interlocutors that such a ques- 
tion could not be considered at the present time, as Canada preferred 
to observe how plans for the world organization and its relationship 
to regional groupings would be developed at San Francisco. 
36 
As a previous chapter has shown, Latin-American proposals on 
this relationship were politely ignored in Ottawa as not meriting 
sufficient interest to Canada at the time. Personally, Pearson fa- 
voured Canadian adherence to the Pan-American Union and was intrigued 
33. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 387, Massey to Robertson, 
19 March 1945. 
34. Massey would go on to write a persuasive article in 
MacZean's magazine which won him the praise of Brooke Claxton, 
himself a leading Cabinet proponent for Canadian membership in 
the Pan-American Union. See Vincent Massey, "Should Canada 
Join the Pan-American Union? ", MacZean's (15 August 1947), 
pp. 22,44-47. Also Claxton Papers, vol. 56, Claxton to Massey, 
4 November 1947. Claxton informed Massey that the Prime Minis- 
ter had in Cabinet referred to the article as "a first class 
piece of work. " 
35. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, despatch no. 
A54, Massey to King, 22 February 1945. 
36. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, Pearson to 
Robertson, 17 March 1945. 
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by pro-union economic arguments emanating from Canadian universities 
as to the potential benefits which could accrue to Canada in the 
event of membership . 
37 
The two men whose views mattered most in Ottawa, Norman Robert- 
son and Hume Wrong, eschewed enthusiasm of any kind, choosing to adopt 
a cool, rational approach. When in 1943 the United Kingdom requested 
its High Commissioner in Ottawa to enquire about Canadian views con- 
cerning entry into the Pan-American Union, Malcolm MacDonald reported 
that Robertson and Wrong appeared sceptical. In response to MacDonald's 
explanation that the Foreign Office believed Canadian membership would 
provide a welcome link between the European and American political sys- 
tems as well as an insurance against continental isolationism on the 
part of powerful elements in the United States - surely a propsal 
which would appeal to any Canadian middle power theorist - the two 
men allowed that they were most interested to hear that the United 
Kingdom favoured Canadian membership, as indeed did some of their own 
colleagues. 
38 
However, the United Kingdom already was aware that the 
real opposition to Canadian membership came from the State Department 
37. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2128, Pearson to 
Robertson, 6 March 1945. Pearson referred in particular to 
Wartime Information Board Reference Paper No. 34 which had 
been written by Professor John Humphrey of McGill University 
in Montreal. Pearson also counselled greater Canadian repre- 
sentation in Latin America in order to exploit future commer- 
cial possibilities. King Papers, Jl Series, Vol. 389, Pearson 
to Robertson, 13 December 1945. 
38. The possibility that opinions of officials of the Depart- 
ment of External Affairs on the issue were to an extent shaped 
by where individuals had attended university, i. e., Oxford, 
Cambridge, or an American university, or as in Robertson's 
case both Oxford and Harvard, arose during the conduct of 
research for this chapter. Although Keenleyside received his 
higher education in the United States, and Massey was often 
uncharitably referred to as a Balliol anglophile, there is 
only limited evidence to suggest any sort of pattern in the 
Deaprtment in this respect. In a letter to the author of 8 
August 1980, H. L. Keenleyside reflected on the question: 
"The attitude of the officers of External Affairs was divided 
but not on any hard and fast lines. Most people tended to 
think it might be a wise thing or it might be unwise but 
nobody was prepared to man the barricades to promote either 
policy. So far as I am aware, the attitude of the officials 
concerned was not influenced by the place in which their 
previous studies had been undertaken. 
" 
250 
in Washington and no further forays into the field could be under- 
taken until it changed its position. The High Commissioner commented 
further that both men were anxious to have a Canadian Minister appoin- 
ted to Mexico but one of the difficulties was getting a properly quali- 
fied Canadian to fill the position. "I think Robertson and Wrong 
are likely to pursue this possibility fairly actively", MacDonald 
wrote, "Then when they have more Ministers placed in the countries 
south of the United States they may consider again the possibility of 
seeking membership of the Pan-American Union . "39 Although Hugh Keen- 
leyside would receive the appointment to Mexico within a year and the 
question of Canadian membership in the organization would be consi- 
dered by Cabinet in 1947, MacDonald erred in assuming that Robertson 
and Wrong would pursue the entire question actively, as their subtle 
reticence remained and perhaps helped most to determine Canada's 
position. 
There was, however, an exception. The Inter-American Conference 
on Problems of War and Peace, which met at Mexico City in late February 
1945, more popularly known as the Chapultepec Conference, was the first 
meeting of American foreign ministers to take place since the Rio Con- 
ference of 1942. Technically the meeting was to be comprised of the 
belligerent American republics, and, in response to some adroit United 
States diplomacy, the six non-belligerents 
40 
, other than Argentina41, 
proceeded to declare war before the advent of the conference. Its 
purpose was to consider cooperative measures for the conduct of the 
39. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, file A9084/281/51, Malcolm 
MacDonald to Sir John Stephenson, 21 September 1943. Also Sir 
John Stephenson to Sir Patrick Duff, 15 July 1943. 
40. Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
41. The accession to power in Argentina of a pro-Axis govern- 
ment had resulted in a violation of Argentina's pledge to co- 
operate in the war against the Axis powers; the United States 
strove to ensure that the new Argentine regime was not recognized 
by its Latin neighbours or others, for that matter. No action 
was required of Canada as the Canadian Minister had returned to 
Canada before the change of Government; the Charge d'Affaires 
had been instructed to confine his contacts with the Argentine 
government to a minimum and to avoid taking any action which 
would imply recognition of the regime. 
King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, minutes of Cabinet 'gar 
Committee Meeting, 26 July 1944; Department of External Affairs 
memorandum, 25 July 1944. 
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war, the economic and social problems which would confront the Americas 
during and after the war, the status of Argentina, and of significance 
to Canada, the question of future international organization with re- 
gional groupings and the result of the great power discussions at 
Dumbarton Oaks. 
Since Canada was already privy to most of what had transpired 
at Dumbarton Oaks through its British connection, Canadian attention 
was held by regional defence and security issues, eventually to emerge 
in the Act of Chapultepec. This understanding, while not representing 
a regionalization of the Monroe Doctrine, did amplify earlier Pan- 
American attempts at Lima (1938) and Havana (1940) to achieve commit- 
ments from the organization for effective action to preserve peace and 
security against extra and intra-hemispheric aggression. 
The United States appeared quite intent on keeping Canada 
abreast of developments. John Hickerson, the leading "Canadianist" 
of the State Department, actually enclosed copies of the American 
proposals on security in a letter to Norman Robertson before the con- 
ference, 
42 
and the possibility of Canadian adherence to the treaty 
became a Christmas cocktail party discussion topic among Ottawa's 
elite. Robertson wrote Pearson early in the new year, informing him 
that following consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the predict- 
able and prudent course for Canada to follow was to remain interested - 
but solely on the periphery. A case for joining the negotiations could 
only be made if the United States was particularly anxious for Canadian 
participation and if there were both public interest and support in 
Canada. There was neither. Further, Robertson argued, it would prove 
exceedingly difficult to engage in broader continental defence discus- 
sions prior to Commonwealth deliberations on the subject. Moreover, 
Canada's evolving multilateral Weltanschauung was indicative of 
grander security interests: 
If the United Nations Organization is to be a success, 
there is an advantage in having the general seourity arrange- 
ments take precedence over regional plans which could be 
completed a good deal more intelligently when the outlines 
42. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 413, Hickerson to Robertson, 
22 December 1945. 
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of the general agreements are known... Our attitude towards 
a hemisphere (sic) treaty might be rather different if it 
followed, rather than preceded the military arrangements 
contemplated under Article 43 of the Charter. 43 
Nonetheless, it was of more than passing interest for Canada 
to be informed as to what would be discussed at Chapultepec in the way 
of precisely such plans for regional security under an all-inclusive 
multilateral umbrella and it was probably for this reason, more than 
any other, that Canada acquired unofficial observer status at the 
conference. From Washington, Nelson Rockefeller, then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American affairs, wrote Mackenzie King, 
stating that he would appreciate unofficial contact with a Canadian 
representative, "... in order that you may know of the plans as they 
are being formulated, and that we may get the benefit of your thoughts, 
the mutuality of interests in Canada and the American republics being 
so strong. " 
44 
Keenleyside, newly-appointed Canadian ambassador to 
Mexico, was asked by the Prime Minister to monitor developments at 
the meeting; further detailed information was to be supplied through 
the United States Embassy in Ottawa. Keenleyside met Rockefeller on 
several occasions during the course of the conference, and at least 
once at the Canadian Embassy. 
45 
Canada was not accorded a privileged 
position in this respect, as the United Kingdom had been taken into 
American confidence in a similar fashion, also at the behest of Nelson 
Rockefeller. As might have been expected, the British and Canadians 
43. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 413, Robertson to Pearson, 
7 January 19 46 . 
44. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 390, Rockefeller to King, 
31 January 1945. 
45. Keenleyside to the author, 8 August 1980. Mackenzie King 
may have had a personal reason in acceeding to Rockefeller's 
request. His connection with the Rockefellers, developed when 
he worked first for them as a labour expert thirty-five years 
earlier, had endured. Diary entries one and two years 
later 
indicate that King had expected an annuity from the family 
upon his retirement. Nelson Rockefeller's 
letters to King 
during this period are full of effusive compliments. See 
also King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 390, King to 
Rockefeller, 
12 February 1945; vol. 413, Rockefeller to King, 12 November 
19 46 . 
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naturally compared notes and analyses. 46 
The Chapultepec meeting could quite properly be assessed as a 
triumph for American diplomacy. Although the Act of Chapultepec did 
not provide specific terms for collective hemispheric security, it 
was evidently perceived by all participants, as well as Canadian and 
British observers, as an entente cordiale which could further be 
developed under the aegis of the United Nations Charter. 
47 
The final 
communique provided a clause whereby the "Argentine Nation" could 
eventually accede to the principles and declarations reached at the 
conference. In addition, in response to a Chilean resolution that 
Canada be invited to join the Pan-American Union, the American re- 
publics recognized Canada's role in the war and expressed the wish 
that the collaboration of Canada with the Pan-American system should 
"become even closer., 
48 
Although Canadian officials were undoubtedly 
concerned by the Chilean proposal, which they knew about beforehand, 
neither Keenleyside nor any other Canadian took part in modifying 
the resolution. For their part, the Latin-Americans tended to appre- 
ciate Canada's delicate position and wishes, not to mention State 
Department preferences. The final tribute to Canada, and the fact 
that a reference was made at all, was therefore as much an expression 
of goodwill as anything else, destined to fall upon receptive ears 
in Ottawa, and was reflective of Mackenzie King's view of Canada's 
place in the hemisphere. 
46. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 389, copy of despatch No. 299, 
Halifax to Eden, 12 March 1945. The British would later super- 
impose their perceptions of what happened at Chapultepec to 
what took place at San Francisco in a remarkable example of 
baroque diplomatic prose concerning the Latin Americans: "The 
single tree of Chapultepec, for which they claim some fifty years' 
growth, seems to loom infinitely larger in their horizon than 
the entire forest of Dumbarton Oaks, among which they detect 
some redwoods. " King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 340, file 
3675, 
copy of United Kingdom San Francisco Delegation cable to 
Foreign Office, 12 May 1945. 
47. The Chapultepec and Rio treaties would not be seriously 
tested, that is in a manner directly involving the United States, 
until the enduring Falkland Islands 
/Malvinas dispute between the 
United Kingdom and Argentina broke into sudden hostilities in 
1982. 
48. Foreign Office, FO 371 Series, file AS1819/317/51, memoran- 
dum prepared by Foreign Office Research Department, 
"The Inter- 
American Conference at Mexico City", 10 April 1945. 
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Dramatic global events during the next year, including the 
beginnings of East/West tensions as well as rampant financial uncer- 
tainty, caused the prospect of closer Canadian alignment with the 
American nations to be raised again. In expectation that Canada 
would be invited to join the Pan-American Union at the Ninth Inter- 
national Conference of American States at Bogota in January 1948, 
a memorandum was circulated in Cabinet in September 1947. Security 
concerns were paramount, and influenced not only by the East/West 
situation, but by the more volatile state of Latin-American politics 
in the immediate post-war years. The following extract from the 
memorandum demonstrates these concerns and adds a further dimension 
already in Canadian minds: 
There is reason to believe that an association of 
Northern democracies, in these days of air transport, 
would be a more valuable regional association for Canada 
than one which includes a number of Latin American dic- 
tatorships. 49 
Needless to add, if Canada had flirted with the idea of 
joining the Pan-American Union earlier in the decade, the prospect 
now did not seem as politically viable. Cabinet therefore approved 
instructions to Canadian diplomats in the United States and Latin 
American countries asking them to prepare demarches which would 
stipulate inter aZia that Canada was not seeking membership nor would 
prefer to receive an invitation to join the association. It was 
emphasized that great tact should be exercised by Canadian represen- 
tatives in order to avoid causing offence to any country. 
The deliberations and decisions at this time induced another 
flurry of interesting exchanges between Pearson, Wrong and Robertson, 
now ensconced in new positions in Ottawa, Washington and London res- 
pectively. They expressed their concern at recent Latin American 
pronouncements on "British Imperialism" in the region, which referred 
in particular to the British Honduras and Falkland Islands, agreeing 
that Canada had been saved from being placed in an embarrassing posi- 
tion had it joined the Pan-American Union earlier. Little would they 
know how prescient their assessment would prove to 
be. Feelings con- 
49. Privy Council Office, RG2/18 Series, vol. 75, file D-19-20, 
memorandum to the Cabinet, "Canadian 
Participation in the Pan- 
American System", 6 September 1947. 
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tinued to be ambivalent, however, and were perhaps best described by 
Norman Robertson: 
In these circumstances, we could help, even in a small 
way, to bring countries like Argentina and Chile to recognize 
that this is no time for breaking crockery. I think we should 
be doing something worthwhile, and would indirectly give 
those Latin American countries a better understanding of 
the reason why our interest in the Pan-American Union has 
remained, and is remaining, lukewarm. 50 
The reader will by now have noticed that Canadian diplomacy 
of the period was imbued with a sense of moral purpose, which though 
not entirely inconsistent with the tenets of functionalism, some- 
times provided a rationale for either involvement or abstention in 
foreign endeavours. In the way Canada approached alignment and 
integration in the hemisphere, this was actually a minor factor. 
Canadian policy-makers fully realized that their powerful southern 
neighbour would aggressively dominate the region more than before, 
theirs was the task to remain abreast of and to anticipate developments, 
searching for opportunities to exercise enlightened self-interest on 
behalf of their own country. 
*** 
A chapter on Canada's continental and hemispheric alignment 
would simply not be complete without an analysis of economic issues, 
and in this case, an examination of continental economic integration. 
It was, after all, during the war and immediate post-war years that 
the basis for the present symbiotic economic relationship between 
Canada and the United States was formed; it would be built upon in 
the following decade and begin to attract public concern in Canada yet 
another decade later. As one scholar has written, in the bilateral 
development of such relations, policy-makers on either side of the 
49th parallel employed, with perhaps some variance, a Zeitmotif of 
consensus and not coercion. 
51 
In its desire to achieve consensus, 
however, Canada was obliged to confront the political realities imposed 
50. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2081, Robertson to Pearson, 
23 April 1948; also telegram 447, Wrong to Pearson, 1 April 1948. 
51. John Michael Little, "Canada Discovered: Continental Per- 
ceptions of the Roosevelt Administration, 1939-1945", unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation (University of Toronto, 1975), p. 590. 
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by geography and economics, and accept a form of dependency which 
would accommodate Canada's self-interest but which the underlying 
functional principle of Canadian foreign policy could not prevent. 
A modicum of independence was, however, preserved. 
The war was the harbinger of change. Integrated continental 
defence production, formalized by the Hyde Park Declaration of April 
1941, whether in fact or form, probably embodied Canada's preliminary 
drift into the American economic orbit. To dismiss this economic 
development in the contemporary fashion as a "sell-out" is not quite 
correct, as the exigencies of the time will readily demonstrate. A 
memorandum from the Department of External Affairs written before the 
conclusion reached at Hyde Park identified the objects of increased 
economic cooperation with the United States as not only to effect an 
economic and efficient utilization of combined production, but to 
minimize the inevitable post-war economic disequilibrium resulting 
from the changes which both national economies were currently under- 
going. 
52 
An active participant in the continental economic interplay 
during these years has asserted that there existed no pervasive inte- 
gration of the entire North American economy for wartime purposes. 
Instead, "... there was a real and effective coordination of wartime 
economic planning and wartime controls in the two countries .,, 
53 
In 
resisting full integration, Canada chose to remain outside of the 
United States Mutual Aid or Lend-Lease Plan of 1941, a measure de- 
signed to help ease the United Kingdom's dollar exchange problem; 
however the Plan's implementation would cause British supply orders 
to be diverted from Canada to the United States. In order to solve 
similar exchange difficulties, Canada wished to secure the benefits 
which would be forthcoming under Lend-Lease, but at the same time 
wished to avoid the concessions required of the United Kingdom, notably 
a liquidation of direct investments which could conceivably lead to a 
weak post-war economic bargaining position. As a major trading nation 
52. DEA, Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 8, 
Part II (1939-1941), memorandum by H. L. Keenleyside and H. Carl 
Goldenberg (Director-General, Economics and Statistics Branch, 
Department of Munitions and Supply), 25 February 1941. 
53. A. F. W. Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision, Can cur: the 
World Monetary System, 1944-1975, (Toronto, 1977), p. 25. 
257 
but smaller power, Canada could not afford to agree to such conces- 
sions. 
The duty of negotiating an agreement with the United States, 
which would embody present and future Canadian wishes, and which in 
the simplest terms would denote buying as much from the United States 
as what it purchased from Canada, ultimately fell to Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King, who, acting upon sound advice from senior officials 
such as Clifford Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and Norman 
Robertson, could justifiably count the resultant Hyde Park Agreement 
or Declaration among his greatest successes. Included in the text 
was a vital stipulation concerning Canadian defence purchases of com- 
ponent parts in the United States to be used in equipment and ammu- 
nitions which Canada was producing for Britain: "It was also agreed 
that Great Britain will obtain these parts under the Lend-Lease Act 
and forward them to Canada for inclusion in the finished articles. "54 
The Prime Minister concluded that the continental mobilization of 
resources in a manner which would enable each country to provide the 
other with the defence articles it could best produce would bring 
about greater efficiency and rapidity of production. However, he 
informed the British, "... Our respective production programmes should 
prove of the utmost value in augmenting and expediting the aid which 
this continent is seeking to contribute in the common interest. , 
55 
Benefits accruing to Canada as a result of the agreement 
rapidly became tangible. The Canadian balance-of-payments with the 
United States, comprising a deficit of $162 million in 1941, registered 
a surplus of $136 million one year later. Canada's American dollar 
balances continued to mount during the course of the war, a fact which 
prompted an ambitious Canadian diplomatic drive to convince the 
American public that Canada, not being party to Lend-Lease, indeed was 
not, as Britain was all too willingly perceived, "bleeding" the United 
54. DEA, File 1497-40, Draft Text of Hyde Park Agreement, n. d. 
55. DEA, File 1497-40, King to Cranborne, 22 April 1941. 
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States, but was doing its utmost for the war effort. 
56 
Although in 
the short term Canada would derive the greatest advantage from this 
new continental relationship, it would not prove to be of an enduring 
variety. But of greatest significance, as Mackenzie King stated in 
the House of Commons, was the fact that the declaration represented 
yet another demonstration that Canada and the United States were 
forging a new world order. 
57 
What he left unsaid at the time but 
undoubtedly believed, was that this new order would lead to the 
removal of trade barriers and stimulate freer multilateral trading 
patterns. 
The larger goal of freer global trade tended to suit the 
Prime Minister's economic approach to the commercial aspects of the 
North Atlantic Triangle and in a bilateral sense served as an embo- 
diment if not a justification of his idiosyncratic "no commitments" 
philosophy. King knew all too well that the Americans would never 
truly comprehend the nature of the Imperial preference system, or for 
that matter would understand that when the United Kingdom reduced its 
duties on United States wheat, lumber, and apples, it was really 
Canada that was making the economic concession in favour of United 
States export interests. 
58 
In the other sense, when meetings of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers addressed questions of economic and com- 
mercial policy, thereby arousing American suspicions, Mackenzie King 
56. Pearson Diary, 7 June 1943. Pearson devoted much time to 
convincing recalcitrant senators and congressmen that Canada 
was not in fact party to Lend-Lease. His efforts frequently 
produced mixed results. However Pearson noted that even promi- 
nent Canadians had their difficulties in understanding the Lend- 
Lease question as well: "How can we keep impressing on the 
United States public that Canada stands almost alone in the 
world in her virtue in not receiving Lend-Lease from the United 
States when the Honourable Thomas Vien, Speaker in the Senate 
(sic), in a burst of eloquence welcoming Mr. Roosevelt in Ottawa 
last week, is quoted by the press as thanking the United States 
through the President for 'supplying us with ships, arms, muni- 
tions and the incalculable advantages of Lend-Lease'. " King 
Papers, J1 Series, vol. 348, Pearson to Robertson, 3 September 
1943. 
57. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28 April 1941, p. 2289. 
58. DEA, Papers of the Under-Secretary Series, vol. 810, memo- 
randum, Robertson to King, 3 November 1941. 
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would usually indicate his satisfaction with the status o at the 
meeting itself, and insist that he could not engage in detailed policy 
discussions without the presence of his Minister of Finance. In pre- 
paration for the 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting in London, Mackenzie 
King went further and staged a "preemptive strike" by sending a tele- 
gram to Prime Minister Attlee stating that a discussion of Imperial 
preference privileges would not be of value without participating 
finance ministers. 
59 
The Prime Minister's philosophy was straight- 
forward: commercial issues should not be wreathed in Imperial trap- 
pings of undue emotional importance so as not to alarm the United 
States, but should be treated in a manner which would allow Canada 
ample room to manoeuvre in terms of post-war economic planning. 
In short, the British side of an essentially isosceles North Atlantic 
triangle should not be extended to the detriment of the American side. 
Article VII of the United Kingdom/United States Lend-Lease 
Agreement, on which Canada had been consulted, called for the elimi- 
nation of all discriminatory treatment in international commerce and 
exhorted all like-minded countries to adhere to this noble purpose. 
Canada wasted little time, exchanging notes with the United States in 
November 1942 which basically amounted to a declaration of "agreed 
action" for the liberalization of world trade. If previous trade 
negotiations were any indication, it was understood in governing 
circles in both Ottawa and Washington that the first step toward 
freer multilateral trade should be undertaken on a bilateral basis. 
In this respect, and in the context of current British-American trade 
talks, Norman Robertson took maximum advantage of a meeting with 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in August 1943 to reassure the Ameri- 
cans of Canada's priorities: "While Canada was interested in the 
successful outcome of the United Kingdom-United States trade talks, 
we, of course, had always dealt with the United States directly on 
such questions of joint concern. " Robertson went much further. He 
stated that the mobilization of the Canadian and American economies 
for war had placed the considerations which usually govern commercial 
59. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 324, memorandum by J. A. Gib- 
son, "Commonwealth Trade and the Future of the 
Empire Prefer- 
ence", 25 April 1946; also vol. 322, file 
F3407, copy of 
Foreign Office paper PMM(44)8, "Annex-Economic Policy", 
1944. 
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policy into abeyance, giving both countries "... [A] greater opportunity 
than we had ever before to see that trade should flow through the most 
productive and most economical channels. "60 
By February 1944, the Americans had already advanced some more 
specific ideas for an orderly agenda on future economic discussions to 
the British, and, since the Russians had been dilatory in indicating 
whether they wished to talk at all, Canadian views could now be sounded 
out. In assessing the import of what the larger powers wished to 
accomplish, Robertson presented his perspectives to the Prime Minister 
in more persuasive language than was his wont, with an optimism which 
would underly the customs union discussions between Canada and the 
United States four years hence. "I feel, very strongly, " Robertson 
wrote, "that what we do, or leave undone, in these next few months 
may determine the entire course of international economic relations. " 
In developing his argument, he chose to amalgamate new Canadian func- 
tionalism with traditional self-interest: 
In this particular field Canada is in a key position 
because of the volume of our trading interest and of our 
special relationship with the United States and United 
Kingdom... Tariffs and preferences, which have been for 
practical purposes inoperative for three or four years, 
will become important again, and new vested interests 
will develop which the world needs, and Canada as much 
as any other country. I think there may be a chance... 
of securing a comprehensive and thoroughgoing trade agree- 
ment with the United States, which could be the first 
major installment of the multilateral programme whic91 
nearly everybody recognizes as the desirable goal... 
As it happened, the Under-Secretary's optimism remained un- 
founded in the short term. The meeting in Washington in February 
1944, while correct and evoking the requisite platitudes by both sides 
on the merits of Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement, did not come 
close to resembling the "meeting of minds" the Canadians had hoped for. 
Moreover, the Canadians were somewhat shocked by the American response 
to their proposal for a fifty per cent reduction on all duties. Con- 
gressional pressures against substantive horizontal tariff cuts, 
in 
60. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 335, memorandum, Robertson 
to King, 24 August 1943. 
61. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 334, memorandum, Robertson 
to King, 21 December 1943. 
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addition to the views of American public opinion, dictated that con- 
cessions on the part of the British Commonwealth should be offered 
in return. Canadian counterarguments in defence of Imperial pre- 
ferences and explanations that the suggested fifty per cent would 
apply to most-favoured-nation tariffs only notwithstanding, the 
United States negotiators clung to their views. "The alternatives 
to Canada to timely action on a broad international basis are not 
attractive, " Robertson concluded, "An attempt to reach a large-scale 
bilateral trade agreement with the United States is certain to face 
a major attack on our preferential tariffs. " Such an attack, he 
believed, would come upon Canada individually rather than as part of 
a general American scheme and could place economic and even political 
strain on the Commonwealth. 
62 
If Canadian industry, which had expan- 
ded so greatly during the war, was to take advantage of new-found 
markets, particularly those in continental Europe, the "beggar they 
neighbour" trading policies of the previous decade could again evolve 
out of the narrow bilateralism being proposed by public interests in 
the United States. 
As a trading nation with much to lose and equally as much to 
gain, Canada participated in the preparatory talks in London in 1946 
for an international trading organization which would operate loosely 
under the umbrella of the United Nations. The results of the prelimi- 
nary meeting, and subsequent discussions at Geneva and Havana, were 
to determine whether the ideal of freer multilateral trade so nobly 
expressed in Article VII could be realized. Norman Robertson, the 
leading and most influential economic thinker of the Department of 
External Affairs, had by then assumed the position of High Commissioner 
to the United Kingdom, and, while not directly involved in policy for- 
mulation in Ottawa, nevertheless offered wise counsel which was always 
62. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 322, memorandum, Robertson to 
King, n. d. (February 1944). To add to Robertson's grief, the 
Montreal Gazette placed the shy mandarin into the unwanted 
limelight with a story entitled "Post-War Tariff Cuts or 
Abolition said Discussed by Canada and U. S. ". Robertson was 
quoted as having informed the newspaper that his mission was 
secret and could not be discussed. King Papers, J4 
Series, 
vol. 334, memorandum, Robertson to King, 2 February 
1944. 
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gratefully received. To assert that these trade negotiations ulti- 
mately foundered on the rocks of a new protectionism tends to be 
overly simplistic, for out of the hopes of what the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) might have been, arose the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For Canada, the approach through- 
out respected a functionalist ideal of sorts: in emerging as one of 
the world's leading trading nations, Canada, by virtue of having been 
treated as practically an equal partner by both the United States and 
United Kingdom in economic discussions during the war, had achieved 
international status and recognition. Canada's subsequent actions 
would have to be commensurate to its new-found status. It followed, 
therefore, that for Canada to do anything but agitate for freer trade, 
such as for example, take a unilateral decision to impose discrimina- 
tory trade restrictions at times of economic difficulty, would link 
the Canadian economy with those of the weaker countries, in whose 
company Canada did not wish to belong. Moreover, freer trade with 
some short-term "belt-tightening" would ultimately result in greater 
prosperity. 
63 
Such opinions, reflective of classical free trade 
theory, were widely held in the Government of Canada, from the depths 
of the bureaucracy to the Prime Minister himself. 
With the end of the war, more qualified views gradually came 
to the fore. Although the reaffirmation in 1946 of the Hyde Park 
Agreement assured continental economic cooperation during the early 
post-war period, at least until whatever new world economic order had 
fallen into place, the prospects for Canadian export diversification 
into large European markets appeared gloomy. Eastern Europe's inci- 
pient economic realignment foretold of political developments to come, 
Western Europe was capable of purchasing only little, and the United 
Kingdom, while victorious, had mammoth outstanding debts and precious 
little sterling to pay for Canadian imports. As a result, Canadian 
exports in 1946 decreased by twenty per cent from their wartime yearly 
64 
average. 
63. DEA, File 265(s), Wilgress to Pearson, 30 September 1947. 
Dana Wilgress led the Canadian delegation to the United Nations 
Trade and Employment Conference at Geneva at the time. 
64. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 306, file 3188, address by 
Minister of Trade and Commerce, J. A. McKinnon to Canadian 
Exporters' Association, 8 November 1946. 
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It was not surprising, therefore, that Canadian policy-makers 
demonstrated a more intense interest in pursuing bilateral economic 
avenues with their southern neighbour with intent to achieve more 
immediate benefits for the Canadian economy as well as possible 
economic restoration through a mode of dyadic association with future 
global economic ventures undertaken by the United States. The situa- 
tion was exacerbated through the famous "dollar crisis" of 1947, 
caused primarily by the fact that a very large proportion of Canadian 
exports were being financed on credit, whereas the bulk of imports 
from the United States, chiefly in the form of durable consumer goods, 
were being paid for in cash. "Our exchange difficulties do not result 
from any basic weakness in Canada's domestic economic position", 
Douglas Abbott, the Minister of Finance, informed Hugh Dalton, his 
British counterpart, "Production is at a high level, prices and costs 
have risen less than in most countries and our balance of payments on 
current account (sic) shows a surplus. " In the same particularly 
frank message, the Minister of Finance requested that the United King- 
dom reduce the speed by which it drew upon a 1.25 billion dollar line 
of credit negotiated with Canada in 1946, an action which in itself 
posed a danger to rapidly dwindling Canadian dollar reserves. The 
circumstances were so acute, Abbott stated, that Canada had considered, 
and had ultimately rejected, adopting legislative measures to impose 
import restrictions, in view that the success of the Geneva trade 
negotiations could be jeopardized by precipitate Canadian action. 
65 
That the situation was grave could not be denied, as it became 
the major topic of discussion when Mackenzie King met Harry Truman in 
April 1947. The Prime Minister enlightened the President, with whom 
incidentally he did not share as easy a rapport as with his predecessor, 
that current Canadian losses of American dollars were running over 
$50 million per month, and expressed his concern that in the absence 
of a rapid trend towards a point closer to a form of equilibrium, 
the Canadian Government would have no choice other than to impose 
import restrictions, depreciate the value of the Canadian dollar, 
65. Privy Council Office, RG2/18 Series, vol. 68, file D-13-4, 




Once the Prime Minister had introduced this ominous- 
sounding topic, it was left to a group of very able Canadian offi- 
cials, most notably Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada, 
and Louis Rasminsky of the Foreign Exchange Control Board, to con- 
tinue talking to the Americans about the subject throughout the sum- 
mer. Ambassador Wrong continued to play an essential pivotal role. 
In the course of these talks, United States officials, while 
undoubtedly sympathetic to the Canadian predicament, made it abun- 
dantly clear that their major preoccupation was not with what was 
economically necessary to assist Canada but rather with what was 
politically possible. The American public had to become convinced 
that the process of financing European reconstruction would eventually 
come to an end aid indeed that Europe was doing all it could to help 
itself. Canada could not expect a more lenient view. In an informal 
meeting with Wrong, Towers and Rasminsky in May, however, Under- 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State Will 
Clayton and John Hickerson, the State Department's Canada expert, 
reiterated the above, but acknowledged that the entire foreign economic 
policy of the United States was jeopardized by what had become a global 
dollar problem. The meeting produced an understanding that a small 
group of officials from both countries should continue - "in utmost 
secrecy", given political sensitivities - to explore ways and means 
of rectifying the dollar crisis. Meanwhile, the depletion of Canadian 
reserves had increased to a startling rate of $100 million per month. 
67 
Before this working group could be organized, Secretary of 
State George Marshall delivered a speech on 5 June at Harvard Univer- 
sity which announced the comprehensive and ambitious plan for European 
reconstruction which would quickly come to bear his name. The worsen- 
ing climate of East/West relations, stimulated by political develop- 
ments in Eastern Europe in addition to fears of Soviet espionage in 
Western countries, to which, as a following chapter will illustrate, 
Canada was not immune, had introduced a more significant strategic 
66. The Prime Minister's arguments were formulated in part by 
Hume Wrong in Washington. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 240, 
file 2412, memorandum, Wrong to King, 21 April 1947. 
67. DEA, File 265(s), WA1689, Wrong to Pearson, 31 May 1947. 
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element to American foreign policy, international economic policy not 
being excluded. For Canada the Marshall Plan could paradoxically both 
complicate and help resolve the dollar crisis; association with the 
Plan could open sought-after European markets, yet in turn could 
generate a new array of heretofore unexpected financial problems. 
In immediate response from London, Norman Robertson analyzed 
the situation with a view toward the longer term. He conveyed his 
attitude to Pearson that the movement for European economic integra- 
tion and enhanced cooperation with the United States, as described in 
Marshall's speech, could possibly exclude Canadian exports from Euro- 
pean markets. Canada was at a threshold: it could either be manoeu- 
vred into the failing and weak sterling area or move towards greater 
continental integration with the United States. A viable reciprocity 
agreement with the United States, he stated, "Mould strengthen... 
our dollar position in the short term, and in the long run, ensure us 
against too great a dependence, relative to the United States, on the 
European market. " It was Robertson's conclusion that the political 
and economic consequences of a discriminatory policy against the 
United States, to which the Prime Minister had alluded during his 
call on President Truman, would be disastrous and should only be 
employed as a last resort. 
68 
Despite the most capable efforts by all concerned in Ottawa, 
alternative solutions to import restrictions were difficult to assess 
and next to impossible to apply. Clifford Clark, the Deputy Minister 
of Finance, led a powerful delegation to Washington to engage in dis- 
cussions with United States officials on Canada's financial problems. 
Clark was blunt, direct and forthright in presenting his American 
interlocutors with two alternative proposals for Canadian financial 
recovery. In a one hour statement, Clark made use of the words 
"banned", "discriminatory", "prohibited", "cut-off" and "drastically 
reduced" in rapid succession, even repeating them to the point where 
the Americans were simply left shocked by what their Canadian colleagues 
were proposing. One need not have wondered why. "Plan A", the severe 
option, requested an American loan of $350 million; called for rationing 
of pleasure travel (proposed savings would amount to 
$30 to $40 million 
68. DEA, File 264(s), Robertson to Pearson, 19 June 1947. 
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annually and would discomfit those Canadians accustomed to winter 
vacations south of the border); and proposed a ban on every identi- 
fiable consumer item imported from the United States with the excep- 
tion of citrus fruits, some vegetables and textiles which would be 
subject to quota allocation. In sum, such restrictions would save 
$400 million. "Plan B" was of course the preferred and more moderate 
proposal. It included a $500 million loan, similar rationing of 
pleasure travel, but proposed non-discriminatory import restrictions 
through quota allocation for all countries and some outright bans. 
69 
As a further and more long-term measure, which one could assert re- 
flected a Robertsonian influence, steps would be undertaken to divert 
Canadian exports through reduction of United States tariffs and par- 
ticipation of Canada in the Marshall Plan. Canada hoped that the 
United States would place some of the procurement for the Plan in 
Canada or make American dollars available in the United Kingdom or 
Western Europe for the purchase of commodities in Canada. 
70 
Perhaps the most unpalatable aspect of both plans, as far as 
the Americans were concerned, was the matter of the loan. Indeed 
the United States officials at the meeting, in addition to suggesting 
that any Canadian action be delayed until January so as not to coin- 
cide with the announcement of agreements negotiated under the GATT at 
Geneva, recommended that Canada approach private bankers in New York 
or the International Monetary Fund. However, persistent lobbying by 
Hume Wrong and others in Washington, which to a large degree centered 
around the spectre of the implementation of the dreaded Plan A, even- 
tually paid off as in mid-November the Export-Import Bank authorized 
a $300 million line of credit for five years, representing a smaller 
amount and a shorter period for repayment than had been desired. The 
moderate proposal therefore became operative, and was put before the 
Canadian public by Finance Minister Abbott on 17 November, somewhat 
ironically immediately following Mackenzie King's broadcast from 
69. DEA, File 265(s), "Summary of United States-Canada Finan- 
cial Discussions, October 29-31", prepared by J. R. Murray, 
Second Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, 
1 November 1947. 
70. Ibid., and in addition, various memoranda, 
"The Dollar 
Problem", "Exchange Problem-Support Restrictions", n. d. 
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London71 which extolled the success of the General Agreement on Tarriis 
and Trade, signed at Geneva on 30 October. Abbott emphasized that the 
measures undertaken would not cause Canada to deviate from its long- 
term goal of freer trade, and promised that "We intend to get rid of 
these restrictions as soon as circumstances will permit., 
72 
Greater 
continental economic integration was evidently still a goal worth 
pursuing. 
The subsequent State Department press release, at an unusual 
length of five pages, was benign in tone if not outright sympathetic 
to the Canadian position. It reflected upon the greater weight Canada 
placed upon foreign trade in its own economy and upon the traditional 
triangular pattern of trade which was now under considerable strain. 
The reluctance of the Canadian Government to impose import restric- 
tions was also underscored, and what must have been considered a 
triumph for the "spirit of goodneighbourliness" which so frequently 
punctuated the speeches of statesmen in both countries, the press 
release concluded that "In terms of her continued contribution to 
world reconstruction, Canada's action should be considered as a short- 
term measure which does not mean abandonment of the long-term objec- 
tives shared by the United States .,, 
73 
Despite American understanding, 
a sympathetic press in both countries, and the politicians' most con- 
vincing rhetoric, the imposition of import controls constituted a 
political embarrassment to a nation which had committed itself to a 
renewal of the international order in all aspects, and indeed, had 
come to be seen by others as a proponent of multilateralism. Canada's 
71. The Prime Minister was in London to attend the wedding of 
Princess Elizabeth and Philip Mountbatten. The timing of the 
speeches had elicited concern in official circles in Ottawa; 
however in the event news of the Royal Wedding swept economic 
news off the front pages of most papers. 
72. Quoted in DEA, File 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "A Survey 
of Canadian External Policy - Chapter 7- Problems of Economic 
and Financial Foreign Policy", 1951. For a more detailed 
account of the entire issue, see R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein 
American DoZZars, Canadian Prosperity (Toronto, 1978), pp. 41-63. 
73. Quoted in DEA, File 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "A Survey 
of Canadian External Policy - Chapter 7- Problems of Economic 
and Financial Foreign Policy", 1951, p. 7. 
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action, as unwillingly taken as it was, in this sense amounted to a 
loss of self-respect. 
In his radio speech to the Canadian public, Douglas Abbott 
had originally intended, but in the event did not say that the Govern- 
ment had proposed discussions with the United States "... looking to- 
ward a more far-reaching and effective reduction of trade barriers 
than is possible under the existing United States legislation res- 
pecting trade agreements. "74 The sentence had been deleted because 
the State Department, wary of an increasingly protectionist-oriented 
Congress, wished to prepare the ground carefully for a matter which, 
although having throughout the years been a subject of informal dis- 
cussion in both capitals, still required considerable political sup- 
port. What Abbott really alluded to in this unused portion of his 
speech was the question of the viability of a free trade area or cus- 
toms union between Canada and the United States. In the pursuit of 
this goal, the following months would illustrate how idealistic and 
practically venturesome continental urges in Canadian economic policy 
vis-a-vis the United States could become. However, the end result 
can best be classified as an historical "might-have-been". 
The idea of a free trade area, reciprocity, or a customs 
union with the United States was current in 1940s, as Robertson's 
memoranda as Under-Secretary and subsequent despatches from London 
attest. It had support amongst other key players in Ottawa, most 
notably the Keynesians in the Department of Finance, and was not 
without attraction south of the border, where elimination of the 
Imperial preferences system had been a long-held commercial goal. 
Canada's response to the dollar crisis in the form of the imposition 
of import restrictions and the acquisition of a substantial American 
loan, was not viewed as a panacea in Ottawa, merely as a stop-gap 
measure. What was ultimately required was a means by which the enor- 
mous one-way bilateral trade flow could be regularized. In economic 
terms, comprehensive tariff cuts on a continental basis on manufac- 
tured goods in particular could encourage an industrial rationaliza- 
tion and greater productivity in Canada's emerging 
"branch plant" 
74. Quoted in DEA, File 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "A Survey 
of Canadian External Policy - Chapter 7- Problems of 
Economic 
and Financial Foreign Policy", 1951, p. 7. 
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structure. The politico-economic argument for the above had been 
employed by Robertson some years earlier. Canada must choose to 
align its economy more closely with that of the United States, or 
simply be forced into greater self-sufficiency, a process which 
would unavoidably involve discriminatory policies and an orientation 
towards Europe which could ultimately result in friction with the 
United States. 
John Deutsch, Director of the International Economic Rela- 
Lions Division of the Department of Finance, and Hector McKinnon, 
Chairman of the Canadian Tariff Board, began informal discussions 
on the concept of a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with the 
United States officials at the time of the Clark mission to Washing- 
ton in October 1947. During the ensuing months, items to be included 
in such an agreement were identified, and methods of implementation 
explored. The plan which eventually emerged was unorthodox, and has 
been referred to by one scholar as "bold and striking" . 
75 
Despite 
this description, it was also disarmingly simple: the proposed cus- 
toms union would allow for substantially free trade between the two 
countries, but would at the same time permit each to retain its 
separate tariff on products from third countries, thus leaving lati- 
tude for further multilateral undertakings. Further, quotas for 
subsidized agricultural products would be imposed. As tariff auto- 
nomy would in fact be retained, it was assumed by all concerned in 
the negotiations that there would be fewer grounds to bring that 
hoary shibboleth, the eventual political absorption of Canada by the 
United States, into the public mind. 
76 
If Canada now decided to 
pursue a closer American orientation in economic policy in favour of 
the traditional North Atlantic pattern, then partnership, and not 
defensive reactions to the image of absorption, would have to become 
the operative rule. However it was recognized, if only inaudibly, 
that with this new partnership, which would promote enhanced spe- 
75. See Terence Fay, "The Proposed Canadian-United States 
Customs Union, 1947-1948: A Bold and Striking Plan", Bul-ý, - 
tin of Canadian Studies IV, No. 1 (April 1980), pp. 38-53. 
76. For a full discussion of the negotiating process, see 
Cuff and Granatstein, American Dollars, Canadian Pro. r-rit:,, 
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cialization of Canadian industry, and open the vast United States 
market to Canadian products, there would exist the very real possi- 
bility that broad policy decisions would be taken in Washington, not 
Ottawa. 
Obviously, Canadian officials believed that the advantages 
accruing to Canada would far outweigh any real or perceived disad- 
vantages. The negotiating process, in a departure from established 
practice, did not feature a strong input from the Department of Ex- 
ternal Affairs, this perhaps being the case because Norman Robertson, 
who had led the Canadian side in bilateral trade negotiations on 
several previous occasions, was now in London, burdened with other 
responsibilities. Nonetheless, the senior officials of the Depart- 
ment were among the most ardent supporters of the plan and were not 
without influence in Cabinet. 
It was precisely in Cabinet where opinions mattered most. 
C. D. Howe, now Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Douglas Abbott, 
the Minister of Finance, were both strongly in favour, as the oppor- 
tunity for a free trade area represented a timely means by which to 
shake off the shackles of current import restrictions, as well as 
provide an immediate substitute for uncertain European markets. Of 
greater significance was the fact that Mackenzie King had given his 
apparently unqualified imprimatur, noting that the Americans seemed 
to be serious indeed about continental "good-neighbourliness. "77 
Continental economic integration, it seemed, was to become a substan- 
tive embodiment of this virtue. 
By March 1948, the Prime Minister had begun to entertain 
second thoughts. Timing of the introduction of the package into a 
broader Cabinet circle, and similar delays south of the border in 
terms of bringing the matter to the President and then to Congress, 
caused him to pause and collect his thoughts. His decision, Mackenzie 
King realized, would be vital not only for the nation but for the 
fortunes of the Liberal Party. He remembered all too well the 
de- 
bacle of the general election of 1911, when the issue of Canadian 
commercial reciprocity with the United States had defeated 
his pre- 
decessor Sir Wilfrid Laurier and brought personal defeat upon himself, 
77. See J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster (ed. ), 1: t 'LQnýie 
King Record, vol. 4 (Toronto, 1970), p. 261. 
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then a youthful Minister of Labour. The tariff reductions proposed 
at that time were insignificant when compared to the magnitude of 
the present plan. Further, Mackenzie King did not wish to have his 
penultimate accomplishment as the British Empire's longest serving 
prime minister be remembered as one which incited divisiveness, as 
a recent rereading of Sir Richard Jebb's Studies in CoZonia Z Va ý --cn- 
alisrn had convinced him could prove to be the case. 
78 
Sentimentality and his concern for a place in history aside, 
King was also worried by recent examples of United States strength 
and power. American attitudes of omnipotence within the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, often not subtly expressed, had alienated other 
friendly members, including Canada, leading them to believe their 
own concerns were being swept aside. 
79 
Opinions in Congress had 
become increasingly dogmatic on questions of economic policy; the 
introduction of any new issue caused American politicians to instinc- 
tively form protectionist lines. 
80 
Exhibitions of extraterritorial 
designs were also not excluded, as in the case of a 1947 United 
States Justice Department decision to investigate Canadian pulp and 
paper companies under American anti-trust laws. 
81 
Perhaps good 
fences did make good neighbours. 
An editorial which appeared in Life magazine on 15 March, 
claiming that Canada needed "complete and permanent economic union 
with the United States", appears to have been the catalyst which 
pushed the Prime Minister over the edge. Always wary of the broad 
78. King Diary, 24 March 1948. 
79. King Papers, Jl Series, vol. 411, Rasminsky to Robertson, 
3 April 1946. 
80. DEA, Papers to the Under-Secretary Series, vol. 810, 
H. D. Scully (Canadian Consul General in New York) to Robertson, 
25 June 1946. 
81. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2157, File "Commo- 
dities, Pulp and Newsprint, 1946 and 1947", memorandum, 
"Cana- 
dian Course of Action", 23 February 1948. In this 
instance, 
the American press strongly criticized the Justice 
Department's 
action, the situation being eventually 
diffused by the appoint- 
ment of a committee of representatives of the 
Newsprint Asso- 
ciation of Canada which met with State 
Department officials in 
Ottawa to discuss allegations of price-fixing. As 
Canada's 
greatest ally during this contretemps was the 
American press, 
diplomatic activities were characterized 
by patience and 
rationality, if at times exasperation. 
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brush of popular journalism, King feared that such inaccuracies as 
contained in the article could, through repetition, become etched 
in the public mind as truth. Canadian newspapers delivered a split 
verdict in response, ranging from The Ottawa Citizen's assessment 
of a free trade area as "an inadequate reason for national suicide", 
to the Vancouver Sun's opinion that "the proposal is worth careful 
study. " 
82 
His mind made up, the Prime Minister nevertheless permitted 
full discussion of a memorandum on the subject at a meeting which 
included St. Laurent, Howe and Abbott as well as several senior man- 
darins. To the best of their abilities, McKinnon and Pearson empha- 
sized the benefits to Canada which would stem from the free trade 
proposal, stating that the circumstances which now made American 
concessions possible were not likely to exist again, either to the 
same degree or in similar combination. While agreeing with the 
logic of the arguments brought forward, King placed great stress on 
the fact that trade with the United States was of such political 
importance that a customs union could only be realized after careful 
planning and extensive public debate, if not after a general election 
on the issue. Howe and Abbott here indicated they would relish such 
an opportunity to destroy the Conservatives. But Mackenzie King had 
experience on his side. He was afraid "old British flag waving tac- 
tics" would be resurrected by the Conservatives, resulting in a bit- 
ter political battle at a time when he was about to withdraw from 
public life and the party would be in the process of selecting a new 
leader and platform. Further, and although he did not dwell at 
length on this aspect, the Prime Minister believed that a major trade 
policy shift of this nature could perhaps in a way be related to the 
secret Atlantic security talks currently underway in Washington. 
83 
82. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 240, file 2411, "Summary of 
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d. Th e 
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Lester Pearson, for one, accepted that whether the decision 
taken was right or wrong, it was arrived at after a thorough analysis 
of the situation. What was imperative now was to convey the decision 
to the Americans in such a way as to leave the door ajar, and to em- 
phasize that the decision taken was not as a result of Ministers be- 
lieving the proposal to be unsatisfactory or disadvantageous to either 
partner. Pearson's own views, however, remained unchanged. "I can- 
not help but feel that a great opportunity has been missed, " he wrote 
Robertson in London, "It is... a sad reflection on our sense of com- 
parative values that so much time has been spent on so many things 
during the last two or three months of infinitely less importance 
than these proposals. " In conclusion, Pearson commented, "I think 
that we have 'missed the bus' , even if we have saved the timetable. "84 
The inevitable conclusion which may be drawn is that Canada 
was tacitly testing the permanence of the North Atlantic triangle 
during these years. Although not endemic to a firmly articulated 
foreign policy, the contemplation of regional and multilateral coun- 
terweights exemplified in this chapter by evolving relations with 
Latin America and the Pan-American Union, respectively indicated a 
desire for Canada to pursue avenues of self-interest which deviated 
from traditional patterns. The extent of such deviation, however, 
would be contingent upon Canada's relations with the United States, 
now an aggressive superpower. By war's end, Canada had inexorably 
been drawn into a continental economic and strategic orbit, and 
enjoyed guaranteed security and economic prosperity in return for 
consensual cooperation with its southern neighbour. The pattern, 
once clearly established during the early war years, continued, yet 
during the 1940s did not seriously compromise the functional princi- 
ple of Canadian foreign policy, nor eliminate the North Atlantic 
triangle, as the remaining chapters will demonstrate. Canada's close 
relationship with the United States very likely helped to create and 
maintain the global position it had so assiduously craved and 
had 
every right to - that of a middle power. 
84. Robertson Papers, vol. II, Pearson to Robertson, 
22 April 
1948. Wrong, who shared the delicate task of informing the 
Americans of the decision, did so with tact and candour, al- 
though he too was bitterly disappointed. King 
Papers, J=ý Series, 
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CHAPTER VIII 
PEACE AND EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION 
We have had enough of the mailed fist. What our 
world needs today is the hand of the physician. 
- William Lyon Mackenzie Kingl 
Canada was unprepared for the sobering experience of peace- 
making. Indeed, Canadian forays into the incipient multilateralism 
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, where 
Canada had been denied central membership, as well as the ultimate 
structure of the United Nations itself following the San Francisco 
conference, should have served to foreshadow what would transpire at 
Paris in the late summer of 1946. After having fought valiantly and 
obtained the right to sit independently at the privileged table at 
Versailles in 1919, Canada, with its higher global profile, played 
1. DEA, file 4697-K-40, "Statement delivered by Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King before the plenary session of the Paris Peace 
Conference", 2 August 1946. 
2 75 
a less prominent role in 1946 than in the resolution of the earlier 
conflict. As John Holmes has written, "It may be that the part played 
in 1919 has been exaggerated because it was the establishment of Cana- 
dian status hitherto unacknowledged, whereas what happened in 1945-=+6 
seemed like a checkmate to a country on the rise. "2 It is vital to 
recognize, however, that in 1945 it was not so much a question of 
Canada's or any other nation's role as one of diverse global circum- 
stances; there was no omnibus peace conference, and in fact one to 
reach a settlement with Germany was never held. Division among the 
great powers was profound, the world poised at the brink of the East/ 
West chasm of today. Thus, agreement with despatch, with a minimum 
amount of divisiveness between the great powers was a necessity in 
1946, and the lessers simply had to be content with what was imposed 
on them from above. 
In response to the constraints of the peacemaking process, 
Canada's functional principle suffered somewhat, eventually becoming 
more refined and taking other more subtle forms. Canada's participa- 
tion in the successful North Atlantic effort to reconstruct war- 
ravaged Europe through the Marshall Plan reflected an astute approach 
to the post-war era, founded in a convergence of functionalism with 
a great amount of self-interest, together with the realization that 
the North Atlantic Triangle would endure, but not as before. 
*** 
By virtue of its own part in the war effort, international 
conferences, as well as its coveted North Atlantic role as interlo- 
cutor between the United Kingdom and the United States, Canada expec- 
ted to play a part of some significance in the ultimate making of 
peace. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to remain 
abreast of great power deliberations on the post-war settlement, 
and this need, as evinced in an earlier chapter, was the rationale 
behind Canada's own establishment of committees in Ottawa concerned 
with post-hostilities planning. 
By mid-1943, at about the time when the functional principle 
was first articulated by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 
2. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, Canc, L, and the Seaý-- : 
for World Order, 1943-1957, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1979), p. 105. 
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Canadian policy-makers began to feel some discomfort at the rather 
scanty information supplied to them by Washington and London respec- 
ting the proposed armistice period, and the inter-allied machinery 
which was expected to control Europe and the peace conferences. 
"The problems arising out of the relationship of the smaller countries 
to the 'Big Four', " Hume Wrong wrote in response to preliminary British 
probes as to Canada's eventual role in the armistice, "... become of 
special importance in connection with the peace settlement as soon as 
the need for concentration of military power lessens., 
3 
Despite 
Canadian eagerness to be functionally involved when the time came, 
Canada remained cautious and prudent, eschewing advance commitments 
of any variety, since "the nature and extent of the Canadian contri- 
bution to the 'policing of Europe' would depend on the circumstances 
of the time and the definition of that phrase., 
4 
The shadow cast by 
the Prime Minister's "no commitments" philosophy was long, and, as 
usual, public opinion had to be most carefully heeded. Moreover, 
Canadian troops had been in Europe for some time, were anxious to 
return home and would possibly have to be deployed in the Pacific 
war theatre. 
As elucidated in a memorandum to the Cabinet War Committee 
by the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems in February 
1944, which inter aZia described the "zoning plan" for the occupation 
of Germany received from the Dominions Office, the end of hostilities 
would likely bring continued shipping difficulties as a result of 
transport problems created by the war against Japan and the need for 
supplies in Europe. Even if transportation were readily available, 
the general forward movement of troops in Germany, including those 
Canadian, would proceed until full and general occupation was achieved. 
In addition, the rate of Canadian forces withdrawal would have to be 
coordinated with the withdrawal of British and American troops. No 
country could afford to lose ground as a result of public reaction 
3. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 426, Cabinet War Committee 
Memoranda, memorandum by Hume Wrong, "Procedure for Negotiation 
of Peace", 26 August 1943. 
4. Ibid., Cabinet War Committee Document No. 578, "Organiza- 
tion of Europe on Cessation of Hostilities", n. 
d. (August 193). 
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to preferential treatment being extended to the troops of another 
allied nation. 
5 
Although the memorandum concluded with the caveat 
that it would be difficult to make detailed plans for the disposition 
of Canadian armed forces after the end of hostilities without at 
least some thought being given to general plans for international 
security - the conference at Dumbarton Oaks had not yet taken place - 
it was plainly obvious that some continuing Canadian military commit- 
ment in Europe was required, if for no other reason than to safeguard 
Canada's multilateral interests and enhance its status. In the event, 
the Canadian Army Occupation Force comprised 18,000 troops and the 
Royal Canadian Air Force provided thirteen squadrons. 
6 
Canadian anxieties at the prospect of being left out of the 
peace deliberations were not without basis: in Washington President 
Roosevelt informed Leighton McCarthy that he "and Winston and possibly 
Stalin" would settle everything. Similarly, in the State Department 
it was thought that the exiled European governments should not return 
in the "baggage train" of the victorious Allies, but after a military 
occupation and temporary political vacuum. Both ideas disturbed the 
Canadians and with cause, as a Casablanca-style meeting would not 
give smaller powers such as Canada an adequate voice, and a political 
gap in Europe on the other hand would be a "dangerous nonsense" which 
would play into the hands of European communist parties. 
7 
The struggle 
for Canadian representation on the Central Committee of the newly- 
formed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, ulti- 
mately unsuccessful, and the peripheral role to be played at Dumbar- 
ton Oaks, would serve as poignant examples as to just how little 
central influence Canada could aspire to in questions of great power 
concern. Being preferentially informed by the British was 
5. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 426, Cabinet War Committee 
Document No. 715, "The Disposition of Canadian Military Forces 
after the Conclusion of Hostilities with Germany", 11 February 
1944. 
6. For a more thorough discussion, see James Eayrs, 
in De: "ef - 
of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence 
(vol. III), (Toronto, 
1972), pp. 183-190. 
7. Pearson Diary, 21 April and 21 May 1943. 
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all very gratifying, but the sort of consultative role Canada wished 
could not function on an ex post facto basis. Perhaps most embarras- 
sing was the fact that the Soviet Union, having expressed its desire 
to have the Dominions share equal status in the United Nations with 
the constituent Soviet republics, also objected to the admission of 
the Dominions to the peace conference. Foreign Minister Molotov 
went so far as to argue that the United Kingdom should sign for all, 
and if India were admitted to the proceedings, then the Baltic repub- 
lics should also be allowed to participate. 
8 
Had Canada's role at 
Versailles in 1919 merely been an aberration? 
Hence, when the draft armistice terms were pondered by the 
great powers in the spring of 1944, the Canadians were uneasy about 
the preamble of the draft instrument of surrender which stated that 
the supreme commands of the Soviet Union, United States and United 
Kingdom would receive the unconditional surrender of Germany "acting 
by the authority of their respective Governments and in the interests 
of the United Nations. " The Post-Hostilities planners in Ottawa pre- 
ferred to substitute the phrase "on behalf of", since the armistice 
of the Great War had employed these words, and so informed the Domi- 
nions office. British efforts to win approval for a change of phrase- 
ology were rebuffed by the Americans and Russians, leaving officials 
in the Department of External Affairs to cynically observe that the 
armistice would not only be imposed on Germany, but on the smaller 
allies as well. Mackenzie King concurred, commenting that Canada 
had declared war independently through its own Parliament in 1939 
and it would therefore be intolerable to accept any formula which 
ignored that essential fact. 
9 
Continued Canadian representations 
of this genre however failed to accomplish very much. 
Although it was tacitly acknowledged that Canadian views on 
the future of Germany would not be brought to the forefront of great 
8. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 389, Wrong to Pearson, 27 
December 1945. According to Pearson, "the Russians are clever 
enough to see that India's position is a card which they can 
continually play in order to extract concessions 
for themselves. " 
Pearson to Robertson, 28 December 1945. 
9. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet 
War Committee, meetings of 14 June and 5 July 1944. 
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power ruminations on the subject, this did not prevent officials of 
the Department of External Affairs from devoting more than a little 
time to this complex question. John Holmes has explained that policy- 
makers were in part motivated by "sheer intellectual exuberance" as 
well as by "the inability to keep one's hands off a subject of ad- 
mitted importance. " 
1 
Not surprisingly, Escott Reid's hands were 
the most active. In a provocative memorandum written in the autumn 
of 1943, he suggested severe economic and social measures to be im- 
plemented by the victors to arrest "re-nazification. " The result 
would be "... such an omelette of at least some of the Nazi elements 
in German life that these Hitlerite eggs can never get back into 
their shells again. " Reid proposed the expropriation of German 
estates and heavy industry without compensation to their owners, the 
enforced separation of church and state, the humiliation of Nazi 
leaders through their own signatures on the armistice, enforced hard 
labour for all senior government and military personnel, and lastly, 
forcing a charter of rights of the individual upon Germany as part of 
the terms of peace. Reid went much further in idealistically sugges- 
ting that all countries could benefit from such a settlement: 
Our efforts to eradicate fascism from Germany will 
be stultified if they are not based on a recognition of 
the fact that the Germans did not succumb to a peculiarly 
German disease but to a disease which is endemic to modern 
society... If we approach the problem of the post-war 
treatment of Germany in this spirit of humility, we may 
be led to take steps not only to eradicate the roots of 
fascism from Gyrrmany but also to eradicate them from our 
own countries. 
A contrary opinion to Reid's arguments quickly came from 
John Read, who, having been the Department's Legal Advisor since 
1927, probably reflected the views of the "old guard. " Read wrote 
not without sarcasm that he was shocked to find his colleagues, 
"the most distinguished living scholars within the field of history 
and political science, engaged in the jettison (sie) of essential 
principles and joining light-heartedly in the headlong stampede 
towards a bigger and better world war. " Ever the practical 
lawyer, 
10. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, vol. 1, p. 119. 
11. Reid Papers, vol. 6, memorandum by Escott Reid, 
"Policy 
towards Germany", 14 September 1943. 
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he concluded that there was no historical evidence as to the practical 
possibility of a conquering group constructing a nation and this was 
certainly not a principle embodied in the Allies' major public state- 
ment of intent, the Atlantic Charter. It would be exceedingly diffi- 
cult for the Allies "... to go further than to create a set of circum- 
stances in which it might be reasonably practicable for a nation to 
grow and develop which was capable of living with the rest of the 
world. " 
12 
During the ensuing months, Canadian foreign policy analysts 
clung to the basic assumption that a defeated Germany would remain 
chauvinistic to a degree which though at the time could not be 
properly assessed, would bode future danger. In Canadian eyes, an 
effective international organization would be the best instrument to 
guard against potential German aggression, and could also assume 
rigid control over Germany's foreign affairs. In response to an 
enlightened and cooperative spirit on the part of future German 
governments, such control could be relaxed, but not abandoned. 
13 
Such a proposal could of course only be implemented through 
the concurrence and participation of the great powers, and, in effect, 
exhibited an ideal viewed through parochial prisms. What course of 
action could Canada, which, unlike some other nations had no terri- 
torial claims against Germany, recommend? From London, Charles 
Ritchie commented that two generations of Canadians had been involved 
in war as a result of Germany's aggressions, and that as a result 
Canada might well be requested to participate in multilateral plans 
extending over several years to keep that country disarmed. "If the 
Canadian people are to assume these responsibilities", Ritchie wrote, 
"... [they] must feel that Canadian policy towards Germany has been 
decided in terms of Canada's interests and that full opportunity has 
been given for Canada's views to be heard... "14 His concern with 
12. Reid Papers, vol. 6, 
Cause", 17 September 1943. 
memorandum by John Read, "A Lost 
13. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2106, file AR 405/1/8 
Pt. 1, memorandum, "The Future of Germany", 23 February 1944. 
The memorandum was likely the work of Escott Reid. 
14. ibid., memorandum by C. S. A. Ritchie, 23 March 1944. 
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the matter of public support was echoed in Ottawa, where Hume Wrong 
believed that while for a short period after the cessation of hosti- 
lities Canada could assume obligations without simultaneously sharing 
in their determination, public sensitivity would render that state or 
affairs transitory indeed. 
15 
And public opinion was important. In a poll conducted by 
the Wartime Information Board in December 1944,60 per cent of Cana- 
dians questioned were certain that the treatment of Germany after the 
last war was related to the present one, and of these a full 70 per 
cent supported the notion that Germany was then dealt with too 
leniently. Those who subscribed to an opposing view, that Germany 
had received overly harsh treatment, were very much in the minority, 
but were invariably better educated. The overwhelming majority thought 
Canada should have something to say in the eventual peace settlement. 
16 
Thus, Canadian politicians and policy-makers were left with the unmis- 
takable impression of the public's conviction that Canada had done 
its part in the war, and now had every right to its just share in the 
making of peace. 
In endeavouring to occupy a more central role in the Euro- 
pean control machinery being contemplated by the great powers, Canada 
was sympathetically assisted by the United Kingdom, which, in its 
own detailed plans, proposed Commonwealth participation in an advi- 
sory council to the envisioned Control Commission. When this sug- 
gestion was predictably turned down by the Americans and Russians, 
the British put forward the idea that Canada could perhaps adminis- 
ter a specific function of the Control Commission, however this un- 
planned approach was again summarily rejected. The Canadians for 
their part were doubtful whether in fact membership on an advisory 
council would bring with it a bonafide chance to participate in the 
direction of the control machinery. Receiving the right to appoint 
a mission to the control commission, a subject of considerable dis- 
cussion in Ottawa, would not in itself give the governments so re- 
presented either responsibility for or a voice in general policy 
15. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2106, file AR 405/l/8 
Pt. V, Wrong, "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary", 30 October 
1944. 
16. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 427, Cabinet War Committee 
Document No. 989, Wartime Information Board Survey No. 51, 
2 December 1944. 
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towards Germany. Conversely, however, such an establishment would 
likely provide a useful means of access to the supreme Allied autho- 
rity in Germany and in so doing could protect Canada's interests. 17 
Usually left unsaid as well as unwritten was the fact that Canada 
preferred an intermediary role unto itself, to which it had in some 
measure become used to, rather than co-existence on an essentially 
impotent council with other smaller powers. 
In any event, by November 1944 the Cabinet War Committee 
had decided that Canada should seek membership in a United Nations 
Commission for Europe - if such a body were to be established - and 
that a Canadian military mission should be set up in Berlin soon after 
the defeat of Germany. Major-General Maurice Pope, the former Chair- 
man of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington and Senior Cana- 
dian Army Member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, duly assumed 
the position of Head of the Canadian Military Mission to the Allied 
Control Commission in Berlin in January 1946. Pope was charged with 
a daunting array of tasks, the sort which would best befit an ambas- 
sador, as his mandate included observation of Germany's immediate 
post-war economic and social development, as well as the process of 
"de-Nazification". Unlike an ambassador, however, Pope did not have 
to award prominence to the representational aspects of his job. 
Canada, as other nations, wished to limit its contacts with Germany 
to the bare requirements dictated by protocol. 
If the above responsibilities were already not enough, Pope's 
letter of instruction, written by Norman Robertson, specified that 
there also existed a considerable Canadian interest in the commercial 
field: "The restrictions placed on German industrial production as 
the result of Allied policy will doubtless create opportunities for 
Canadian exports in the replacement of German trade abroad. This is 
a development that should be watched... "18 Robertson's remarks, 
which Mackenzie King underscored on his personal copy, were indicative 
17. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2106, file AR =+05/1/8, Pt. V, 
C. P. H. P. (44) Report 6, "Control Machinery for Europe - Canadian 
Participation", 19 October 1944. 
18. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 241, file F2427, Robertson to 
Pope, 29 January 1946. 
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of the aggressive approach to economic policy Canada would take in 
the immediate post-war years. 
Pope's abilities to observe and analyze were acute, and his 
despatches, always well-reasoned and extremely literate, served to 
give politicians and officials alike an overview of developments in 
Europe. His assignment was not without its frustrations, and as Pope 
remarked, "Caution and reserve are undoubtedly excellent virtues in 
themselves, but to an inquirer it sometimes seems that they can be 19 
overdone. " Only British representatives provided him with occa- 
sional if meagre information and an insight into the inner workings 
of the control machinery. Nonetheless, Pope's presence in Berlin 
provided Canada with a valuable strategic window from which to observe 
increasing East/West polarization: 
For never even one moment here in Berlin can an 
observer exclude from his mind the sensation of grim 
opposition of conflicting forces, glacier-like one 
might almost say, in view of the pressures to which 
they give rise. The point of contact may be in Berlin, 
but all the while one feels that the range of opposition, 
of which one cannot avoid being so acutely aware, runs 
along the entire periphery of Eurasia, from Finland 
southwards to the Middle East and thence eastwards to 
far-off Manchuria and Korea. 
20 
Mackenzie King led a small but impressive delegation to the 
Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1946. It comprised Brooke 
Claxton, Minister of National Health and Welfare; Arnold Heeney, 
Secretary to the Cabinet; Georges Vanier, Ambassador to France; 
Dana Wilgress, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Norman Robertson 
and General Pope. The delegation was too small to deal with the 
clausal minutiae of peacemaking which had so absorbed Sir Robert 
Borden and his colleagues in 1919, its members instead preferred to 
address the broader questions of the day. The Prime Minister himself 
favoured this approach, it being conducive to his shrewd political 
instincts in assessing the mood of the Canadian public, as well as 
his own personal aversion to entanglements in European affairs. 
That 
19. Pope Papers, vol. 2, Pope to Wrong, 24 May 11x46. 
20. Pope Papers, vol. 2, despatch }438, Pope to King, 
23 March 1946. 
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is not however to imply that King was reluctant to believe in fair 
functional treatment for all. "It is my understanding, and I have 
so informed Parliament, " Mackenzie King wrote Clement Attlee prior 
to the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May, "... that all 
states invited to the Conference will have full opportunity to exa- 
mine the draft treaties on their merits and to put forward sugges- 
tions for amendments. " Although Canada would never go so far as to 
express outright dissent, he hinted darkly that "If these countries' 
views were to be ignored, it might make it difficult for the govern- 
ments concerned to secure the support of their parliaments and peoples 
for the final peace treaties., 
21 
Hume Wrong, who was in London at that time, believed that 
despite assurances from both the British and Americans that the smal- 
ler powers would have a voice, the Big Four - now of course including 
France - would probably not depart at all from the conclusions reached 
by the Council of Foreign Ministers, established by the Moscow Decla- 
ration three years earlier. "The real Peace Conference may, there- 
fore, be the Council of Foreign Ministers, " Wrong concluded, "... and 
the countries invited later to Paris may only have a choice between 
signing and not signing the peace treaties. The present, therefore, 
may be the only time to exert influence on the results. "22 Though 
Wrong's plea was duly noted in Ottawa, the Prime Minister had already 
determined the low-key approach which would be followed. 
At the plenary meeting of the conference in Paris on 2 august, 
King informed the assembled delegates that Canada possessed no specific 
national interest "in the adoption of any particular formula for the 
solution of individual conflicts and differences which, in the aggre- 
gate, will constitute the general settlement. " Rather, "Our principal 
interest and duty lies, it seems to me, in helping the countries more 
directly concerned to work out agreed solutions which are likely to 
21. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 324, file F3413, King to 
Attlee, 23 April 1946. King also reminded Attlee that he was 
sure to agree that it would not be possible 
for the British 
Foreign Secretary to advance a Commonwealth policy at the meet- 
ings of the Council of Four, since Commonwealth members were to 
be represented separately at Paris. 
22. Ibid., cable no. 998, Wrong to Robertson, 
2-'+ April 1946. 
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endure. "23 The spirit of the functional principle which the Prime 
Minister himself had enunciated was still evident, if muted: Canada 
would endeavour to assume a role proportionate to its contribution 
with a view towards the betterment of the whole. 
The Canadians, it may be said, found solace in their func- 
tional principle when it became evident that the smaller powers would 
not have much to say in the broad thrust of the peace settlement. 
The difficulty in securing a Canadian voice in the control machinery 
for Europe, the disheartening news via the usual Dominions Office 
channels concerning the decisions taken by the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, continued Soviet objections to Dominion involvement, as 
well as the lack of any ready information to prepare for parliamentary 
debate, 
24 
all foretold of what was to transpire at Paris. Brooke 
Claxton was not very surprised, therefore, when United States Secretary 
of State J. F. Byrnes informed him that the meeting at Paris was 
"... but a conference at which the representatives of the Lesser Powers 
are being afforded an opportunity to make recommendations regarding 
the draft Peace Treaties to the Council of Foreign Ministers which 
said body is free to accept or reject as it pleases them. "25 
For his part, Mackenzie King could only endure a month at 
Paris. Tired and ill, horrified at the profligacy of delegates from 
other countries, 
26 
and despondent at seeing too many new faces and 
few familiar ones, he returned to Ottawa, but not before having gazed 
23. DEA, file 4697-K-40, "Statement Delivered by Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King before the plenary session of the Paris Peace 
Conference", 2 August 1946. 
24. In preparation for a debate in the House of Commons on the 
subject in March 1945, Hume Wrong prepared a memorandum for the 
Prime Minister based upon the fragmentary information collected 
thus far: The particulars of the recent Franco-Soviet Treaty and 
the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty. Most of the information Wrong 
provided Mackenzie King was of the "a senior Foreign Office 
official has told Holmes of Canada House" variety. 
King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 342, file F3683, memorandum, 
Wrong to King, 19 March 1945. 
25. Pearson Papers, Pre-1958 Series, vol. II, Pope to Pearson, 
29 October 1946. 
26. King Diary, 5 August 1946. 
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with evident fascination at the bunker in Berlin where Hitler had met 
his end, 
27 
and having informed his advisers just how much they had 
failed him. Before he left, the Prime Minister made a most useful 
contribution to solving the procedural difficulties plaguing the con- 
ference by suggesting that the Council of Foreign Ministers, instead 
of waiting until the conference had ended to consider its recommenda- 
tions, could convene in Paris during the course of the meeting to 
ponder all proposals. This suggestion was ultimately adopted and 
served to abet the fractious nature of the conference. It was Macken- 
zie King's last gesture on the international stage and thus represented 
the end of an era. 
The Prime Minister's departure left an energetic and compe- 
tent Brooke Claxton in charge of the Canadian delegation. Human re- 
sources were stretched: for every Canadian delegate, for example, 
there were seven from Yugoslavia and other smaller countries were 
also better represented. The requisite committee work therefore 
brought with it problems of manpower allocation, shift-work becoming 
commonplace. The fact that Canada had made it abundantly clear that 
it was not interested in the finer aspects of territorial questions 
or in legal matters, was paradoxically all the more reason to place 
Canadians in such positions where the utmost of objectivity was re- 
quired. As a result, General Pope found himself chairing a committee 
concerned with the Bratislava bridgehead between Hungary and Czechos- 
lovakia, and Claxton himself served as chairman of the higher profile 
Legal and Drafting Commission. Canada could therefore not help but 
become involved in European questions, its role in conference commit- 
tees providing the most ready example of how functionalism could be 
applied, not through rational direction by decision-makers as a policy 
instrument, but by force majeure, when the greater powers and circum- 
stances dictated a functional role. 
However as might be expected, once in positions of influence, 
the Canadians were zealous. Canada supported Austria's right to be 
27. Pope Diary, vol. 2,21 August 1946. Pope recorded that 
King had remarked that "most of this gang of Nazis had come 
from the gutter, had achieved the highest positions in the 
Government of a great state and there like vermin in a hole 
in the ground Hitler had died like a rat. " 
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heard on the frontier dispute with Italy; 
28 
encouraged other nations, 
notably the Balkan states, to be more reasonable in their treatment 
of boundary questions; and throughout sought to secure protection for 
racial and religious minorities who certainly had suffered most durinj 
the war. Practically all commissions had sessions stretching on for 
six hours or more, the Italian Political Commission establishing the 
record with a twenty-eight hour marathon meeting without adjournment. 
Most Canadian delegates managed only two or three hours sleep per 
night and used the rest of their time - when not serving on commis- 
sions or committees - poring over agenda items, as well as drafts 
and representations from other countries and interest groups. 
29 
In- 
formal Commonwealth meetings also took place, but as expected, inter- 
ests diverged markedly. 
General Pope privately grumbled at the attitudes of his 
younger colleagues, who, it appeared to him, were grasping at straws 
which could be utilized to build up Canada's image and could thereby 
cause the conference to degenerate into a "plug competition". He 
agreed with Mackenzie King that the Canadian press should not neces- 
sarily always be given something to report and expressed satisfaction 
at an article in the Manchester Guardian which admiringly noted 
28. Claxton informed the plenary conference that Austria 
could have had its say in probably less time than had been 
used to debate whether it should be heard or not. His remarks 
closely followed the line taken by the Prime Minister: "If 
anybody asks what is Canada's interest in this, I reply that 
Canada has probably as little interest in territorial ques- 
tions as any country. We want no territory, we want no repa- 
rations, but we have an interest in peace, in security and 
prosperity... We believe that freedom is the essence of 
security and prosperity and that a peace based on freedom 
is more likely to be brought about if everyone is given the 
freest possible opportunity to express their views than if 
we close the doors. " 
DEA, file 4697-K-40, Statement by Brooke Claxton before 
the 20th Plenary Conference, 17 August 1946. 
29. Claxton Papers, vol. 67, "Notes on 'Canada and the Con- 
ference of Paris"', n. d. This memorandum constituted Claxton's 
comments on a draft chapter in F. H. Soward, Canada in World 
Affairs, From Normandy to Paris, 1944-46, (Toronto, 1950). 
Also vol. 89, Claxton to Pickersgill, 13 September 1946. 
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Canada's reserve as being an unmistakable sign of maturity in inter- 
national councils. 
30 
If Canadian delegates and officials were eager, they cer- 
tainly did not embarrass themselves publicly in the manner their Com- 
monwealth colleagues from Australia did. Herbert Evatt, the Austra- 
lian Minister of External Affairs, continued in the boisterous fashion 
which had won him such notoriety at San Francisco a year earlier, and 
introduced no less than seventy amendments on diverse subjects, all 
of which were defeated. 
31 
By comparison, the Canadian approach tended 
to be almost too low-key. 
But what in effect had been the point of these months of 
feverish activity? In his final speech before the Plenary Conference 
on 8 October, Brooke Claxton stated that the measure of the success 
or failure of the Paris Conference would be the extent to which the 
Council of Foreign Ministers acted upon the recommendations of the 
conference. How were the great powers to act if they themselves 
were so hopelessly divided over so many issues? The great powers 
convened in New York following the Paris meeting to give final con- 
sideration to its recommendations, and although the territorial settle- 
ment between Italy and Yugoslavia continued to be a point of contention 
particularly over the internationalization of Trieste, in general the 
proposals which had attracted two-thirds majority support at Paris 
and where there was consensus among the great powers were in most 
cases incorporated into the final text. As limited in function as 
the Paris Conference was, Claxton wrote St. Laurent, its recommenda- 
tions "... contributed substantially to the settlements that have now 
been arrived at. " 
32 
30. Pope Diary, vol. 2,13 & 14 August 1946. 
31. As other ministers, Evatt did not remain for the entire 
conference, leaving the majority of amendments for the remaining 
delegation members to introduce. Even New Zealand, so closely 
linked to Australia in foreign policy terms, was unable to sup- 
port the majority of the Australian proposals. As Claxton com- 
mented, "It requires Dr. Evatt himself to argue an Evatt amend- 
ment. " Claxton Papers, vol. 91, Claxton to St. Laurent, 7 Sep- 
tember 1946. 
32. Claxton Papers, vol. 88, Claxton to St. Laurent, 10 Februar' 
1947. 
2 89 
It had to be and ultimately was recognized, however, that 
no matter how meritorious the accepted recommendations were, their 
fundamental weakness was that they had been carried in the face of 
sustained opposition by what had increasingly been referred to as 
the "Slav Bloc". 
33 
The conference therefore assumed added signifi- 
cance in that it marked the first occasion when the essential differ- 
ences between East and West were held up to public scrutiny. At the 
beginning of the conference, many delegates believed bloc voting of 
any variety would not persist and prove to be the rule, but by Octo- 
ber, a great many of the final votes "... were counted out as 15 to 6, 
15 to 6, with the mechanical regularity of a cash register. The "34 
Western countries were eager to conclude the conference so that the 
second meeting of the United Nations General Assembly would not have 
to be postponed, but the Soviet Union did not share their haste. 
Failure by the Western nations to respond in kind to long-winded Soviet 
discourses frequently constituted a propagandistic victory for the 
other side, as it seemed the West had no defence. Playing the Russian 
game on the other hand merely served to prolong the conference. 
In the wake of the Paris Conference, decision-makers in 
Ottawa believed that there existed a need to discuss the German set- 
tlement, which had not been considered at Paris, before the four 
greater powers pronounced it a fait accompli. Consequently, Canada 
circulated its views to the others at a senior level, and, in return, 
received polite acknowledgements and occasional exclamations of inter- 
est in proposals such as the creation of an international authority to 
control the Ruhr. This work culminated in late 1946, when the Council 
of Foreign Ministers appointed deputies to ponder the submissions of 
33. DEA, Washington Embassy Series, vol. 2453, no. 72, Claxton 
to St. Laurent, 31 October 1946. 
34. Claxton Papers, vol. 67, "Notes on 'Canada and the Conference 
of Paris"', n. d. Claxton also noted that the Soviet delegation 
was better briefed than any other. In the Legal and Drafting 
Commission, for example, it was a Russian delegate, speaking in 
English, who pointed out a mistake between the English and French 
texts, after they had been screened by numerous legal experts. 
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the other formerly allied nations. With typical caution, the Cana- 
than Government sought assurances that such a submission would not 
be construed as representing Canada's final word in the making of 
peace with Germany. Further, the Canadians still clung to the notion 
that provision should be made for appropriate Canadian participation 
in the deliberative process. "We are not necessarily asking for imme- 
diate participation, " Lester Pearson wrote Norman Robertson who was 
to make the demarche in London, "In fact, something in the nature of 
commissions of states with special interests meeting... in private 
and with as much informality as possible, would meet our views... , 
35 
The time for extended consultations, however informal, had long since 
passed. 
For Canada, therefore, the importance of questions of sub- 
stance concerning peace and the future of Germany as elucidated in 
its memorandum before the deputies, was in a sense secondary to those 
questions dealing with procedure, public awareness very likely attri- 
buting greater significance to the latter. Indeed, the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, in response to parlia- 
mentary and editorial pressure, had indicated to the House of Commons 
that Canada had endeavoured to be "moderate and constructive", and 
was still prepared to suggest practicable alternatives. 
36 
In the event, however, agreement amongst the deputies verged 
on the impossible and a further meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in Moscow in March 1947 resulted in deadlock. Small power 
concerns were by this time clearly not uppermost in the minds of the 
Foreign Ministers, although United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin continued to voice the sort of sympathies almost required by 
tradition. Subsequent Canadian memoranda on the German peace settle- 
ment, including an ingenious suggestion from Robertson calling for an 
international statute incorporating a constitutional framework for 
Germany as an alternative to a formal peace treaty, 
37 
fell upon 
interested, but essentially deaf, great power ears. 
35. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 428, Pearson to Robertson, 
24 January 1947. 
36. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 30 January 1947, pp. 5 ff. 
37. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 428, Robertson to Pearson, 
29 January 1947. 
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In a sense, Canadian multilateral policy had become rather 
stale, neutered by the failure to realize a justification of Canada's 
war-time role. A self-righteous emphasis on procedure, that is, how 
smaller powers could be justly recognized in the peacemaking process 
in a manner commensurate to their contributions, the functional prin- 
ciple, had ceased to have as much significance during the interregnum 
between the creation of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Pact 
as before. Canada's inability to secure a more influential role at 
Paris and indeed in the entire peacemaking process, resulted in an 
unconscious decision among Canadian policy makers to give less pro- 
minence to the functional principle as an instrument of unilateral 
foreign policy and instead apply it in a more muted fashion to tradi- 
tional North Atlantic patterns, where greater success could be anti- 
cipated. The economic reconstruction of Europe represented a challenge 
in this respect. 
"The problem of international relief, " Norman Robertson 
wrote in the autumn of 1946, "is a problem of sharing scarcities. 
It would be easier to tackle this problem if every country was simul- 
taneously doing its utmost to reduce these scarcities by encouraging 
maximum output of all the things the world needs., 
38 
This aphorism 
was not new to Canadian policy; its economic rationale was charac- 
terized by a sort of multilateral fundamentalism, evident in Canada's 
approach to the incipient General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
as well as its abortive attempt to establish a continental customs 
union with the United States the following year. Moreover, the support 
Canada gave to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis- 
tration (UNRRA) during the war in large measure coloured Canada's 
approach to the economic reconstruction of Europe at war's end. 
To be sure, UNRRA had encountered its share of difficulties, 
however its work was illustrative of the results which a well-coordi- 
nated international relief effort could produce. Pearson's early pre- 
diction that Canadian chairmanship of the organization's Supply Com- 
mittee could become a "big thing", 
39 
had proven to be the case, and, 
38. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2105, File AR 405/1/4/20, 
Pt. 1, memorandum, n. d. (November 1947). 
39. Pearson Diary, 22-27 March 1943. 
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in addition, this practical and well-publicized demonstration of the 
functional principle was in itself an argument for a strong Canadian 
voice in emerging international organizations, whether economic or 
political. Not to be ignored was the fact that future commercial 
opportunities in Europe were practically assured. 
It was with some trepidation, therefore, that officials in 
the East Block in Ottawa viewed the American decision to terminate 
UNRRA in 1946, ostensibly for the reason that the United States could 
not agree to the further allocation or distribution of relief supplies 
by an international agency over which it could not exercise adequate 
control. In other words, relief had become increasingly politicized, 
and continued wranglings in the Council of Foreign Ministers convinced 
all concerned that the situation would not improve. The Americans 
simply did not wish to provide supplies to areas of Eastern Europe 
which could indirectly support rearmament efforts coordinated by the 
Soviet Union. 
Canada, while appreciative of American thinking, could not 
associate itself with any public declaration of its southern neigh- 
bour's rationale, and chose instead to adopt a moral tone to the 
effect that the best policy to follow would be one of strict adherence 
to the principle that relief was outside politics and should only be 
granted to nations which could visibly demonstrate a required need. 
40 
As impartiality was evidently required for such an interpretation, 
what better agency to coordinate relief in war-torn Europe than the 
new, if untried, United Nations? Consequently, the Canadian delega- 
tion to the first General Assembly in London was instructed to give 
assurances that Canada would be prepared to bear its fair share towards 
meeting 1947 relief needs if this was to be done by "cooperative inter- 
national action to discharge what would, in fact, be recognized as a 
responsibility of the United Nations. "41 The British and Americans 
40. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2105, File AR 405/1/4/20 
Pt. l, memorandum by Pearson, 24 October 1946. 
41. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 110, File 
U-40-1, "Memorandum to the Canadian Delegation to the General 
Assembly concerning International Relief Questions after the 
Termination of UNRRA", 4 November 1946. 
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however opposed the creation of such an international agency, pre- 
ferring bilateral arrangements between supplying and receiving govern- 
ments instead. While maintaining its position as to the desirability 
of a relief agency at the General Assembly, Canada realized that it 
could not support its establishment against the wishes of its closest 
great power friends, thereby assisting the aims of anti-Western Soviet 
propaganda, already rife at this first regular meeting of the United 
Nations. Nonetheless, Canada prudently took every available oppor- 
tunity to stress the international character of the relief problem, 
and supported the establishment of a proposed technical advisory com- 
mittee which would investigate relief requirements, the ability of 
countries to meet these needs and which would make recommendations 
for outside assistance for those who required it. 
42 
Bilateral undertakings proved largely to be of a piecemeal 
variety, insufficient to meet the difficulties posed by the drain on 
Western European dollar reserves as well as general reconstruction 
costs, particularly exhorbitant in the United Kingdom. Canada, itself 
suffering from its own dollar crisis in 1947, looked toward the United 
States for leadership, and that country in turn sought more visible 
cooperation from the British and other Europeans to assist the Truman 
administration's own efforts to convince Congress of the efficacy of 
reconstruction in Europe. The Americans believed that European eco- 
nomic integration, or a regional customs union, might bring solutions, 
yet even Dean Acheson, the Under-Secretary of State, admitted there 
was no clear idea in Washington as to what was meant by the concept, 
nor why and how the British should take the initiative. 
For its part, the United Kingdom was cautious; its reluctance 
to lead rather than follow was born of doubts based upon inconsisten- 
cies in American policies as well as the belief that should Britain 
take an initiative, all traditional American suspicions of "British 
imperialism" would again be aroused. In Ottawa, a seeming lack of 
American commitment was a cause for concern. "The great danger, 
" 
Lester Pearson informed the Prime Minister, "... is that while Con- 
gress waits and wonders, Europe will go to pieces. " In such a scenario, 
42. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 343, file 3694, memorandum 
from Pearson to King, 6 December 1946. 
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the Under-Secretary continued, Canada would be among the first coun- 
tries to suffer. Whereas Canada's immediate economic difficulties 
stemmed from its American dollar imbalance, emergency arrangements 
could always be entered into with the United States, however the 
European danger in the long term embodied a greater threat to Canada's 
economic security. "If there ever was a necessity for bold, imagina- 
tive leadership in Washington, " Pearson concluded, "it is now. "43 
The United States Secretary of State, George Marshall, deli- 
vered his famous Harvard speech three days later on 5 June 1947, and 
although the speech in itself was little more than an implication 
that the United States Administration was favourably contemplating a 
plan for economic assistance to Europe, the message to the Europeans 
was unequivocal: if those countries organized to help themselves, the 
United States would be willing to assist them substantially in turn. 
As a result, the United Kingdom and France met at Paris a few weeks 
later with the intention of organizing a conference of all European 
countries, a meeting which eventually took place in July, and then 
without the participation of the Soviet Union and its new-found 
satellites. Committees were established to study various elements 
of reconstruction, their reports eventually being presented to 
Secretary Marshall in September. 
Neither the British nor the Canadians had been forewarned 
about Marshall's speech; initial reactions were therefore rather 
guarded in nature, there being fears that the speech's vagueness could 
be interpreted and utilized by the Soviet Union to advance its own 
designs in Europe, should agreement in the Council of Foreign Ministers 
on the future of Germany prove illusory. Preliminary discussions at 
Whitehall led the Canadians to think that Foreign Office officials 
were convinced that any money forthcoming under the Marshall Plan 
would arrive too late, and would be of insufficient quantity to sti- 
mulate economic recovery. That being said, however, the British were 
expending every effort to organize with what little information was 
initially available to them. 
44 
43. DEA, File 264(S), Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime 
Minister", 2 June 1947. 
44. Douglas LePan Papers, vol. 1, despatch A. 663, Hudd (Fred- 
eric Hudd, Acting High Commissioner) to St. Laurent, 
30 July 
1947; also, King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 429, cable no. 
960, 
LePan to Pearson, 11 June 1947. 
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In talks with the Americans in the autumn concerning the 
fate of Canada's own rapidly dwindling dollar reserves, Canadian nego- 
tiators exacted a commitment based largely on the goodwill of the Tru- 
man Administration that off-shore purchases in Canada would be allowed 
under the terms of the Marshall Plan. This promise was one of the key 
factors in bringing about smooth bilateral acceptance of the less dra- 
conian of two proposed Canadian import restriction programmes examined 
in the preceding chapter. Purchase of commodities in Canada with 
United States dollars could not only in part alleviate the dollar de- 
ficit, but could also reduce the anticipated inflationary pressure in 
the United States which would be caused by the Marshall Plan, thereby 
helping to effectively undermine the thrust of Congressional opposi- 
tion to the entire venture. 
Off-shore purchases, while of undisputed benefit to Canada, 
could however not be classified as a Canadian contribution to Euro- 
pean recovery, as policy-planners within the Department of External 
Affairs readily pointed out. Since passage by Congress of the Mar- 
shall Plan was by no means assured, a Canadian contribution, even if 
only of a token variety, would allow the State Department to inform 
the American public that there were other countries willing to share 
the burden. With the ever-increasing tension in Europe in mind, 
Douglas LePan in London proffered a broad analysis of the dilemma: 
Canadian cooperation in the Marshall Plan would 
tend to show that the Western World is not to be pictured 
as a single giant towering above a cluster of mendicant 
clients, each holding out a begging-bowl, but rather as 
a group of freely associated states, differing widely 
to be sure in their resources and in their needs, but 
also held together by a great number of ligaments both 
of interest and of sentiment. 
45 
In Ottawa, Escott Reid calculated figures to give substance 
to a proposed Canadian financial contribution. He thought it would be 
advantageous to suggest to the Americans that Canada would be prepared 
to provide $250 million a year for four years towards European recovery 
if the United States would agree to spend the equivalent amount on pur- 
chases in Canada under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. Although he 
45. DEA, File 264(S), LePan, "Memorandum: Canada and the : Marshall 
Plan", 25 September 1947. 
296 
conceded that such a contribution would further strain the Canadian 
dollar position vis-a-vis the United States, at least in the short 
term, positive action of this sort would serve to demonstrate to Cana- 
dians that taking measures which would further distort the Canadian 
economy - as, for example, import restrictions - would be unwise and 
impede the goal of freer global trade. 
46 
As was often the case, Reid's 
political superiors did not share his enthusiasm. 
In their report to the American Secretary of State, the Euro- 
peans identified Canada as a supplier nation and also implied that it 
should have a larger role in the execution of the Marshall Plan. What 
remained unclear however, was whether Canada would be expected to ex- 
tend further credits to the participating countries - the loan to the 
United Kingdom already counted substantially for the drain on Canadian 
dollar reserves - without financial assistance from the United States. 
47 
It was for this reason as much as any other, in addition to the clearly 
articulated goal of securing greater opportunities for Canadian trade, 
that Clifford Clark's discussions with the Americans in the autumn - 
as already examined - concerning proposed Canadian economic measures, 
assumed such importance. 
Uncertainty as to how and how much Canada was to contribute 
to the Marshall Plan continued until the end of the year. This was 
not as a result of a dearth of activity in Ottawa nor of excessive 
parsimony, but reflected the fact that international finance was in a 
fluid but dismal state. It was a time for making do with what one 
had until the Marshall panacea, held up by politics in Congress, rec- 
tified matters. 
Meanwhile, the drain on Canadian reserves, represented largely 
by unrequited exports to the United Kingdom and Western Europe, amounted 
to $969 million during 1946 and $601 million in 1947. The British 
financial position, described by Norman Robertson as "a time bomb 
ticking away in the heart of Whitehall , 
48 
was far worse and continued 
to deteriorate at an alarming rate. 
46. DEA, file 264(S), Reid, "Canada and the Marshall Plan", 
8 October 1947. 
47. St. Laurent Papers, vol. 37, memorandum, "Canada and the 
Marshall Plan", 20 October 1947. 
48. DEA, file 9388-40, Robertson to St. Laurent, 8 January 1947. 
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The United Kingdom had been a recipient of Canadian food 
assistance throughout the war, and as its financial situation became 
increasingly precarious following it, British citizens were confronted 
with a stricter rationing programme than heretofore. Bilateral dis- 
cussions pertaining to continued Canadian food exports to the United 
Kingdom were inaugurated by a British statement which proposed a re- 
duction of $45 million of certain products in 1948, including a com- 
plete cessation of purchases of Canadian beef, eggs and bacon, as 
well as some timber imports. When coupled with an expressed British 
desire to draw down its Canadian line of credit at a faster rate, 
despite repeated Canadian entreaties to resist this temptation, the 
stage was set for what were to become exceedingly difficult negotia- 
tions. Contrary to the hard line adopted by the Canadian Minister of 
Agriculture, the redoubtable "Jimmy" Gardiner, who predictably ten- 
dered full support to his rural constituency, Robertson from London 
and Wrong from Washington advocated a temporizing policy until Mar- 
shall Plan aid was available, but also emphasized the need for more 
diversified outlets for Canadian agricultural products. 
49 
Since a potentially embarrassing deadlock seemed inevitable 
at bilateral food talks held in Ottawa in December 1947, Lester Pear- 
son, who had lately been concerned with more glamorous international 
issues at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, took an 
active part in personal negotiations with Sir Percivale Liesching, 
the leader of the British delegation. In order to strengthen its 
hand, the Canadian Government, at the instigation of the Departments 
of Agriculture and Finance, had startled and alarmed the United Kingdom 
by suggesting the abrogation and refinancing of the bilateral wheat 
agreement, proposing instead to supply new export credits to make up 
the difference between the world wheat price of $3 per bushel and the 
British contract price of $1.55. This low price in itself represented 
a form of aid, but American recalcitrance made its recognition as such 
in the Marshall Plan doubtful. With the worsening dollar situation in 
Canada, it was felt in Ottawa that little else could be done in the 
circumstances. 
49. DEA, file 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "A Survey of Canadian 
External Policy, Chapter 7- Problems of Economic and Financial 
Foreign Policy", p. 14. 
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Amid grumblings from senior officials from other departments, 
but with the full support of Mackenzie King, who more than anyone was 
aware of potential public reaction to perceived Canadian avarice, Pear- 
son deftly intervened with a compromise proposal. He suggested that 
the wheat price be maintained at $2 per bushel for the next crop year 
and that other food contracts should be renewed at adjusted prices. 
To recompense, $15 million per month would be made available for the 
United Kingdom to draw upon for three months only, whereupon the finan- 
cial situation would be reviewed. Robertson viewed this measure as 
the best of possible stopgap solutions: "[B]y the time... three months 
are up and the whole problem has to be examined again, the prospect 
of large-scale aid under the Marshall Plan will have become so unmis- 
takably clear that the problem will be easier .,, 
50 
Although on the 
surface Robertson and Pearson, as others, viewed the European Recovery 
Programme (ERP), as the Marshall Plan was officially known, as a great 
hope for European reconstruction and financial recovery, they realized 
it was not the sole solution to the global economic malaise nor to 
Canada's own financial problems, for that matter. Moreover, Canada 
could not afford to simply monitor developments in Washington with a 
sense of polite aloofness; its North Atlantic heritage demanded more. 
Accordingly, Hume Wrong was cabled instructions in early 1948 
as how to approach United States officials on Canada's financial posi- 
tion and role in the European Recovery Programme. In a meeting with 
Under-Secretary of State J. A. Lovett and his advisors, Ambassador Wrong 
and John Deutsch explained that although it was as yet too early to 
assess the results of the import restrictions imposed the previous 
autumn, preliminary statistical surveys had shown that the Canadian 
measures would at best prevent a further drain on Canada's dollar re- 
serves. Wrong's assertion that after a thorough review of the f inan- 
cial situation, Canada could go as high as $100 million in allowing 
European countries to draw upon credits already authorized - 
$45 mil- 
lion for the United Kingdom had already been agreed upon during the 
50. DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2100, file AR 106/4, 
Robertson to Pearson, 27 December 1947; Pearson to Robertson, 
22 December 1947; also King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 
334, file 
3610, Pearson, "Memorandum for the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs; United Kingdom Food Discussions, 
" 12 December 
1947. 
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earlier food negotiations - brought a remark from Paul NitzeS1 of the 
American side that this amount was well below their own estimates of 
the share which they expected Canada could carry, even after consi- 
deration of the indirect contribution implicit in low-priced food 
contracts to the United Kingdom. 
52 
In Wrong's words, the meeting was not encouraging: "Lovett 
remarked that he could give me 'little current comfort', and he later 
said that our talk had at least had the effect of sharing our misery 
with them. The results, in short, were depressing., 
53 
Wrong was un- 
certain whether he had convinced his American interlocutors of the 
risks Canada would face in granting further credit to the United King- 
dom. To the Americans, the British appeared to have far greater risks 
to run than Canada, which in turn might have to act with a certain 
lack of financial prudence by extending $15 million monthly for a 
longer period, as it was unclear when the European Recovery Programme 
would come into effect. The ambassador countered with the arguments 
which had been so well prepared for him in Ottawa, returning repeatedly 
to the dangerous nature of Canada's reserve position but concluded 
that "We shall, however, probably hear more of this suggestion. x, 
54 
Indeed Canada would, for its economic self-interest had 
placed it in an unenviable bargaining position. As a result of its 
willingness to play the "lynch-pin" role and help to bring British 
financial concerns to Washington's attention, it received subtle yet 
firm pressure from the United States to do more. Moreover, in order 
to receive the benefits of off-shore purchases under the European 
Recovery Programme, American public opinion could not be allowed to 
receive the impression that Canada was a selfish nation. 
Canada's attempts to underscore British woes in Washington 
were appreciated in Whitehall. More than the usual amount of consul- 
51. Presently leader of the United States delegation at the 
nuclear disarmament discussions at Geneva. 
52. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 61, file 
C-10-13-D, cable no. 488, St. Laurent to Wrong, 21 February 1948. 




tation had taken place between the Canadians and the British; cables 
and despatches were shared and freely discussed among officials in 
Washington, London and Ottawa. The close relationship between their 
respective problems was readily acknowledged; that the key to their 
solution lay in Washington was self-evident. However the Canadians 
stopped short of agreeing to undertake a joint approach to the Ameri- 
cans, as had been suggested in some circles in London. This, it was 
believed, could prove to be dangerous given "the traditional American 
suspicion of Commonwealth 'ganging up' tactics. "55 On the other hand, 
it was also essential not to blur overly the distinction between Cana- 
than and British interests, nor to be seen as a peripheral partner in 
what was rapidly becoming a North Atlantic tangle. 
The Secretary of State for External Affairs, soon to be 
Prime Minister, subscribed to a considerably harder view of Canada's 
role than did his senior advisors. To St. Laurent, the United Kingdom 
possessed reserves which it would in any case have to expend, and 
Canada was doing that country a great service with its low contract 
prices. "Safeguarding their reserves, " St. Laurent informed Pearson, 
"... is a matter for them to discuss with Washington and I do not like 
the idea of having us join with them as supplicants... " 
56 
Pearson, 
who was of course acutely aware of the public damage which could be 
done by being too closely associated with the British, was also wary 
of the dangers of an aloof attitude: "Nothing could be more misleading 
or irritating than to have the British over-emphasize in Washington 
the difficulties of the Canadian sector of their financial front. "57 
Canada had to be involved and although the Canadians were clearly 
annoyed at sometimes unsubtle American and British demands to provide 
more, there was little to do but to accede to such pressures, albeit 
in as small a way as possible, given prevailing circumstances. 
55. Pearson believed that separate approaches to Washington 
amid close consultation between London and Ottawa represented 
the key to the matter. The Americans could in turn suggest 
combined discussions. 
DEA, file 154(S), Pearson to Robertson, 2 February 1948. 
56. DEA, file 154(S), minute by St. Laurent on memorandum 
by Pearson, 27 January 1948. 
57. DEA, file 264(S), Pearson to Robertson, 5 March 1948. 
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The Marshall Plan, or Economic Cooperation Act (ECA), to 
be administered by an agency based in Washington, was approved by 
Congress on 3 April 1948, its rocky passage speeded by political 
events in Europe. In late February, the seizure by Communist ele- 
ments of the Czech government, followed by the "suicide" of Foreign 
Minister Jan Masaryk, appeared to make military conflict with the 
Soviet Union imminent. Within a month, highly secret tripartite 
talks concerning the viability of a North Atlantic military alliance 
between the United States, United Kingdom and Canada would commence. 
Despite the increased American pressure for a greater con- 
tribution to European recovery which these political developments 
brought, Canada remained somewhat obdurate. A request from the United 
Kingdom for permission to draw $15 million for the month of April on 
the Canadian line of credit, with the understanding that this amount 
would be retroactively repaid when the European Recovery Programme 
came into effect, was rebuffed, as Canada chose to reserve any action 
on international credit matters until prospects for the 1948 crop 
year became known. From London, Norman Robertson, deeply disturbed 
by heightening tensions on the European continent, objected to this 
approach which to him seemed myopic, stating that "... it would be a 
mistake to urge too far our unwillingness to advance such a compara- 
tively small amount of further credit. " In Washington, Hume Wrong 
reacted in similar fashion, and confirmed Canadian fears that the 
Americans would be shocked by Canada's decision not to grant further 
credit to Britain for the time being. However assurances from the 
United States that the United Kingdom would receive $375 million of 
ECA aid between the passage of the legislation and the end of June, 
eventually helped to persuade Ottawa to agree to allow the British 
to draw on Canadian credit at $3.5 million per week for the first two 
weeks of April. In his message to London, St. Laurent underscored 
the temporal nature of this assistance and reaffirmed his government's 
intention to review the entire situation in September. 
58 
In a narrower sense, the possibility and extent of off-shore 
purchases in Canada under the aegis of the European Recovery Programme 
continued to preoccupy officials in the East Block. As Canada had 
58. DEA, file 5296-C-40 (Soward Papers), "Problems of Economic 
and Financial Foreign Policy", pp. 18-19. 
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given notice that it intended to reconsider its creditor relationship 
with the United Kingdom in September, it would, policy planners be- 
lieved, make a good deal of sense to inform the State Department of 
this intention directly, as awareness of this fact could evoke a 
favourable American response to the prospect of ECA purchases in 
Canada. With respect to the ultimate course of action in September, 
Robertson, the acknowledged sage in these matters, ventured to sug- 
gest that there existed two variables, not one, which would influence 
the ultimate decision of the Canadian Government. "It is true, " he 
cabled from Canada House, "... that if there is a large wheat crop, we 
will be in a better position by the fall to grant further credit. But 
equally it seems to me we will be in a better position if by that time 
there has been a large volume of off-shore purchasing in Canada. "59 
In other words, the Americans should be convinced that the amount of 
additional credit Canada would be able to offer would be directly 
attributable to the quantity of United States dollar purchases made 
in Canada out of ECA funds until September. 
The purpose of conversations which those Canadian officials 
involved in the interdepartmental aspect of European recovery had 
with their American counterparts in Washington in May was to provide 
Canadian estimates of the balance of payments between Canada and the 
United Kingdom for the second calendar quarter of 1948 - British 
statistics usually exhibited great variance - as well as to present 
to the United States a list of Canadian commodities and services 
available for purchase by recipient countries between April and July. 
Not surprisingly, the Canadians were also charged with expressing 
Canada's interest for a concrete form of association between Canada 
and the United States on European matters. 
To the extent that Canadian products could be generally 
identified, the discussions were encouraging, however insofar as an 
59. DEA, file 264(S), cable no. 507, Robertson to St. Laurent, 
9 April 1948. Robertson's influence on Canada's politico- 
economic approach to European recovery cannot be underestimated. 
He had ready access to everyone at Whitehall, including the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, and was 
listened to most carefully in Ottawa. More often than not 
his 
recommendations were those which were followed, 
frequently 
over opposition from senior officials of other 
departments. 
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enhanced relationship was concerned, despite frank admissions from 
nearly all United States officials that close bilateral association 
was desirable, if not essential, the Americans could do no more than 
explain that "the organization was still in the embryonic stage, and 
they were not in a position to discuss with Canada even generalities. " 
In addition, no thought had yet been given to the question of off- 
shore purchases, so vital to Canadian policy planning. According to 
Richard Bissell, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Economic 
Cooperation Agency (ECA), Canada had to ensure that it would be ade- 
quately represented and its interests put forward at Paris, which in 
due course would likely replace Washington as the centre of gravity 
of the European Recovery Programme. 
60 
Canada was not unprepared. Whereas the financial aspect 
of European recovery, at least with respect to off-shore purchases 
in Canada remained cloudy, the Economic Cooperation Agency's pro- 
gramming through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), 61 the organism which eventually emerged in response to Secre- 
tary Marshall's speech, represented an area where Canada could garner 
advantages. S. D. Pierce, the External Affairs officer who had relin- 
quished ambassadorial responsibilities in Mexico in order to monitor 
European recovery in Paris, concluded that Canada's primary and imme- 
diate task was to see that each individual country recipient of ECA 
assistance nominated Canada as its preferred country of supply when 
it would be both in the Canadian interest and that of the entire 
programme to do so. Canada's trade commissioners in the field should 
aggressively continue to seek commercial opportunities as before, and 
refer the more complicated question of financing, either by ECA grant, 
loan or by "free dollars" to Ottawa. 
62 
To this end, Pierce convened 
a meeting of all Canadian trade commissioners in Europe. As each 
recipient country was to bring its individual four year recovery pro- 
grammes - their preparation required by the Marshall Plan - to Paris 
60. DEA, file 264-B(S), "Report on Conversations in Washington 
regarding the European Recovery Programme", 5 May 19+8. 
61. Today the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD). 
62. DEA, file 264(S), memorandum by S. D. Pierce, "Observations 
of Canada's Participation in E. R. P. ", 1 June 1948. 
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to receive peer sanction from all nations comprising the OEEC, Canada 
clearly expected off-shore purchases to proceed on a de basis, 
even if not so formally stipulated in the Economic Cooperation Act. 
"Should the United States' 'European Recovery Programme' 
result in a substantial easing of our United States dollar difficul- 
ties, " intoned a March 1948 memorandum prepared by the Department of 
External Affairs for consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee 
on External Trade Policy, "Canada might be expected to grant addi- 
tional credits to the United Kingdom. , 
63 
As mentioned above, such 
expectations were high, particularly in Washington. Buoying American 
expectations was the fact that the first months of the European Reco- 
very Programme had been good to Canada, with $400 million of quarterly 
funds being allocated to the United Kingdom without restriction as to 
where they could be spent - an unexpected decision on the part of the 
ECA. Canada appeared to be on the verge of receiving preferential 
treatment, and spirits soared in Ottawa. By mid-June, Canada had 
managed to secure a remarkable 22 per cent of total ECA appropriations 
of over $6 million and had, without a specific promise, received more 
than half the allocation for off-shore purchases, largely accounted 
for by the fortunate fact that the British wheat contracts had been 
covered by the programme. However there was other hopeful financial 
news: the import restrictions imposed in November 1947 had evidently 
had some effect as well, and also by this time, there had been a gain 
of $267 million in Canada's American dollar reserves. 
Canadian promises to reassess its policy towards European 
recovery in September had thus far managed to avert any direct pres- 
sure from Washington for increased credits, but by mid-summer Canada's 
improved financial position as well as the seemingly certain election 
of an isolationist Republican administration in November occasioned a 
more strident American approach. United States officials now said 
they wished to see Canada double its existing credit 
from $150 million 
to $300 million and looked forward to negotiations to affect 
"a per- 
63. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 78, file 
E-40-2, "Memorandum on the European Recovery Programme prepared 
for the Interdepartmental Committee on External 
Trade Policy 
by the Department of External Affairs", 12 March 
198. 
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manent contributing partnership" between Canada and the ECA. 
64 
Not- 
withstanding the fact that Canada had earlier requested a similar 
commitment, the suggestion for "permanence" had now arisen on the 
American side and was therefore viewed warily in Ottawa. Predictably, 
there were similar fears to those which had surfaced when more formal- 
ized continental economic integration was envisioned some months 
earlier: decisions would inevitably be made in Washington and Ottawa 
would therefore be the recipient of more pressure, not less, and lose 
whatever multilateral manoeuvrability it once possessed. 
A series of meetings during the ensuing months convinced 
the Americans how tenacious their Canadian counterparts could be to 
what were perceived as covetous designs on a country which was easing 
itself out of a financial crisis. The discussion between the two sides 
eventually devolved into one of statistical interpretation: the Ameri- 
cans believed Canada was profiting too much from ECA purchases, whereas 
the Canadians believed their country was barely holding its own, and 
even with a bumper wheat crop, the most which could be expected would 
be a simple reinstatement of the British credit in September. When 
United States officials conceded that increased Canadian credits would 
neither enhance nor damage the European Recovery Programme one way or 
another, Congressional suasion being a more fitting rationale for the 
Canadian augmentation they desired, Canada had all but won a most 
strenuous battle. Concerns over the volume of off-shore purchases in 
Canada continued, but to a lesser degree, during the last months of 1948. 
Although the Canadian exchange position slowly improved, the 
rate of amelioration was insufficient to prevent a massive devaluation 
of the pound and to a lesser extent, of the Canadian dollar, in the 
autumn of 1949. By that time, political developments - the Berlin 
blockade and airlift, events in Korea and the Middle East - had, 
together with economic factors, dashed the hope for freer multilateral 
trade, which Canada had shared with other nations. Rampant protection- 
ism once again appeared to be at hand. 
Canada's participation in the Marshall Plan graphically 
exemplified an evolution in its economic relations with the 
United 
64. For a more thorough account, see R. D. Cuff and 
J. L. Granat- 
stein, American Dollars - Canadian Prosperity, 
Canadian-:: eý e zn 
Economic Relations, 1945-50, (Toronto, 1978), pp. 110-124. 
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Kingdom, which in great measure paralleled the political changes ana- 
lyzed in an earlier chapter. Although Canada's post-war financial 
assistance to Britain was certainly the logical extension of measures 
taken during the war, the $1.25 billion credit extended following it 
was in the main motivated more by self-interest than altruism. In 
order to secure continued access to the British market, it was neces- 
sary to help finance the United Kingdom balance of payments deficit. 
Underneath all their idealism and explanations that such a substantial 
credit arrangement would meet short run financial difficulties and 
promote the common objective of freely convertible currencies and 
expansive global trade - all very true - Canadian commercial planners 
earnestly sought a broader market base for Canadian products in the 
United Kingdom. Nonetheless, by 1948, Canada had provided over $6.5 
billion in financial assistance to Britain, no insignificant amount, 
even by today's standards. This sum included an astonishing $35 
million in private contributions through voluntary agencies. 
65 
Tradi- 
tional ties, though often relegated to sentimental status, still 
appeared to bind. 
It was not surprising that Secretary Marshall's call for the 
European countries to examine the feasibility of a customs union, 
as an evident prerequisite to United States financial assistance, 
65. An approximate breakdown of Canadian financial assistance 
to the United Kingdom follows: 
Wartime Measures Dollars 
- repatriation of British-held securities ... 800 million 
- interest-free loan ............. 
700 
- purchase of U. K. interests in 
Canadian war plants ............ 
200 
- gift for purchase of war supplies ...... 1,000 
- Mutual Aid .......... 
2,162 
- Voluntary Relief (war and post-war) ..... 
35 
Post-War Measures 
- 2% loan (1946) .......... 
19250 
- Cancellation of British Commonwealth 




SOURCE: DEA, Canada House Series, vol. 2081, file AR 13/8, 
Pt. I. memorandum, "Canada's Financial Aid to the 
United Kingdom, n. d. (October 1948). 
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sparked great interest among Canadian officials. The general concept 
was, as has already been noted, congruent with their own proclivities. 
"Suggest you consider implications of western European customs union, " 
Norman Robertson cabled from London shortly after Marshall's Harvard 
speech, "... not only in terms of its probable direct effects on volume 
and direction of Canadian exports, but as [a] means of underwriting 
our general political interest in [Europe's] stability and prosperity., 
66 
Canadian encouragement of closer European economic integration, it 
was felt, would add an element absent from United States endorsement 
of the same, in that such support would emanate from a Commonwealth 
member, and a beneficiary, albeit nominal, of current preferential 
arrangements. The High Commissioner's recommendation, it should be 
remembered, belied a conviction that closer economic integration could 
have a more direct application on a North American scale. 
A European study group established under the OEEC and charged 
with examining the viability of a customs union, engendered a useful 
exchange of economic data, however failed to provoke much enthusiasm 
among European countries for the concept. Though convinced of the 
fact, but not wishing to offend the Americans, the Europeans were loath 
to admit that ad hoc arrangements for economic cooperation through the 
OEEC would be more practical than the unwieldy theoretical framework 
inherent in a customs union. Canadian analysts, who had heeded Robert- 
son's suggestion to study the question, concluded that from a strictly 
economic standpoint, the United Kingdom had a vital role to play in 
European recovery. Concurrently, it was no less essential that Bri- 
tain's economic relationship with the Commonwealth, which before the 
war received 40% of British exports and in turn furnished 87% of all 
imports, be maintained, if not expanded. 
67 
Canada was more amenable 
to recognize the necessity of this dichotomy than its Commonwealth 
peers, notably Australia and New Zealand, which, being integral com- 
ponents of the sterling area, were somewhat apprehensive of the domes- 
tic economic and political difficulties a European customs union could 
cause. 
66. DEA, file 264(S), cable no. 994, Robertson to Pearson, 
19 June 1947. 
67. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 107, file 
U-10-11, memorandum, "The Economic Aspects of 
Western Union", 
10 September 1948. 
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Since Canada's traditional role in international commerce 
had followed the sides of the North Atlantic triangle, a customary 
pattern which in the immediate post-war period had been artificially 
supported with grants and loans, the trade surpluses attributable to 
the European Recovery Programme presented a rather distorted picture. 
Canada's special overseas markets for agricultural products could 
suffer through European economic integration, particularly as a result 
of the economies of scale between customs union members and a natural 
propensity for the United Kingdom to divert purchases to other sterling 
nations; the loss of Canada's preferential status in United Kingdom 
markets could therefore dictate some adjustment in Canadian production. 
The alternative, viewed with optimism by the denizens of the East Block, 
was that "... in giving up U. K. preferences Canada might obtain general 
access to the whole market of the countries in the Customs Union in a 
fashion which could compensate for any loss in Commonwealth preferen- 
ces. "68 It was increasingly realized that the quest for a counter- 
weight to United States economic dominance, to become one of the great 
legacies of the war, could represent a significant tenet of Canadian 
foreign policy in future years, particularly as Canada's interest in 
Commonwealth preferences became ever more peripheral. 
69 
It was also 
at this time that plans for the concept of North Atlantic integration, 
Canada's singular contribution to the strategic talks already underway, 
neared fruition. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, visited 
Ottawa in late September 1948, in order both to re-examine the bilateral 
financial relationship and to present to Canada the United Kingdom's 
"four-year plan" for economic recovery, one of the stipulations of the 
Economic Cooperation Act. His visit provoked another round of Cabinet 
bickering which predictably centered on the role which agricultural 
products were to assume in any new bilateral economic configuration. 
It was on this subject that the opinions of Louis St. Laurent, already 
leader of the Liberal Party and soon to succeed Mackenzie King as 
68. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 61, "Memo- 
randum on the Proposed European Customs Union", n. 
d. (September 
1948). 
69. Using Europe as an economic counterweight, or 
"Third Option" 
eventually became an articulated policy of the government of 
Pierre Trudeau in 1973. 
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Prime Minister, prevailed. He chided his colleagues for expecting the 
United Kingdom to do the impossible, which was to continue to buy some 
Canadian agricultural products at an economic disadvantage. It was un- 
realistic to believe, he argued, that the United Kingdom would continue 
to represent a market where Canada's trade could operate as before the 
war. Rather, one should perceive the matter as that of a broader Euro- 
pean market, or self-supporting area, which could serve as a buffer zone 
between East and West. 
70 
St. Laurent's opinions were echoed by his own 
successor and the Cabinet's newest member, Lester Pearson. 
In addition, further financial assistance from Canada to 
the United Kingdom and possibly other European countries was both 
essential and unavoidable, for as Acting Under-Secretary of State 
Escott Reid quipped, "The Lord, and the United States, loveth a 
cheerful giver. , 
71 
Talks with the United States on aspects of the 
Canadian financial review, also conducted in September, confirmed 
that Canada would not retreat from projected disbursements for the 
period July 1948 to June 1949 of $60 million in credits to the United 
Kingdom, $72 million to other ERP countries, $6 million in direct 
relief, and $57 million from the wheat price differential. 
72 
Cripps 
70. DEA, file 154(S), "Memorandum for the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs", by H. O. Moran, 18 September 1948. L. B. 
Pearson was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs 
on 10 September 1948. 
71. Ibid., Escott Reid, "Memorandum to the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs: Visit of Sir Stafford Cripps", 18 Septem- 
ber 1948. 
72. DEA, file 264(S), memorandum, "Canadian-United States ERP 
Discussions", 27-29 September 1948. In London, Robertson met 
with Cripps before his departure and led the discussion along 
more esoteric lines. The High Commissioner expressed his con- 
cern at the prospect of a division of the world into two trading 
blocs (sterling and dollar) with only a minimum of trading rela- 
tions between them. The decision evinced in the British four- 
year plan to conclude rigid bilateral agreement with other Euro- 
pean countries, thereby eventually bringing them 
into the sterling 
area, was therefore of concern to such a nation as Canada which 
relied heavily on trade. In addition, United States reactions 
could prove to be negative and could impair American attitudes 
to the Commonwealth and the incipient North Atlantic alliance. 
Cripps in turn expressed his doubt that continuation of present 
trends would result in the dichotomy foreseen 
by Robertson. He 
was correct. DEA, file 154(S), A. E. Ritchie, 
"Notes on Dinner 
Conversations with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Interested 
United Kingdom Officials", 3 September 1948. 
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would have no other choice but to accept the Canadian position with 
gratitude as a fait accaºnpZi. 
For Canada, there was little to fear from Commonwealth eco- 
namic intrigue. The Meeting of Prime Ministers convened in London 
following the Chancellor's visit to Ottawa, and although financial 
questions constituted a large portion of the agenda, the combination 
of the Cripps' visit and Norman Robertson's smooth presence as interim 
leader of the Canadian delegation - replacing an ailing Mackenzie King 
until St. Laurent arrived - ensured an absence of ruffled feathers. 
Indeed, Cripps repeatedly stressed the importance which the sterling 
countries must accord to Canada, both as a source of essential supply 
and as an expedient link with the dollar area. Also, the United King- 
dam would in practice offer preferential treatment to Canada over 
other dollar countries. 
73 
A proposal to establish further economic 
consultative machinery, in addition to the existing Commonwealth Eco- 
nomic Committee which had been established years earlier by the Impe- 
rial Conference, was routinely resisted by the Canadians, it not being 
perceived as having any useful purpose other than the promotion of 
trade within the sterling bloc. Moreover, its creation could pose 
difficulties with the United States. The suggestion eventually with- 
ered away, but not before Robertson recommended Canadian membership 
for the sole reason that if Canada was not party to the Commonwealth's 
deliberations, "the committee may get into all sorts of mischief., 
74 
Such a confident attitude on Canada's part would have been unthinkable 
in Commonwealth councils only a few years earlier. 
Canada's role in the making of peace in Europe on the poli- 
tical and strategic level could not be assumed as having been in any 
way profound. Its financial contributions to European recovery, on 
the other hand, when examined on a proportionate basis, come much 
nearer to fitting that description. Having per force and by design 
abandoned its pre-war view of the world, in favour of a new multi- 
lateralism, Canada nonetheless sought a re-ordering of the traditional 
73. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 107, file 
U-10-11, cable no. 1780, Robertson to Pearson, 
12 October 198. 
74. DEA, file 50023-40, cable no. 1809, Robertson to Pearson, 
14 October 1948. 
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North Atlantic triangle in the immediate post-war period. Washington 
had become the economic base of the triangle, and, in order to avoid 
being inexorably drawn into rigid alignment, Canada had to maintain 
in large measure its relationship with the United Kingdom and forge 
new links with what would become a reconstituted and rejuvenated 
Europe. Failure to pursue this restructured triangular pattern, and 
a reluctance on the part of the Europeans to accept its efficacy, 
even for themselves, as the British four-year plan seemed to indicate, 
could inhibit the trend toward political and military integration 
among the North Atlantic countries. "It is therefore in the national 
interest of Canada, " Escott Reid wrote in the autumn of 1948, "to do 
everything we can to diminish the possibility that economic develop- 
ments in the North Atlantic countries may in the long run make impos- 
sible the success of those political and military developments which 
are today the main goal of Canadian foreign policy. "75 A new inter- 
nationalism was at hand. 




EPILOGUE: NEW COMMITMENTS NOW NECESSARY 
The exigencies of the war as well as its legacy forced 
change in Canadian foreign policy during the 1940s. A policy of com- 
mitments only when absolutely necessary, the cautious philosophy most 
closely associated with Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who presided 
0 
over the Department of External Affairs for most of the period, gra- 
dually eroded to reveal what could best be identified as an approach 
characterized by "enlightened self-interest". This evolution, which 
the preceding chapters have sought to articulate, came, some would 
agree, in response to force majeure, but also as a result of deliberate 
policy direction, masterminded in part by a handful of bright minds 
resident in this same Department. They espoused a conviction that 
Canada should be accorded its rightful place in the new world order. 
Their wish to see Canada's chief instrument of policy, the functional 
principle, enshrined with more direct economic and strategic interests, 
as befitting the middle power which Canada had aspired to become, 
provided the catalyst for most of the nation's bilateral and multi- 
lateral initiatives. Status and recognition were significant, yet 
312 
313 
although traditional geopolitics would ensure the maintenance of the 
shorter but vital side of the North Atlantic Triangle, diminishing 
British influence, both constitutional and economic, together with 
Canada's broadening relationship with its powerful southern neighbour, 
its new-found interest in its own hemisphere and Europe, all necessi- 
tated realignment. How change came about in these various areas has 
already been demonstrated; the purpose of this epilogue is to convey 
just how much further it could and would go, particularly with respect 
to what had rapidly become the grand issues of the day, the dawn of 
the atomic age and the deterioration of East/West relations. 
As negotiators at the International Civil Aviation Confer- 
ence at Chicago in 1944 all too readily noticed, Canada lay astride 
the air routes of a world which could now be best perceived through 
polar geographic projections, Mercator's "Eurocentric" perspective 
being overly symbolic of distances once judged infinite. Two events - 
the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
1945, and the revelation of the existence in Canada of än espionage 
ring controlled by the Soviet Union a month later, evoked a sense of 
unfamiliar vulnerability and did much to once and for all eradicate 
the "fire-proof house" isolationist theory of Canadian policy which 
had prevailed between the wars. The Prime Minister, who in apocalyp- 
tic tones had earlier identified the atomic weapon as one which could 
perpetuate "dread among nations" and "could mean the destruction of 
civilization". 
' 
was later aghast that the Russians had penetrated his 
own Department of External Affairs, among others, in order to acquire 
the secret of the bomb's manufacture. 
2 
1. King's diary reflections followed discussions with British 
High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald on the subject. King Diary, 
24 February 1945. 
2. After initially trying to assure Norman Robertson that the 
revelations were those of an individual who had perhaps incurred 
the displeasure of the Soviet Embassy, he later discovered that 
the penetration had been more extensive than initially feared. 
"They went right into our Department of External Affairs ... 
in 
the cypher room there was an agent of the Russians who had seen 
and knew all our cyphers and had known what they contained. 
" 
Moreover, the British High Commission and National Research Labo- 
ratories in Ottawa and Montreal had also been infiltrated with 
people providing clandestine information to the Russians. 
King 
Diary, 6-7 September 1945. 
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Having played a minor role in what during the war had gradu- 
ally become a tripartate atomic partnership with the United States and 
United Kingdom, Canada's collaboration toward the peaceful use of 
atomic energy, through the construction of an experimental pile at 
Chalk River, was significant, all the more so since Canada was the 
sole producer of the essential ingredient, uranium oxide. The manage- 
ment of Canada's contribution rested with C. D. Howe, the indefatigable 
Minister of Munitions and Supply and with Dr. C. J. Mackenzie of the 
National Research Council. 
3 
Neither Mackenzie King nor the senior 
officials of his ministry were kept au courant with scientific develop- 
ments. 
Consequently, following the destruction of Hiroshima, the 
officers of the Department of External Affairs were confronted with 
the daunting task of establishing a comprehensive international atomic 
policy where before there had been none. Hume Wrong was quick off the 
mark, advising the Prime Minister that control of the weapon should 
rest with the United Nations. Such a denouement would of course have 
been admirably consistent with stated Canadian policy towards inter- 
national organization in general, and would, according to Wrong, be 
determined by the attitudes taken by the British and American govern- 
ments. Whether or not the secret of the bomb's manufacture would be 
preserved, shared or independently arrived at by other countries was 
still very much an open and unsettling question, as was whether ura- 
nium supplied by Canada would remain the principal ingredient. The 
possibility that the discovery of the atomic bomb could heighten ten- 
sion between the great powers instead of reducing it could also not 
be discounted. This in turn, Wrong prophetically noted, could result 
in "a serious effort to plant foreign agents in Canada with the object 
of securing information on secret processes. "4 
3. For a detailed analysis of Canada's role in the development 
of atomic energy, see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, P¬: üce- 
making and Deterrence, (vol. 3), (Toronto, 1972), pp. 258-318; 
John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, Canada and -%: c Search or 
World Order, 1943-1957, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1979), pp. 196-ý28; and 
Judith H. Lougheed, The Canadian Role in the Development of 
Atomic Energy, 1942-1946", unpublished M. A. Thesis, Norman Pater- 
son School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 
(Ottawa, 
1980). 
4. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 234, file 2284, memorandum, 
Wrong to King, 18 August 1945. 
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The revelations of the Gouzenko Affairs - to become known 
as the "King Affair" in Moscow upon public disclosure sometime later - 
vaulted Canada into the forefront of international intrigue. The 
uncomfortable position accorded Canada and the media attention gene- 
rated would not wane once the matter was made public in February 1946, 
as the disclosures eventually necessitated the establishment of a 
Royal Commission of enquiry which, in addition to corroborating Gou- 
zenko's evidence, brought uncustomary and unwanted public exposure 
to such paragons of selflessness as Norman Robertson. 
6 
Policy considerations pertaining to the Gouzenko business 
and the atomic bomb therefore became inexorably intertwined, and for 
Mackenzie King a meeting with President Truman and Prime Minister 
Attlee in Washington in November 1945, which resulted in a Declara- 
tion on Atomic Energy, thus took on a greater amount of gravity. On 
the one hand, international control of the awesome weapon had to be 
assured, yet on the other, a golden mean of firmness without antago- 
nism as well as a cautious magnaminity had to be pursued with the 
Soviet Union. For example, publicity of Soviet espionage activities 
prior to a possible extension of an invitation to the Russians to 
join in international atomic cooperation could be construed by Moscow 
as being indicative of premeditated Western unwillingness to include 
the Soviet Union. Indeed, a great power accord was essential, Robert- 
son informed his interlocutors at the Dominions Office, since the new 
weapon had by its very existence caused the arrangements for security 
and the great power veto established at San Francisco to lose much of 
5. Named after Igor Gouzenko, the Soviet cypher clerk who sought 
asylum at the Department of Justice on 6 September 1945, claiming 
to have documents disclosing the existence of a Soviet espionage 
operation in Canada. 
6. Roberton's name had been mentioned during the proceedings 
of the commission in connection with Fred Rose, the only com- 
munist Member of Parliament in Canada, whom Robertson 
had 
received at his home in 1941 in order to discuss Nazi activities 
in Canada. During the war years Robertson maintained a dossier 
on such subversive elements and continually prodded the 
Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police to take a greater interest in these 
questions, no matter how suspect the source. 
DEA, Canada House 
Series, vol. 2081, Robertson to Pearson, 
29 October 1946. 
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their meaning. Moreover, international control of the bomb required 
harsher measures than had ever been contemplated at that conference. 
Robertson did not exclude the possibility that the three nations thus 
far concerned could re-establish great power cooperation by sharing 
the results of atomic research. This, the Canadian High Commissioner 
believed, could be "a practical form of control: it would reinforce 
any scheme of international control worked out between the Governments 
concerned. "7 Though perhaps overly idealistic, the idea was sound, 
but simply came too late. 
A Canadian memorandum, written for presentation at the 
Washington meeting and largely the work of Lester Pearson, stipulated 
that the bomb represented "the greatest threat to man's existence 
ever conceived, and, paradoxically, the greatest opportunity to realize 
world peace. " Utilizing this dichotomy, the memorandum articulated a 
strident case for international regulation. The great powers, which 
in this instance appeared to include Canada, 
... should exploit the temporary advantage they now 
possess in order to bring this weapon under inter- 
national control, so that it can never be used by 
anyone. This can be attempted by trading the knowledge 
of invention and manufacture they alone possess at 
present, for renunciation by all nations of the right 
of production or use, except, possibly on orders from 
the United Nations. This in its turn means interna- 
tional supervision and control of the development and 
use of atomic energy. If an honest offer of this kind, 
made by the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, 
were refused by any other state, that refusal would 
certainly disclose which nations were to be trusted 
and which feared. 
8 
The Canadians had clearly presented their case: a gradua- 
list, and above all, multilateral approach was required. President 
Truman's statement of 27 October, which posited the theory that pos- 
session of the atomic bomb be regarded by the world as a 
"sacred 
trust", was in the Canadian perspective neither a viable nor 
logical 
alternative to international control. The Soviet Union would never 
7. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 340, file 3677, top secret 
summary of meeting between Robertson, 
M. I. 5 and Dominions Oflice 
officials, 9 October 1945. 
8. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 389, file "Pearson 
19=+5", 
"Canadian Memorandum on Atomic Warfare", 8 November 
19.5. 
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accept such a unilateral "solution" as the final word in power bloc 
politics. In the event, and once the initial hysteria over bureau- 
cratic unpreparedness had dissipated, British and American views 
proved to be in accordance with those Canadian, and the more voci- 
ferous arguments were withheld for future use. 
Apparent tripartite congruence notwithstanding, Mackenzie 
King intervened with several tactical suggestions to the American 
draft declaration. He believed that by placing the recommendations 
of the three nations for control of the bomb in the text before the 
announcement of the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission under the 
aegis of the United Nations - the real purpose of the declaration - 
the three powers, which in his mind really meant the United States, 
could be prevented from shirking their responsibilities in favour of 
a "leave it to the UN attitude. " Further, the Canadian Prime Minister 
emphasized the necessity of having adequate safeguards in place before 
specialized atomic information could be exchanged with other countries. 
A broader concern noted by Pearson, and one which permeated the Cana- 
dian side, was that "... in referring to a Commission of the United 
Nations, the world organization was being given a very severe test at 
the outset of its existence. " As a result, the three signatory states 
were "now obligated more than ever... to strengthen and develop the 
United Nations Organization so that it could successfully meet this 
and other tests. "9 
In the declaration itself, the three heads of government 
stressed the reciprocal aspect any exchange of basic scientific infor- 
mation would dictate, and affirmed their scepticism that dissemination 
of specialized data concerning the practical use of atomic energy 
without effective, reciprocal and enforceable safeguards acceptable 
to all nations "... would contribute to a constructive solution of 
9. King Papers, J1 Series, vol. 389, file "Pearson 19+5", 
despatch no. 2714, Pearson to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 21 November 1945. In the same despatch, Pearson com- 
mented on the rampant confusion which had prevailed throughout 
the drafting of the declaration. British and American drafts 
had been presented, but not by an amalgamated 
drafting committee 
as was customary. Canada did not present 
its text, and chose 
instead to amend the American draft. A 
_onü drafting 
committee, of which Pearson was a member, was not established 
until the eleventh hour. 
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the problem of the atomic bomb. On the contrary, we think it might 
have the opposite effect. "10 Of greater significance than these 
words, which in retrospect seem to have taken on a rhetorical hue, 
was the proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Commission 
on Atomic Energy, which, empowered to make specific proposals for 
the exchange of scientific information, disarmament, and effective 
safeguards, would build mutual confidence. 
11 
Under the assumption 
that confidence would increase, and indeed be mutual, the Commission 
could in turn proceed to more complex, and ultimately secure methods 
of atomic energy control. 
The creation of the Commission was approved by the f our 
great powers in Moscow one month later, and Canada was the only nation 
not a great power to be granted membership. The appointment of General 
A. G. L. McNaughton: soldier, scientist and erstwhile Minister of National 
Defence as Canada's representative, attested to the seriousness with 
which Canada perceived its new role in the atomic age. McNaughton's 
tenure at the United Nations would be fraught with frustrations as 
friction between East and West intensified; his active and sensible 
presence however helped to assure Canada of a place in the front row 
of global developments and would underscore the deep sense of commit- 
ment Canada would bring to the United Nations then and in the decade 
to come. 
Mackenzie King did in fact discuss the Gouzenko Affair and 
its ramifications with Messrs. Truman and Attlee at Washington and 
together the heads of goverment reached an understanding that there 
should be no publicity in the immediate future, and for good reason. 
Negotiations with the Soviet Union in the Council of Ministers at the 
time could best be described as arduous and exasperating, with atomic 
energy adding a new and unpredictable dimension. Several valuable 
months could also be beneficial to ferret out unsuspecting 
Soviet 
10. Canada, Treaty Series, 1945, no. 13, "Declaration on Atomic 
Energy made by the President of the United 
States of America, 
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the 
Prime Minister 
of Canada at Washington, November 
15,1945. " 
11. An expression which would come to epitomize 
East/West 
detente some thirty years later. 
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agents and informers in all three countries. For Canada the situation 
was very distressing: it dearly wished to see a rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union among the great powers, yet not entirely at the price of 
its own security and relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The bilateral climate between Canada and the Soviet Union 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1942 had been 
correct and cordial, if one-sided. Canada-Russia friendship societies 
flourished in Canada, the Canadian press was lavish in its praise of 
the Soviet war effort and did its best to minimize the attention given 
to ideological and social differences. With the exception of their 
unpalatable stance on the equality of the British Dominions with the 
constituent Soviet republics and their stubborness over the veto at 
San Francisco, Soviet diplomats had been treated with diffidence by 
their Canadian counterparts. The Soviet Union was also a recipient 
of Canadian aid, both through outright loans and UNRRA. Save for the 
transfer of ownership of the Petsamo nickel mines in Finland, which 
brought twenty million dollars into Canadian corporate coffers in 
194412, the Soviet Union did little or nothing to reciprocate Canada's 
good will. When Mackenzie King therefore glowingly portrayed the 
development of relations between his country and the Soviet Union to 
his Commonwealth colleagues at their 1944 London meeting, he was trying 
to give substance to an essentially one-sided story. 
13 
Instead, Canada was frequently denounced as an imperialist 
capitalist state, a country which hoarded its wheat while others 
starved, and as a "puppet" of the United States or colony of the United 
Kingdom. Canadian officials experienced Soviet obstructionist methods 
first hand at several international conferences and by 1946, Canadian 
delegates to multilateral meetings were issued instructions as to how 
to respond to the most flagrant disruptive tactics employed by their 
12. Canada, Treaty Series, 1944, No. 29, "Protocol between 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics Providing for the Payment of a Compensation to Canada 
for Nickel Mines at Petsamo", signed at Moscow, 8 October 19ý+. 
13. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 322, copy of British document 




In installing a mission at Kuibyshev, the Russian war-time 
capital in 1943, and in appointing Dana Wilgress, a senior and highly 
lauded observer of Soviet affairs as ambassador, Canada demonstrated 
its desire to accord diplomatic parity to its relations with the last 
of the great powers. Canada's diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union 
was therefore as much a symbol of Canada's middle power status as an 
observation post, the interaction between these two functions being 
integral to the perspective of Canada's place in the new world order 
as postulated by the Department of External Affairs. The process was 
continuous. As has already been noted in the preceding chapters, 
analysis within the various post-hostilities planning committees in 
Ottawa also exhibited commentaries on Soviet policy, particularly 
with respect to the question of ultimate peace in Europe. Despatches 
from Moscow, either from the hand of Wilgress or his able lieutenant 
Arnold Smith, and later John Holmes, frequently augmented departmental 
efforts and usually made their way onto the Prime Minister's desk, 
further distribution to either the Foreign Office or State Department 
not being unusual. 
In the same manner that the Canadians could not curb their 
intellectual exuberance over the future of Europe before and after 
the Paris Conference, so could they not restrain themselves from 
probing Soviet foreign policy and its global implications. A cynical 
and even realistic reader might assert that such analyses were all for 
naught, that Canada had only a minor role to play in what were, by any 
definition, great power stakes. This view was initially shared to a 
certain degree in Ottawa, where, as exemplified by the Cabinet War 
Committee's decision in 1943 not to have Canada become the protecting 
power for Poland in the Soviet Union - after British and American over- 
14. For example: "Some Soviet delegates make a practice of 
trying to goad other delegates into losing their tempers. They 
then reply coldly and suavely. Though a loss of temper 
is 
almost always unwise, this does not mean that a representative 
should always be restrained and unemotional. There are times 
when he can usefully be forceful, spirited, eloquent and 
blunt. " 




tures to do so - prudence prevailed. 
15 
However in the next few years, the beliefs of the officers 
of the Department of External Affairs and the political pragmatism 
of their political masters became remarkably consonant. Canada, it 
was strongly believed, had a direct interest in the temper of rela- 
tions between the Soviet Union and the United States, the latter, 
since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1941, being a military ally of 
Canada. The existence of the atomic bomb, not to mention the Marshall 
Plan, had added even greater import to this continental relationship. 
Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 
1946, which divided departmental opinion, was seen as an illustration 
of changing values. Aside from the obvious reasons for producing 
detailed studies within the East Block, the opportunity to create 
discursive and academic pieces on a subject, or to reply to them in 
a similar manner, strengthened morale in the Department and honed 
skills which would prove invaluable in the numerous multilateral 
encounters to come. In the case of tripartite deliberations for a 
North Atlantic treaty, the Canadians would not have long to wait. 
The work of Dana Wilgress, a fluent Russian speaker who 
had begun his career as a trade commissioner in the Soviet Union in 
the 1920s, set the tone. In a despatch reflecting upon the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers which transpired in October 1943, 
Wilgress stated that following the war, the Soviet Union would do 
everything possible to maintain a free hand in Eastern Europe and 
would be wary indeed of American altruism and how it would affect 
that objective. The Soviet Union hoped for a lengthy period of peace 
and security to recuperate from the ravages of war, and, according to 
Wilgress, would have to be assured that collective security, and not 
the balance of power principle which was evidently preferred, repre- 
sented the means to this end. "None of this is likely to materialize, 
" 
concluded the ambassador, "unless the United States commences to 
realize that the battle for security has to be fought on two 
fronts - 
the domestic front against Middle Western isolationism and the 
foreign 
front against balance of power and spheres of influence proponents 
in 
15. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 425, Cabinet War Committee, 
minutes, 5 May 1943. 
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other countries. "16 Given the Soviet concern for a free regional : and, 
as described by Wilgress, it was not surprising, therefore, that Canada': 
functional principle garnered little more than a polite nod in Moscow. 
The last possible thing the Russians wanted were smaller powers reques- 
ting a voice in the settlement of Europe. 
17 
At the forefront of much of the intellectual activity of the 
Department of External Affairs, one could predictably find Escott Reid. 
In August 1947, while several of his colleagues were preoccupied with 
the implementation of the Marshall Plan and Canada's own financial 
crisis, Reid turned his energetic mind to an allied but to him, 
broader subject: Western Union. It was a concept which occupied 
policy planners in several countries, and which several months later 
would be pushed by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin as a means 
for uniting Europe against possible Soviet aggression. This action 
would result in the Brussels Treaty of March 1948. In a lengthy memo- 
randum entitled "The United States and the Soviet Union", Reid attemp- 
ted to determine the ppssibility of war between these two powers and 
the implications for Canadian policy either in the event of war or in 
the case of persistent bellicosity. Although he concluded that war 
within the next ten to fifteen years was unlikely, it could be pre- 
vented through a closer integration of the Western democracies and 
a collectively firm but open approach to the Soviet Union. In ela- 
borating upon what this would mean for Canadian policy, Reid stated 
that American journalist Walter Lippmann's idea of an "Atlantic 
Community" was already coming into existence through the Marshall Plan. 
16. DEA, File 7-V(s), despatch no. 50, Wilgress to King, 
16 February 1944. Wilgress was also concerned by recent 
"spheres of influence" theories advanced by members of the 
Churchill Government. 
17. At a meeting in Moscow with Vice-Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs Ivan Maisky, Wilgress was subjected to a discourse 
on the need for a superior voice for the great powers in the 
formation of a new international organization. Wilgress re- 
plied: "I then said that our policy had been enunciated very 
clearly in a recent speech of the Prime Minister and asked 
him 
if this speech had come to his attention. He replied 
in the 
affirmative and said, 'Mr. King gave Lord Halifax a very clear 
answer. Poor Halifax. ' The last remark was said with a quiet 
smile. " 
DEA, Papers from the Office of the Under-Secretary Series, 
vol. 823, file 702, despatch no. 79, Wilgress to 
King, 10 March 
1944. 
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The Canadians would extrapolate upon this concept at a later date. 
For Canada, therefore, the Pax Britannica of the previous century, 
which had faded with the end of the war and would continue to do so 
with the emergence of newly independent nations, was to be replaced 
by a Pax Americana in the later twentieth century. In recognition 
of this fact and in view of evident similarities between Canadian 
and American sectors of public opinion, Canada, Reid argued, could 
exert "an influence at Washington out of all proportion to the rela- 
tive importance of our strength in war compared with that of the 
United States. The game is difficult, the issues will be delicate, 
but with skill we can play it successfully. "18 
Reid's thoughts generated a good deal of attention and com- 
ment among his colleagues. In a highly detailed response, Charles 
Ritchie, now ensconced as second-in-command in Paris, disagreed with 
the "maximize influence in Washington theory", because of its appa- 
rent exclusivity. He suggested that instead Canada "emphasize as 
much as possible her independent position and in so doing lend all 
possible support to a faltering United Kingdom, whose wide inter- 
national experience "made her a most valuable source for peace. " 
Moreover, Britain could still be used as a counterweight to the per- 
vasive influence of the United States. The maintenance and enhance- 
ment of relations with other middle and smaller powers should also 
not be overlooked, and, of greatest significance in a global context, 
Canada should continue its very active participation in the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies. 
19 
The Department's Soviet experts did not hesitate to make 
their views known as well. Dana Wilgress took time from what were 
proving difficult multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva to 
18. DEA, File 52-F(s), memorandum, "The United States and the 
Soviet Union", 30 August 1947. Reid had compiled much of his 
supporting information from despatches received from Moscow 
and from George Kennan's famous "X" article, "The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs (July 1947), pp. 566-582. 
19. DEA, File 52-F(s), untitled memorandum, Ritchie's comments 
on Reid's paper, op. cit., 6 November 1947. In Washington, 
Wrong shared Ritchie' s views. Ibid. , 
"Comment on Draft 
Memorandum dated August 30th Entitled 'United States and 
Soviet Union"', 3 December 1947. 
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state that the memorandum should offer a more finely tuned historical 
perspective but also urged that "... we should once and for all stop 
arguing about the proper method of dealing with the Soviet Union and 
give every support to that policy of firmness upon which the United 
States is embarking... " 
20 
Arnold Smith, for his part, dismissed the 
entire "bi-polarity" thesis of the possibility of war arising out of 
the interplay of two great concentrations of power. In a letter to 
Pearson on the subject of the Reid memorandum, he advanced the view 
that the danger of war would arise almost exclusively from the expan- 
sionist policies pursued by the Soviet Union, since in the Kremlin, 
"offence" and "defence" were synonymous. Smith also advocated a 
form of Western union as the best response to the security threat 
posed by the Soviet Union, but went much further in proposing that 
the Soviet Union should be made to withdraw from the United Nations. 
By such an action, "an overwhelming and effective preponderance of 
strength in the non-Soviet three-quarters of the world" could be 
organized, thus serving to reduce the prospects of war. 
21 
In es- 
pousing this opinion, Smith was very much in the minority among his 
colleagues, who had placed most of their hopes for the future in 
that organization and its universality. 
Smith also produced a lengthy and comprehensive paper en- 
titled "The Russians and the Rest of Us" which convincingly articu- 
lated his thesis and which, as one would by now expect, generated 
another flurry of opinions and analyses from Canadian policy makers 
in both Ottawa and farther-flung points on the globe. From London, 
Robert Ford indicated that he thought the study a useful exercise, 
however chose to debate some of the finer points concerning the 
20. DEA, File 52-F(s), Wilgress to Pearson, 6 November 1947. 
21. DEA, File 52-F(s), Smith to Pearson, 10 December 1947. 
At the time, Smith was on a secondment to the National Defence 
College at Kingston, Ontario. His friend from his Moscow 
days, George Kennan, had accepted a similar position south 
of the border. Smith would serve as Canadian Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and become the first 
Secretary General of the Commonwealth, a position he held 
from 19 65 to 19 75. 
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application of Marxist doctrine in the Soviet Union. 22 At the mili- 
tary mission in Berlin, General Maurice Pope was less kind: "I get 
impressions both of reality and unreality, of a sense of that which 
is possible combined with a rarified academic point of view that is 
hardly of this though world in which we live. And the effect of one 
is pretty well to neutralize the other. , 
23 
By far the most realistic, and in retrospect, prescient, 
analysis emanated from the Canadian Embassy in Moscow where John 
Holmes laboured diligently as Charge d'Affaires during the difficult 
years of 1947 and 1948. Holmes applauded the efforts of Smith but 
admitted that although he himself had been in Moscow for some time, 
he still found it difficult to reach any conclusions about many 
aspects of Soviet policy. Holmes commented that "this exceptionally 
rational and logical discussion was perhaps too logical. It is a 
great mistake to underestimate the strength and determination of this 
country, but I wonder if we do not fall into the error sometimes of 
assuming it to be more monolithic than it is . 
"24 Specifically, Holmes 
believed that the Soviet regime was at times capable of brilliant 
action, as in orchestrating the change of government in Prague, but 
also of considerable bungling, as demonstrated by various gratuitous 
actions which only hastened the passage of the European Recovery 
Programme by the United States Congress. Though economically the 
government was capable of impressive if ruthless measures, there 
were also monumental errors of judgment made by the leadership, "a 
25 
mixture of men with brilliant minds and fanatical ignoramuses. " 
22. DEA, File 52-F(s), Ford to Reid, 6 April 1948. In future 
years, Ford would become "the" expert on the Soviet Union in 
the Department of External Affairs and Dean of the Diplomatic 
Corps in Moscow. Now in retirement, he continues to serve as 
"Special Advisor to the Under-Secretary on East/West Relations". 
23. DEA, File 52-F(s), Pope to Reid, 28 January 1948. Smith 
and Reid have both readily acknowledged that their views were 
at times ignored when first presented, but as circumstances 
changed, their superiors often tended to be less sceptical. 
Interviews with Arnold Smith, 6 June 1980 and Escott Reid, 
12 June 1980. 
24. DEA, File 52-F(s), Holmes to Reid, 2 September 1948. 
25. Ibid. 
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Human frailty, as in the Western democracies, also played its part 
in the Soviet Union, where it perhaps merited greater study because 
it was less tangible. 
The foregoing account of perceptions of the Soviet question 
has provided only a brief glimpse at the extent and depth of intel- 
lectual discussion within the Department of External Affairs. One 
is, however, able to discern that during the five years from when 
the Department officially went to war in 1943, the formation of policy 
within it, as a result of a dialectic of various points of view, had 
become more sophisticated, balanced and pragmatic, the tone being set 
for Canada's next decade. The initial goal had been one of inter- 
national order through forms of multilateral organization which would 
embody the needs and aspirations of all nations. The transition from 
this Weltanschauung to one which would include an important security 
element, either in the name of the United Nations or through a re- 
gional grouping under its Charter was made effortlessly, largely due 
to a reliance on special relationships with the United States and 
United Kingdom, expanding relationships with other countries, and 
the existence of a fundamental multilateral raison d'etre, the func- 
tional principle. The central issue was clearly one of avoiding a 
military confrontation between eastern and western power blocs, 
something which solutions such as the "fool's paradise" of another 
Kellogg-Briand Pact could simply not prevent. As both the United 
States and Soviet Union entertained misconceptions about the other, 
based in part upon a reciprocal ignorance of the other's history and 
ideology, as well as a wariness over their respective motives, flaws 
in their policies could rapidly become fissures if rationality did 
not prevail. 
26 
As a middle power with much at stake, it was believed in 
Ottawa that Canada could provide a rational but self-interested con- 
tribution towards the maintenance of peace through collective secu- 
rity. In pursuing this conviction, Canadian officials played a major 
26. DEA, File 52-F(s) , memorandum 
by Hume Wrong and Hume 
Wright, "Influences Shaping the Policy of the United States 
towards the Soviet Union, " Washington, 4 December 1947. 
Also Ford to Reid, 26 February 1948. 
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role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
27 
Canada's overall 
approach to the concept of Western union was perhaps best defined by 
a distinguished British scholar as being guided by a profound concern 
"... that British and American policy should keep in step", and that 
the American initiative in European reconstruction "... has been doubly 
welcome in that it reconciled Canada's interests as a North American 
and as a British nation. " 
28 
In Ottawa there was less cool academic detachment about 
Canada's role. "One reason why we need an Atlantic Union, " Lester 
Pearson wrote Hume Wrong, "is that we must establish in peace time 
some international constitutional machinery which could be used in 
war time as the basis for a supreme war council, or some such body. " 
There was a functionalist aspect as well in that the existence of 
such machinery would enable "governments which have wisdom and matu- 
rity to have greater influence on the formulation of policy than 
would be warranted by their mere power alone., 
29 
The experiences 
of the war continued to rankle. 
In fashioning this Canadian outlook, Pearson and Reid worked 
together very closely, the former frequently driven and won over by 
the crusading fervour of the latter. In a unique development, both 
men did some of their policy-making in public, delivering speeches 
on their favourite subject to boards of trade and meetings of learned 
societies. They were more forthright in their classified prose, with 
phrases dealing with the purpose of the proposed pact as a rallying 
point for the spiritual as well as military and economic resources 
of Western Christendom against Soviet totalitarianism creeping into 
the occasional memorandum. 
30 
Ever the consummate drafter, Reid com- 
27. For a superlative account of the making of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, see Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hore, The 
Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, (Toronto, 1977). 
Other excellent studies include James Eayrs, In Defen, -ý_- of 
Canada: Growing Up AZZied (vol. 4), (Toronto, 1980); and John 
W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, Canada and the Sear 2l. -"o-,, 
World Order, vol. 2, (Toronto, 1982). 
28. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 237, File 2351, copy of a 
paper by Nicholas Mansergh of Chatham House, 27 July 
198. 
29. Reid Papers, vol. 6, Pearson to Wrong, 21 May 
1948. 
30. Reid Papers, vol. 6, memorandum by Reid and revised 
by 
Pearson, "Proposed Pact of Mutual Assistance", 1-; March 19.48. 
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composed a "Treaty of the Free World" as he had done for the San 
Francisco Conference a few years earlier and also wrote of the need 
for a North Atlantic Parliament led by Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, 
General Dwight Eisenhower and Lester Pearson. 
31 
Such ardour was not 
always welcome to other members of the Department, as for example 
Norman Robertson, who, though usually of a tolerant demeanour, on 
one occasion reproached Reid for his language: "Specifically, I 
would cut out all the three-decker phrases... most of the double-bar- 
relled ones, and any remaining echoes from the Anglican prayer book. "32 
If Canadian officials appeared overly fervent at times it 
was for good reason, for the Soviet Union's actions in Europe, from 
the collapse of Czechoslovakia, to pressures on Turkey and Iran, 
the Berlin Blockade, as well as the uncertainty of imminent elections 
in Italy, all heightened a feeling of nervous tension and impending 
crisis. Apparent Soviet designs on Norway prompted Clement Attlee 
to inform Mackenzie King that "events are moving even quicker than 
we at first apprehended... in this situation only a bold move can 
avert the danger and the pace already set by Russia tells us that 
there is no time to lose... "33 The British Prime Minister concluded 
that the most effective course to follow would be to take early steps 
under the United Nations Charter to form a regional Atlantic pact of 
mutual assistance. Moreover, he proposed that officials of the United 
States, United Kingdom and Canada meet in Washington for preliminary 
discussions towards this end. Mackenzie King, undoubtedly realizing 
that the time for prudent procrastination had long since passed, 
31. Reid Papers, vol. 6, "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary", 
18 March 1948. 
32. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 112, file 
U-40-4, cable no. 1987, Robertson to Reid, 9 November 1948. 
In response Reid stated that much of the draft had already 
been amended, some of the language having been taken verbatim 
from correspondence between Messrs. King and Attlee. Further, 
"Canadian adherence to the proposed Treaty will constitute a 
revolution in Canadian foreign policy and it would be easier 
to get full public support for this revolution if the Treaty 
is as easily understandable as possible. It would also, I 
hope, not be written in the language of tired civil servants. 
That is all I am after. " Ibid ., cable no. 
1908, Reid to 
Robertson, 11 November 1948. 
33. Reid Papers, vol. 6, cable no. 220, Attlee to King, 
10 March 1948. 
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cabled a precise and immediate reply: "I am deeply impressed with 
the gravity of these developments... collective measures seem to e 
to be essential to establish some sense of security and to preserve 
the peace. " 
34 
Thus, for the first time in its history, Canada was 
poised to enter into a peace-time alliance, an action dictated by 
necessity and facilitated by an enhanced and confident presence on 
the international stage. Commonwealth defence had been perceived 
as archaic and impractical; complete continental integration too 
rigid. An agreement with both the United States and United Kingdom, 
however, to include an unspecified number of continental European 
countries, would have great appeal, and would be more in keeping with 
the evolution and direction of Canadian policy. 
The preliminary tripartite discussions in Washington, which 
concluded at the end of March 1948, established the groundwork for 
multilateral talks at a later date. The fact that these and subse- 
quent deliberations were held in the American capital was indicative 
of a radical change in United States peacetime foreign policy, as 
well as the Truman Administration's determination to adopt a politi- 
cally bi-partisan approach acceptable to Congress. In representing 
Canada, Pearson agreed that a preliminary paper should be circulated 
in the form of a United States proposal, so that if leaks should 
occur, the entire venture would not be construed by other governments - 
notably the French - as having been the work of three countries. With 
Pearson's assistance, two initial ideas were temporarily discounted: 
that Canada and the United States accede to the European Brussels 
Pact already in existence and that the United States (possibly with 
Canada) issue a unilateral declaration of mutual assistance, thereby 
establishing a sort of North Atlantic Munroe Doctrine. The former 
suggestion was criticized for not allowing for a comprehensive struc- 
ture should other countries wish to become involved; the latter, by 
its very unilateral nature would stifle hopes for guarantees of reci- 
procity - essential in Canadian eyes - and could evoke some public 
dissatisfaction by its apparent one-sidedness. In this first meeting, 
senior officials of the three nations recommended that 
diplomatic 
approaches be undertaken by the United States to the Brussels signa- 
34. Reid Papers, vol. 6, cable no. 666, King to Attlee, 
11 March 1948. 
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tories to inform them of plans to conclude a security pact for the 
North Atlantic Area, 
35 
and similar demarches should be made to the 
Nordic countries to ascertain whether they would be prepared to 
accede to the Brussels Treaty. Of greatest significance in terms 
of whether a regional security pact would in fact be viable, was the 
recommendation that the President of the United States make a decla- 
ration of American intention in light of the obligations assumed by 
the Brussels Pact signatories pending the conclusion of a regional 
pact. Such a declaration would essentially amount to a guarantee 
that an armed attack against a nation party to the Brussels Treaty 
would be considered an attack against the United States and would be 
dealt with under the collective self-defence provisions of Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter. 
36 
While haste appeared to be of the essence, given the pre- 
vailing public views at the time that Soviet armies numbering three 
million men could occupy Europe to the Atlantic coast in a matter of 
weeks, there was at least some unease that the determination with 
which North Atlantic consolidation was being carried out could pro- 
voke the Russians to engage in equally determined action. From Moscow, 
John Holmes counselled that in the ensuing months care should be 
taken to leave the Soviet Union grounds for retreat. But, as he also 
acknowledged, "Whatever the risks of firmness, the risks of weakness 
are greater., 
37 
Canadian attempts to temporize, albeit in a manner 
which would not directly present the Russians with sufficient latitude 
to retreat, took the form of a continuing effort to diversify the 
purposes of the North Atlantic Pact to include provision for a "North 
Atlantic Community", a concept which had begun to acquire shape in 
Ottawa at this time. In this instance, the motive of domestic poli- 
tical and economic self-interest could not be overlooked either. 
35. "Area" was added to the title for reasons of flexibility, 
as Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran and other countries at this 
stage being contemplated as possible signatories or recipients 
of military guarantees, could lay no claim to 
Atlantic shoreline. 
36. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 112, 
file 
U-40-4, memorandum by Pearson, 
"Security Pact for the North 
Atlantic Area", 27 March 1948. Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter refers to "the inherent right of the 
individual or col- 
lective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member 
of the United Nations. " 
37. DEA, File 283(s), Holmes to Pearson, 
9 April 1948. 
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Official discussions in Washington during the summer of 1948 
between the United States and the Brussels powers, joined after the 
initial meetings by Canada, led to predictable differences. There 
was dissent over which countries should be included in the pact, 
some such as Italy not really being able to claim an Atlantic presence. 
Another, Portugal, possessed a government which at least in Ottawa 
did not meet the standards for membership in a union of Western demo- 
cracies. In the event, the strategic value of the Azores proved too 
attractive for the Americans and British to resist. A further problem 
for the Canadians was the linkage, or in American strategist George 
Kennan's terms "dumbbell" theory postulated by the United States, 
which maintained that a pact consisting of the Brussels group on the 
one hand, linked to a North American unit on the other, would con- 
stitute the best arrangement. Canada, with its own North Atlantic 
triangular relationship, did not wish to see this traditional struc- 
ture compromised at continental expense, and, in addition, have the 
prospects for reciprocal guarantees among North Atlantic Treaty sig- 
natories diminish. 
Lester Pearson, who during the multilateral negotiations 
in Washington was elevated to the position of Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet on 4 October 
1948 which summarized the discussions to that point and outlined pros- 
pects for the second phase of more detailed talks. The proposed 
treaty's basic purpose would be to provide "the basis for the organi- 
zation of an overwhelming preponderance of force - military, economic 
and moral - over the Soviet Union and a sufficient degree of unity to 
ensure that this preponderance of force may be used as to guarantee 
ne. "38 Increases that the free nations will not be defeated one by o .  
38 
in defence expenditures by Canada, an important domestic issue which 
would have to be considered, would be necessary in any event, 
Pearson 
argued, as the existing state of international tension would 
likely 
continue. However the rearmament of members of the 
Pact would be 
premised on a plan where each country would undertake the task 
it could 
perform most efficiently. Canada could therefore expect 
to expend 
funds to maintain its own armed forces and 
industrial machine in a 
state of readiness and could possibly assist 
in rearming the Western 
European countries. 
38. DEA, File 283(s), "Memorandum to the Cabinet: 
North Atlan- 
tic Treaty", 4 October 1948. 
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In his memorandum to his Cabinet colleagues, Pearson also 
presented the foundation of the arguments Canada would expound in 
the coming months concerning Article 2 of the Treaty, to be known 
afterward as the "Canadian Article". Mindful of the way Canada had 
been expected to "tag along" when hostilities commenced in 1939, of 
its privileged yet minor role at Dumbarton Oaks and in the direction 
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as 
well as the sobering experience of peacemaking at Paris two years 
earlier, it was now to be welcomed that the North Atlantic Treaty 
"establishes a constitutional basis for a devolution of per in 
peace and war from the Grand Alliance to its organs and agents, as 
compared with the arrogation of power by the Big Two or the Big Three 
in the last war. " The new minister's words echoed the functionalist 
thinking prevalent in his department, an outlook he himself had helped 
to create. Stating that this new international institution would 
have the potential for growth and adaptation against changing global 
conditions, Pearson predicted that the "North Atlantic Community", 
"today a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic 
and cultural traditions", could in the future become a vehicle for 
political and economic unification. 
39 
Thus the focus of Canadian attention and effort became 
Article 2 of the Treaty. Article 5, which dealt with the "Pledge" 
to commit troops, where one would suspect Mackenzie King would have 
placed greater emphasis, had he not been so close to the end of his 
public career, assumed lesser importance. The balance of payments 
crisis of the previous year, protracted bilateral financial uncer- 
tainty with the United Kingdom, an enhanced commercial relationship 
with the United States and active participation in the European Reco- 
very Programme all necessitated a more pervasive Canadian concern with 
39. DEA, File 283(s), "Memorandum to the Cabinet: North Atlan- 
tic Treaty", 4 October 1948. The actual article states: 
"The Parties will contribute toward the further 
development 
of peaceful and friendly international relations 
by strengthening 
their free institutions, by bringing about a 
better understanding 
of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, 
and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. 
They 
will seek to eliminate conflict 
in their international economic 
policies and will encourage economic collaboration 
between any 
and all of them. " 
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multilateral economic questions. The North Atlantic Alliance would 
not become an exception to this tenet of Canadian foreign policy. 
As Escott Reid so simply explained Canada's dilemma, "... Canada would, 
economically speaking, be keeping one foot in the United States camp 
and one foot in the Western European camp; this would help to blur 
the sharp edges between the two groups .,, 
40 
A sense of balance and 
proportion in Canadian policy could therefore be maintained. 
Although the Americans were initially not enamoured with 
the proposal to include an economic statement, for fear it would gene- 
rate confusion with other international agencies already active in 
the field, they eventually became more amenable to the concept of 
"some general blessing" to be given in the preamble of the treaty 
for collaboration amongst members. 
41 
To some in Ottawa, this would 
simply not do. Reid urged a higher moralistic tone, and envisioned 
the aim of the drafters of the Treaty of Rome some years later for a 
federation with supranational authority. His basic philosophy, moulded 
during his activist stewardship of the Canadian Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs over a decade earlier, was that international con- 
flict, as perpetrated by the anachronism known as the sovereign state, 
could be reduced through the efforts of an international body equipped 
with effective legislative powers. 
42 
North Atlantic integration was 
therefore desirable, if not essential. 
In Washington Hume Wrong, more appreciative of the foibles 
and sensitivities of American domestic politics, repeatedly stated 
that it was an alliance which was being created, and not a federation. 
In London, Norman Robertson in large measure shared his colleague's 
views. Wrong feared that any attempt to identify the agencies to be 
established in the Treaty would foment disputes over their composi- 
tion and terms of reference. "I much prefer to get the Treaty first 
and then debate these matters in a Council, on which we would, of 
40. DEA, File 154(s), untitled memorandum by Escott Reid, 
24 September 1948. 
41. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 112, File 
U-40-4, cable no. 3024, Wrong to Reid, 
24 November 1948. 
42. Personal letter from Escott Reid to Loring Christie, 
10 October 1935. Given to the author by Mr. Escott Reid. 
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course, be effectively represented. "43 The ambassador was correct, 
for in the ensuing months, Congressmen would enquire why the Geneva 
agreements were insufficient to encompass economic collaboration in 
toto and State Department officials would indicate their perhaps 
premature distaste for some of the activities of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council as well as UNESCO. 
44 
Lester Pearson waivered between the two polarities presented 
by his closest advisors, but eventually came down in favour of the 
necessity to include Article 2 in the North Atlantic Treaty, but for 
a variety of largely economic reasons which could be supported in the 
House of Commons. He had now become, first and foremost, a politician. 
Although American recalcitrance over perceived Congressional dissent 
was understandable, the United States in fact possessed articles 
similar to Article 2 in bilateral agreements already negotiated with 
the Western European countries under the Economic Cooperation Act. 
As Canada had no such accords, it was believed that Canadian arguments 
for a strong Article 2 were not unlike those previously advanced by 
the United States. Further, the article could acquire additional 
significance as the basis for financial cooperation between Canada 
and the United Kingdom to balance obligations assumed by Britain to 
continental Europe under the Organization for European Economic Co- 
operation. Also, the United States in all likelihood shared Canada's 
concern over current trading practices promulgated by the United King- 
dom, for one, which featured the reduction of imports from hard cur- 
rency or dollar sources. 
45 
With the full support of the United Kingdom and later the 
other European countries, as well as an important concession on the 
part of the United States, Canada achieved the inclusion of its 
article in the North Atlantic Treaty. Had it come to forcing the 
Canadians' hand on whether to have the Treaty without Article 2, 
Canada would no doubt have capitulated, as its commitment from the 
43. Privy Council Office Records, Series 18, vol. 112, file 
U-40-4, cable no. 3024, Wrong to Reid, 24 November 1948. 
44. Ibid., cable no. WA-447, Wrong to Pearson and Reid, 
19 February 1949. 
45. Ibid., "Memorandum for Cabinet; Proposed North Atlantic 
Treaty", 16 February 1949. 
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outset, indeed throughout the development of international organiza- 
tions during these years, had been to contribute its proportionate 
share to the maintenance of peace and world order. However the fact 
that nations initially indifferent or opposed to Canada's position 
on the North Atlantic Treaty ultimately concurred with Article 2, 
provided adequate recognition of Canada having been elevated to the 
rank of a middle power. What has been termed Canada's "golden age" 
of diplomacy had begun. 
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